START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001227 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS AND INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUPS, DECEMBER 10, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-120. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 10, 2009 Time: 4:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At a joint meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) and the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),the sides reviewed a U.S.-proposed joint draft text for Article XI. Substantial progress was made in developing agreed text, though differences remained including determining how to address visiting heavy bombers at air bases for deployed heavy bombers during an inspection. End Summary. ¶4. SUBJECT SUMMARY: What To Call The Inspections; Visiting Bombers during Inspections; Defining Items of Inspection; Exhibitions. -------------- WHAT TO CALL THE INSPECTIONS -------------- ¶5. (S) Dr. Warner began by providing a draft of a proposed definition for "declared data." He noted the TTDWG would formally propose this term at its next meeting. As the term appeared frequently in the article language, it was important for both sides to understand and agree to its meaning. ¶6. (S) Discussion proceeded to the draft of Article XI that had been developed in the IPWG. Both sides readily agreed to the U.S. text of the first paragraph of the article, which establishes the right to conduct inspection activities for the purpose of confirming the declared data and ensuring verification and compliance with the provisions of the treaty. ¶7. (S) Turning to paragraph 2 (Type 1 Inspections),Ilin pulled the Russian bracketed text and offered to work from the U.S.- proposed text. He noted both sides shared a common understanding of the framework for addressing each inspection. The paragraphs on each type of inspection activities should include the purpose of the inspection activity, a description of locations affected, and an indication of the items subject to inspection. At the same time, he wondered what would be the best way to capture the definition of each type of inspection. ¶8. (S) A discussion ensued concerning the need for a formal definition of "types of inspections" or if the term could be defined as first mentioned in the text (e.g., "herein after referred to as Type one"). Amb Ries pointed out that the treaty was a public document and many would read primarily the treaty articles. As a result, there was a need to ensure the reader would understand the substance of the terminology contained in the article. Warner then proposed what became the agreed solution to note at the end of each paragraph that the inspection specified therein would thereafter be known as a Type One or Type Two inspection. -------------- VISITING BOMBERS DURING INSPECTIONS -------------- ¶9. (S) Continuing with the discussion, Ilin then asked about the U.S. formulation for Type One inspections at heavy bomber bases, noting the U.S. wording called for inspections of "deployed" heavy bombers. Warner pointed out the fact that the wording of the sentence was designed to capture the place to be inspected instead of specifying the actual items to be inspected. He observed such a base might have deployed or test heavy bombers present at the time of inspection. He offered an example in which a non-deployed heavy bomber might come out of storage and be on its way to one airbase and stopover at a base that was subject to inspection. Such a bomber was clearly a "visitor" and should not be subject to inspection. ¶10. (S) Ilin took a more re strictive view. If a non-deployed heavy bomber were to come to a declared air base, it would be characterized as a deployed heavy bomber for purposes of an inspection. Warner conceded an inspecting Party might want to inspect a visiting aircraft, but he reminded Ilin that such an aircraft would not be the source of data that should be confirmed during an inspection. Ilin asserted further that any bomber, be it equipped or not equipped for nuclear armaments, would be subject to an inspection if it was present at the airbase. For the heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear armaments, the procedure would be confirmation that it had not been reconverted back to carrying nuclear armaments and was not equipped for nuclear armaments. Warner disputed this approach. With that, the sides agreed to move to the next paragraph and leave the word "deployed" in brackets for the time being. -------------- DEFINING ITEMS OF INSPECTION -------------- ¶11. (S) The sides then turned to paragraph 3 of the article which covers Type Two inspections, focusing on non-deployed SOA, formerly declared facilities, and eliminations. Looking at the sentence which read, "The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number and types of non-deployed items at such facilities," Ilin asked for a definition of the term "items." Ilin wondered if this meant merely SOA, or did it have a broader meaning. ¶12. (S) Warner explained the term "items" referred to the thing to be inspected. He showed Ilin an agreed list of "items" which were in Section VII of the Inspection Part of the Protocol. After further discussion, the sides agreed to incorporate this list into the wording of paragraph 3 of Article XI as well. -------------- EXHIBITIONS -------------- ¶13. (S) Looking briefly at paragraph 4, Warner asked Ilin if the Russian side still needed the last sentence on exhibitions to confirm differences between SOA and missile defense interceptors in light of the recent discussion on agreed statements. (Begin comment: The substance of the Russian proposal called for the question of such an exhibition to be handled in the Bilateral Consultive Commission. End comment.) Ilin agreed to drop the Russian language from paragraph 4 in light of the most recent Russian proposal. ¶14. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES. -- Non-Paper, Draft Definition, "Declared Data," dated December 10, 2009. ¶15. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Amb Reis Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Dr. Dreicer Dr. Fraley Mr. Rust Mr. Taylor Ms. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Lobach Ms. Vodopolova Mr. Colonel Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS