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09GENEVA1200 2009-12-20 13:10:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 8, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-108.



2. (U) Meeting Dates: December 8, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG), chaired
by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met on December
8 to discuss Section VII, inspections of non-deployed
strategic offensive arms (SOA), and Article XI of the treaty
(Types of Inspections Activities). General agreement was
reached on Section VII with the exception of the number of
times per year Type 2 inspections may be conducted at a given
facility, and with the use of unique identifiers on ICBMs and
SLBMs. Warner provided to the Russian side a revision to
Article XI, paragraph 2 (Type 1 inspections), of the
U.S-proposed joint draft text (JDT) which provided legal
clarifications to the agreed text. Finally, in Section IV,
(activities at the point of entry (POE)), Warner proposed
expanding the language which stated that an inspection team
must be informed at the POE when the number of heavy bombers
at the inspected site was less than 70 percent of the total,
to also address mobile launchers of ICBMs when their
inventory was less than 50 percent. Ilin agreed to consider
it but requested that SSBNs also be included in this proposal.



4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VII, Inspections Of
Non-Deployed SOA; Article XI; and Prior To Departing the POE.



--------------------------


SECTION VII INSPECTIONS OF NON-DEPLOYED SOA


--------------------------





5. (S) Warner opened the meeting by proposing to discuss
Section VII which addressed inspections of non-deployed
strategic offensive arms (SOA). In Paragraph 1 which
identified the installations that were subject to such
inspections, the sides agreed to list the facilities in the
same order as they appeared in the database (Part Two of the
Protocol). Warner did not accept the Russian proposal to
include "bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments" and so this phrase remained bracketed. Ilin
provided proposed text addressing eliminated SOA. After some
discussion, the sides agreed to revise the last phrase of the
paragraph to read "facilities conducting procedures to
eliminate strategic offensive arms in order to confirm the
elimination procedures have been completed."



6. (S) In Paragraph 2 on inspection quotas, the sides agreed
to eight Type 2 inspections per year but continued to
disagree on the number of inspections per year that may be
conducted at the same facility. The U.S. proposal was two
per base per year and the Russian proposal was one. Ilin
asked what sites the U.S. side proposed to inspect twice.
Warner replied that Russia had eighteen facilities subject to


Type 2 inspections and that the inspection team would choose
the actual bases. Ilin acknowledged the disagreement and
stated that the proposed numbers should remain bracketed.



7. (S) Paragraph 4 addressed the written information that
must be presented to the inspection team upon its arrival at
the inspection site. The sides agreed that such information
would include the number, type, category and version of
non-deployed SOA and related items located at the site when
pre-inspection procedures went into effect. The term
"variant" was accepted and the sides agreed to add "training
launchers" to the list.



8. (S) In Paragraph 5 on the inspectable area for facilities
other than conversion or elimination facilities for heavy
bombers, the sides agreed to allow for the inspection of the
area within the boundaries of the site diagram as well as the
structures annotated on the site diagram. Warner and Ilin
concurred that either the term "Inspection Activities Annex"
would be used to refer to Level 3 material or, should it be
agreed upon prior to treaty signature, the appropriate
numbered technical annex itself. The last sentence of the
subparagraph (a) was relocated to make a new subparagraph (c)
to read "For launch canisters, the inspecting team shall have
the right to inspect all launch canisters declared to be
empty within the boundaries of the site diagram." Lastly, in
subparagraph (b), "silo launchers of non-deployed ICBMs" was
rephrased to "test silo launchers."



9. (S) In Paragraph 6 on conversion or elimination
facilities for heavy bombers, the sides agreed on the text.
However, Warner and Ilin decided to further consider whether
the term "variant" was needed in the phrase "Such inspections
shall be conducted to confirm the data on the numbers, by
type and, if applicable, category and variant, of these heavy
bombers."



10. (S) In Paragraph 8 on unique identifiers, Warner stated
the text should read, "Inspectors shall have the right to
read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs and
SLBMs located at the inspection site except for such ICBMs or
SLBMs located in test launchers or soft-site launchers of
ICBMs or SLBMs." However, Ilin stated that the entire
paragraph should remain bracketed.



11. (S) Ilin proposed to add a new paragraph 10 which read,
"The inspection team shall have the right to confirm that
ICBMs and SLBMs are training models of missiles based on the
differences stipulated in Part Two of the Protocol. Training
models of missiles loaded in training silo launchers shall
not be subject to inspection." After consulting with the
U.S. delegation, Warner agreed that this was acceptable.



--------------------------


ARTICLE XI


--------------------------





12. (S) Warner stated that after receiving guidance from
Washington and following consultations with the Treaty Text
and Definitions Working Group, the U.S. side proposed a
revision to paragraph 2 of the U.S.-proposed JDT of Article
XI.



Begin text:

Each Party shall have the right to conduct Type One
inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases and air bases for
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The purpose of
Type One inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of
declared data on the number and types of deployed and
non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers
specified for such facilities in the notifications and
exchanges of data provided in accordance with Parts Two and
Four of the Protocol. Additionally, the purpose of such
inspections shall be to confirm the number of warheads on
designated deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs or the number of
nuclear armaments on designated deployed heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments.

End text.



13. (S) Warner noted that, consistent with the language used
in START, the expression "confirmed declared data" was
changed to "confirm accuracy of declared data" and the phrase
"facilities in the notifications and exchanges of data
provided in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the
Protocol" was added. Warner pointed out that the substance
of the paragraph remained unchanged in that the paragraph
stated the inspection locations as well as their purpose.
Warner remarked that the paragraph was clarified to state
that the information being confirmed came from the database
(Part Two of the Protocol) which was updated via
notifications (Part Four of the Protocol).



14. (S) Ilin expressed concern that the word "additionally"
in the last sentence seemed to imply that the items in this
statement were to be considered in a separate context from
the items in the previous one. Warner stated that this was
not true and that the two sentences would be combined to
prevent this possible misinterpretation. Warner declared
that the paragraph linked the data that the inspectors
brought with them to the data provided by the inspected Party
at the pre-inspection briefing, and facilitated its
comparison. Ilin agreed to have the Russian side's legal
advisors review the proposed text.



--------------------------


PRIOR TO DEPARTING THE POE


--------------------------





15. (S) Warner provided a proposed revision to paragraph 6
of Section IV of Part Five of the Protocol (Inspections).
The text currently stated that prior to the departure of the
inspection team from the POE to the inspection site; the
inspection team must be informed if the number of heavy
bombers at the inspected site was less than 70 percent. The
U.S. proposal expanded on this concept to include mobile
ICBMs. Specifically, prior to the departure of the
inspection team from the POE to the inspection site, the
in-country escort would notify the inspecting Party if, for
an ICBM base, the number of mobile launcher of ICBMs was less
than 50 percent of the number of such mobile launchers
specified for that base. Ilin asked whether such a provision
could also be stipulated for SSBNs in port. Warner replied
that the U.S. side would consider this.





16. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

- Revision of U.S.-Proposed JDT for Part Five, Section
VII, dated December 6, 2009; and

- Revision of U.S.-Proposed JDT for Article XI,
Paragraph 2, dated December 8, 2009.



17. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
LTC Lagraffe
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Izrazov
Col Petrov
Ms. Voldopova
Ms. Komshilova (Int)



18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS