START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001190 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, NOVEMBER 30, 2009 REF: GENEVA 1188 (SFO-GVA-VII-068) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-072. ¶2. (U) Meeting Dates: November 30, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Petrov, met twice on November 30th to discuss U.S.-proposed joint draft texts (JDTs) for Sections V, VII, and VI of SFO Protocol Part 5 on Inspection Activities. Discussion during the morning session focused on Section VII, Type II inspections of non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA) and formerly declared facilities, while the afternoon focused on Section VI, Type I inspections of deployed SOA, warheads and operational bases. ¶4. (S) Both sides agreed to correct all references to other treaty sections or annexes in accordance with the newly-developed agreed-upon treaty structure. The U.S. side agreed to drop references to support equipment and empty launch canisters throughout the protocol but retained brackets on other items of inspection (IOI) until the sides could agree on a list of IOI. ¶5. (S) Petrov indicated Russia intended to alter its concept of the size criteria or reference cylinder used for Type I and Type II inspections and argued for rights to inspect SSGNs during Type I inspections of submarine bases. Petrov also indicated Russia might have to change its use of covers used during warhead inspections. ¶6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Terminology; Section V on Non-Disclosure; Section VII Type II Inspections; Section VI Type I Inspections; and Heavy Bombers and Warhead Cover Issues. -------------- TERMINOLOGY -------------- ¶7. (S) Dr. Warner deferred further discussion on treaty Article XI (Inspection Activities) due to issues that arose in the Conforming Group, and provided the Russians with an updated draft JDT for Section VI, which had been discussed during the IPWG morning session on November 29 (Reftel). After a short discussion, both sides agreed to use the term warheads on deployed ICBMS and SLBMs rather than the term deployed warheads. Kotkova offered initially the term warheads on deployed SOA but finally agreed that both sides clearly understood the concept. -------------- SECTION V ON NON-DISCLOSURE -------------- ¶8. (S) On the issue of non-disclosure of information by inspectors, Warner explained the U.S. side's rationale for the addition of the term publicly in paragraph 3. The Russians agreed to lift the brackets after Warner assured the Russians that the phrase shall not publicly disclose conveyed the same concept as in paragraph 6 of Article X of START. -------------- SECTION VII TYPE II INSPECTIONS -------------- ¶9. (S) Section Title. Despite previous Russian agreement to drop the Russian term "new facilities" from the title of Section VII, Warner agreed to retain the brackets until Petrov could consult with his delegation. Russia retained brackets around the U.S.-proposed term "formerly declared f"acilities. Warner proposed generalizing the titles of both Sections VI and VII and use the short titles of Type I or Type II inspections. Kotkova said she saw no legal issues provided the longer title was used in Article XI. She agreed that the Section titles could have Type I or Type II in parenthesis at the end of the long title. ¶10. (S) Paragraph 1. The list of facilities subject to inspection under the Type II construct was discussed at length. Petrov struck the bracketed phrase "bases for submarines equipped with SLBMs," but expressed concern that facilities for heavy bombers (HB) in non-nuclear configuration were not listed. Warner noted that the U.S. side had proposed transparency measures for such HBs to address Russian concerns over reconversion but not under Type II inspections. Warner countered Petrov's claim that the list of facilities was not needed again in Section VII as the list was already included in Article XI, noting that specific facilities should be spelled out in each section. ¶11. (S) Paragraph 3. Petrov accepted the U.S.-proposed language and struck the Russian-proposed text in the introductory paragraph. Warner ultimately deleted the term "support equipment" in sub-paragraph (a) and throughout the remainder of the sections of Part V. Both sides agreed to retain brackets around all other items until an agreement could be reached on what items constitute IOI. Petrov confirmed that Russia disagreed with the START concepts for reference cylinder and access criteria based on large enough to contain. Petrov agreed to sub-paragraph (b) provided no HBs of any type located at the inspected base could leave, to include test HBs. ¶12. (S) Paragraph 4. During the afternoon session, Warner agreed that the inspected Party would provide the pre-inspection briefing information in written form to the inspecting Party. Sub-paragraph (b) was moved to the third tier group of documents, and both sides agreed to consolidate sub-paragraph (a) as the final sentence of paragraph 4. All text in the revised paragraph 4 was agreed, however, Petrov retained brackets around the requirement to provide a reason for the absence of each item from an inspection site. ¶13. (S) Paragraph 5. Warner noted that this paragraph would have to be updated based on the recent U.S. proposal to expand the application of unique identifiers (UIDs). Petrov agreed to provide language on exceptions to the right to read UIDs for test and soft-site launchers. Both sides agreed to retain brackets around all text in this paragraph for the time being. ¶14. (S) Paragraph 7. Petrov accepted the U.S.-proposed text in the introduction and in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b),but retained brackets around sub-paragraph (c) until the issues of IOI and test ranges were decided. Warner deleted the entire sub-paragraph (d) during the afternoon session. ¶15. (S) Paragraphs 8 through 11. Warner retained brackets around all text in paragraph 8. With the addition of "within the boundaries of the site diagram" in paragraph 9 and the deletion of "submarines in dry dock" in paragraph 10, Petrov agreed to the U.S. text. Russia proposed to add a new paragraph on training models of missiles (TMOMs) as new paragraph 11. The text would be similar to paragraph 12 of Section VI. -------------- SECTION VI TYPE I INSPECTIONS -------------- ¶16. (S) Warner and Petrov first engaged in a short, but ultimately fruitless discussion on how the sides could broaden the right to read UIDs to ICBMs and SLBMs loaded in launchers during Type I inspections. Petrov claimed it would not be technically possible to see the UIDs since they would be placed on the first stage of a missile and had no purpose for inspections of warheads. ¶17. (S) Paragraph 12. Petrov confirmed that inspectors would have the right to inspect TMOMs during an inspection unless such TMOMs were loaded in training silos. ¶18. (S) New paragraph 13 ICBM Bases. With the retention of brackets around the number of deployed ICBMs subject to warhead inspections and deletion of the word "nuclear" before warheads, Petrov agreed to the U.S.-proposed text in the introduction and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). Petrov accepted (c) after Warner agreed to modify the text to read "items specified during pre-inspection procedures at maintenance facilities." Petrov retained brackets around all text in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e). ¶19. (S) New paragraph 14 Submarine Bases. With the retention of brackets around the number of deployed SLBMs subject to warhead inspections and deletion of the word "nuclear" before warheads, Petrov agreed to the U.S.-proposed text in the introduction and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b),but argued that sub-paragraph (b) should include the right to inspect SLBM launchers converted to launch sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Warner disagreed, citing the U.S. position that a SLCM launcher is not an SLBM launcher. Petrov said he would provide new language on inspection of SLCM launchers to be added to sub-paragraph (b). Petrov accepted the first sentence in sub-paragraph (c) with minor changes, but retained brackets around the second sentence regarding other SSBNs located in waters of the base but not selected for the warhead inspection. Petrov indicated the Russians wanted to include SSGNs in this section. -------------- HEAVY BOMBERS AND WARHEAD COVER ISSUES -------------- ¶20. (S) After a long discussion on the inspection of deployed HBs, the number of deployed HBs to be inspected, and on HBs carrying non-nuclear armaments located at air bases during Type I inspections, Warner and Petrov agreed to retain existing brackets around this kind of inspection until issues were resolved by Washington and Moscow. ¶21. (S) Petrov recommended that the issue of reentry vehicle covers used for warhead inspection of ICBMs and SLBMs be moved to third tier as a technical issue to be resolved by the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Petrov cited the fact that the United States only has two systems subject to warhead inspections while Russia has six completely different systems, and indicated Russia might need to change either its warhead covers or the warhead covering procedures to adapt to the changed treaty inspection requirements. Warner argued that is precisely the reason to have general provisions in the protocol that applied to any covers used during Type I inspections. Petrov retained brackets around the entire paragraph pertaining to covers used during warhead inspections. ¶22. (S) Petrov agreed to the concluding paragraphs related to fixing the time of completion and transport of the inspection team to the location designated for post-inspection procedures. Warner and Petrov also discussed whether Section VI should have a provision allowing parallel inspection activities to take place during Type I inspections. Both sides agreed that parallel inspection activity by subgroups was the preferred method, but ultimately agreed not to write specific text in the protocol as the inspection team chief and local base personnel would be best suited to make such a decision. ¶23. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: -- U.S. Proposed JDT for Section VI, Inspections of Strategic Offensive Arms at Operational Bases, Including the Nuclear Warheads On or Associated With Them, Conducted Pursuant to Subparagraph TBD of Article XI of the Treaty, dated November 30, 2009, showing updates through November 28. ¶24. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Celusnak Maj Johnson LTC Leyde Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. Shkeyrov (Int for AM Session) Mr. Bennett(Int for PM Session) RUSSIA Col Petrov Col Izrazov Ms. Kotkova Col Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int for AM Session) Mr. Pogodin (Int for PM Session) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS