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| Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|
| 09GENEVA1185 | 2009-12-18 18:38:00 | SECRET | Mission Geneva |
Cable title:
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
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1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-131. 2. (U) Meeting Date: December 12, 2009 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------------------- SUMMARY -------------------------- 3. (S) At a meeting of the Counting Rules Subgroup of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG), the sides reviewed the latest joint draft text (JDT) for Article III and Article IV and discussed each other's positions. The Russian side argued against including space launch facilities, linking them to the presence and use of strategic offensive arms (SOA) for space launches. Heavy bombers also received attention in terms of basing and treatment of new types. Finally, the questions of locational re strictions for SOA abroad was discussed, with the Russians favoring a stricter interpretation of such re strictions. End Summary. 4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article III, Paragraphs 1-6; Article III, Paragraph 7; Addressing Space Launch Facilities; Dual-Basing Heavy Bombers; Basing SOA Abroad; and Storage of Nuclear Weapons. -------------------------- ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPHS 1-6 -------------------------- 5. (S) Mr. Taylor confirmed that the U.S. delegation had received the latest Russian proposals for Articles III and IV. He proposed the subgroup review the current positions to determine if any new agreements could be reached. - Paragraph 1 (counting rule for each deployed SOA) was agreed as written. - Paragraph 2 (counting rule for deployed warheads), Adm Kuznetsov agreed with the text as written with the exception of the number of armaments attributed to a deployed heavy bomber. - Paragraph 3 (counting of ICBMs and SLBMs), agreed as written. - Paragraph 4 (counting of new types), Kuznetsov noted agreement to the text with the exception of the clarifying description that the heavy bombers considered under the treaty were only those equipped for nuclear armaments. He reported if Russia had to accept the wording as currently proposed by the U.S. side, the Russian delegation would consider revising the already agreed definition for a heavy bomber. - Paragraphs 5 (counting for launchers) and 6 (new types of ballistic missiles and distinguishability of nuclear and non-nuclear bombers) were also agreed. -------------------------- ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPH 7 -------------------------- 5. (S) Paragraph 7 (existing types) provoked a protracted discussion on what types of SOA were to be considered existing types. Taylor outlined the U.S. position and rationale behind the proposal to exclude the Minuteman II, Peacekeeper, and Trident I missiles from consideration as existing types. Kuznetsov embarked on a soliloquy in which he referenced data that had been compiled by Russia in November 2009 concerning the numbers of missiles and launchers in the U.S. inventory, he wondered how the United States could consider a missile not to be an existing type when both missiles and launchers of the type had existed so recently. While the missiles might have been in storage and not deployed, they still existed. Kuznetsov wondered out loud how the Duma would consider a treaty when large numbers of missiles formerly considered under START were now excluded from consideration. 6. (S) Turning to the treatment of nuclear armaments in paragraph 7(d), Kuznetsov proposed deletion of this paragraph altogether. He reasoned it was unnecessary to declare the types of armaments for heavy bombers when the counting rules for heavy bombers relied on attribution. To his mind, there was no need to compare differences in armaments as the question was simple: there either were armaments installed or there were not. 7. (S) Taylor reminded Kuznetsov that the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) was still working the inspection procedures for heavy bombers. He noted the importance of having data that inspectors could use to confirm what they were looking at. Kuznetsov opined the IPWG should decide what needed to be inspected prior to the writing of the corresponding treaty article text. Taylor replied that the correct answer was actually the opposite: the TTDWG should decide the provisions first, and the IPWG should then develop the supporting procedures. At this point, both sides agreed to leave Article III for the present and move on to Article IV. -------------------------- ADDRESSING SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES -------------------------- 8. (S) As paragraphs 1 and 2 were already agreed, and paragraph 3 was being discussed at the Head of Delegation level, the sides immediately moved to paragraph 4 which provided for location re strictions on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Kuznetsov raised the issue of space launch facilities. Again referring to his data sheet, he recounted that there were launchers for Trident I, Peacekeeper, and MMII at Meck Island, Kodiak Island, Wallops Island, and Vandenberg. He wanted to know whether, if Russia agreed to the category of a space launch facility, the United States would declare the SOA on-site and the associated launchers. 9. (S) Taylor noted how the former START Treaty had already provided a way for addressing how launchers and missiles at space launch facilities would be treated. Looking to the treaty under negotiation, he said if activities at space launch facilities involved accountable missiles and launchers under the new treaty, those missiles and launchers would fall under the provisions of the new treaty. However, he caveated this comment by noting that the Russian side had yet to agree to a provision for space launch facilities in the treaty. 10. (S) In response to further queries by Kuznetsov concerning the numbers and types of ICBMs and SLBMs that might be at various space launch facilities, Taylor offered that Kuznetsov had touched on a couple of key points. Determining how to treat SOA at such a location hinged on the sides agreeing to questions related to data exchange, declaring the existing types subject to the treaty, and accepting the concept of a space launch facility. He noted such a discussion would then be more easily facilitated and the other side's intention made more transparent. 11. (S) Toward the end of the session, Kuznetsov made one last run at the question of space launch facilities. Again reviewing his notes, he asserted there were silos at Meck Island and Kodiak, Alaska, which were outside of national territory. He also raised the question of the silo launchers located at Vandenberg AFB. Taylor advised him the launchers at Meck, Kodiak, and Wallops Island were all soft-site launchers and did not meet the definition of silos. As for Vandenberg, he wryly noted the former silos at the space launch facility were no longer silo launchers for ICBMs but were in fact launchers for ground based interceptors, and that Kodiak, Alaska, was in fact part of U.S. national territory. -------------------------- DUAL-BASING HEAVY BOMBERS -------------------------- 12. (S) The sides turned to discussion of Russian-proposed paragraph 8, prohibiting basing of nuclear and non-nuclear equipped heavy bombers at the same base. Kuznetsov said this provision seemed to work well under START and wondered why it would not also work under the new treaty. Taylor laconically pointed out how both sides indulged in selective incorporation of START provisions into the new treaty. He noted the efforts underway to convert heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and said the Russian proposal to cite this provision in Article IV was new and would require further study. -------------------------- BASING SOA ABROAD -------------------------- 13. (S) Paragraph 10, which addressed a ban on basing SOA abroad, drew a lengthy discussion over U.S.-proposed language to ensure rights of passage for submarines and to visit third-country ports. Kuznetsov dismissed the need for such language, arguing it was already a generally recognized international principle that did not need to be repeated in the treaty text. Taylor noted the language appeared in the START Treaty. As there had been no harm in having it, the Russian side should defend its position for dropping it. Ms. Melibekian brought up the fact that such rights were already enshrined in the Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982. 14. (S) Mr. Dean pointed out that the language was necessary to make it clear that the sides were not seeking to modify such rights in the current treaty. At the end of the presentation, Kuznetsov concluded the addition of such language would neither help nor hinder the provision, so it could be accepted. -------------------------- STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -------------------------- 15. (S) The final discussion centered on paragraph 11 which precluded storage of nuclear armaments at air bases for heavy bombers converted for nuclear armaments. Taylor noted the treaty under negotiation was about reductions and limitations of deployed systems. Where a side might choose to store its nuclear weapons was outside of the scope of the treaty. However, he did offer to discuss the matter further in the event the Russian side wished to agree to the efficacy of inspections of nuclear weapons storage facilities, to which Kuznetsov quickly demurred. 16. (U) Documents proviced: None. 17. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Taylor Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Dr. Dreicer Dr. Fraley Ms. Zdravecky Mr. French (Int) RUSSIA Admiral Kuznetsov Ms. Fuzhenkova Colonel Kamensky Ms. Melikbekian Mr. Trifonov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS |