START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001182 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 8, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-109. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 8, 2009 Time: 3:45 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group chairs, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, met at the Russian Mission on December 8. The United States delivered a revised General Provisions section, discussed heavy bomber counting rules and the recent U.S.-proposed agreed Statement on Heavy Bombers, and confirmed the U.S. existing types intended to be declared in the treaty. Trout floated the idea of using an agreed statement to take care of Peacekeeper (PK) and possibly Trident I, while Orlov floated limits of 700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers with an 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBMS, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Some bracketed issues in the text were also discussed, with some brackets removed. End Summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: We Need General Provisions; Heavy Bombers; PK, MM-II, TRIDENT I; The Central Limits; U.S. and Russian Force Structure; Bracketed Text And Other Issues; and Closing Comments. -------------- WE NEED GENERAL PROVISIONS -------------- ¶5. (S) Trout delivered a revised section on General Provisions for the database. LT Lobner explained the rationale for the new text, citing the deletion of introduction paragraphs, or chapeaus, in all parts of the Protocol. Additionally, he pointed out, the United States had worked to incorporate more of the Russian-proposed text and parts of the former START Annex J. ¶6. (S) Begin Text of U.S.-proposed Section I of Part Two of the Protocol: December 7, 2009 Section I. General Provisions ¶1. The Parties shall use the categories of data contained in Part Two, Database for Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Database, when providing data required by the Treaty and this Protocol. ¶2. The Parties shall exchange data related to their strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty, current as of (Date of Signature),no later than 45 days after signature of the Treaty, except as provided for in paragraph 6 of Article VIII. ((3. Each party acknowledges that it is responsible for the accuracy of its own data.))1 ¶4. For the purposes of this Part and for exchanges of data, the word "dash" is used to denote that the entry is not applicable in such case. The word "blank" is used to denote either that this data will be provided when available, or that this data shall not be publicly released, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII. ¶5. The parties shall provide, as a category of data, geographic coordinates relating to the data contained in the Database. All geographic coordinates provided for in the Database shall be expressed in latitude and longitude to the nearest minute, except in cases where two or more locations are within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, and are of the same type or have the same appearance; in such cases, the latitude and longitude shall be expressed to include seconds. ¶6. In specifying geographic coordinates, each Party shall use the system of coordinates commonly employed by it. ¶7. Geographic coordinates for silo launchers of ICBMs located in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base and fixed test launchers at a test range shall be expressed to the nearest minute. End Text. ¶7. (S) Orlov focused on the data exchange requirements of the revised document, citing recent information provided to him by the Notifications Working Group which specified that the first data exchange would occur 45 days after entry-into-force (EIF). Trout reiterated the U.S. position that, in addition to a data exchange within a certain amount of days after EIF, the United States would exchange data current as of signature within 45 days after signature. Lobner added that the Notifications Working Group would take care of the EIF requirements with input from the MOU Working Group, but argued that the MOU Working Group would have to specify any requirements to exchange data prior to EIF. Orlov agreed to evaluate this position. -------------- HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶8. (S) Moving to the recent U.S. proposal for an agreed statement on the B-1 heavy bombers, Orlov retorted that the paper had caused great commotion in the Russian delegation and they had formed a "war room" to discuss the paper. Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement: PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS Agreed Statement: The Parties agree that in order to provide assurances that B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments continue to satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with Part III of the Protocol, the following provisions shall apply after the completion of the elimination or conversion, using conversion procedures employed previously under START, of the final B-1B heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments: ¶1. The United States of America will notify the Russian Federation that the Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas have been eliminated. Once eliminated, these facilities will not be subject to inspection. ¶2. B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments will no longer be subject to the provisions of the Treaty, other than those provisions contained herein. ¶3. The United States will offer an annual exhibition of B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The Russian Federation has the right to participate in this exhibition within the 30-day period following notification. ¶4. The procedures for conduct of such annual exhibitions will be identical to those for heavy bomber conversion confirmation exhibitions, contained in Section VIII to Part Five of the Protocol and Part Three of the Protocol, with the following additional procedures: (a) The point of entry will be Travis Air Force Base, California. (b) The United States will indicate in the notification the B-1B base where the exhibition will take place. (c) Upon arrival at the B-1B base, the in-country escort team lead shall provide an annotated site diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (d) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the inspection team leader may designate no more than one B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments for exhibition. (e) A member of the in-country escort shall permit inspectors to view the designated B-1B heavy bombers that were converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol and therefore are incapable of employing nuclear armaments. (f) The conduct of such an exhibition shall be recorded in the official report. End text. ¶9. (S) Orlov asked some clarifying points about the paper beginning with the U.S. position to not have non-deployed heavy bombers. Trout answered stating the U.S. position in the non-paper that the United States would have deployed heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. He made a caveat on the deployed heavy bomber term, stating that there was still discussion within the U.S. delegation about using non-deployed heavy bombers to refer to bombers at Davis Monthan, adding, however, that the United States would still eliminate these bombers in the 7-year reduction period. (Begin comment: Davis Monthan Air Force Base is a U.S. conversion and elimination facility for heavy bombers. End comment.) Orlov commented that it would have been helpful if the U.S. paper had stated this fact. Orlov asked about heavy bombers in long term maintenance for 1 year or more. Trout replied that the United States still considered these heavy bombers deployed but that the U.S. delegation was still thinking about this concept. Orlov pointed out the absence of B-52Gs in the paper. Trout said that under the U.S. proposal this bomber was not an existing type. ¶10. (S) Orlov turned to the last paragraph of the non-paper regarding new types of non-nuclear heavy bombers which would not be declared if built, asking why new non-nuclear heavy bombers would not fall under the provisions of the treaty. Trout replied that the United States would not consider new non-nuclear aircraft to be subject to the treaty and noted that the United States had no active plans to build such aircraft. ¶11. (S) Finally, Orlov commented on the U.S. analysis on the number used for attribution of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. First he confirmed that the United States wanted the warhead ceiling at 1500 if 1 was used as the attribution number for heavy bombers, but the warhead ceiling would be 1600 if 3 was the attribution number for bombers, to which Trout agreed. Orlov then stated that the United States must have performed significant analysis on the connection of these numbers with respect to the number of heavy bombers and nuclear armaments the United States would have by the end of the 7-year reduction period. Trout acknowledged this point and agreed that there was a specific relationship. -------------- PK, MM-II, TRIDENT I -------------- ¶12. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States intended to declare PK, MM-II, and Trident I in the database. Trout replied that these systems were not existing types and were not deployed launchers, nor would they be at the time of signature. Orlov remarked that it was odd to have launchers with missiles somewhere but not be covered by the treaty. Trout replied that as the United States had stated, the United States would eliminate the PK empty launchers and commented that the MM-II launchers at Vandenberg were test launchers, and therefore non-deployed. Orlov pointed out that Russia also had many silos and submarines awaiting elimination, including its heavy ICBMs. He asked whether Russia could remove them from the MOU. Trout turned back to the U.S. systems saying that perhaps we could use an agreed statement or other document to capture the U.S. pledge to eliminate the PK within 7 years of EIF of the treaty. Orlov commented that this was the first time he had heard this proposal and would take it back to his delegation. He recalled though that in START there were definitions for "former type" and "retired type" and that perhaps this was another possible way to address this situation. ¶13. (S) Trout took the opportunity to ask when the Russians would provide a list of what existing types they intended to declare for the treaty. Orlov joked that perhaps he would provide half the list. -------------- THE CENTRAL LIMITS -------------- ¶14. (S) Orlov broke into a "personal" musing regarding the limits and floated 700 as a number for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and 800 as a number for deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Trout reiterated the U.S. position on non-deployed heavy bombers but said that these were interesting numbers. -------------- U.S. AND RUSSIAN FORCE STRUCTURE -------------- ¶15. (S) Trout and Orlov engaged in a quick discussion about force structure differences with Trout pointing out that the United States looked to find bilateral ways for each side to better understand each other's forces. Both joked that after 15 years of START, each side had a very good idea about force structure. Trout continued, referring to the Russian "MIRVing" of mobile ICBMs against the U.S. "De-MIRV-ing" of the MM-III silos. This, he argued, is why the United States had kept so many MM-III silos and hypothesized that if the United States had continued to MIRV the MM-III the United States would probably have a much smaller number of strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). If that had been the case, the original Russian proposal of 500 SDVs would not have been so drastically opposite to the initial U.S. proposal. Orlov agreed with this logic but added that Russia had some different strategic concerns, referring to Russian concerns with the United Kingdom, France, China, and the increasing technological ability of U.S. missile defense systems. He further pointed out that the U.S. goal of "Nuclear Zero" made Russia take into account U.S. precision weaponry and development of a conventional ballistic missile, exclaiming that soon U.S. conventional systems would "almost be equivalent to" nuclear systems. Trout pointed out that though it might seem different to Russian logic to spend so much money on a technology like conventional ballistic missiles which would only be used to target a few terrorists, this was important to U.S. strategy and interests. -------------- BRACKETED TEXT AND OTHER ISSUES -------------- ¶16. (S) Turning to some bracketed text issues, Orlov asked whether the United States would drop the "associated with" regarding the central limits. Trout deferred all such counting rule related questions saying that once agreement was reached on the third non-deployed limit, and also on the counting rules, all of these brackets would drop away. ¶17. (S) Trout asked whether the Russian position had changed regarding test heavy bombers. Orlov stated the United States knew very well the Russian position on this matter. ¶18. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States would drop other mobile ICBM requirements if the Russian side accepted the U.S. package. Trout spoke indirectly about this matter, stating that it was possible that some other re strictions would drop; however, it was still the U.S. position that mobile systems were unique from any other type of system and that some additional re strictions would still apply. He then qualified the statement though by adding that the United States had been looking to impose equality among systems where possible, citing the unique identifier proposal on all systems as an example. Orlov commented that negotiating with "packages" was very difficult, to which Trout agreed. ¶19. (S) Pischulov then asked some specific questions about the database text. Bracketed text in the introductory first and second paragraph sentences was agreed to. Annex C, Nuclear Armaments Technical Data, was deleted. Trout agreed to consider, therefore, deleting the category of names for nuclear armaments in Annex D. Trout agreed to drop "weight of fully loaded stage" in Annex A regarding missile technical data. ¶20. (S) Regarding some mobile ICBM related issues, Trout confirmed with Orlov that the Russians still intended to provide boundary coordinates for an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Lobner and Pischulov spoke about how to handle information that would not be publicly released, as coordinates was one such example. ¶21. (S) After an inquiry about text duplication, Lobner made a brief statement that the United States had found some ways to shorten the text and reduce duplication but that these things were related to agreement on the third limit (deployed and non-deployed launcher together),reductions in Article IV re strictions, and agreement on counting rules. -------------- CLOSING COMMENTS -------------- ¶22. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to meet on Thursday if new guidance was received by either side. They agreed that most of the remaining bracketed text was related to central limits, counting rules and additional Article IV re strictions. Once these issues were resolved, Trout pointed out, the brackets would fall. Orlov agreed and said, "that'll be the day." ¶23. (U) Documents provided: - U.S. -- U.S.-Proposed Section I of Part Two of the Protocol, dated December 7, 2009 (Russian translation provided.) ¶24. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES: Mr. Trout LT Lobner Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA: Gen Orlov Col Pischulov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS