START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001219 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S.-PROPOSED JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL, DECEMBER 19, 2009 (CABLE 12 OF 12 CABLES) REF: A. GENEVA 1208 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 1 OF 12 CABLES) ¶B. GENEVA 1209 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 2 OF 12 CABLES) ¶C. GENEVA 1210 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 3 OF 12 CABLES) ¶D. GENEVA 1211 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 4 OF 12 CABLES) ¶E. GENEVA 1212 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 5 OF 12 CABLES) ¶F. GENEVA 1213 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 6 OF 12 CABLES) ¶G. GENEVA 1214 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 7 OF 12 CABLES) ¶H. GENEVA 1215 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 8 OF 12 CABLES) ¶I. GENEVA 1216 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 9 OF 12 CABLES) ¶J. GENEVA 1217 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 10 OF 12 CABLES) ¶K. GENEVA 1218 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 11 OF 12 CABLES) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-162. ¶2. (S) The text at Paragraph 3 is the working document from which the U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text of the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms dated December 19, 2009 will be prepared. It establishes the baseline for the next round of the negotiations. Because of the length of the document, text will be sent as separate cables. This is Cable 12 of 12 cables. ¶3. (S) Begin text: PART SIX - BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION Conforming Group JDT December 8, 2009 Section I. Composition of the Commission ¶1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party through diplomatic channels the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission no later than 30 days after ((signature))1 ((entry into force))2 of the Treaty. ¶2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members, advisors, and experts. A session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission. ¶3. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission. Section II. Convening a Session of the Commission ¶1. A session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 15 days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following: (a) the questions that the Party intends to raise, (b) the name of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, or the head representative of the Party; and (c) the proposed, accepted or alternate date and location for the convening of the session. Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party prior to the convening of the session. No fewer than two sessions of the Commission shall be convened each year, unless otherwise agreed. ¶2. A session of the Commission shall be convened not later than 45 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section. ¶3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, and shall remain in session for no more than 15 days, unless otherwise agreed. ¶4. The Commissioners of the Parties may communicate with each other during the intersessional period in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions. Section III. Agenda ¶1. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Part. ¶2. Each Party shall have the right to raise in the Commission questions that arise during a session of the Commission; provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of their delegations that are required. Section IV. Work of the Commission The work of the Commission shall be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may record ((agreements))1 ((arrangements))2 or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. Section V. Costs Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the work of the Commission. Section VI. Communications Communications in accordance with this Part shall be provided through diplomatic channels; or through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the Parties. Section VII. Additional Procedures ((and Provisional Application))1 ((1.))1 The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission. ((2. The provisions of Article XIII of the Treaty and the provisions of this Part shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of Article XIII of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. ¶3. The provisions of Article XIII of the Treaty and the provisions of this Part shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.))1 PART SEVEN - TELEMETRY ((General Obligations))1 ((1.))1 ((For a three-year period, b))2 ((B))1eginning ((at))1 entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on ((no more than))2 five flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs per year. ((2. Each Party shall provide telemetry on any five of seven test flights selected by the monitoring Party from a list provided by each Party, as specified in the Notifications Part of this Protocol, at the beginning of each year of all ICBM and SLBM flight test planned for that year. ¶3. If a test flight on which telemetric information is to be exchanged is not conducted, then telemetric data shall be exchanged for another of the test flights, as specified in the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol. ¶4. In the event a Party conducts less than 5 test flights during a calendar year, it will provide telemetry on all test flights except one test flight that it chooses to exclude from this requirement.))1 ((In addition, if Trident II SLBM launches take place on behalf of Great Britain, telemetric information about them shall be included in the annual quota of the U.S. side.))2 ((4. Prior to the three-year anniversary of entry into force of this Treaty, the Parties shall review,))1((After three years of treaty implementation, the sides shall consider the conditions and method of further telemetric information exchange on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs))2 within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission((, the results of the telemetric information exchange and shall decide whether to modify the telemetric information exchange on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs and prototypes of ICBMs and SLBMs. Unless the Parties agree otherwise in the BCC, the exchange shall continue as specified in this Part and in the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol))1. ((5. The Parties agree to the following for flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs and prototypes of ICBMs and SLBMs on which telemetry shall be exchanged: a) Telemetry shall be broadcast without data denial techniques; b) The notification of the flight test shall include the frequency and modulation of the telemetric information; c) Telemetric information broadcast during the test flight shall be exchanged on recording media; and d) Information shall be exchanged to interpret the telemetric information and, if the telemetric information broadcast during the test flight is encrypted, information to unencrypted the telemetric information.))1 ((6. The exchanges of information required by paragraph 5 above shall be conducted as specified in the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol.))1 ((The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an equal number of flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted by the Parties, and in an agreed amount.))2 PART EIGHT - PROVISIONAL APPLICATION As of November 30, 2009 The Parties agree to apply the following provisions of the Treaty and Protocol provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty pending the entry into force of the Treaty: (TO BE DETERMINED) (a) Treaty Articles (i) Article xx (ii) Article xx (iii) Article xx (iv) ... (b) Protocol (i) Part xx of this Protocol (A) ... (B) ... (ii) The following portions of Part xx of this Protocol (A) ... (B) ... PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS SFO-GVA-VII U.S. Proposed JDT December 19, 2009 Protocol to the Treaty U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) Converted from SSBNs Fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that((, other than the provisions contained herein,))1 the U.S. guided missile submarines, known to the United States of America as "SSGNs" and to the Russian Federation as "PLARK",(( shall not be subject to the provisions of the Treaty.))1 ((shall be subject to the Treaty, taking into consideration the provisions of this document.))2 In order to provide assurances that all four SSGNs of the United States of America are incapable of launching SLBMs, the following provisions shall apply to such submarines: (a) No later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct an initial one-time exhibition of each of the four SSGNs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on such submarines are incapable of launching an SLBM. The procedures for the exhibition shall be consistent with the procedures for the exhibition of the conversion of an SLBM launcher in accordance with Part Three and Part Five of this Protocol. (b) Subsequent to the completion of the initial exhibitions, the United States of America shall also provide periodic opportunities for the Russian Federation to confirm that none of the four SSGNs have been reconverted to make them capable of launching SLBMs. In order to provide assurances that an SSGN has not been re-converted and that the launchers on such a submarine are incapable of launching an SLBM, the Russian Federation shall have the right, while conducting a Type One inspection, to inspect the designated launcher((s))2 of each converted SSGN if such a submarine is located at the designated submarine base during the period of inspection. The number of such inspections shall not exceed a total of six, during the duration of the Treaty, for all four converted SSGNs existing at the time of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall not exceed two inspections for each SSGN. (c) The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be consistent with the procedures for conducting an inspection of an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM, in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modifications: (i) The SSGNs at the designated submarine base shall be subject to pre-inspection re strictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol and shall be subject to inspection. After pre-inspection re strictions have been implemented, no temporary shelters, each of which obstructs the viewing of four SSGN launchers, shall be installed. If such temporary shelters were installed prior to the implementation of pre-inspection re strictions, the SSGN launchers under these shelters shall not be subject to inspection. The total of SSGN launchers obstructed from viewing because they are under such shelters on a single SSGN shall not exceed eight launchers. (ii) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine base, and in addition to the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall provide written information on the number of SSGNs subject to inspection under the terms of this Agreed Statement and the number of launchers on those submarines. (iii) The location of each SSGN subject to pre-inspection re strictions shall be annotated on the coastline and waters diagram. (iv) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate ((one))1((two))2 SSGN launcher((s))2 for inspection, if such launchers are located on submarines located at that base, instead of ((one non-deployed SLBM launcher or one deployed SLBM launcher))1 ((one non-deployed SLBM launcher))2 as specified in subparagraph 6 (b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol. (v) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the inspectors that the designated launcher is incapable of launching an SLBM. (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in the official inspection report. (d) If the United States of America converts other SSBNs into SSGN guided missile submarines, such SSGNs shall be subject to the measures specified in this Agreed Statement, and an additional number of inspections will be agreed between the Parties within the framework of the BCC. As of December 3, 2009 SFO-GVA-VII U.S. Proposed JDT December 19, 2009 Protocol to the Treaty Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers First Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that((, other than the provisions contained herein))1, after completion of the conversion of the final B-1B heavy bomber, ((B-1B heavy bombers shall not be subject to the provisions of the Treaty.))1 ((B-1B heavy bombers shall be subject to the Treaty based on the provisions provided for in this document.))2 In order to provide assurance that the B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments, the following procedures shall apply thereafter to such B-1B heavy bombers: (a) No later than one year after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct a one-time exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments to demonstrate it is incapable of employing nuclear armaments. The procedures for such an exhibition shall be consistent with the procedures for a heavy bomber conversion exhibition as provided for in Part Three of the Protocol of the Treaty. Following the exhibition, the distinguishing features that differentiate a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments from a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be recorded in the official report of that exhibition and shall be applied thereafter for identification of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (b) The United States will notify the Russian Federation that Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, have been eliminated when all the B-1B heavy bombers based there have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (c) Such eliminated facilities where converted B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based may be inspected as formerly declared facilities. Such inspections shall fall within the annual quota for Type Two inspections established in accordance within Section VII of Part Five of this Protocol. Moreover, no more than one such inspection at one of the two B-1B bases may be conducted each year. This inspection may be used to demonstrate that the converted B-1B heavy bomber remains incapable of employing nuclear armaments. (d) The procedures for the conduct of such an inspection shall be in accordance with Section VIII of Part Three and Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modified Type One inspection procedures: (i) At the point of entry, which for such an inspection is Travis Air Force Base, California, the inspection team that has designated either Ellsworth Air Force Base or Dyess Air Force for a formerly declared facility inspection will be informed of the number of B-1B heavy bombers currently located at the base. If less than 50 percent of such heavy bombers based at that base are present, the inspection team leader shall have the right to: (A) inform the member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base shall take place; or (B) designate another inspection site associated with the same point of entry; or (C) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. (ii) Upon arrival at the eliminated facility, the in-country escort team lead shall provide an annotated site diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers that are present at the base; (iii) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the leader of the team attending the inspection will designate no more than three B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments for inspection; (iv) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect each of the three designated B-1B heavy bombers to confirm that those heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments; and (v) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in the official inspection report. (e) If, after the completion of the conversion of all B-1B heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, during a Type One inspection being conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, B-1B heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are present when pre-inspection movement re strictions are implemented, those heavy bombers shall not be subject to the Type One inspection. (f) If the United States decides to convert all of another type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, those converted heavy bombers shall also be subject to the aforementioned verification measures. SFO-GVA-VII U.S. Proposed JDT December 19, 2009 Protocol to the Treaty Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped Non-Nuclear Armaments Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions provided for in paragraph 8 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to carry out joint basing at an air base of heavy bombers of a type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type converted in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of this Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments until the last of them is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (a) Before completion of conversion of the last such heavy bomber of a type equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all heavy bombers located at an air base may be inspected. In this connection, inspections with respect to heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for nuclear armaments shall be conducted within the established annual inspection quota in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol (Type One inspections). At the same time, within one and the same inspection heavy bombers declared to be equipped for non-nuclear armaments may be inspected to confirm that they have not been converted into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. (b) The inspection procedures for an air base of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and converted heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modified Type One inspection procedures: (i) At the point of entry, if the inspection team has designated such an air base for inspection, the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this Protocol shall apply to deployed heavy bombers. The inspection team shall also be informed of the number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments currently located at that base. (ii) The heavy bombers equipped for both nuclear and non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be subject to the pre-inspection re strictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol. (iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall provide written information on the number and types of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at that air base at the time pre-inspection re strictions went into effect. In addition, a member of the in-country escort shall add to the site diagram the locations of each such declared heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the inspection team leader shall designate no more than three heavy bombers ((equipped for nuclear armaments))2 depicted on the site diagram for inspection. (v) In addition to the rights specified in paragraph ((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, if so designated, no more than ((one))1((three))2 heavy bomber((s))1 equipped for non-nuclear armaments to confirm that the bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments. (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in the official inspection report. (((d) The application of this Agreed Statement with respect to each specific type of heavy bombers shall be agreed within the BCC.))2 SFO-GVA-VII U.S. Proposed JDT December 19, 2009 Protocol to the Treaty Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped Non-Nuclear Armaments Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions provided for in paragraph 8 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to carry out joint basing at an air base of heavy bombers of a type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type converted in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of this Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments until the last of them is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (a) Before completion of conversion of the last such heavy bomber of a type equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all heavy bombers located at an air base may be inspected. In this connection, inspections with respect to heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for nuclear armaments shall be conducted within the established annual inspection quota in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol (Type One inspections). At the same time, within one and the same inspection heavy bombers declared to be equipped for non-nuclear armaments may be inspected to confirm that they have not been converted into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. (b) The inspection procedures for an air base of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and converted heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modified Type One inspection procedures: (i) At the point of entry, if the inspection team has designated such an air base for inspection, the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this Protocol shall apply to deployed heavy bombers. The inspection team shall also be informed of the number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments currently located at that base. (ii) The heavy bombers equipped for both nuclear and non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be subject to the pre-inspection re strictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol. (iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall provide written information on the number and types of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at that air base at the time pre-inspection re strictions went into effect. In addition, a member of the in-country escort shall add to the site diagram the locations of each such declared heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the inspection team leader shall designate no more than three heavy bombers ((equipped for nuclear armaments))2 depicted on the site diagram for inspection. (v) In addition to the rights specified in paragraph ((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, if so designated, no more than ((one))1((three))2 heavy bomber((s))1 equipped for non-nuclear armaments to confirm that the bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments. (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in the official inspection report. (((d) The application of this Agreed Statement with respect to each specific type of heavy bombers shall be agreed within the BCC.))2 SFO-GVA-VII U.S. Proposed JDT December 19, 2009 Protocol to the Treaty Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or Elimination Facility Located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona Third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the definition of the terms "air base" and "deployed heavy bomber" in Part One of this Protocol, and paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, heavy bombers awaiting conversion or elimination at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona shall be considered deployed heavy bombers until such time as they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments or eliminated. Other Agreed statements Rapid reload ?? PART TEN - GENERAL PROVISIONS As of December 3, 2009 ¶1. The Parties may agree to Annexes that shall contain procedures for the implementation of this Protocol. These Annexes shall be an integral part of this Protocol. ¶2. This Protocol shall be subject to and governed by the Treaty and is an integral part thereof. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. Done at on , in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: OF AMERICA: (( ))1 Proposed by the United States (( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation End text. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS