START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001226 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): AD HOC MEETING, DECEMBER 16, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-154. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 16, 2009 Time: 3:30 P.M. to 5:10 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At an Ad Hoc Meeting on December 16, Dr. Warner presented two alternative proposals that attempted to address many of the remaining interlinked issues in the START Follow-on treaty negotiations. After detailed discussion, the Russian side asserted that the new proposals would not help advance the process of coming to agreement on several key issues. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: U.S. Proposal Paths; and The Inspections Dialogue. -------------- U.S. PROPOSAL PATHS -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner explained that the leadership on the U.S. side had asked the U.S. delegation to set up this meeting to address the most important remaining issues with their Russian counterparts. He listed the six main issues that the U.S. delegation believed remained. The first, exchange of telemetric information, would not be addressed in today's meeting. The second issue was the annual quota on Type One and Type Two inspections, including both the aggregate total and the quotas for the two types of inspections. Third was how to address the inspection activities related to elimination. Both the second and third issues involved inspection activities and were important aspects of the verification regime for the treaty. Fourth was the issue of cooperative measures as described in Article XII of the treaty. While this topic was also related to the overall treaty verification regime, it was not covered in the Inspection Activities section of the protocol. The fifth and sixth issues involved verification measures associated with mobile ICBMs and were directly related to the U.S. decision to withdraw its proposal regarding continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Missile Assembly Production Plant. Specifically, the fifth issue involved advance notification of the exit of newly-produced SLBMs and ICBMs at the Votkinsk plant which would be matched by similar notifications regarding the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from U.S. production plants. The sixth was the application of unique identifiers (UIDs) on all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers of the two sides. ¶6. (S) Warner laid out two alternative proposals to address five of the six remaining issues. In the first proposal, the aggregate number of Type One and Type Two inspections would be 18 each year and there would also be a maximum of 6 exhibitions each year to confirm conversion or elimination procedures have been completed on ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Warner noted that the U.S. side was also seeking Russian agreement to provide advance notification of the exit of newly-produced SLBMs and ICBMs from the Votkinsk plant in return for reciprocal U.S. notifications of a similar nature; the application of unique identifiers on all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; and cooperative measures associated with heavy bombers and mobile ICBMs. ¶7. (S) The second proposal placed the number of Type One inspections at 12 and the number of Type 2 Inspections at 12, with inspections to confirm elimination procedures limited to the Type Two Inspection quota. The advance notifications, use of unique identifiers, and cooperative measures described as part of the first proposal were included in this proposal as desired results associated with solution of the key inspection issues. -------------- THE INSPECTIONS DIALOGUE -------------- ¶8. (S) Ilin agreed with the list of six issues presented by Warner and added a seventh, counting rules or central limits, as of prime concern to Russia. Warner concurred that counting rules were indeed at the heart of the new treaty but, as with the issue of telemetry exchange, were not to be discussed in today's meeting. Ilin responded that all of these issues had been discussed by the delegations to some extent. Ilin claimed he was surprised by the references to continuous monitoring at Votkinsk, commenting that he believed that set of issues had been resolved fully in the past. Both sides recounted their changing positions over time on numbers of inspections and the lack of convergence on this issue. ¶9. (S) The U.S. side reviewed the various proposals it had put forward to try to engage the Russian delegation in discussions regarding cooperative measures that would enhance the ability of each side to use national technical means (NTM) in verification of the treaty. Mr. Koshelev remarked that several of these measures were viewed as impractical by the Russian delegation. Warner responded that the U.S side was willing to consider any that the Russian side would propose as alternatives. The Russian delegation stated they believed this approach, which was largely focused on mobile ICBMs, had been addressed long ago and that the U.S. delegation was stirring up old issues that could not be dealt with if a treaty was to be signed on December 18 or 19. Warner pointed out that all of these issues were unresolved, interlinked, and needed to be addressed before treaty signature was possible from the U.S. side. He said there had been valuable compromises on many issues, but that this set clearly remained unresolved. ¶10. (S) Col Ryzhkov commented that while Type One and Type Two inspections appeared to be an agreed formulation, Russia had only accepted this concept on the condition of a reduced number of inspections. He further pointed out that the workload calculations for the Russian facilities showed an increased burden at the higher inspection numbers proposed by the Untied States in comparison with the workload burdens under START. He also pointed out that they had worked hard in the Conversion or Elimination Working Group to come up with procedures that could be verified by NTM rather than by inspection. Based on that, he could not see why so many inspections would be necessary. Moreover, he asserted, calling the inspection of an eliminated item an "exhibition" did not change its character. ¶11. (S) Elliott pointed out that a right to inspect without a sufficient number of inspections was not a real right. If the U.S. President and U.S. delegation did not believe the opportunities for inspection of converted and eliminated items were adequate, there would be no signature of the treaty. Warner pointed out that while the Conversion or Elimination Working Group had greatly reduced the on-site inspection requirements, in many cases the use of NTM was insufficient to be confident that the same items were actually eliminated and not being repeatedly displayed for NTM. The United States was prepared to conduct a small number of specific exhibitions, for which the United States would pay the in-country expenses of the inspectors, using small teams of inspectors, in order to gain the confidence it desired. ¶12. (S) Ilin suggested that the proposals presented by Warner would not advance the process of coming to closure on the treaty and protocol sections. Warner assured the Russian delegation that his intention had not been to delay, extend or complicate the negotiations, but rather to propose some potential solutions to a difficult set of interlinked problems. He challenged the Russian side to present their ideas regarding how these important issues could be resolved. ¶13. (S) Documents provided: None. ¶14. (S) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Elliott Ms. Pura Amb Ries Mr. Siemon Mr. Trout Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Mr. Kuznetsov Gen Poznikhir Col Ryzhkov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS