START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001234 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 16, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-152. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 16, 2009 Time: 10:30 a.m. - 12:15 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group (WG) chairs, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, met at the U.S. Mission on December 15. Orlov and Trout, for the third consecutive meeting discussed the nomenclature for nuclear weapons for heavy bombers, with Orlov delivering some additional thoughts on why "warheads" was more appropriate than "armaments." A quick review of all remaining brackets was done, with agreement by both sides on the remaining issues. Both acknowledged that almost everything that could be un-bracketed at the working group level had been done. Trout maintained his position on the nomenclature for launchers at Space Launch Facilities, but promised to research the issue some more. With respect to technical recognition features for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, both sides agreed to do some homework on what data was required to support inspections. End Summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Data Exchange Again; Space Launch Success; General Provisions and Site Diagrams; Heavy Bombers Issues; and End Comments. -------------- ONE MORE TIME WITH HEAVY BOMBER WARHEADS -------------- ¶5. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to examine all the remaining bracketed issues in the document, starting with Section II, Aggregate Numbers. For the third meeting in a row, Orlov asked if the U.S. had accepted the Russian construct of "nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers." Trout replied that the U.S. position was still "nuclear armaments for deployed heavy bombers." He commented that this language was being discussed at the head of delegation level. Orlov acknowledged that fact, but delivered a few points on the Russian rationale behind their language. The main point, he argued, was that the U.S. language suggested the exact armaments on the bomber, such as an ALCM or Nuclear Bomb, but it was the nuclear warhead which is accountable. Trout said he would deliver this point to his delegation to consider. ¶6. (S) Regarding the attributed nuclear warhead count listed in the Database, Orlov confirmed the Russian position that the number listed in the Database was not related to the inspection process, adding that the purpose of the heavy bomber inspection, as written, was not to verify warhead data in the Database. In the hypothetical case where the three bombers had more weapons physically on them than were attributed to the base, the Database would not be updated, as the two events were not related. ¶7. (S) Turning to UIDs and warheads on each individual launcher, Orlov said that Russia was still thinking about the U.S. proposal to drop the warhead data in exchange for listing UIDs. ¶8. (S) Orlov asked if the U.S. had accepted "non-deployed launcher for ICBMs and SLBMs" as the correct category to list launchers in the Space Launch Facility section. Trout replied that the U.S. side was still considering the issue and would provide an answer soon. Col Pischulov asked LT Lobner if the U.S. was going to provide a new list of Space Launch Facilities since the existing types had changed. Lobner replied that he would provide an updated list when the language for the section had been agreed. ¶9. (S) Trout asked Orlov why Russia still insisted on the numerous categories of technical data for recognition features for heavy bombers. Orlov admitted that there was no clear relation between this technical data and counting rules, but argued that the technical data was important for inspections, just as there was significant technical data for ICBMs and SLBMs, such as length. Trout countered, arguing that such information as length was actually used by inspectors to determine types, and other information was used in relation to the "large enough to contain" rule. ¶10. (S) Orlov agreed to think more about this issue, but pointed out that he thought inspectors should know basic measurements for bombers so that they could know what hangars were capable of housing certain bombers. Trout agreed with this logic, saying that this kind of information is understandable, but the pages upon pages of data proposed by the Russian side were not. Both agreed that this data needed to be approached from an inspection point of view. Orlov also cautioned against deleting too much technical data too quickly. Trout agreed, and said that both sides should independently determine what they should keep and what should be deleted. ¶11. (S) Lobner discussed some conforming issues, mentioning that the text was nearing completion, and that almost all of the remaining brackets were related to large issues. Both sides agreed to continue the conforming process on the document. -------------- END COMMENTS -------------- ¶12. (S) Trout concluded the meeting, saying that much work had been accomplished the past few days. Orlov agreed. ¶13. (U) Documents provided: NONE ¶14. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Trout LT Lobner Ms. Stewart Mr. French (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Col Pischulov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS