ASHRAF/MEK: GOI ASKS ICRC PRESIDENT ABOUT MOVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000255 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019 TAGS: IZ PHUM PREF PREL SUBJECT: ASHRAF/MEK: GOI ASKS ICRC PRESIDENT ABOUT MOVING CAMP Classified By: Mark C. Storella, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., reasons 1.4. b and d. ¶1. (U) During a briefing for Ambassadors on his recent trip to Iraq, ICRC President Kellenberger mentioned how often the situation of the Ashraf camp and the future of its Mujahedin e Khalq (MEK) occupants had come up in conversations. He noted that the issue was politically charged and understood the GOI's discomfort, but noted that both International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Iraqi law provided certain protections to the camp residents. Kellenberger stated that the Ashraf group had considerable political support around Europe, particularly in parliaments, and that ICRC continued to receive a raft of mail and requests for appointments from Europeans in defense of the Ashraf residents. Demonstrating a whiff of exasperation, he mused that he may start telling Europeans that if they are so concerned, why don't they just resettle them all in their own countries. ¶2. (C) In an aside following the briefing, the Charge pressed Kellenberger on what had been discussed with GOI officials regarding Ashraf. Kellenberger said he had been called to a meeting on short notice with the Iraqi National Security Advisor on a Friday night to discuss the matter. The official stated that Iraq was considering moving the camp to a "less desirable" location and wanted Kellenberger's views. Kellenberger said he declined to give the ICRC seal of approval, which he thought was being sought. Rather, he stressed again that IHL and the concept of non-refoulement clearly applied. Beyond that, Iraqi law applied and he implied that Iraqi law permitted such a move. He left the decision squarely in the hands of the GOI, though, indicating only that it needed to be made within domestic and international legal boundaries. The Charge asked Kellenberger if he thought there would be a bloodbath if the camp were moved. Kellenberger admitted that there are bad elements in Ashraf who could create problems. Noting also that the MEK had been allied with Saddam, he stressed one would also need to be careful about which Iraqis were involved in an eventual move of the camp. He did not, however, think significant violence was inevitable, if the situation were handled carefully. STORELLA