START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001198

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, DECEMBER 7, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 1175 (SFO-GVA-VII-071)

B. GENEVA 1187 (SFO-GVA-VII-076

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-103


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 7, 2009
Time: 4:00 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) A meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working
Group was held at the U.S. Mission on December 7. A
discussion of the heavy bomber counting rule dominated the
meeting and a subgroup was formed to further discuss. End
Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: The U.S. Concept of Heavy Bomber
Counting; Finding the "Golden Middle;" Article III Heavy
Bomber Counting Rule; Why Three?

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THE U.S. CONCEPT OF HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING
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5. (S) Amb Ries suggested discussing the counting of heavy
bombers because it played into the "larger picture." Mr.
Taylor proceeded to make an oral presentation of the U.S.
concept behind its approach to the counting of heavy bombers.


6. (S) Taylor presented the following points:

-- We define deployed heavy bombers to be all heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments, except for test heavy
bombers. From this flows how we treat all heavy bombers in
the treaty. We agreed that each deployed heavy bomber
counted as one. Test heavy bombers may be based only at
heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities
for heavy bombers. We have a separate limit of ten for test
heavy bombers, since they may be equipped for nuclear
armaments.

-- The U.S. categories of heavy bombers are: deployed heavy
bombers, test heavy bombers and heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. (Begin comment: Neither side now has
training heavy bombers. We already agreed that deployed
heavy bombers would only be based at air bases. End
comment.)

-- At the beginning of the treaty "heavy bombers" are defined
by the list of existing types. The U.S. definition for an
existing type is: "The term "existing type" means for ICBMs,
SLBMs, or heavy bombers, a type of ICBM, SLBM, or heavy
bomber, for which at least one ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber of
that type was deployed on the date of signature of this
Treaty." For the United States the current text lists the
B-52H, the B-1B and B-2A, as the current existing types.


-- All heavy bombers of existing types present at entry into
force will be listed in the Memorandum of Understanding (Part
II of the Protocol) by basing locations and for each of the
three categories above. A reminder of the categories:
deployed heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

-- Once all B-1Bs are converted so that none of them are
equipped for nuclear armaments they will all be taken outside
the Treaty by virtue of an agreed statement that will be
negotiated separately. The converted B-1Bs will also not be
based at an air base since air bases are facilities where
deployed heavy bombers are based. It does not make the B-1B
a non-deployed heavy bomber since they will not be based at
an air base.

-- All deployed heavy bombers remain as "deployed" regardless
of location. The only way for a deployed heavy bomber to
cease to be a deployed heavy bomber was one of three ways:
1) it is declared to be a test heavy bomber (and counts
towards the limit of 10 such heavy bombers),2) it is
converted to be a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, or 3) it is eliminated.

-- Any newly produced heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments becomes subject to the treaty either as a deployed
heavy bomber or as a test heavy bomber when it leaves the
production facility.

-- Any newly produced heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments is not subject to the treaty.


7. (S) ADM Kuznetsov asked whether other members of the
Russian delegation had heard about this concept and whether
there would be a definition for the term "non-deployed heavy
bomber." He noted that based on the U.S. concept, the United
States would not define "non-deployed heavy bomber." Taylor
responded that Kuznetsov was correct.


8. (S) Koshelev pointed to notes written on a white board in
the room (Begin comment: The white board still showed notes
and charts made during a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group
which met in the same room immediately prior to this meeting.
End comment.) and said it indicated that "non-deployed heavy
bombers should be included in the (central) limits." Amb
Ries retorted that the discussion that had taken place in the
Ad Hoc meeting was theoretical, based on a Russian proposal
and was not the U.S. position. Koshelev added that the
Russian view was that there should be a category of
non-deployed heavy bombers and that the Russian Federation
has many SSBNs which would be counted even while they waited
for elimination. Ries asked for the Russian position on the
definition of a deployed heavy bomber.


9. (S) Kuznetsov responded that the Russian definition was
very simple and logical in that every heavy bomber based at
air bases and equipped for nuclear armaments were deployed
heavy bombers. Kuznetsov went on to say that all other heavy
bombers were non-deployed including heavy bombers equipped
with non-nuclear armaments. He said that all heavy bombers
at flight test, training, production and storage facilities
were considered non-deployed. Kuznetsov added that if
inspectors saw heavy bombers and nothing was loaded on them,


the Russian proposal would call for using the attribution
rule of one. If the heavy bomber carried several ALCMs,
every missile would count. Kuznetsov reiterated that this
was the proposal the Russian side made in Article III,
paragraph 2(b). He stated there was a "gap" in the U.S.
position "because there was no notion of non-deployed heavy
bombers." "You have deliberately excluded this notion," he
said. Koshelev added that this absence deprived the Parties
of an incentive to reduce the numbers of heavy bombers.


10. (S) Kuznetsov said an attribution rule was proposed much
as it existed under START because the sides' deployment
concepts were different. The United States stored its heavy
bomber nuclear armaments near its heavy bombers, whereas
Russia stored its nuclear armaments farther away from the
heavy bombers. Kuznetsov further added that there were also
conventional cruise missiles stored with the nuclear
armaments, making the counting problematic.


11. (S) Ries responded that the United States remained
uncomfortable with attribution as a counting rule. The
intent for the United States was to actually account for
nuclear armaments for heavy bombers the same way as for ICBMs
and SLBMs. She said that the United States chose the word
"armaments" because it was a more realistic approach. Ries
relayed that the United States understood the different
methods of the sides for storing heavy bomber nuclear
armaments.

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FINDING THE "GOLDEN MIDDLE"
--------------


12. (S) Kuznetsov said the delegations needed to find the
"golden middle." He explained again that Russia did not have
nuclear armaments at air bases. Kuznetsov added that there
were conventional cruise missiles at Russian air bases,
therefore the Russian proposal was for attribution. Further,
he could not imagine a way out of this situation.


13. (S) Taylor returned to the issue of deployed versus
non-deployed and stated that deployed and non-deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs was a clear concept and had clear definitions.
When a missile was removed from the launcher, it became
non-deployed. This accepted the Russian position because the
U.S. side would drop the concept of "considered to contain;"
doing so was linked to Russian acceptance of the
U.S.-proposed limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.
Taylor said it was difficult to have a heavy bomber and
consider it to be non-deployed because it was still equipped
for nuclear armaments. Taylor added that the U.S. concern
was that the heavy bomber was always equipped for nuclear
armaments unless it was converted or eliminated. Taylor
asserted that the Russian proposal was based on the location
of the heavy bomber, as opposed to the U.S. proposal which
was based on whether the heavy bomber was equipped for
nuclear armaments. Taylor reiterated that, under the U.S.
approach, there were three categories of heavy bombers:
deployed heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Taylor maintained this
was indeed the "golden middle" for how to deal with deployed
heavy bombers.


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ARTICLE III HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULE
--------------


14. (S) Taylor proposed the U.S. text for Article III,
paragraph 2(b) which stated: "For each deployed heavy
bomber, the number of nuclear armaments shall be three."
Taylor added that this adopted the Russian approach to
attribution although it was a strict attribution rule.
Taylor highlighted that each deployed heavy bomber counted as
three under the aggregate limit in Article II, paragraph 1(b).

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WHY THREE?
--------------


15. (S) Kuznetsov asked for an explanation as to why the
number three was chosen. Taylor said the Russian side had
proposed an attribution rule and suggested that it be one,
two or three, and the U.S. had selected three. Koshelev
added that it was not the responsibility of the Treaty Text
and Definitions Working Group to decide the attribution rule
number because it related to military and technical aspects
and should be discussed in a different group. Ries said that
this issue needed to be discussed in this setting because
brackets remained in Articles II and III.


16. (S) Kuznetsov asked why we were discussing Article II
when, despite a few remaining brackets, it was previously
agreed. Koshelev added that today's discussion had showed
"serious diversion." Ries added that the U.S. proposed
several ways to solve the problem, including through a side
agreement, and the U.S. awaited Russia's response to the
proposal.


17. (S) Kuznetsov said that a lot of time had been spent on
this issue and on the text of the Article II chapeau and use
of the term nuclear armaments. He further argued that by
including the word "nuclear" in Article II, paragraph 1(b),
it was like saying "wet water" because the word nuclear
already appeared in the chapeau. He added that Article II
had come back from the Conforming Group because of the
remaining brackets and the problems they represented. In
addition, the heads of delegation planned to discuss Article
II, paragraph 2.


18. (S) Taylor reminded Kuznetsov that the sides had agreed
to take "nuclear" out of Article II, paragraph 1(b),and both
sides said they would confirm this change with their
delegation members (Ref A). Taylor said that both sides
returned to the working group meeting the next day and agreed
to put "nuclear" back in paragraph 1(b),otherwise all
conventional armaments for heavy bombers would also be
counted (Ref B). The U.S. side then agreed to drop the
phrase "or associated with," and accepted the attribution
approach so that when the text said each heavy bomber would
count as three, it would be "very clean."


19. (S) Kuznetsov said it was clear that everything was
unclear. The working group decided that a subgroup would
discuss the issue further the following day.


20. (S) Documents provided: None.




21. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Amb Ries
Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Dr. Dreicer
Ms. Kirchgasser
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS