START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001231 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 14, 2009 REF: GENEVA 1225 (SFO-GVA-VII-134) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-141. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 14, 2009 Time: 11:30 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Counting Rules Subgroup of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) met on December 14 to continue the discussion of Articles III and IV of the treaty. The sides agreed that existing types of missiles would cease to be included in the treaty when all the launchers of that type of missile were gone. The Russian side agreed not to seek inclusion of the U.S. Trident I system in the list of existing types based on a discussion of which space launch facilities would be included in the treaty. The sides also discussed joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article III: When Do ICBMs and SLBMs Die?; Heavy Bomber Warhead Attribution; Inspecting Converted Heavy Bombers; Trident I, Once Again; Existing Types Vis--Vis Space Launch Facilities; Armaments or Not; Review Changes to Article IV; and Follow-Up. -------------- ARTICLE III: WHEN DO ICBMS AND SLBMS DIE? -------------- ¶5. (S) Mr. Taylor began the meeting of the Counting Rules Subgroup of the TTDWG on December 14, by handing over a paper with a U.S. proposal for Article III, paragraph 5, which contained a new sentence to deal with the cessation of application of the treaty to existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The new sentence read: "ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to the Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type for such an ICBM or SLBM have been eliminated or converted in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of the Protocol to the Treaty." Taylor said that the U.S. intention was to address the status of the missiles when a particular type of launcher ceased to exist. Because there was no category for "retired type" as there had been under START, the new treaty needed a mechanism to cover this scenario. ¶6. (S) ADM Kuznetsov quickly noted that the proposed sentence matched the thinking of the Russian delegation. He asked one linguistic question about the difference between "subject to the provisions of the treaty" in the previously existing sentence and "subject to the treaty" in the new sentence. Mr. Dean acknowledged that the shorter formulation was preferred and agreed to change it. Kuznetsov said he needed to consult with the rest of his delegation, but asserted that the sentence could be added to the joint draft text (JDT) without brackets. -------------- HEAVY BOMBER WARHEAD ATTRIBUTION -------------- ¶7. (S) Returning to a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the remaining brackets in Article III, Taylor said the Heads of Delegation (HOD) were talking about the number of warheads to be attributed to each deployed heavy bomber, as shown in paragraph 2. Kuznetsov insisted that the number had been agreed at one. Taylor demurred, awaiting confirmation by the HOD. Kuznetsov read a previously-dropped sentence and said that it should be reflected in the text: "If there are no nuclear armaments on a deployed heavy bomber, one warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber." Taylor responded that the U.S. could not accept the sentence and it would have to be bracketed. ¶8. (S) Taylor asked whether the Russian delegation had any flexibility regarding the phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments" in paragraph 4(f),on when such heavy bombers would first become subject to the treaty. Kuznetsov said the Russian delegation had been convinced by the U.S. arguments for this phrase and could now accept it. The sides agreed to remove the brackets. -------------- INSPECTING CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶9. (S) Kuznetsov provided a JDT for Article III and pointed out a new proposal for paragraph 6, which covered those items that should not count under the treaty. Begin text: 6.(c) Within the same type, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty when the last of them is converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. Such heavy bombers may be inspected to confirm that they have not been reconverted to heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. End text. ¶10. (S) Kuznetsov explained that this new provision was necessary to make clear that, when the last of a type of nuclear equipped bomber was converted to be non-nuclear, all bombers of that type would remain inspectable to ascertain they had not been reconverted. Taylor answered that the agreed statement on this subject was being worked between the delegations and that he would have to take this language back for consideration by the U.S. side. Kuznetsov clarified that the agreed statement covered the B-1B bomber, but this provision covered the B-52H. Taylor noted that the B-1B agreed statement included a paragraph on future conversions, which he believed covered the possibility of conversion of a number of B-52H heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. -------------- TRIDENT I, ONCE AGAIN -------------- ¶11. (S) On the list of existing types under the START Follow-on treaty, Taylor reiterated that the U.S. side would not accept Trident I as an existing type because there were no such launchers. The agreed statement on the SSGNs would satisfy Russia's concerns about the status of the SSGNs and their inability to launch such missiles. In response to a question from Kuznetsov, Taylor spelled out that the U.S. delegation had decided to create the text the sides had agreed to earlier in the meeting for paragraph 5, rather than deal with this issue in another agreed statement. -------------- --- EXISTING TYPES VIA-A-VIS SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES -------------- --- ¶12. (S) Kuznetsov said the problem was not the Trident I, but rather the Peacekeeper and Minuteman II systems. What, he asked, if the existing launchers were at a space launch facility? Taylor stated that if there was an existing launcher, even at a space launch facility, the missiles would be considered existing types. Kuznetsov persisted, specifying the Minuteman II launchers at Vandenberg and at Wallops Island. If those continued to exist, he proclaimed, the Minuteman II would be an existing type. Taylor concurred. "And what about the Peacekeeper," Kuznetsov asked. Taylor said it would also be an existing type. Kuznetsov carried on by asking whether the answer would depend on the alert status of the launchers. Taylor said it would not. ¶13. (S) Kuznetsov stated there had been some confusion during a late night meeting of the database group the previous day. He sought clarification that the United States would list its space launch facilities in the database. The confusion had caused the Russian delegation to decide it needed to see the names of (though not the data for) all U.S. facilities in the database before signature of the treaty. Taylor used the opportunity to stress that the United States believed it would be difficult for the Presidents to sign a treaty without any actual information in the database. The sides needed to agree on the data that would be exchanged at the time of signature. ¶14. (S) Kuznetsov closed this portion of the discussion by repeating that the Russian delegation would drop Trident I from its proposal for existing types. -------------- ARMAMENTS OR NOT -------------- ¶15. (S) Moving to the next subparagraph, on existing types of nuclear armaments for deployed heavy bombers, Taylor said the list of nuclear armaments would still be required for inspections of heavy bombers. Kuznetsov listened to the argument and said only that he would report it back to his delegation. -------------- REVIEW CHANGES TO ARTICLE IV -------------- ¶16. (S) The U.S. delegation provided a proposed JDT to capture the changes that had been made at the last meeting (Reftel) and the sides walked through the document. Taylor pointed out that the United States had dropped its subparagraph on a limit of non-deployed ICBMs per ICBM base. Kuznetsov asked about "joint basing" of heavy bombers for nuclear and non-nuclear armaments and whether the need to base these heavy bombers together would continue for the life of the treaty. Taylor explained the B-1B conversion was expected to end in the fall of 2010 but he did not have the timeline for the B-52H. He hoped the Russian delegation would understand the predicament of having fewer than a base worth of bombers and needing to support their operation out of another base. He noted that the treaty conversion or elimination procedures would give Russia ample opportunity to observe those procedures and follow-up with inspections. ¶17. (S) Reading from the latest START Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data on heavy bombers, Kuznetsov listed the number of U.S. airbases. "Will you convert the bombers from each base in parallel or one at a time? Will you do one base at a time?" He opined that there would be combined basing of nuclear and non-nuclear equipped heavy bombers for the entire life of the treaty. Kuznetsov wondered whether it would help to add "unless otherwise agreed" to the end of the sentence prohibiting joint basing. Taylor said he did not see how that would resolve the problem; Kuznetsov agreed that, personally, he did not think it would be a solution. Taylor ended the exchange by reassuring that the agreed statement would address Russia's concerns. -------------- FOLLOW-UP -------------- ¶18. (S) Later the same day, Kuznetsov conveyed to Taylor that the Russian side had no objection to paragraph 6 as formulated during the morning meeting. The Russian side agreed to exclude Trident I from the list of existing types in paragraph 7(b) and (d). With regard to the issue of existing types of nuclear armaments for deployed heavy bombers, Kuznetsov referred the solution to Dr. Warner and Col Ilin. Taylor replied that the issue was linked to the heavy bomber counting rules in paragraph 2(b) and would be solved by the HOD. As a result, the new version of the JDT retained only two brackets in paragraphs 2(b) and 7(e) and the United States committed to providing a new version. ¶19. (S) With respect to Article IV, Russian-proposed paragraph 8, restricting joint basing of heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at an airbase, Kuznetsov indicated that he understood the difficulty this paragraph posed for the U.S. side but that it would be hard to make a case to Moscow to drop it. ¶20. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: -- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Article III, Paragraph 5, dated December 14, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian; and -- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Article IV, dated December 14, 2009, in English. - RUSSIA: -- Russian-Proposed JDT, Article III, dated December 14, in Russian and unofficial English. ¶21. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Taylor Lt Col Comeau Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Dr. Dreicer Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Smith (Int) RUSSIA ADM Kuznetsov Ms. Fuzhenkova Col Kamenskiy Ms. Melikbekian Mr. Trifonov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS