START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001197 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, DECEMBER 7, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-102. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 7, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Time: 4:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met twice on December 7th to discuss Sections V, VI, and VIII to Part V of the Protocol on Inspection Activities. Discussion focused on exemptions for inspections of submarines, inspections at heavy bomber air bases, covering of front sections during nuclear warhead inspections, when new types would be exhibited, the necessity for elimination exhibitions, inspections of ballistic missile defense-related items, and size criteria to be used for access during inspections and related matters. While the sides confirmed agreement on substantial sections of text and clarified differing positions on a number of key issues, a number of significant outstanding issues remained. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VI: Inspections; Section VIII: Exhibitions; Afternoon Session, Section VIII and Missile Defense; and Section V: Inspection Activities. -------------- SECTION VI: INSPECTIONS -------------- ¶5. (S) The meeting began with a discussion of the provision that submarines and SLBM launchers located in the waters of a submarine base shall not be considered to be within the boundaries of the inspection site and shall not be subject to inspection. Ilin argued such an exemption was illogical and unnecessary and that the nature of Type One inspections made it obvious that during the inspection of non-deployed systems a submarine was not subject to inspection, but Warner contended it was, and noted that the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) had dealt with and resolved this issue under START. Warner agreed to attempt to reformulate the text. ¶6. (S) Ilin then argued against a provision for mobile ICBMs in the Section VI provision on rights to inspect declared non-deployed launchers discovered to contain warheads during a nuclear warhead inspection. Warner explained that this was simply a way to prevent incorrect information being provided during pre-inspection procedures concerning the number of warheads contained on ICBMs or SLBMs. Ilin replied that the Russian side wanted to rid the treaty of any special provisions for mobile ICBMs. ¶7. (S) Moving to airbases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, Warner suggested specifying that inspections would be directed "to confirm the number of" nuclear armaments on heavy bombers. Ilin counter-offered a provision stating that inspectors would have the right to inspect heavy bombers for non-nuclear armaments. Debate ensued on the definitions of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, without resolution. The sides agreed that "to confirm the number of" would be included in the section, but brackets would remain regarding the inclusion of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. ¶8. (S) In paragraph 15(c) on inspector rights to inspect structures capable of containing heavy bombers, the sides agreed to delete the term "deployed" before heavy bombers and the word "only" with respect to inspector rights to "ascertain whether or not such structures contain a deployed heavy bomber." ¶9. (S) Turning to the issue of covers for re-entry vehicles during a nuclear warhead inspection, Warner proposed the U.S. formulation which called for the viewing and measurement of all covers, and noted that more detailed information on the size and type of covers would be provided at the annex level. Ilin contended that the text should specify that the covers should be "individual covers," that the inspectors should confirm the number of re-entry vehicles equals the number of warheads, that the provision would apply only to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and that inspectors should have the right to view any cover and only measure hard covers. Col Petrov then handed over a formal Russian proposal regarding the text on covers. Warner, noting that this was a sensitive, tough issue, stated that the sides would discuss the matter further at a later date. -------------- SECTION VIII: EXHIBITIONS -------------- ¶10. (S) In paragraph 2, on general exhibition rights and obligations, Ilin questioned including reference to exhibitions which had already been completed under START with respect to requirements for exhibitions of new types. Warner explained that this was necessary so that the sides would not have to re-exhibit strategic offensive arms (SOA) and suggested deferring to the lawyers on the matter. ¶11. (S) Discussion then turned to data exchange, and Ilin again opposed reference to START with respect to the requirement to populate data in the treaty's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Warner responded that the rationale for incorporating these references to START was to address the potentially significant gap between the expiration of START and the entry into force (EIF) of the START Follow-on treaty. He commented that the United States was particularly interested in the new Russian mobile ICBM. (Begin comment: This was a reference to the RS-24 Mod 2/SS-27 Mod 2 mobile ICBM that the Russian side is expected to introduce in the near future. End comment.) Obliquely referring to the RS-24 Mod 2, Ilin retorted that the requirement to exhibit a new type 45 days after EIF was inconsistent with the paragraph's other provision stipulating that exhibitions would be conducted at the exhibiting Party's discretion. Col Zaitsev intervened that the Russians would exhibit any new type when they had it. Ilin then stated that the Russian side opposed the 45-day requirement but agreed that exhibitions should be carried out before inspections begin under the new treaty, which would be 60 days after EIF. He pledged to think further about how to formulate this position. Ilin also argued that elimination exhibitions should not be included in paragraph 3. The Russians then handed over their version of the paragraph. ¶12. (S) For paragraph 4 on conversion or elimination exhibitions, Ilin queried why the United States believed such exhibitions should be obligatory. Warner replied that total discretion was not tenable. The paragraph therefore remained in brackets. ¶13. (S) For Russian-proposed paragraph 5 on exhibitions of missile defense interceptors, Warner made clear that such a provision would be impossible for the United States to accept. ¶14. (S) Discussion followed on elimination exhibitions. Warner stated that both sides agreed that national technical means are sufficient to confirm the elimination of silo-based ICBMs, silo launchers, SLBMs, and SLBM launchers. Dissension, he remarked, focused on mobile ICBMs and their launchers. He continued that the leading candidate for the elimination of mobile ICBMs would require the burning out of the solid fuel in the ballistic missile and the drilling of a hole or multiple holes in the motor casing. The U.S. side, he said, wanted the chance to conduct an inspection of a batch of several eliminated missiles, which would likely add up to only about four such inspections or exhibitions each year. These inspections could not, however, be deducted from the total quota of inspections, since the total number of Type II inspections was only expected to be eight. Ilin replied that national technical means would be sufficient for the confirmation of eliminations. A back and forth ensued on what would be sufficient for such purposes, with Warner pointing out the inequality implicit in the inspection quota because the Russian side would be able to inspect the smaller number of U.S. bases under the quota while the U.S. side would not be able to do the same to the Russian side because of their larger number of bases. No resolution of the issue was reached. -------------- SECTION VIII AND MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶15. (S) At the beginning of the afternoon session, the U.S. side handed over a revised version of Section V and the Russian side handed over its proposed version of Section VIII. Ilin sought inclusion of provisions on ballistic missile defense as a trade for higher elimination exhibition quotas, but Warner explained that the United States could not tolerate incorporating such measures into the treaty. Warner suggested that Ilin raise such proposals in the appropriate fora for U.S.-Russian missile defense discussions, including with Under Secretary Tauscher during her visit later in the week. -------------- SECTION V: INSPECTION ACTIVITIES -------------- ¶16. (S) Warner then turned to Section V on inspection activities. For paragraph 7, the sides retained brackets around the 14-hour requirement for movement from the point of entry to the inspection site, pending further discussion of pre-inspection movement re strictions. ¶17. (S) For paragraph 10, the sides maintained their positions, with the Russians seeking to include nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers as items of inspection and the U.S. side holding to its position on including weapons storage area inspections, pending further discussion of counting rules. ¶18. (S) On paragraph 11's 97 percent size criteria, Warner offered that the details of the issue could be settled at the annex level. Ilin recommended removing the 97 percent rule and replacing it with a provision allowing for size criteria to be settled in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Warner urged settling the matter in the annex, noting that it was important for provisional application, as volume assessment would be key for inspections. The sides left the matter bracketed. ¶19. (S) For paragraph 13, the sides retained brackets regarding the number of inspectors permitted on an inspection. The Russians did not present an alternative number to the U.S.-proposed figure of 10. ¶20. (S) For paragraph 16, the Russian side suggested removing the 24-hour time limit for inspections of heavy bomber air bases. Warner pledged that the U.S. side would get back to the Russians on the proposal. ¶21. (S) For paragraph 18 on sequential inspections, the sides maintained brackets. ¶22. (S) Warner then handed over a revised joint draft text of Section VII. He proposed discussing the annexes the following day but Ilin resisted talking about the annexes. ¶23. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: -- U.S. Revised Proposal for Section VI; and -- U.S. Revised JDT for Section VII. - RUSSIA: -- Russian Proposal on Covers for Section VI; -- Russian Proposal for Section VI, paragraph 3; and -- Russian Proposal for Section VIII. ¶24. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby LTC Leyde Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Izrazov Col Petrov Col Zaitsev Ms. Voldopova Ms. Evaroskaya (Int for AM Session) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS