START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001195 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 1187 (SFO-GVA-VII-076) ¶B. GENEVA 1175 (SFO-GVA-VII-071) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-098. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 4, 2009 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:50 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) meeting chaired by Amb Ries and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Representative Mr. Koshelev, discussion focused on Articles II, III, IV, IX and XII. The Russian side objected that its proposal to combine locational and numerical limits into single paragraphs for each item in U.S.-proposed Article IV Joint Draft Text (JDT) was not accepted. Additionally, the Russian side objected that its proposal for locational restrictions on non-deployed heavy bombers did not appear in the U.S.-proposed JDT. The Russian side stated that it was difficult to maintain the same concept for the formulation "armaments for" when translating this U.S.-proposed text into Russian and recommended adding "units of" prior to "armaments for" in order to permit applying numerical limits to warheads as addressed in Article IV. The Russian side questioned the meaning of the text "within the limitations set forth in this Treaty" versus "within the aggregate limits in this Treaty" as they appeared in Article II. The U.S. side accepted the Russian proposal to have a single list oQxisting types of ICBMs in Article III that included both ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs. The U.S. side offered new Article IX text proposing to use unique identifiers (UIDs) on all strategic offensive arms (SOA). The Russian side declined the offer stating it could not accept the proposal since the U.S. side had not accepted the Russian package deal. The Russian side again rejected discussion of Article IX on Cooperative Measures. End Summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Agenda; Article IV, Article II Deployed Heavy Bomber Warhead Limit; Article II Limitations Versus Aggregate Limit; Article III; Article IX Use of UIDs; and Article XII Cooperative Measures. -------------- AGENDA -------------- ¶5. (S) Although Ries suggested the agenda consist of discussions on Article II, IX, XII and XIII, Kuznetsov hijacked the agenda and suggested discussion of Article II, III, IV, and IX, defining the agenda for the meeting. -------------- ARTICLE IV -------------- ¶6. (S) The U.S. side provided proposed JDT of Article IV which reflected the previous day's discussion (Ref A). Ries indicated several large conceptual issues remained unresolved from the package deals presented by both sides that were linked to each other and to the resolution of the text in Article IV. Mrs. Zdravecky noted that the translation of paragraph 3 (a),which addressed the limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, revealed an awkward formulation of U.S.-proposed text. The text was corrected by inserting the word "aggregate" in the last phrase of the paragraph. This additional word clarified the English translation and did not change the paragraph substantively. ¶7. (S) Kuznetsov stated that he did not see Ms. Kotkova's request from the previous meeting to gather numerical and locational formulations for the same items in the same paragraph. Koshelev added that combining the limits on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges in paraQaph 6 with the limits on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers in paragraph 3 demonstrated this Russian concept. He noted that combining paragraph 3 and 3(a) further added clarification. ¶8. (S) Kuznetsov continued to criticize the U.S.-proposed JDT and stated that only U.S.-proposed locational restrictions on non-deployed heavy bombers were reflected. He believed the JDT should reflect the Russian position provided in the proposal of the Russian side provided on November 30, 2009 (Ref B). Ries assured Kuznetsov this was an administrative oversiQt. Kuznetsov recommended the Russian-proposed textQe placed after the last paragraph of the U.S.-proposed JDT. Ries agreed. -------------- ARTICLE II DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBER WARHEAD LIMIT -------------- ¶9. (S) Ries noted that in paragraph 2(b) which addressed the warhead limit, the U.S. side had changed its bracketed text to reflect nuclear "armaments for" deployed heavy bombers in contrast to the Russian-proposed formulation "warheads on" deployed heavy bombers. Koshelev and Mr. Lobach engaged in a lengthy discussion on the impossibility in the Russian language of having a limit attached to armaments. The word "armaments" in Russian was a noun to which a number could not be attached. The text "units of" could be added prior to "armaments for" in the U.S.-proposed text to accurately reflect the concept of a limit on warheads: either armaments for deployed heavy bombers in the U.S. formulation or a limit on warheads on deployed heavy bombers as in the Russian concept. The sides agreed this was a linguistic problem and could be left for the Conforming Group to resolve. -------------- ARTICLE II LIMITATIONS VERSUS AGGREGATE LIMIT -------------- ¶10. (S) Kuznetsov mounted a repeat attack on the formulation "within the limitations set forth in this Treaty" as used in paragraph 2 of the U.S.-proposed JDT. (Begin comment: This discussion was essentially the same discussion between Mr. Taylor and Kuznetsov conducted in the November 30, 2009, TTDWG (Ref B). End comment.) Lobach indicated there was a major substantive difference in the U.S.-proposed formulation and the Russian-proposed formulation "within the aggregate limits in this Treaty." Whereas "aggregate limits" in the Russian formulation reflected a maximum number, "within the limitations" as used in the U.S. formulation denoted a limitation that was both quantitative and qualitative. Lobach stated a phrase such as "as provided for in this Treaty" would resolve the linguistic difference in the formulations proposed by each side. If the sides chose not to use such a phrase, Lobach indicated that deleting "within the limitations set forth in this Treaty" would also resolve the difference. Ries asked the Russian side to provide proposed text so the U.S. side could better understand the linguistic differences. Since the Russian side believed paragraph 2 touched on both a numerical and locational limit, Ries offered that moving this paragraph to Article IV could also resolve the issue. Koshelev offered to pass this idea back to Russian experts in Moscow. -------------- ARTICLE III -------------- ¶11. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the formulation of paragraph 7 (a) which addressed the existing types of ICBMs, to include ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, presented a problem for Russia. Since the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) existed as both an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and an ICBM for silo launchers of ICBMs, it would be better to just list ICBMs in generic terms in this paragraph. Whether an ICBM was the mobile or silo version of the ballistic missile could be determined in the MOU since facilities would be declared as either ICBM bases for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or ICBM bases for ICBMs of silo launchers of ICBMs and the numbers of mobile ICBMs or silo based ICBMs would be declared for each type of facility. ¶12. (S) In addition, Kuznetsov said he understood that the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) had resolved the issue of heavy bomber counting rules by the sides accepting an attribution rule, and as such, it was no longer necessary to list the existing types of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers in paragraph 7. He understood the IPWG resolved to inspect nuclear armaments "on deployed heavy bombers" and inspecting weapons storage areas was no longer incorporated in Part V, Inspection Activities. Ries made clear the U.S. position on counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments could change only if Russia accepted other proposals offered by the United States, to include a limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. She explained the word "for" in English was interpreted to mean both "on" and "associated with." Koshelev suggested it was time that the TTDWG and the IPWG meet to come to agreement on the concepts each used. Ries agreed. -------------- ARTICLE IX USE OF UIDS -------------- ¶13. (S) Ries provided a U.S. working paper on Article IX to the Russian side. She noted that since Russia had stated the use of UIDs was a one-sided procedure, the United States was proposing to broaden the use of UIDs to include use on ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and deployed heavy bombers. ¶14. (S) Kuznetsov stated he could understand the use of UIDs on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, but did not understand the concept of using UIDs on SLBM launchers. He believed the United States would never let Russian inspectors below deck on an SSBN to confirm UIDs on individual SLBM launchers. Ries explained the U.S. side proposed to use UIDs to identify one unit from another unit. She understood that each side currently had its respective methods to track armaments, equipment and SOA. This being the case, the United States was proposing to use such numbering to identify individual units. ¶15. (S) Dr. Fraley stated that if applying UIDs to SLBM launchers concerned the Russian side, the United States would simply remove this part of the proposal or the sides could consider creative ways to apply UIDs to SLBM launchers. Kuznetsov stated the Russian side could not accept the proposal even if a creative way to apply UIDs to SLBM launchers was determined since the use of UIDs was part of the U.S. package deal and the package deal was an all or nothing offer by the U.S. side. Additionally, Article IX dealt with national technical means (NTM) of verification and the use of UIDs did not belong there since a side could not possibly see a UID with NTM. The discussion ended with Ries commenting that Article IX concerned verification, which included the use of UIDs. ¶16. (S) Referring to paragraph 1 (c) which addressed concealment practices at ICBM bases, Kuznetsov stated the brackets on the text "and deployment areas" could not be removed until this term had been properly defined. Koshelev clarified that the Russian delegation had now taken "ownership" of this bracketed text, which had been a previous U.S. proposal that the U.S. delegation had since dropped. -------------- ARTICLE XII COOPERATIVE MEASURES -------------- ¶17. (S) Ries hoped the sides could have further discussion on the use of cooperative measures (CM). Kuznetsov remarked that the issue was not for the TTDWG to discuss. Additionally, the Russian package deal stated all procedures needed to be applied equally over all SOA. Article XII only addressed CM as it pertained to mobile launchers of ICBMs and as such, the Russian side could not consider its use. Ries noted the proposed text in Article XII included procedures for both mobile launcher of ICBMs and deployed heavy bombers. Cooperative measures added additional verification measures based on the unique features of these two systems. ¶18. (S) Kuznetsov agreed with Ries' statement, however, as previously noted, the Russian package deal stated that measures had to be applied to all SOA and he did not see SSBNs mentioned in Article XII. Ries asked whether Kuznetsov was proposing adding CM procedures for SSBNs, to which Kuznetsov answered that he could add these procedures but it was too late in the negotiating process to add new procedures to the treaty. ¶19. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: -- U.S.-Proposed Article II Joint Draft Text, dated December 4, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian; -- U.S.-Proposed Article IV Joint Draft Text, dated December 3, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian; and -- U.S. Article IX Working Paper, dated December 4, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian. ¶20. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Amb Ries Lt Col Comeau Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Dr. Dreicer Dr. Fraley Mr. Hanchett Mr. Holleran Mrs. Zdravecky Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev ADM Kuznetsov Ms. Fuzhenkova Mr. Ivanov Col Kamenskiy Mr. Lobach Ms. Melikbekian Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶21. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS