START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001200 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 8, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-108. ¶2. (U) Meeting Dates: December 8, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met on December 8 to discuss Section VII, inspections of non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA),and Article XI of the treaty (Types of Inspections Activities). General agreement was reached on Section VII with the exception of the number of times per year Type 2 inspections may be conducted at a given facility, and with the use of unique identifiers on ICBMs and SLBMs. Warner provided to the Russian side a revision to Article XI, paragraph 2 (Type 1 inspections),of the U.S-proposed joint draft text (JDT) which provided legal clarifications to the agreed text. Finally, in Section IV, (activities at the point of entry (POE)),Warner proposed expanding the language which stated that an inspection team must be informed at the POE when the number of heavy bombers at the inspected site was less than 70 percent of the total, to also address mobile launchers of ICBMs when their inventory was less than 50 percent. Ilin agreed to consider it but requested that SSBNs also be included in this proposal. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VII, Inspections Of Non-Deployed SOA; Article XI; and Prior To Departing the POE. -------------- SECTION VII INSPECTIONS OF NON-DEPLOYED SOA -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner opened the meeting by proposing to discuss Section VII which addressed inspections of non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA). In Paragraph 1 which identified the installations that were subject to such inspections, the sides agreed to list the facilities in the same order as they appeared in the database (Part Two of the Protocol). Warner did not accept the Russian proposal to include "bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments" and so this phrase remained bracketed. Ilin provided proposed text addressing eliminated SOA. After some discussion, the sides agreed to revise the last phrase of the paragraph to read "facilities conducting procedures to eliminate strategic offensive arms in order to confirm the elimination procedures have been completed." ¶6. (S) In Paragraph 2 on inspection quotas, the sides agreed to eight Type 2 inspections per year but continued to disagree on the number of inspections per year that may be conducted at the same facility. The U.S. proposal was two per base per year and the Russian proposal was one. Ilin asked what sites the U.S. side proposed to inspect twice. Warner replied that Russia had eighteen facilities subject to Type 2 inspections and that the inspection team would choose the actual bases. Ilin acknowledged the disagreement and stated that the proposed numbers should remain bracketed. ¶7. (S) Paragraph 4 addressed the written information that must be presented to the inspection team upon its arrival at the inspection site. The sides agreed that such information would include the number, type, category and version of non-deployed SOA and related items located at the site when pre-inspection procedures went into effect. The term "variant" was accepted and the sides agreed to add "training launchers" to the list. ¶8. (S) In Paragraph 5 on the inspectable area for facilities other than conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, the sides agreed to allow for the inspection of the area within the boundaries of the site diagram as well as the structures annotated on the site diagram. Warner and Ilin concurred that either the term "Inspection Activities Annex" would be used to refer to Level 3 material or, should it be agreed upon prior to treaty signature, the appropriate numbered technical annex itself. The last sentence of the subparagraph (a) was relocated to make a new subparagraph (c) to read "For launch canisters, the inspecting team shall have the right to inspect all launch canisters declared to be empty within the boundaries of the site diagram." Lastly, in subparagraph (b),"silo launchers of non-deployed ICBMs" was rephrased to "test silo launchers." ¶9. (S) In Paragraph 6 on conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, the sides agreed on the text. However, Warner and Ilin decided to further consider whether the term "variant" was needed in the phrase "Such inspections shall be conducted to confirm the data on the numbers, by type and, if applicable, category and variant, of these heavy bombers." ¶10. (S) In Paragraph 8 on unique identifiers, Warner stated the text should read, "Inspectors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs and SLBMs located at the inspection site except for such ICBMs or SLBMs located in test launchers or soft-site launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs." However, Ilin stated that the entire paragraph should remain bracketed. ¶11. (S) Ilin proposed to add a new paragraph 10 which read, "The inspection team shall have the right to confirm that ICBMs and SLBMs are training models of missiles based on the differences stipulated in Part Two of the Protocol. Training models of missiles loaded in training silo launchers shall not be subject to inspection." After consulting with the U.S. delegation, Warner agreed that this was acceptable. -------------- ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶12. (S) Warner stated that after receiving guidance from Washington and following consultations with the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group, the U.S. side proposed a revision to paragraph 2 of the U.S.-proposed JDT of Article XI. Begin text: Each Party shall have the right to conduct Type One inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases and air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The purpose of Type One inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers specified for such facilities in the notifications and exchanges of data provided in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol. Additionally, the purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the number of warheads on designated deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs or the number of nuclear armaments on designated deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. End text. ¶13. (S) Warner noted that, consistent with the language used in START, the expression "confirmed declared data" was changed to "confirm accuracy of declared data" and the phrase "facilities in the notifications and exchanges of data provided in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol" was added. Warner pointed out that the substance of the paragraph remained unchanged in that the paragraph stated the inspection locations as well as their purpose. Warner remarked that the paragraph was clarified to state that the information being confirmed came from the database (Part Two of the Protocol) which was updated via notifications (Part Four of the Protocol). ¶14. (S) Ilin expressed concern that the word "additionally" in the last sentence seemed to imply that the items in this statement were to be considered in a separate context from the items in the previous one. Warner stated that this was not true and that the two sentences would be combined to prevent this possible misinterpretation. Warner declared that the paragraph linked the data that the inspectors brought with them to the data provided by the inspected Party at the pre-inspection briefing, and facilitated its comparison. Ilin agreed to have the Russian side's legal advisors review the proposed text. -------------- PRIOR TO DEPARTING THE POE -------------- ¶15. (S) Warner provided a proposed revision to paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of the Protocol (Inspections). The text currently stated that prior to the departure of the inspection team from the POE to the inspection site; the inspection team must be informed if the number of heavy bombers at the inspected site was less than 70 percent. The U.S. proposal expanded on this concept to include mobile ICBMs. Specifically, prior to the departure of the inspection team from the POE to the inspection site, the in-country escort would notify the inspecting Party if, for an ICBM base, the number of mobile launcher of ICBMs was less than 50 percent of the number of such mobile launchers specified for that base. Ilin asked whether such a provision could also be stipulated for SSBNs in port. Warner replied that the U.S. side would consider this. ¶16. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: - Revision of U.S.-Proposed JDT for Part Five, Section VII, dated December 6, 2009; and - Revision of U.S.-Proposed JDT for Article XI, Paragraph 2, dated December 8, 2009. ¶17. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch LTC Lagraffe LTC Leyde Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Izrazov Col Petrov Ms. Voldopova Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS