START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001220 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S.-PROPOSED JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE TREATY, DECEMBER 19, 2009 (CABLE 1 OF 2 CABLES) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-161. ¶2. (S) The text at paragraph 3 is the working document from which the U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will be prepared. The draft text is dated December 19, 2009. It establishes the baseline for the next round of negotiations. Because of the length of the document, text will be sent in separate cables. This is Cable 1 of 2 cables. ¶3. Begin text: SFO-VII U.S. Proposed Joint Draft Text December 19, 2009 TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches to interaction across the whole range of their strategic relations, Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation, Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons, Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat, Expressing strong support for global efforts in non-proliferation, Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a multilateral approach, Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both Parties, Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms and that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability, Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century, Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that the reduction levels envisaged by the Treaty were achieved, Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and to strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, Have agreed as follows: Article I ¶1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Protocol. ¶2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the Protocol. Article II ¶1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed: (a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; (b) ((1500))1 ((1550))2, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers. ¶2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. Article III ¶1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this Treaty: (a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one unit. (b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one unit. (c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit. ¶2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this Treaty: (a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. (b) For each deployed heavy bomber, the number of nuclear armaments shall be ((three))1 ((one))2 warhead((s))1. ¶3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs: (a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type. ¶4. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to this Treaty as follows: (a) an ICBM when it first leaves a production facility; (b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility; (c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first installed and closed; (d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility; (e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched; (f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of such a heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber airframes. ¶5. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and deployed heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with procedures provided for in Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMS or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type for such an ICBM or SLBM have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶6. For the purposes of this Treaty: (a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty apply. (b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (c) Heavy bombers of ((a given))1 ((the same))2 type shall cease to be subject to ((the limitations of))2 this Treaty when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is either eliminated or converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶7. As of the date of signature of this Treaty: (a) Existing types of ICBMs are: (i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; (ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24. (b) Existing types of SLBMs are: (i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56; (ii) for the United States of America, the Trident II. (c) Existing types of heavy bombers are: (i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A; (ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160. (d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are: (i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56; (ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM launcher Trident II. Article IV ¶1. Each Party shall locate: (a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases; (b) deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile submarines. ¶2. Each Party shall base deployed heavy bombers only at air bases. ((3. Each Party shall limit deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number of such launchers does not exceed 800.))1 ((4))1 ((3.))2 Each Party shall locate: (a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, production facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases. (b) non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs only at ICBM bases, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities of ICBM bases, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training facilities, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. ((5.))1 ((4.))2 Non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no more than 30 days. ((6.))1 ((5.))2 Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges. ((7.))1 ((6.))2 Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. ((8.))1((7))2 Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than ten. ((9.))1((8))2 Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers. ((9. Each Party undertakes not to carry out joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at an air base, unless the Parties agree otherwise.))2 ¶10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities. ¶11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. The obligations of this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights under generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. Article V ¶1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. ¶2. The Parties agree that modernization and replacement of their strategic offensive arms ((as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles))1 may ((only))1 involve ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. ¶3. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arms is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article ((XIV))1 ((XII))2 of the Treaty. ((4. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further undertakes not to convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.))2 ((Article VI ¶1. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in re stricted areas. A re stricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another re stricted area. No more than ten deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a re stricted area. A re stricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM. ¶2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs within each re stricted area so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that re stricted area. ¶3. Each re stricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs. ¶4. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave re stricted areas only for routine movements, or relocations. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations. Prior to the departure of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from re stricted areas or deployment areas for purposes other than those specified in this paragraph, the Parties shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission to agree upon any additional measures that may be necessary. ¶5. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside re stricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation.))1 Article ((VII))1 ((VI))2 ¶1. Conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with this Treaty shall be carried out by: (a) national technical means of verification in accordance with Article IX of this Treaty; and, (b) inspection((s))2 ((activities))1 as provided for in Article XI of this Treaty. Article ((VIII))1 ((VII))2 ¶1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in Part Two of its Protocol, in which data specified for items subject to the provisions of this Treaty are listed according to categories of data. ¶2. Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in such data and shall provide other notifications provided for in the Protocol to this Treaty, in order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty. ¶3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty. ¶4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty. ((5. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public or a third party the information from the initial exchange of data described in paragraph 2, Section I, Part 2 of the Protocol, which shall be listed in Part Two of the Protocol and associated Annexes, as well as any photographs appended thereto, except as otherwise provided in this Article. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this Article or received in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty.))1 ((6.))1 ((5))2 Geographic coordinates ((relating to data contained in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty))2, ((unique identifiers,))1 site diagrams ((provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty))2, and coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be released to the public, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. ((6. Each Party may release to the public data and other information of which it becomes aware in the course of implementation of this Treaty, subject to the consent of the other Party. The Parties shall consult within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on release to the public of such data and information, including data on aggregate numbers of warheads.))2 ((7. The aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear armaments for deployed heavy bombers, as stated in subparagraph (b)of Article II, may be released to the public. All other nuclear warhead data shall not be released to the public or any third party unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.))1 Article ((IX))1 ((VIII))2 In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, in those cases where, in the estimation of one of the Parties, ambiguous situations may arise, that Party shall take measures, including providing information in advance, inter alia through diplomatic channels, on activities being conducted with respect to strategic offensive arms, which are associated with their deployment or increasing readiness, so as to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. Article ((X))1 ((IX))2 By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on ((test))1 launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of such telemetric information. Article ((XI))1 ((X))2 ¶1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law; (b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article; and (c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. ¶2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers , or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms. ((3. The Parties shall provide notification no later than 48 hours in advance of the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from production facilities for solid fuel ICBMs and SLBMs. For the purpose of this paragraph, such production facilities are, for the Russian Federation, the Votkinsk production facility, and for the United States, (to be provided). Such notifications shall identify whether the ballistic missile is an ICBM or SLBM, and shall include the unique identifier, the destination of such ICBMs and SLBMs and the estimated time of arrival.))1 ((4. To aid verification, each ICBM, SLBM, ICBM launcher, and deployed heavy bomber shall have a unique identifier as provided for in Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.))1 Article ((XII))1 ((XI))2 ¶1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases for deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. Such inspection activities shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One inspections. ¶3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at facilities identified as facilities subject to inspection in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty except for the facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Article. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty ((and to confirm that strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated))2. In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at formerly declared facilities ((subject to this Treaty))2, which are listed in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty. The inspection activities set forth in this paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections. ¶4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type ((and to confirm the conversion or elimination))1 of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty. ((Article XIII ¶1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures: (a) a display in the open of the mobile launchers of ICBMs located within each re stricted area of one ICBM base specified by the requesting Party with the exception of those mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in routine movement. For each specified ICBM base, the roofs of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs in all re stricted areas at that base shall be open for the duration of a display. The mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the re stricted areas shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures. Those mobile launchers of ICBMs at the base specified by the requesting Party that will not be displayed due to routine movement shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph XX of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made; (b) a display in the open of all deployed heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those deployed heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made. ¶2. Mobile launchers of ICBMs and deployed heavy bombers subject to each equest pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article sall be displayed in open view without using concalment measures. Each Party shall have the right t make five such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or any particular air base more than one time each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of deployed heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. ¶3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.))1 Article ((XIV))1 ((XII))2 To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty, to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and (c) resolve questions related to the application of ((relevant))1 ((the))2 provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm((, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph TBD of Section TBD of Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty))1. Article ((XV))1((XIII))2 To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties undertake not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article ((XIII))1 ((XII))2 of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State. (( ))1 Proposed by the United States (( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS