START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001189 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP, DECEMBER 4, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-097. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 04, 2009 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) During the meeting of the Notifications Working Group, held at the Russian Mission on December 4, the sides briefly discussed Article VIII noting that it was ready for negotiation by the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG). Mr. Siemon discussed the Preamble and three sections of the U.S.-proposed Part Four of the Protocol, Notifications, and Col Ryzhkov provided comments on individual notifications. ¶4. (S) Ryzhkov described his concept of notifications for conversion or elimination (CorE) noting it was possible to have only two notifications. Siemon recommended that there should also be a discussion with CorE Working Group Chair, Mr. Elliott, and Ryzhkov agreed. The two sides also discussed heavy bombers. Ryzhkov opined that notifications should be provided when visiting heavy bombers landed at any facility, declared and undeclared. Siemon replied that data with respect to the movement of U.S. bombers to specific overseas locations was sensitive, however he agreed the Russian proposal could be discussed further. End Summary. ¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Treaty Article VIII and Part IV Preamble; Sections I and II; Conversion or Elimination Notifications; and Heavy Bombers. -------------- TREATY ARTICLE VIII AND PART IV PREAMBLE -------------- ¶6. (S) Ryzhkov began the meeting by stating that Amb Antonov required that the working group chairs agree on the concepts of treaty articles before the TTDWG be permitted to negotiate that text. He proceeded to note two minor concerns with the current U.S.-proposed text, and both were resolved during the discussion. Siemon indicated that the United States was prepared to accept, in the TTDWG, the first four paragraphs for Article VIII in a slightly revised form, and consequently, Ryzhkov could notify Antonov that his requirement had been met. ¶7. (S) Siemon shifted the discussion to the Preamble to Part Four of the Protocol to the treaty, Notifications. He suggested use of a "General Provisions" section to capture notifications in Greenwich Mean Time, and Ryzhkov agreed that was possible. Ryzhkov stated he would generate new proposed text for this section, and Siemon agreed to do the same. -------------- SECTIONS I AND II -------------- ¶8. (S) Siemon opened discussion on Section I by noting that the START format was in bold text after each notification. He stated the intention was for each side, at a later time, to properly map notifications from START to the new treaty, where applicable. Ryzhkov indicated that he was proceeding down a different path. First, he believed a Format 3, Notification of Change in Data with Respect to Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty, would be used in all cases where data was changed. Therefore, there would be no need for any other Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data change notifications. He cited Format 4, Notification of Loss as a Result of Accident and Format 5, Notification of Disablement Beyond Repair, as examples of notifications that could be combined with Format 3. Additional Russian comments regarding this section were specific to individual formats as indicated below: - Format 8, Notification for Variants of ICBMs and SLBMs, and New Versions of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, the location for the Exhibition or Exhibitions Conducted Pursuant to the Treaty. Russian comment: Notification was not required since variants are not considered under this treaty. - Format 11, Notification of Planned Numbers of Nuclear Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and on or Associated with Deployed Heavy Bombers. Russian comment: Notification was not required since no drastic reduction in numbers would occur under this treaty. - Format 12, Notification of Expected Number of Deployed Strategic Offensive Arms in Excess of Previously Notified Planned Number. Russian comment: Notification was not required since this document alters data provided in a Format ¶11. - Format 15, Notification of the Transfer of Items to or from a Third Party. Russian comment: Notification was not required since Russia would not transfer items to third parties and since U.S. transfers to the United Kingdom would be minimal. When a transfer by the United States did take place, the United States could use either a change in MOU data or a Format 144, "Additional Messages" notification. - Format 16, Notification of Exit from a Newly Constructed Facility. Russian comment: Notification was not required since neither side was likely to construct a new production facility during the life of this treaty. If new construction did occur, this could be notified under Format 144, "Additional Messages." - Format 31, Notification of Visit of Deployed Heavy Bomber to Specified or Eliminated Facility. Russian comment: Notification was required. - Format 44, Notification of Beginning of Major Strategic Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. Russian comment: Notification was required. - Format 45, Notification of Completion of Major Strategic Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. Russian comment: Notification was required. - Format 63, Notification of Arrival of Converted Heavy Bomber at Viewing Site. Russian comment: A separate notification is not required. This would be covered by Format 3. - Format 68, Notification of Annual Schedule for Conversion and Elimination. Russian comment: Notification has not been used for the past 8 years. Transfer of this information would occur through other notifications. - Format 83, Notification, no less than 48 hours in advance, of the Planned Departure from a Production Facility of the First Prototype ICBM or SLBM. Russian comment: Russia was still considering a notification of this type. - Format 88, Notification, no less than 48 hours in advance, of the Departure of a Mobile Launcher of Prototype ICBMs from its Production Facility. Russian comment: This notification was never used in the history of START and proposed deleting it in the new treaty. - Format 91, Notification of Exit of First Long-Range Nuclear ALCM of a New Type from a Production Facility. Russian comment: This notification was not required since radiation equipment would be used to determine nuclear from non-nuclear in lieu of distinguishing features. - Format 94, Notification of Arrival of First Nuclear ALCM of New Type at First Air Base. Russian comment: This notification was not required since radiation equipment would be used at air bases for heavy bombers. -------------- CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION NOTIFICATIONS -------------- ¶9. (S) Ryzhkov stressed that only two notifications were needed with respect to CorE activities: Notification of Intention and Notification of Initiation. Siemon replied that the U.S. side had attempted to capture the current CorE text and asked questions regarding notification of specific steps in the process. Ryzhkov reiterated that only notifications of intent and initiation were required in addition to a change in MOU notification to close each process. Siemon recommended Ryzhkov and Elliott discuss this matter to ensure the needs of both sides were met. Ryzhkov agreed. -------------- HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov raised a concern regarding visiting heavy bombers. He stated that bombers were highly mobile and they often visited undeclared facilities where no notification was required. He recommended a notification be required in these cases as well as with declared facilities. Siemon responded that maintenance issues can force heavy bombers to land at undeclared facilities. He asked if Russia,s concern was about continental or overseas movements of heavy bombers. Ryzhkov replied that Russia was concerned about both, and clarified that his primary concern was about the movement of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Siemon stated heavy bomber movement notifications were sensitive for specific overseas locations because of tactical support to the ongoing U.S. war effort but the concept of heavy bomber notifications could be discussed at a later working group meeting. ¶11. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶12. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Mr. Coussa Mr. Dwyer LTC LaGraffe LT Sicks Mr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶13. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS