START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000413 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I): RUSSIAN COMMENTS ON U.S. ELEMENTS FOR A START FOLLOW-ON TREATY REF: STATE 50910 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-003. ¶2. (U) At paragraph 3 below is the text of the official translation of a Paper by the Russian Side on Comments on the Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty (REFTEL). ¶3. (S) Begin text: Official Translation To be Turned Over to the U.S. Side Paper of the Russian Side June 1, 2009 Comments on the U.S. Documents Received during the First Round of Negotiations During the first round of negotiations, the U.S. side gave us three documents: "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty," "The Rationale for Using Verification Measures to More Closely Correlate Warheads and Delivery Vehicles," and "The Interrelationship between the Moscow Treaty (SORT) and the START Follow-on Treaty." At that time, there was a preliminary exchange of views on some of the provisions of those documents. As "homework," the Russian side reviewed the U.S. side's positions regarding the new treaty to replace the START Treaty, which were set forth in the aforementioned documents, and we would like to make a number of points. First of all we will address the most important U.S. document, "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty." To a large extent the provisions of Section I, "General Obligations and Objectives" resonate with our ideas in this respect. At the same time, a question immediately arises regarding the use of the U.S.-proposed term "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" in the new treaty. Our understanding of this question was set forth in a well-reasoned manner in the statement "On U.S. Plans to Equip ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-nuclear ('Conventional') Reentry Vehicles," which was made on May 20, 2009, at the first round of negotiations. We are awaiting the U.S. side's response. . It seems to us that the provisions of Section II, "Central Limits and Counting Rules," are of decisive importance for the substance of the new treaty: they answer the question of what concept will form the basis of the treaty. The U.S.-proposed concept of the treaty represents a departure from the concept of the START Treaty and to a considerable extent reproduces the approaches in its draft "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Regarding Strategic Offensive Nuclear Reductions," of October 23, 2008. This conclusion derives, above all, from the U.S. side's efforts to establish the main limitations on "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads," leaving non-nuclear warheads outside the new treaty. Such "double-entry bookkeeping" is, in our view, extremely counterproductive and can have a far-reaching destabilizing impact on the nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes. We also spoke about this in our above-mentioned statement of May 20, 2009. The document received from the U.S. side does not contain rules for counting deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Therefore, the second part of the U.S. document which concerns verification and reduction of, and limitations on, these delivery vehicles remains unclear. Thus, the U.S. is moving toward a situation where the production of strategic missiles could be arbitrarily increased, while verification of them would practically cease. The U.S. side is also proposing to establish levels for deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and for deployed heavy bombers. In this connection, reference is made to deployed launchers only for those ICBMs and SLBMs that have been "tested for nuclear weapon delivery." As we understand it, under this approach deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration would not be subject to the new treaty. The provision concerning some launchers that are no longer capable of supporting the operation of ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers that have been converted to non-nuclear roles, requires separate consideration. The Russian side is prepared to discuss this issue in the future. It is also clear that the terminology for the new treaty may require detailed discussion and agreement. The Russian side believes -- and this was already stated in our Aide-Memoire of December 15, 2008 -- that strategic delivery vehicles, not least among them ICBMs and SLBMs, are an integral component of strategic offensive arms. Accordingly, in order to be viable and effective, the new treaty on SOAs must provide for the further verifiable reduction and limitation of both strategic delivery vehicles and the warheads on them. This position of ours was clearly stated at the first round of negotiations. The U.S. side further proposes considering the possibility of adapting for the new treaty the START Treaty provisions pertaining to limitations and prohibitions, elimination, notifications, monitoring and verification, the establishment of a body similar to the JCIC, the Parties' international obligations, the duration of the new treaty, and obligations concerning further negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We believe it would be appropriate to discuss these issues after the key provisions relating to the subject of the new treaty are agreed. We would like to address separately the provisions of the document regarding mobile ICBMs. The Russian side proceeds from the premise that the new treaty should not contain provisions that would impose special limitations on mobile ICBMs. Accordingly, at the meeting on May 20, 2009, we presented our position regarding U.S. continuous monitoring activities at the portal of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, which involve verification of the production of mobile ICBMs. This issue must be closed out before December 5, 2009. We believe it would be inappropriate to retain the obligations regarding the exchange of telemetric information in the new agreement. Now a few words on the second U.S. paper, "The Rationale for Using Verification Measures to More Closely Correlate Warheads and Delivery Vehicles." Clearly, this document requires careful discussion by experts since it has to do with a number of the technical aspects of verification. Nonetheless, we would note the point in the document to the effect that the U.S. is proposing to combine the Moscow Treaty concept of limiting operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads with the START Treaty concept of an overall limit on delivery vehicles. We must state again that the term "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" is used by the U.S. side unilaterally -- the Moscow Treaty is based on the term "strategic nuclear warheads." Since the U.S. side does not envisage that ICBMs and SLBMs are the subject of the new treaty, we could return to discussion of this question once we receive additional explanations from the U.S. side. And finally we will turn to comments on the third U.S. document, "The Interrelationship between the Moscow Treaty and the START Follow-on Treaty," which we received a few days after the end of the first round of negotiations. In considering this issue, the Russian side proceeds, above all, from the instructions of the Russian and U.S. Presidents to work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty. Accordingly, we believe our negotiations must be directed toward accomplishing this objective. The option of terminating SORT after entry into force of the new treaty appears quite logical. End text. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. STORELLA NNNN End Cable Text