Financial Crisis - considerations for April UNGA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 000279 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR IO/EDA and EEB/OMA USUN for JLAWRENCE and CNORMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV UNGA ECOSOC SUBJECT: Financial Crisis - considerations for April UNGA negotiations REFS: A) GENEVA 220 B) GENEVA 262 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; NOT FOR INTERNET ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The report of the UNGA President's Commission of Experts on Reforms of the Monetary and Financial System (Stiglitz report) will contribute to a negotiated outcome document in the hope of giving the UN a greater role in financial affairs. A greater UNGA role would not necessarily serve USG interests. The US may be able to avert that result, as well as improve the UN response to the financial crisis, by proposing productive actions for the UN Secretariat and UN agencies, actions such as those listed in paragraphs 11-13. END SUMMARY. -------------- Lessons from the Fair Globalization Negotiations 2004 -------------- ¶2. (U) The UN is preparing for April negotiations on an outcome document which may include a response to the report of the UNGA President-led Commission of Experts on Reforms of the Monetary and Financial System (the Stiglitz Commission). Mission officer's personal experiences negotiating another UNGA resolution (responding to the ILO Director General Somavia-led Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, which in 2004 produced the report "A fair Globalization: Creating opportunities for all"),may provide some relevant lessons. Stiglitz was a member of the Somavia-led Commission, and Somavia is now an ex-officio member of the Stiglitz Commission. ¶3. (SBU) The final 2004 UNGA resolution on the Fair Globalization report took considerable time to discuss. Just arriving at consensus to "take note" of the report required weeks of contentious negotiations, because delegations who had government officials on the Somavia-led Commission wanted the report endorsed. The Finnish President was a Co-Chair of the Somavia-Commission, and the Finnish delegate rallied EU support to insist on endorsing, or at least welcoming, the report. The G-77 also demanded endorsement of the report. Informally, several EU delegates admitted that some of the positions in the report were not fully consistent with their government's policies and priorities, but they backed the Finnish effort nonetheless. The final compromise was to take note of the report and also express appreciation for the specific efforts of the co-chairs and the Commission as a group. ¶4. (SBU) Stiglitz, Somavia and the UNGA President appear to have learned from the Fair Globalization process and have raised the stakes by making the UNGA process, responding to the "Stiglitz report," time-limited and leading to a high-level meeting. Member states negotiating the modalities for the June High Level meeting have also defused the argument that "the Stiglitz report was not mandated by member states and so has no status," by calling upon the Secretary General to prepare a report for the high level meeting. We can expect the Secretary General to delegate drafting of his report to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' (DESA) and the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),both of which have served as Secretariats for the Stiglitz Commission. Therefore we can expect the Secretary General's report to draw heavily on the Stiglitz report. Given the pressures and expectations of substance from a high-level meeting and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' (DESA) contribution to drafting the initial negotiating document for the UNGA President, that draft likely will be full of substance. It will be very difficult for the outcome document to just take note of the Secretary General's report. -------------- Strategy -------------- ¶5. (U) Since the outcome document will be substantive, it can be an opportunity to put forward our own ideas on how to use the UN system to respond to the global financial crisis. Focusing the international community on practical responses by the UN could lead to positive actions and would divert attention from any bad ideas in the draft outcome document. ¶6. (SBU) In parsing out our response to the UNGA President's draft, a first cut may be to separate actions that might help resolve the financial crisis from those that might help alleviate the economic downturn. The first set of ideas might be acknowledged, and referred for action to the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs),to the G-20, to member states, or to whoever is appropriate, with an invitation to consider them. The second set of actions could then GENEVA 00000279 002 OF 004 be reviewed and separated in terms of whose mandate they fall under and so distributed. The key in doing this would be that the UNGA "invites" others to consider the ideas, and thus avoids creating any appearance of the UNGA having jurisdiction where it does not. ¶7. (SBU) Mandates: No developed country would want to have financial issues and ODA decided in a forum like the UNGA where the principle of one country, one vote, takes precedence over economic weight. In second committee and UNCTAD, the US with support from the EU and JUSCANZ (like-minded non-EU countries) has been vigilant to avoid treading on the mandates of the BWIs. The Secretary General's report and UNGA President's draft negotiating document will likely intend to put financial and economic issues solidly in the UNGA fold, along the lines proposed by the Stiglitz report. Paul Oquist, Senior Advisor from the UNGA President's office, previewed this position at the Stiglitz briefing in Geneva on March 12 (ref A),where Oquist said that the final solutions to the global financial crisis need to come to the UN for approval as a matter of legality; that the G7 and G8 have no basis in international law; and that international solutions affect everyone, so everyone should have a voice in them for them to be legitimate. Oquist concluded that trillions are being spent to reinstate credibility in the global financial system, but we must have equality and justice where everyone feels their interests are represented. Oquist explained further that UN leadership in responding to the financial crisis is the logical next step following the initial breakthrough in the Monterrey consensus, which gave DESA the Secretariat follow-up role on Financing for Development and provided an agenda for an annual spring UNGA-ECOSOC/BWI meeting (Monterrey Consensus paragraphs 68-73). ¶8. (SBU) It could be useful for USDEL to have a clear pre-negotiating consensus with like-minded countries that this UNGA negotiation will not address mandates of the BWIs or further expand UNGA's role in finance. There may be a strong dynamic in favor of leaving it to the USG to play hardball and take the hit for protecting developed countries' interests. Unless there is lots of advance preparation with the EU, encouragement of Japan to speak, and coordination with JUSCANZ, the US risks being isolated and portrayed as not only responsible for the global financial crisis but being the obstacle to its resolution. ¶9. (SBU) To avoid the US being isolated, USDEL may wish to consider: -- Getting like-minded countries to agree on redlines for this negotiation; -- Getting commitments from other countries to speak out, so from the onset any G-77 efforts to divide like-minded countries by isolating the US come to naught. -- Laying down redlines with the facilitators for the negotiations of the outcome document, in the hopes that any chairman's compromise proposals will take into consideration US redlines. (Those facilitators are the Permanent Representatives to the UN in New York of Netherlands and of St. Vincent.) ¶10. (SBU) Assuming it is impossible to just take note of the Secretary General's report, USDEL may wish to have a back-up position whereby we agree to some kind of open-ended working group or dialogue in the appropriate forum to consider elements of the report in detail. USDEL can make the short time-frame for negotiations work in our favor by using the time to negotiate practical ideas for how the UN should respond to the crisis and relegating the ideas from the report to dialogue and discussion in appropriate forums (since there is insufficient time for capitals to really reflect on those ideas before the June high-level meeting). -------------- Practical Actions by the UN Responding to the financial crisis -------------- ¶11. (U) The global financial crisis has caused Member States' to reconsider the levels of their contributions to the United Nations due to budget constraints they are facing in their respective governments. Given overall budget constraints, the US could use this discussion as an opportunity to continue to press the UN Secretariat and UN agencies to prioritize and focus their work in order to more effectively use available resources. The US could promote the following principles/actions: a. Recognize that collection of better statistics and use of more transparent, effective impact measurement tools (such as collection and analysis of gender-disaggregated data by member states and the GENEVA 00000279 003 OF 004 UN) are essential if we are to effectively tailor and target assistance programs and UN efforts. b. Improve the UN regular budget presentation by showing expenditure by activity. Providing greater transparency on expenditures by thematic activity would complement ongoing efforts to implement results-based budgeting. More detailed reporting would allow Member States to direct resources to the precise activities that are having the most impact. Implementation of results-based management and international public sector accounting standards in the UN Secretariat, should also draw on the best of what's used by the UN agencies and be compatible with UN agencies' systems. c. Increase its use of shared services, including possible carbon neutral technologies, i.e. video-conferencing. d. Call on the UN (DESA, LLDC/SIDS, NEPAD, and UNCTAD) and the regional economic commissions to discuss with their governing or advisory boards the use of the 91 new positions allocated to them by the fifth committee under the UN development pillar in December 2008, and to report back to the UNGA on proposed best use of those positions. The 50 positions in the regional economic commissions were established effective January 1 and the 41 posts for DESA, LLDC/SIDS, NEPAD and UNCTAD will be established effective July 1, ¶2009. For whichever positions are not yet filled, we could call on the SG to ensure those positions are deployed towards helping developing countries to maintain living standards and employment and to continue work towards achievement of the MDGs. e. Build on UN "delivering as one" experiences to implement what works well across all agencies and countries, so that we can most effectively use scarce resources. In this regard, we might look at management of the Iraq Trust fund and website, which are transparent and structured to encourage demand-driven inter-agency coordinated UN projects. ¶12. (U) The USG could ask each US expert that follows a UN agency or Economic Commission to come up with a few ideas for specific actions and proposals. For example for UNCTAD, we could: a. Consider supporting the UK-initiated proposal to have UNCTAD monitor trends in direct foreign investment in response to the global financial crisis. (ref B) b. Pick up on the UNCTAD gender experts meeting's recommendation that UNCTAD apply gender analysis to trade data and alert member states on a timely basis of sectors and countries where men and women are affected differently by the global financial crisis, so that member states can develop gender-aware policy responses. However, DESA may have more capacity to do gender analysis than UNCTAD, since DESA's gender office will receive five new positions under the development pillar, while UNCTAD has not yet established a gender office. c. Call for an acceleration of efforts to consolidate requests for trade and development related technical assistance from member states, and offers of assistance, into an accessible, transparent database (perhaps along the lines of Reliefweb). Look at the Enhanced Integrated Framework for LDCs in this regard. d. Consider providing voluntary funds to help developing countries that have requested UNCTAD's entrepreneurial training program (EMPRETEC) to establish that program, since that program specifically supports employment creation. Consider providing voluntary funds as catalysts to expand the ASYCUDA customs software program to all countries that have requested it, since that program is proven to reduce corruption and to increase recorded government revenues from customs. ¶13. (U) The international Trade Center (ITC) also has proven programs aimed at poverty reduction through exports and tourism. We should consider making voluntary contributions to those programs since they directly support achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and employment creation. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (SBU) This is the time, first, to use what exists to the best possible benefit of supporting living conditions and economic growth in developing countries; and then second, once we have done all we can to help people continue to earn livelihoods, to look thoughtfully at proposals for structural changes to the international financial architecture. USG should use the GENEVA 00000279 004 OF 004 opportunity created by the Stiglitz report to make the UN system fight fires, and not get side-tracked by a bigger debate on financial architecture that can happen more thoughtfully (and ideally elsewhere) after the existing financial system is again functioning more normally. By engaging all parts of the UN system to work effectively within their existing mandates, in support of developing countries, the US would show its desire to work with the global community and to make the UN system, within its existing mandates, effectively respond to the global financial crisis. The US could consider reinforcing this approach and statements against protectionism, by targeting more of its voluntary contributions towards programs that facilitate trade and generate employment in developing countries. END COMMENT. STORELLA #