START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001188 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 2009 REF: GENEVA 1174 (SFO-GVA-VII-063) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-068. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 29, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.; and 3:00 P.M. - 5:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The ninth and tenth meetings of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) of this session were held on November 29, 2009. Dr. Warner and Col Petrov discussed a revised treaty Article XI text and Sections I, V, and VI of Part Five of the Protocol. Unresolved issues concerning heavy bombers and mobile launcher systems continued to limit clearing of bracketed text. Russian concepts to limit the scope of inspections became clearer as the Russian side gave some details on reducing site diagrams and adjusting reference cylinders to re strict access. End Summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Review of Adjusted Treaty Article XI; Nothing is Agreed Until All is Agreed; Section VI and Issues on Mobiles; Shrinking Basing Areas; Rights and Obligations Must Stay in Tier Two; Section V Revisited: TwoQSteps Forward, One Back; Large Reference Cylinders, Little Access. -------------- REVIEW OF ADJUSTED TREATY ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶5. (S) The sides agreed to discuss joint draft text (JDT) paragraphs from treaty Article XI, then Section VI and V to Part Five of the Protocol. ¶6. (S) In treaty Article XI, the U.S. side agreed to use the term "warhead" instead of "nuclear warhead;" the only bracket remaining concerned inspections of heavy bomber nuclear armament weapons storage areas (NAWSA),which remains a continuing issue. In the paragraph on exhibitions, the sides agreed to retain brackets on technical characteristic exhibitions and periodic checks of converted items of strategic offensive arms (SOA). (Begin comment: The term 
"SOA" remains under discussion in the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG). End comment.) End Summary. ¶7. (S) The sides next discussed Section I, General Obligations, to Part Five of the Protocol (Inspection Activities). The sides also agreed to paragraphs 2 and 4. The sides also agreed to paragraph 1 after removal of reference to continuous monitoring. One word remained bracketed in paragraph 3, which concerned the use of "publicly" regarding the non-disclosure of information. Petrov said Russia would need to study this further. Paragraph 5, concerning the number of inspectors, was moved to Section V of Part Five, but the numbers of inspectors for the various types of inspections was left bracketed. The Russian-proposed provision in paragraph 6 to allow only one inspection activity at any one time was left bracketed. Paragraphs 7 and 8, concerning the number of inspections, were moved to Sections VI and VII, respectively. Disagreements remained unresolved on the yearly quota of inspections and the number of sites that could be inspected a second time in 1 year. -------------- NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED -------------- ¶8. (S) Petrov stated that the proposed Russian package (Ref A) was to be accepted only as a whole and that individual provisions could not be accepted with others rejected. Warner noted that Russia had demonstrated no compunction about breaking up U.S. package proposals in the recent past and stated the United States would follow the same practice in responding to the recent Russian "package," noting that "nothing is agreed until all is agreed." -------------- SECTION VI AND ISSUES ON MOBILES -------------- ¶9. (S) Discussions continued on Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol regarding Type 1 combined inspections, and pickQup at paragraph 9, which concerned designation procedures. Warner noted that in general, many issues could be cleared up once definitions concerning heavy bombers were resolved. He suggested that Col Ilin and Col Petrov needed to talk to Gen Orlov and Adm Kuznetsov about this matter. The sides agreed to use the term "structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs" instead of "fixed structure" throughout the Protocol. The Russians held fast that re stricted areas should not be inspectable and that only one vice two ICBM or SLBM launchers Qd the missiles in or on them should be designated for RVOSI/nuclear warhead inspection. The sides agreed to discuss provisions for designation of heavy bombers at a later time. -------------- SHRINKING BASING AREAS -------------- ¶10. (S) Warner noted that for re stricted areas at the mobile ICBM bases, the Russian proposal did not include procedures to look for ICBMs in structures large enough to contain them, but at submarine bases, inspectors could inventory SLBMs in magazines; this was an inconsistency. Petrov responded that there was no need to look in re stricted areas as there was no limit on non-deployed missiles. Warner noted that such a limit had been proposed, the inspectors had the right to confirm declared data at the base which included data on the number and location of undeployed mobile ICBM launchers, and that inspectors would need to look for additional deployed mobile launchers as well. Petrov stated that Russia would only include the structures that were intended to contain launchers on the site diagrams for basing areas. (Begin comment: Petrov thus implied that the site diagrams at road mobile ICBM re stricted areas would only include nine buildings; the sliding roof garages for road mobile ICBM launchers. End comment.) ¶11. (S) During a discussion of paragraph 10 of Section VI, the sides agreed to a 12-hour limit to transport inspectors to a designated silo launcher, but left transportation time to a re stricted area for mobile ICBMs bracketed. -------------- RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS MUST STAY IN TIER TWO -------------- ¶12. (S) The sides discussed Section VI, paragraph 11, which developed into a more general discussion of the remaining paragraphs of Section VI. The Russian side wanted to put a link at this paragraph to "refer our readers" to the third tier annexes for these procedures; Petrov noted this was similar in structure to START. Warner asked whether the Russian side was walking back on the previous agreement to keep the provisions that pertained to rights and obligations in the first two tiers of the treaty, that is, to the treaty itself and the protocol, and that it was unacceptable to move rights and obligations to the third tier. Warner reminded Petrov that in any event, Annexes 6 and 7, later redesignated as Sections 6 and 7 of the Inspection Activities Part of the Protocol, needed to be finished before treaty signature, and that if the Russian side proposed to push additional provisions from Section VI to the annexes, they should provide the entire text of the proposed annex. -------------- -------------- SECTION V REVISITED: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE BACK -------------- -------------- ¶13. (S) The afternoon meeting focused on a discussion of Section V, General Rules for the Conduct of Inspection Activities. The sides agreed to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 17 and 19. In paragraph 3, the Russian side had not yet determined if it could accept the word "publicly" to describe the non-disclosure of information. In paragraph 7, the sides agreed on a 14-hour transport time limit from the point of entry to the designated inspection site, but not on a provision related to the recall of mobile launchers. The Russian side wanted to move a provision concerning use of cameras to the Annex 5, so the language remained bracketed. ¶14. (S) In paragraph 9, the Russian side insisted on bracketing previously agreed text concerning the right to view and measure items and linked this to concerns that it would allow measurement of warheads. The Russian side initially proposed that paragraph 10 include warheads and silos, confusing the term "item of inspection" with treaty-accountable items. To resolve the confusion, the Russian side proposed adding a clarifying phrase in the chapeau of paragraph 10, "about which technical data has been provided in Part Two of this Protocol," which was added in brackets for U.S. review. Also remaining in brackets in paragraph 10 were references to items of inspection within a heavy bomber NAWSA. Petrov and Warner acknowledged the need to discuss a forthcoming U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on B-1B heavy bombers, which could help clear some brackets in paragraph 10. -------------- LARGE REFERENCE CYLINDER, LITTLE ACCESS -------------- ¶15. (S) The United States proposed a shortened version of paragraph 11 on size criteria and reference cylinders, and a discussion ensued; no brackets were cleared. The Russian side opposed the use of its smallest first stage in the calculation of reference cylinders. Petrov maintained that this would be unfair because the classification of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are such that they would only be found in canisters or as completely assembled missiles. He proposed basing reference cylinders on what would actually be found at the bases. Warner argued it would be more efficient to employ one reference cylinder. (Begin comment: If the Russian proposals were accepted, reference cylinders at Russian facilities would be much larger than at U.S. facilities, and thus re strict access at certain Russian bases as compared to U.S. bases. A canisterized SS-18 without front section is 30.5 meters long and 3.5 meters in diameter, while a Minuteman III first stage is 6.3 meters long and 1.68 meters wide. End comment.) ¶16. (S) The sides continued to disagree on the maximum number of inspectors for each type of inspection activity but only for Type 2 inspections. Petrov said that Russia intends to decrease the size of the inspectable area at Plesetsk so it would be possible for 7 inspectors to complete a Type 2 inspection there within 24 hours. For Type 1 inspections and exhibitions the Russians agreed on 10 inspectors rather than 9 inspectors. ¶17. (S) The sides reached agreement on the duration of all inspections except for Type 1 inspections at air bases. The Russian side bracketed "24 hours" because they were concerned that 24 hours might not allow sufficient time to use radiation detection equipment associated with the possible need to distinguish nuclear from non-nuclear armaments encountered during the inspection of a heavy bomber. ¶18. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: -- Updated Section VII of Part Five of Protocol; and -- Proposed Annex 7 to Protocol. ¶19. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Buttrick Mr. Celusnak Mr. Couch (a.m. meeting) Maj Johnson LTC Leyde Mr. McConnell Ms. Purcell (p.m. meeting) Mr. Rust (a.m. meeting) Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. Shkeyrov (Int a.m. meeting) Mr. Hopkins (Int p.m. meeting) RUSSIA Col Petrov Col Izrazov Mr. Kamenskiy Ms. Vodopolova Ms. Komshilova (Int a.m. meeting) Ms. Evarovskaya (Int p.m. meeting) ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS