START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000419 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I): RUSSIAN PAPER CONTAINING QUESTIONS ON U.S. "ELEMENTS" PAPER Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-007. ¶2. (U) The text at paragraph 3 is the official translation of the Russian paper containing questions on the U.S. "Elements" Paper. ¶3. (S) Begin text: Official Translation Paper of the Russian Side June 2, 2009 Questions of the Russian Side in Connection with the U.S. Paper "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty" of May 19, 2009 ¶1. Paragraph (e) of Section I, "General Obligations and Objectives," says that the U.S. seeks to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals as part of our efforts to "strengthen deterrence for both sides" (("ukrepleniye sderzhivaniya dlya obeikh storon")) (the original reads: "strengthen deterrence for both sides"; the translation received from the U.S. delegation reads: "strengthen mutual deterrence" (("zakrepleniye (sic) vzaimnogo sderzhivaniya)). We would ask the U.S. side to explain in greater detail exactly what it means here. Are we really talking about "mutual deterrence" or about deterrence in a "multilateral" context? ¶2. In Subsection A of Section II, "Central Limits and Counting Rules," the U.S. side anticipates that a "small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads" would not be considered to be operationally deployed. We would like to receive detailed explanations from the U.S. side as to what portion of the total number of warheads could constitute the aforementioned "small number." ¶3. The same subsection provides for a "warhead limit" (( Trans. Note: Throughout the text the English word "limit" is rendered in Russian as "level" ("uroven'"))) and goes on to say that "the central limit would be on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads." We would request clarification as to whether the U.S. side has in mind that besides the "central limit" on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the new treaty could provide for some other limits on warheads, and if so, what warheads. ¶4. Why does the U.S. side use different approaches to counting warheads on ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) and on heavy bombers? Specifically which facilities does the U.S. side anticipate classifying as "a specified weapon storage area associated with or directly supporting a heavy bomber base" (Section II, Subsection A)? ¶5. In Subsection B of Section II the U.S. side proposes establishing limits on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. We would request clarification as to the reason for this proposal, which provides for lumping together in the same limits deployed launchers for strategic delivery vehicles - ICBMs and SLBMs - and one of the types of delivery vehicles - heavy bombers. ¶6. Subsection B of Section II contains the wording "ICBMs and SLBMs tested for nuclear weapon delivery." We would ask you to clarify the specifics of this wording, taking into account that according to the understanding between the Parties at the time the START Treaty was concluded, all their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers subject to the Treaty are nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Does the U.S. side have in mind producing and testing new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration? ¶7. We would ask you to provide a more detailed explanation as to what is meant by launchers "that are no longer capable of supporting operational ICBMs or SLBMs." What are the criteria the U.S. side intends to use to define the transfer of a launcher into this category? What are the criteria for "considerable time and expense"? ¶8. In the context of Subsection D of Section II, which deals with "deployment of non-nuclear warheads," the following question arises: do technical methods of verification exist which would make it possible to guarantee that the other Party could identify that a reentry vehicle in flight is conventionally armed? ¶9. In the context of Subsection E of Section II, which deals with terminology: Is a definition of the term "new type," for example, necessary if the new treaty does not provide for limitations applicable to ICBMs and SLBMs? ¶10. In Section IV, "Elimination," elimination procedures for only silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers are cited as examples of elimination procedures. Does the U.S. side have in mind that in the new treaty the application of elimination procedures would be limited specifically to silo launchers and heavy bombers? ¶11. Section V, "Notifications, Monitoring, and Verification," proposes retaining and adapting, "as appropriate," the main START Treaty provisions concerning data exchange, notifications, and inspections. We would request clarification as to how the U.S. side intends to accomplish this task, given its approach that provides for rejecting the reduction and limitation of an aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs. ¶12. Subsection C of Section V, which deals with verification, proposes adapting the relevant START Treaty provisions for the new treaty's requirements. Since the U.S. position does not provide for reduction and limitation of the aggregate number of ICBMs, a question arises as to whether verification of ICBMs and SLBMs is necessary, especially in view of the fact that Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported either as assembled missiles without launch canisters or as assembled missiles in launch canisters, while U.S. missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages of such missiles. And if ICBMs and SLBMs are subject to verification, as the U.S. side proposes, then in that case what should be the goal of verification, given that counting of ICBMs and SLBMs is not envisaged? In this context a question also arises as to the advisability of conducting exhibitions to confirm the relevant technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs and exchanging telemetric information in connection with flight tests of these missiles -- in the absence of any qualitative limitations for these strategic delivery vehicles. ¶13. Questions concerning Section VIII. In the U.S. side's version, the duration of the Treaty is defined as 5-10 years. It is anticipated that the new levels will be reached in 3-5 years. Does the U.S. side envisage establishing a strict time line for phasing -- if phasing is provided for -- as is done in the START Treaty? End text. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. STORELLA NNNN End Cable Text