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09GENEVA1185 2009-12-18 18:38:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-131.



2. (U) Meeting Date: December 12, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) At a meeting of the Counting Rules Subgroup of the
Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG), the sides
reviewed the latest joint draft text (JDT) for Article III
and Article IV and discussed each other's positions. The
Russian side argued against including space launch
facilities, linking them to the presence and use of strategic
offensive arms (SOA) for space launches. Heavy bombers also
received attention in terms of basing and treatment of new
types. Finally, the questions of locational re strictions
for SOA abroad was discussed, with the Russians favoring a
stricter interpretation of such re strictions. End Summary.



4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article III, Paragraphs 1-6;
Article III, Paragraph 7; Addressing Space Launch Facilities;
Dual-Basing Heavy Bombers; Basing SOA Abroad; and Storage of
Nuclear Weapons.



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ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPHS 1-6


--------------------------





5. (S) Mr. Taylor confirmed that the U.S. delegation had
received the latest Russian proposals for Articles III and
IV. He proposed the subgroup review the current positions to
determine if any new agreements could be reached.

- Paragraph 1 (counting rule for each deployed SOA) was
agreed as written.

- Paragraph 2 (counting rule for deployed warheads), Adm
Kuznetsov agreed with the text as written with the exception
of the number of armaments attributed to a deployed heavy
bomber.

- Paragraph 3 (counting of ICBMs and SLBMs), agreed as
written.

- Paragraph 4 (counting of new types), Kuznetsov noted
agreement to the text with the exception of the clarifying
description that the heavy bombers considered under the
treaty were only those equipped for nuclear armaments. He
reported if Russia had to accept the wording as currently
proposed by the U.S. side, the Russian delegation would
consider revising the already agreed definition for a heavy
bomber.

- Paragraphs 5 (counting for launchers) and 6 (new types of
ballistic missiles and distinguishability of nuclear and
non-nuclear bombers) were also agreed.






--------------------------


ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPH 7


--------------------------





5. (S) Paragraph 7 (existing types) provoked a protracted
discussion on what types of SOA were to be considered
existing types. Taylor outlined the U.S. position and
rationale behind the proposal to exclude the Minuteman II,
Peacekeeper, and Trident I missiles from consideration as
existing types. Kuznetsov embarked on a soliloquy in which
he referenced data that had been compiled by Russia in
November 2009 concerning the numbers of missiles and
launchers in the U.S. inventory, he wondered how the United
States could consider a missile not to be an existing type
when both missiles and launchers of the type had existed so
recently. While the missiles might have been in storage and
not deployed, they still existed. Kuznetsov wondered out
loud how the Duma would consider a treaty when large numbers
of missiles formerly considered under START were now excluded
from consideration.



6. (S) Turning to the treatment of nuclear armaments in
paragraph 7(d), Kuznetsov proposed deletion of this paragraph
altogether. He reasoned it was unnecessary to declare the
types of armaments for heavy bombers when the counting rules
for heavy bombers relied on attribution. To his mind, there
was no need to compare differences in armaments as the
question was simple: there either were armaments installed
or there were not.



7. (S) Taylor reminded Kuznetsov that the Inspection
Protocol Working Group (IPWG) was still working the
inspection procedures for heavy bombers. He noted the
importance of having data that inspectors could use to
confirm what they were looking at. Kuznetsov opined the IPWG
should decide what needed to be inspected prior to the
writing of the corresponding treaty article text. Taylor
replied that the correct answer was actually the opposite:

the TTDWG should decide the provisions first, and the IPWG
should then develop the supporting procedures. At this
point, both sides agreed to leave Article III for the present
and move on to Article IV.



--------------------------


ADDRESSING SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES


--------------------------





8. (S) As paragraphs 1 and 2 were already agreed, and
paragraph 3 was being discussed at the Head of Delegation
level, the sides immediately moved to paragraph 4 which
provided for location re strictions on non-deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs. Kuznetsov raised the issue of space launch
facilities. Again referring to his data sheet, he recounted
that there were launchers for Trident I, Peacekeeper, and
MMII at Meck Island, Kodiak Island, Wallops Island, and
Vandenberg. He wanted to know whether, if Russia agreed to
the category of a space launch facility, the United States
would declare the SOA on-site and the associated launchers.



9. (S) Taylor noted how the former START Treaty had already
provided a way for addressing how launchers and missiles at



space launch facilities would be treated. Looking to the
treaty under negotiation, he said if activities at space
launch facilities involved accountable missiles and launchers
under the new treaty, those missiles and launchers would fall
under the provisions of the new treaty. However, he caveated
this comment by noting that the Russian side had yet to agree
to a provision for space launch facilities in the treaty.



10. (S) In response to further queries by Kuznetsov
concerning the numbers and types of ICBMs and SLBMs that
might be at various space launch facilities, Taylor offered
that Kuznetsov had touched on a couple of key points.
Determining how to treat SOA at such a location hinged on the
sides agreeing to questions related to data exchange,
declaring the existing types subject to the treaty, and
accepting the concept of a space launch facility. He noted
such a discussion would then be more easily facilitated and
the other side's intention made more transparent.



11. (S) Toward the end of the session, Kuznetsov made one
last run at the question of space launch facilities. Again
reviewing his notes, he asserted there were silos at Meck
Island and Kodiak, Alaska, which were outside of national
territory. He also raised the question of the silo launchers
located at Vandenberg AFB. Taylor advised him the launchers
at Meck, Kodiak, and Wallops Island were all soft-site
launchers and did not meet the definition of silos. As for
Vandenberg, he wryly noted the former silos at the space
launch facility were no longer silo launchers for ICBMs but
were in fact launchers for ground based interceptors, and
that Kodiak, Alaska, was in fact part of U.S. national
territory.



--------------------------


DUAL-BASING HEAVY BOMBERS


--------------------------





12. (S) The sides turned to discussion of Russian-proposed
paragraph 8, prohibiting basing of nuclear and non-nuclear
equipped heavy bombers at the same base. Kuznetsov said this
provision seemed to work well under START and wondered why it
would not also work under the new treaty. Taylor laconically
pointed out how both sides indulged in selective
incorporation of START provisions into the new treaty. He
noted the efforts underway to convert heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments and said the Russian proposal to cite
this provision in Article IV was new and would require
further study.



--------------------------


BASING SOA ABROAD


--------------------------





13. (S) Paragraph 10, which addressed a ban on basing SOA
abroad, drew a lengthy discussion over U.S.-proposed language
to ensure rights of passage for submarines and to visit
third-country ports. Kuznetsov dismissed the need for such
language, arguing it was already a generally recognized
international principle that did not need to be repeated in
the treaty text. Taylor noted the language appeared in the
START Treaty. As there had been no harm in having it, the



Russian side should defend its position for dropping it. Ms.
Melibekian brought up the fact that such rights were already
enshrined in the Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982.



14. (S) Mr. Dean pointed out that the language was necessary
to make it clear that the sides were not seeking to modify
such rights in the current treaty. At the end of the
presentation, Kuznetsov concluded the addition of such
language would neither help nor hinder the provision, so it
could be accepted.



--------------------------


STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS


--------------------------





15. (S) The final discussion centered on paragraph 11 which
precluded storage of nuclear armaments at air bases for heavy
bombers converted for nuclear armaments. Taylor noted the
treaty under negotiation was about reductions and limitations
of deployed systems. Where a side might choose to store its
nuclear weapons was outside of the scope of the treaty.
However, he did offer to discuss the matter further in the
event the Russian side wished to agree to the efficacy of
inspections of nuclear weapons storage facilities, to which
Kuznetsov quickly demurred.



16. (U) Documents proviced: None.



17. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Ms. Zdravecky
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

Admiral Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Colonel Kamensky
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Trifonov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)



18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS