START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001239 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) B-1B AND SSGN AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, DECEMBER 13, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-135. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 13, 2009 Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. Place: United States Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The sides met to discuss the U.S. response to the Russian counter-proposal of December 10, 2009. (Begin comment: Russian counter-proposal was delivered separately to the U.S. Mission. End comment.) Mr. Warner handed over the U.S. counter-proposals to each of the Russian responses on the SSGN and B-1B agreed statements. The discussion for SSGNs centered on whether the items would still remain subject to the broad provisions of the treaty or simply the aggregate limits of the treaty. On B-1Bs, the issue revolved around an initial demonstration that included a non-converted B-1B. The Russian side agreed in principle to both agreed statements, however they needed to confer with the rest of the Russian delegation and Moscow for feedback. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Another Look at SSGNs; and More on B-1Bs. -------------- ANOTHER LOOK AT SSGNS -------------- ¶5. (s) Warner provided a brief synopsis of the SSGN document. Begin text of U.S. Non-Paper: SFO-GVA-VII U.S. Non-Paper December 12, 2009 PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, other than the provisions contained herein, the guided missile submarines shall not be subject to the provisions of this Treaty. In order to provide assurances that the four SSGNs of the United States continue to be incapable of launching SLBMs, the following provisions shall apply to such submarines: ¶1. No later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States shall conduct an initial one-time demonstration of each of the four SSGNs to confirm that their launchers are incapable of launching an SLBM. The procedures for the demonstration shall be identical to the procedures for an SLBM launcher conversion exhibition in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶2. Subsequent to the initial demonstration, the United States shall also provide opportunities for the Russian Federation periodically to confirm that the four SSGNs have not been reconverted to make them capable of launching SLBMs. In order to provide such assurances that an SSGN has not been re-converted during the duration of the Treaty and their launchers are incapable of launching an SLBM, the Russian Party shall have the right, while conducting Type One quota inspections, to inspect guided missile launchers of each converted SSGN if they are located at the inspected submarine base during the period of the inspection. The number of such inspections for each SSGN shall not exceed ((one))1 ((two))2 times during the entire duration of the Treaty. ¶3. The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be identical to the procedures for conducting an inspection of an SLBM launcher which does not contain a deployed SLBM in accordance with Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶4. In lieu of inspecting the SLBM launcher which does not contain a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one guided missile launcher located on a SSGN. If a Dry Dock Shelter is installed, tubes obstructed by the shelter are not accessible for viewing. A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the inspectors that the guided missile launcher is incapable of launching an SLBM. ¶5. The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in the official inspection report. ((6. If the United States should acquire other types of SSGN guided missile submarines, such SSGNs will also be subject to all the aforementioned verification measures.))2 End text. ¶6. (S) Col Ilin was quick to note that the United States specifically stated up front that the SSGNs would not be subject to the provisions of the treaty. Warner and Mr. Dean both explained that except for the provisions contained in the agreed statement, the four SSGNs would not be subject to the broad provisions of the treaty. Ilin expressed the Russian concept that since the SSGNs would be inspected under Type One inspections that it was only logical that they fall under the broad provisions of the treaty; however, he agreed that the SSGNs would not be subject to the limitations of the treaty. (Begin comment: The Russian interpretation of "limitations" of the treaty is the "aggregate limits" only. End comment.) ¶7. (S) In response to Ilin's query about the SSGN conversion procedures, Elliott explained that for the initial demonstrations, since the SSGNs had already been converted under START, the demonstration would only be to show how the conversions were done. Furthermore, Elliott maintained that should any more submarines be converted, the United States would follow procedures covered in Part Three of the START Follow-on Protocol. Warner clarified that the last sentence in the U.S. proposal on SSGNs was not supposed to be bracketed and that it elaborated Elliott's point precisely. ¶8. (S) Ilin expressed a positive reaction to a SSGN demonstration although he said a review was required by Moscow. Additionally, Ilin agreed with the concept that SSGNs should be demonstratedin order to show that they had not been reconverted. Ilin questioned, during a Type One inspection, whether it would be possible to conduct an inspection of an SSGN. Warner replied that it would be possible if the Russian inspectors elected to use their "empty launcher" allocation to lookQt a launcher on an SSGN. Ilin then moved the discussion to a question as to how many launchers a dry dock shelter (DDS) covered when installed. He mentioned that the agreed statement should state clearly that the DDS will cover no more than the number that it covers whether it is three, four or six. Warner said he would get the answer as to how many launchers the DDS covered and would ensure the text clearly stated the concept. ¶9. (S) Ilin stated he would take this back to the Russian delegation and also try to get feedback from Moscow. -------------- MORE ON B-1BS -------------- ¶10. (S) Begin text of U.S. delegation paper: SFO-GVA-VII U.S. Delegation Paper December 12, 2009 PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, other than the provisions contained herein, after the completion of the conversion of the final B-1B heavy bomber, and for such time as no B-1B heavy bomber is equipped for nuclear armaments, B-1B heavy bombers shall not be subject to the provisions of this Treaty. The Parties also agree that the conversion procedures employed previously under the START Treaty for conversion of B-1B heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall continue to be used under this Treaty. In order to provide assurances that the B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments continue to satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply to such heavy bombers: ¶1. The United States will notify the Russian Federation that the facilities where solely B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, have been eliminated. Such eliminated facilities where converted B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based may be inspected as eliminated facilities under a Type Two inspection to confirm that they are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. The inspection will fall within Qe quota for Type Two inspections established in accordance within Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. Moreover, no more than one such inspection at one of the two B-1B bases may be conducted each year. ¶2. The procedures for the conduct of a Type Two eliminated facility inspection will be in accordance with Section VIII to Part Five of the Protocol and Part Three of the Protocol, with the following modified procedures: (a) At the point of entry for such an inspection, Travis Air FoQe Base, California, the inspection team that has designated either Ellsworth Air Force Base or Dyess Air Force for an eliminated facility inspection will be informed if more than 50 percent of the B-1B bombers based at that base are currently located at the base. If less than 50 percent are present, then the inspection team leader shall have the right to: (i) inform the member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base shall take place; or (ii) designate another inspection site associated with the same point of entry; or (iii) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. (b) Upon arrival at the eliminated facility, the in-country escort team lead shall provide an annotated site diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments that are currently present at the base; (c) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the leader oQhe team attending the inspection will designate no more than three B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments for inspection; (d) A member of the in-country escort shall permit the members of the team attending the inspection to view the designated B-1B heavy bombers that were converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty to confirm that the bombers inspected continue to satisfy the requirements for conversion and therefore are incapable of employing nuclear armaments; and (e) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in the official inspection report. ¶3. If during a Type One Inspection being conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are present when pre-inspection movement restrictions are implemented, those heavy bombers shall not be subject to the Type One inspection. ¶4. If the United States should convert any other type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, those converted heavy bombers shall also be subject to the aforementioned verification measures. End text. ¶11. (S) Col Ryzhkov began the discussion by addressing the fact that under START the conversion process for B-1Bs was not completely fulfilled. He asserted that the U.S. proposal to continue using procedures under START to complete the B-1B conversion process would be difficult for the Russian side to accept. The Russian side had disagreed with the United States that the procedures had rendered the B-1B incapable of employing nuclear armaments. Elliott replied that the United States had been doing the conversion for many years and if there was no agreement between the sides then the disagreement would continue for the next 10 years. Elliott made it clear the United States did not intend to devise a new procedure to complete the conversion of the B-1B fleet and that given that the modification process of the fleet was nearly complete, boQ sides needed to find a way to resolve this issue. Elliott commented further that the Russian side clearly knew that the United States did not store nuclear armaments at B-1B bases and that it did not train their B-1B crews in the nuclear mission. Elliott stated that the U.S. concession was to offer periodic exhibitions that would go no further in confirming the conversion procedure than had been done previously. Ryzhkov reasserted that the initial B-1B conversion demonstration was done improperly and it was the responsibility of the Party performing the conversion to convince the other Party that the conversion was sound. ¶12. (S) Ilin proposed that the United States should provide a demonstration for the B-1Bs much like the United States proposed to do for the SSGNs. For the B-1Bs the demonstration should provide a comparison of a non-converted B-1B with a converted B-1B. Warner said he would take the proposal for consideration but queried Ilin about the U.S. proposal for assurances against reconversion. Warner stated the Russian side must choose between the Type Two inspection for an eliminated facility Q the U.S.-proposed annual exhibition but could not have both. Warner also mentioned the reason the United States elected to expound upon the Type Two proposal from the Russian side was because we thought the Russian side preferred a regime that provided for a surprise verification rather than one which was predetermined by the United States. ¶13. (S) Documents provided: See paragraphs 5 and 10 above. ¶14. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES: Mr. Warner Mr. Elliott Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA: Gen Orlov Col Ilin Gen Poznikhir Col Ryzhkov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS