START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001196 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, DECEMBER 6, 2009 REF: GENEVA 1180 (SFO-GVA-VII-099) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-100. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 6, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) on December 6 focused on the portions of Section VI of Part V of the Protocol on Inspection Activities--Type 1 Inspections--that describe how the inspection team leader would designate what is to be inspected in a given inspection and what the inspection team would have the right to inspect. Seven paragraphs were discussed and some portions of text were agreed but the major differences between the sides remained at the end of the meeting. These differences included a number of provisions that were related to the inspection of mobile ICBMs and how B-1Bs that had been converted from nuclear to non-nuclear configuration and SSBNs converted to SSGNs would be handled during Type 1 inspections. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: What Happened to the Annexes?; Designating What is Going to be Inspected; Getting Down to the Inspection. -------------- WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ANNEXES? -------------- ¶5. (S) Col Ilin opened the meeting by stating that the agenda for the day should consist of continuing to work through Section VI of the Protocol, then addressing Sections VII and VIII of Part V of the Protocol on Inspection Activities if there was sufficient time. Dr. Warner agreed, remarking that with an additional opportunity for the Russian and U.S. Presidents to meet in the near future, the IPWG should plan on an additional 5 to 6 days of work to come to conclusion. He reminded the group that Heads of Delegation (HODs) Gottemoeller and Antonov had agreed that the IPWG would address three selected parts of the annex prior to treaty signature. The portions of the Annex on Inspection Activities to be addressed were Section 4 (Site Diagrams - derived from Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Annex J), Section 6 (Procedures for Inspections of Deployed Strategic Warheads and their Nuclear Warheads - Type 1 inspections), and Section 7 (Procedures for the Inspection of Covered Objects, Containers, Launch Canisters, Vehicles, and Structures--primarily Type 2 inspections). The remaining portion of Annex J of the MOU would be shifted to the IPWG for discussion and inclusion in its remaining annexes as had been agreed by the MOU Working Group chairs, Trout and Orlov. Ilin replied that he had received no such instructions from Antonov concerning either the inclusion of any annexes to be addressed prior to signature or the shifting of MOU Annex J to the responsibility of the IPWG. Both Warner and Ilin agreed to check with their HOD on these commitments and the shifting of responsibilities. -------------- DESIGNATING WHAT IS GOING TO BE INSPECTED -------------- ¶6. (S) Discussion picked up where it had left off in the previous IPWG meeting (Reftel) on the third part of U.S. subparagraph 9(a) of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol on Inspection Activities, concerning the designation of ICBM launchers for inspection at ICBM bases. This text included the U.S. proposal for an option to designate two deployed silo launchers from the same launcher group for inspection. Warner re-stated the U.S. intention to agree to the Russian position of requiring only one deployed launcher for inspection if the number of inspections agreed upon was at least 20. The brackets stayed in place. ¶7. (S) The next portion of text addressed the right to designate a fixed structure declared not to contain a mobile launcher for inspection. Both sides recognized the continuing difference over "re stricted" versus "basing" areas and agreed to let the Definitions Subgroup resolve the issue. Ilin attempted to explain the rationale for Russian text that would allow the right to inspect a fixed structure only if a fixed structure not containing ICBMs was actually at that base. After some discussion, Ilin agreed to work on a re-formulated version of this text. ¶8. (S) The following portion of text, on not designating mobile launchers at maintenance facilities, was agreed text. The next part was a U.S.-proposed provision for designating one re stricted area for inspection at a mobile ICBM base. At Ilin's request, Warner described the U.S. rationale for this provision based on the Data Update Inspection (DUI) under START. He explained that the inspecting Party designated one re stricted area for inspection, after which the inspected Party would declare the number of launchers as well as deployed ICBMs and support equipment in the area. The inspecting Party would proceed to the area, confirm the data provided, and use size criteria to check for any additional missiles or support equipment. The one change with START Follow-on (SFO) would be that support equipment would no longer be inspectable. This provision was an important component of the START DUI inspection process that the United States wanted to retain in the SFO Type 1 combined inspection; it allowed the inspecting Party to confirm the number of deployed ICBMs and launchers in a designated re stricted or basing area. Ilin objected that this was another provision that singled out mobile ICBM systems and that there was no analog for silo-based ICBMs or SLBMs. In other words, at a silo base only the maintenance area was subject to inspection and not the entire missile field so mobile ICBMs were again being singled out. He re-stated the Russian position that any such provision for mobile systems was unacceptable. Warner committed to discuss a couple of variations on the recall provision for mobile systems with Ilin during the next meeting, one of which would be a provision applicable to all types of systems and not just mobile ICBMs. The provision was left in brackets. ¶9. (S) The discussion moved on to subparagraph (b), designating SLBMs for inspection at submarine bases. The first part was agreed text other than the number of SLBMs that could be designated for a nuclear warhead inspection, with the United States proposing two and Russia proposing one. This was left bracketed. The next part concerned the right to select for inspection an SLBM launcher that was declared not to contain a deployed SLBM. After some discussion it was agreed that this was similar to the selection of empty ICBM launchers. The U.S. approach would be to select one empty launcher for inspection as one of its two launchers or would select two launchers that contained SLBMs unless the number of inspections agreed upon in the treaty was 20 or greater. In that case, the United States would inspect one empty and one occupied launcher or just one occupied launcher if an empty launcher was not available, in a similar fashion to the Russian proposal. The Russian approach would be to allow selection of one occupied and one empty launcher. ¶10. (S) The Russian text also included a provision for inspecting a launcher on a submarine which had been converted to an SSGN, describing this as a "non-deployed SLBM launcher." Warner stated that, once converted, an SSGN would not be capable of launching an SLBM and so it would no longer be considered an SLBM launcher at all, and would not be subject to the treaty. The U.S. view was that no inspections of SSGN should take place during a Type 1 inspection but that there would be a provision for inspection of SSGNs separately in an agreed statement on SSGN conversion that the U.S. side planned to propose. Ilin brought up the case of a submarine that could launch both nuclear SLBMs and non-nuclear SLCMs and stated that he believed they should be able to inspect for that possible configuration. Warner stated that while that was hypothetically possible, the United States had no plans to do so and that nuclear-capable and non-nuclear submarines would be kept separate from one another. ¶11. (S) An additional difference in the wording of this part was over the range of selection options for the empty launcher to be inspected. The Russian side took the view that the selection must be from the same SSBN originally selected for inspection while the U.S. side would allow selection from any SSBN subject to inspection. Warner clarified that the selection of two launchers containing SLBMs would be from the same SSBN while the selection of an empty launcher could be from a different submarine. This was analogous to the U.S. approach to ICBM selection from within the same launch group for those "containing" and outside the launch group selected for the warhead inspection for an empty ICBM launcher. ¶12. (S) When Zaitsev asked why the United States wanted to inspect the warheads on two rather than one SLBM, Warner explained that two provided for a stronger statistical sample. Zaitsev said he believed that the probabilities were the same but that inspecting two would increase operational difficulties for the inspected Party. Warner said the United States was prepared to go down to inspecting one SLBM launcher containing an SLBM and one that was empty if the annual number of inspections was large enough since a larger number of inspections would help compensate for a smaller number of launchers/missiles being inspected during each inspection. ¶13. (S) The discussion of subparagraph 9(c),designating for inspection at air bases, focused on two topics, the Russian proposal for selection of "3 plus 3" heavy bombers for inspection and inspection of B-1Bs under START Follow-on. The U.S. proposal called for the selection of three deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to be inspected in a Type 1 inspection at an air base. In addition to this, the Russian proposal included the option to select three heavy bombers visiting the air base that are of another type equipped for nuclear armaments or that are equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This text remained bracketed. After some discussion of the logistical and timing complexities of the ongoing B-1B conversion, both sides decided to leave the existing brackets in place based on the positions each continued to hold. -------------- GETTING DOWN TO THE INSPECTION -------------- ¶14. (S) The discussion of paragraph 10, on transporting the inspection team to the items to be inspected, focused on the Russian objection to singling out "re stricted area" for mobiles rather than naming the item to be inspected as for other systems. After some discussion of the rationale for the option of transporting inspectors to a re stricted area as one choice of discrete destination during an inspection of mobiles, the text was left bracketed. ¶15. (S) Ilin agreed to remove the general Russian provision for inspection of strategic offensive arms in Russian paragraph 9, recognizing that other paragraphs described this right much more comprehensively. An extended discussion of paragraph 11 on unique identifiers (UIDs) focused on the Russian concerns that the right to read the data from them was preferentially applied to mobile ICBMs. The crux of the issue was that access to the UIDs would be difficult for silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs when these missiles were deployed in their launchers, while it was straight forward to read the UIDs on mobile ICBMs deployed on its launcher. Warner proposed a number of options for placement of UIDs that would make the provision more evenly applied and challenged the Russian delegation to propose an alternative solution. ¶16. (S) The discussion of paragraph 13 focused on the items and areas where an inspection team would have the right to inspect at ICBM bases. Re-wording of subparagraph (a) by the U.S. delegation led to a clearer description of the launcher-missile-warhead relationship for a deployed ICBM. Warner also stated that the United Stateswould be willing to accept the Russian concept of deployed and non-deployed armaments conditional on acceptance by the Russians of some form of limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. The last two subparagraphs, (d) and (e),remained bracketed because of references to re stricted areas and how they would be handled. It was agreed that the inspection rights at submarine bases should parallel those at ICBM bases during the discussion of paragraph 14. The Russian version also included a reference to non-deployed launchers that was intended to allow inspection of launchers on SSBNs that had been converted to SSGNs. Ilin said he would provide a modified Russian formulation that more clearly called out a launcher on an SSGN, although Warner unequivocally stated the U.S. position that this would not be covered under the treaty. ¶17. (S) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES -- Section VIII. Exhibitions, December 6, 2009 ¶18. (S) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Ms. Purcell LTC Leyde Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. French (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Lobach Col Petrov Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaitsev Ms. Pogodin (Int) ¶19. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS