START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001205 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, DECEMBER 12, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-127. ¶2. (U) Meeting Dates: December 12, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva and Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met twice on December 12 to review and clarify remaining points of contention in Sections IV, VI, and VIII of Part Five of the Protocol and Article XI. Discussion during the morning session focused on the parameters and guidelines for inspections, with particular focus on inspections of heavy bomber bases, the breadth of inspections of mobile ICBM bases, conversion issues associated with B-1B and SSGNs, and related matters. ¶4. (S) The Parties then discussed exhibitions. During this phase, the Russian side appeared to clarify that it would declare the RS-24 as a "new type," though Ilin pulled back on this statement by deferring to the Presidential conversation. Ilin also said that it was "unlikely" that Russia would build new silo launchers during the life of the treaty. The sides also agreed to generalize references to strategic offensive arms (SOA) and the U.S. side pushed for a "batching" concept associated with eliminations. ¶5. (S) In the afternoon session, the sides also agreed to generalize across ICBM types the minimum number of launchers required for an inspection. In Article XI, the sides worked to remove specific listings of types and facilities and to shift them to appropriate parts of the Protocol, though it was not clear whether the Russian side agreed to a full listing of these objects in the Protocol. The sides also differed on the specifics of heavy bomber movement 
notifications and discussed beginning work to reach agreement on selected parts of the annex, without agreement. ¶6. (S) During informal conversations during breaks, the Russian side stated that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was playing an "active role" in guiding the Russian delegation. The Russians also provided some information on Defense Minister Serdyukov. End Summary. ¶7. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section IV: Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry; Section VIII - Exhibitions and Existing Types; Afternoon Session, Section IV; The Political Dynamics Guiding the Russian Delegation; Article XI, Heavy Bomber Notifications; and Annexes. -------------- SECTION IV: ACTIVITIES BEGINNING UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY -------------- ¶8. (S) The meeting began with a review of the previous day's discussion on Article XI. Ilin regarded the debate as "not fruitful," but admitted that some of the U.S. points were valid. In that light, the Russian side had revised their proposed version of Article XI, and handed over copies. ¶9. (S) The discussion then turned to Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. The chapeau was agreed as written. For paragraph 1, the sides discussed whether there was a need for a complete list of what would be subject to Type One and Type Two inspections. Debate also took place on the parameters of the agreed statement for B-1Bs; the U.S. side reported that it was working on a joint draft text (JDT) of the statement. Warner made clear that the United States would not characterize heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments as "non-deployed" heavy bombers and that the B-1Bs to only conventional weapons carriage would be removed from treaty accountability. The non-deployed category could, in his view, include heavy bombers at flight test centers, maintenance depots, those at storage areas, and those awaiting elimination. The definition would depend, he continued, on settlement regarding the central limits, especially on whether there would be some form of limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. ¶10. (S) For paragraph 2, the sides noted continued dissension on the number of annual permitted inspections. In light of the recent Russian proposal, the sides agreed to U.S. language on "no more than two facilities being inspected each year." Paragraph 3 was agreed. ¶11. (S) With respect to paragraph 4, Col Petrov and Warner discussed the implications of changing the pre-inspection movement re strictions. Warner noted that these re strictions would remain the same under the revised approach, but simply be moved forward in time. ¶12. (S) Warner reported that the United States would remove its proposed paragraph 5 on concentration/recall upon agreement regarding key elements of Section IV. ¶13. (S) For paragraph 6, the sides agreed to a number of wording changes, including using the term "data" instead of "information" and dropping a specific reference to mobile ICBMs. ¶14. (S) For paragraph 7(a) regarding data provided during inspections of ICBM bases, the sides agreed to drop a specific requirement for information on mobile ICBM launchers and generalize this requirement within a broader reference to ICBM launchers. The U.S. delegation also agreed to clarify its proposed sentence stipulating that escorts should only provide information on mobile ICBM launchers within the basing areas and maintenance area. On Paragraph 7(b) on inspections of submarine bases, the sides agreed that resolution of standing differences would depend upon agreement on the agreed statement on SSGNs. ¶15. (S) For paragraph 7(c) regarding inspections of heavy bases, the sides discussed notifications of heavy bomber movements. Warner emphasized that the most detailed the United States would be prepared to include in movement notifications of heavy bombers to locations outside U.S. territory would be to indicate the theater or continent where they were temporarily located. Ilin pushed for more clarity, down to the individual country level. Though no agreement was reached, Warner volunteered to try another formulation. ¶16. (S) For paragraph 8(a) on the number of deployed ICBM launchers to be selected for nuclear warhead inspection, the U.S. side argued for the ability to designate two such launchers, while the Russian side advocated for only one. The issue was not resolved. ¶17. (S) Petrov then asked for a fuller explanation of the U.S. vision for Type One inspections at mobile ICBM bases. Mr. Rust explained that the U.S. proposal would be for the inspectors to designate one or two mobile ICBM launchers for nuclear warhead inspection and possibly one empty fixed structure, which could be substituted for one of the deployed mobile ICBMs. In addition, inspectors would be able to inspect the maintenance facility at the base along the lines provided for during a data update inspection under START. In addition, the inspectors would enjoy the right to inspect a designated basing/re stricted area, which would be inspected, as under START, to confirm the number of deployed mobile ICBMs in that area, including the right to inspect structures large enough to contain the given reference cylinder representing the size of a mobile ICBM. ¶18. (S) Discussion ensued about the merits of inspectors having the right to effectively inspect two separate basing areas and the distinctions in procedures between the two inspections. Ilin argued that the inspectors should only be able to go through a single re stricted basing area, because such inspections were burdensome for the affected base. Warner agreed to consider limiting inspections to a single re stricted basing area. ¶19. (S) After noting that the inspection rights for submarine bases would reflect the outcome of the SSGN agreed statement discussion, the sides turned to the question of inspections of heavy bomber air bases. Warner stated that the United States could not discuss subjecting more than three heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to inspections. He also made clear that, while Russian inspectors would be able to inspect B-2As and B-52Gs, B-1Bs converted for non-nuclear armaments would not be liable to inspection, explaining that the maintenance and administrative burdens associated with offering these B-1Bs to inspection would be too onerous. Ilin replied that, in light of the long-standing disputes about the sufficiency of B-1B conversion procedures, "many in Moscow" believed that the proposed U.S. conversion procedures offered for START Follow-on were insufficient to allay concerns that the B-1Bs could be reconverted to support nuclear use. He contended that allowing B-1Bs to be inspected would provide additional assurance against such reconversion fears. Warner responded that Russia could use short-notice Type Two inspections to view Dyess and Ellsworth Air Force Bases, and elaborated on the proposed U.S. agreed statement on B-1Bs. Ilin stated that resolution of the issue would depend upon finalization of the agreed statement. ¶20. (S) The sides agreed that paragraph 10 on inspectors rights to read unique identifiers would need to await decision at the leadership level; the Russian side continued to refuse to accept this provision ¶21. (S) For paragraphs 12-15, on what inspectors would be able to inspect at the various bases, the sides agreed that the remaining issues therein would depend upon higher-level decisions. They noted that the remaining key issues included: whether inspectors could designate two or only a single deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs at ICBM and submarines bases for nuclear warhead inspection; the SSGN matter; recall/concentration requirements for mobile ICBMs; and definitions for deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. ¶22. (S) For paragraph 16 on placing covers over reentry vehicles prior to nuclear warhead inspections, Warner reaffirmed that the United States would not alter its position regarding the manner for handling the hard covers used for Trident II/D5 nuclear warhead inspections. A discussion ensued on the applicability of the "individual" cover proposal of the Russian side. Warner commented that it was critically important that covers not be permitted to hamper the counting of individual re-entry vehicles as stated in the paragraph being discussed. Warner stated that the United States was not prepared to withdraw its position on measuring covers and suggested that the sides maintain the brackets, noting that many of the issues would need to be addressed in the annexes. ¶23. (S) The Russian side then proposed shifting provisions for eliminated facilities from Article V to the inspection sections of the Protocol. Warner pledged to consult with the U.S. members of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group and respond later to the Russian proposal. -------------- SECTION VIII - EXHIBITIONS AND EXISTING TYPES -------------- ¶24. (S) Turning to Section VIII on exhibitions, the Russian delegation made clear its opposition to any singling out of mobile ICBM systems. During the discussions, the Russian side also commented that it was "not likely" that Russia would create new silos during the lifetime of the treaty. The sides also discussed the question of whether existing launcher types would need to be exhibited. (Begin comment: The underlying issue here was whether, if the Russian side declared the RS-24 an existing type as of signature, it would have to conduct a technical characteristics exhibition on that ICBM. End comment.) The Russian side also floated the notion that exhibitions were not obligatory. Warner therefore noted that the Russian side had not been clear regarding what systems it would declare at signature as existing types. For instance, he said, the initial Russian paper listing existing types of ICBMs did not include the RS-24, while the latest submission did. Ilin replied that this was a misunderstanding and stated that Russia would declare the RS-24 as an existing type of ICBM. After Warner reminded him of the previous paper, Ilin shifted to stating that he did not know the outcome and recommended waiting until Monday after the Presidents had spoken over the weekend. ¶25. (S) For paragraph 3, Warner pushed back against the Russian proposal to refer only to SOA, clarifying that only three systems could potentially be converted: ICBM launchers; SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. ICBMs and SLBMs could not be converted. Ilin insisted on reference to SOA, and so Warner agreed to that formulation. Ilin also queried whether B-1B conversion would fall under this paragraph, and Warner deferred on the matter to the Conversion or Elimination Working Group. ¶26. (S) For paragraph 4 on conversion or elimination exhibitions, Warner explained the batch concept of elimination exhibitions, whereby the burden on the eliminating Party could be reduced. Ilin responded that there was no natural accumulation of eliminated systems at the elimination facilities. Warner urged the Russian side to consider the batching approach, especially given that it had emerged as an informal custom under the START Treaty during the elimination of mobile ICBMs and their launchers. -------------- AFTERNOON SESSION, SECTION IV -------------- ¶27. (S) Turning to Section IV during the afternoon session, the sides noted agreement on paragraphs 1-5. For paragraph 6, dealing with the number of mobile ICBM launchers available for an inspection, the Russian side argued for extending the 50 percent floor requirement for the number of deployed mobile launchers present to all ICBMs (as opposed to the U.S.-proposed figure of 30 percent). The U.S. side agreed. The sides also agreed to clarify that the preinspection movement re strictions would take effect 1 hour after the designation of the base at the point of entry. The sides also kept the sequential inspections paragraph in brackets. -------------- -------------- THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS GUIDING THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION -------------- -------------- ¶28. (S) Warner then described his understanding of the agenda for the working group if the Presidents issued instructions to complete the treaty in short order following their telephone discussion later that day: first, to reflect those areas of agreement reached between the Presidents; second, to solve inspection-specific issues, such as the number of inspections permitted per year and the inspection activities to be used to monitor guidelines for elimination; and, third, to resolve smaller matters. Ilin tellingly replied, "If we get an impetus, then we shall find a solution." ¶29. (S) During a break in the discussions, Warner and Ilin informally discussed some of the political dynamics in Russia. Specifically, Warner asked what role Prime Minister Putin played in guiding the treaty negotiations. Clearly tight-lipped on the topic, Ilin replied elliptically that Putin played "an active role" in the negotiations. Warner also asked the Russian side for background on Russian Defense Minister Serdyukov. Col Zaitsev described his background as "hazy," and Ilin noted that he had been the chief Russian tax official before becoming defense minister but did not know what he had done before that. The Russian side also commented that he was "very tough and strict." -------------- ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶30. (S) Warner and Ilin asked Mr. Brown and Mr. Lobach to revise Article XI in order to streamline the text's specifications of systems subject to Type One and Type Two inspections and to exhibitions. After consulting with Lobach, Brown suggested abbreviating paragraphs 2 (Type One inspections),3 (Type Two inspections),and 4 (exhibitions) by replacing their listings of systems with references to Section VI, VII, and VIII of Part Five of the Protocol, respectively. The only significant step required to implement this change would be to list the relevant systems in Section VIII. Ilin responded that the sides should return to the issue later, but commented that he liked the idea. He also urged putting more material from Article XI into the Protocol. ¶31. (S) Warner then pointed out that if the sides agreed to remove the lists of facilities from paragraph 3 on Type Two inspections, they would absolutely need to list them in the Protocol. Ilin responded that they were in the Memorandum of Understanding, which should suffice. Warner responded that that would not be sufficient. Warner explained that the U.S. side wanted assurances that if the sides were to agree to an "extremely abbreviated" treaty, then the lists of inspectable facilities and kinds of SOA being inspected would need to be included in the Protocol. He noted that this would involve listing ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments for conversion exhibitions and ICBMS, SLBMs, ICBM and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers for elimination exhibitions. For new type exhibitions, the list would be limited to: ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and, as set forth in Part Two of the Protocol, ICBM launchers. He noted that the last category would cover mobile ICBM launchers without singling them out by name. Ilin asked for the list in writing. It was not clear whether Ilin committed not to shortening the lists in the Protocol. ¶32. (S) A short discussion ensued in which Ilin advocated removing references to specific sections of the Protocol in the treaty. Brown responded that this was not tenable because it would create ambiguity. Lobach argued the reverse. Warner pledged to create a new version of Article XI based upon the discussions. -------------- HEAVY BOMBER NOTIFICATIONS -------------- ¶33. (S) The sides returned briefly to the issue of notifications of the location of heavy bombers when operating abroad. The Russian side sought greater specificity in the location provided by the notification, down to the country level. Warner pushed back, arguing for only providing information at the region/continental level. No resolution was reached. -------------- ANNEXES -------------- ¶34. (S) At the close, Warner urged the working group to begin work on the annexes, specifically 6 and 7. He reasoned that, if the Presidents gave a "go" signal after their telephone call later in the day, the group would need to begin consideration of the annexes the following day. Ilin was non-committal. ¶35. (U) Documents provided: - RUSSIA: -- Russian Revised Proposal for Article XI ¶36. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby LTC Leyde Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Ms. Zdravecky Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Izrazov Col Petrov Col Zaitsev Ms. Voldopolova Mr. Pogodin (Int for PM Session) ¶37. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS