START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001181 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 2009 REF: GENEVA 1145 (SFO-GVA-VII-083) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-107. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 4, 2009 Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group met at the U.S. Mission on December 4. This was the eighth MOU Working Group meeting of this session and the fifteenth meeting overall. Mr. Trout reiterated the U.S. position on acceptance of the Russian deployed and non-deployed counting rules for missiles if a limit for non-deployed launchers was agreed. Orlov asked to hear the U.S. logic on choosing the number 3 for heavy bomber attribution. Both sides clarified their positions regarding the dates of data exchange. ¶4. (S) The U.S.side agreed to take another look at the opening chapeau to the database in light of Russian concerns about language and recent Conforming Group decisions. Trout also engaged Orlov in a discussion regarding the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan. ¶5. (S) A statement by Orlov regarding telemetry resulted in an animated Russian review of how telemetry worked its way back into the treaty, with the accusation that they were tricked into accepting a suggestion from U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for Russia, Mike McFaul, that the word "telemetry" had to be somewhere in the treaty. Now, despite the Russian principled position against having telemetry in the treaty, the United States was now proposing to include the START telemetry provisions in the treaty. End Summary. ¶6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Deployed/Non-Deployed Concept; Heavy Bomber Counting Rules; MOU Data Exchange and Timeline - Again; Brackets Still Held Hostage; MOU Photo Exchange; Leninsk and Test Heavy Bombers; Telemetry is a Four Letter Word; Duplicate Language; A Bad Idea; and Closing Comments. -------------- DEPLOYED/NON-DEPLOYED CONCEPT -------------- ¶7. (S) Trout reiterated the U.S. position that until there is agreement on a limit for non-deployed launchers, the Russian construct of deployed and non-deployed launchers cannot be used, but suggested that the working group continue to review the MOU with the assumption that we will get agreement. Regarding the nomenclature for the second central limit regarding warheads, Trout noted that the delegations would have to develop new language to incorporate the attribution aspect of heavy bomber nuclear armaments, stating that perhaps the text could be changed to "warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers." Orlov agreed that new language would have to be developed and that the two sides should think about a proposal. -------------- HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULES -------------- ¶8. (S) Orlov began a discussion on how heavy bomber weapons should be accounted for, saying that when he had left for Moscow it was agreed that it would be one weapon per heavy bomber and now the United States had invented three weapons per heavy bomber. Trout responded that the one weapon per bomber rule was a Russian invention and he had explained the logic behind the U.S. proposal to Poznikhir at the last meeting (Reftel). He went on to explain that the U.S. proposal was an attempt to be more realistic. The United States would have a few hundred ALCMs at operational bases and that taking the total number and dividing it by the number of heavy bombers at the base, three was the approximate result. Orlov reminded the working group that long ago the Russian delegation had suggested one weapon per bomber and that concept was reported to and approved by President Medvedev. Now the U.S. delegation, at the last minute, was bringing up a new proposal claiming that it better reflected reality. Care should be taken in such claims because both one and three result in virtual counts and have no relation to bombers that can carry many times more. Trout rejoined saying that once MOU data is exchanged, the Russians will see we have nowhere near enough ALCMs to fully load all bombers, but if Russia intended to keep more weapons at its bases we could go back to the U.S. position of inspecting weapon storage areas and get a true count of the number of ALCMs on the base. ¶9. (S) Orlov asked whether the number of ALCMs that will be on U.S. heavy bomber bases reflected the U.S. plan to remove ALCMs from those bases. Trout replied that it did. Orlov opined that the U.S. proposal only addressed the U.S. situation but was not suitable for Russia, suggesting that a return to counting only those weapons on heavy bombers might be better because it is consistent with how warheads are counted on ICBMs and SLBMs. Trout stated that Russian concerns were addressed in the U.S. offer to allow Russian inspection of U.S. weapon storage areas. He also reminded Orlov that in the Ad Hoc Working Group the major Russian concern with the U.S. approach was the cost of building a facility for the storage of additional ALCMs and the expense of moving the ALCMs to the new facility. Trout then explained that the United States faced the same expenses but that the United States was willing to spend the money, that this did not have to be achieved until 7 years after entry-into-force (EIF) of the treaty, and that the United States had agreed to set this idea aside to move toward the Russian attribution proposal. ¶10. (S) Orlov again asked how the United States had arrived at three weapons per bomber. Trout replied that if Russia intended to have only one weapon per bomber at their bases then the United States could reconsider the number, but he also stated the belief that Russia would have more than that at their bases. Orlov stated that the United States had more than three weapons per bomber at each base. Trout replied that 7 years after EIF the United States would not have those high numbers. Orlov again stated that the new proposal was presented in the closing days of the negotiation session and asked how this problem could be solved in the short time remaining. Poznikhir stated that at least the sides had agreed to attribution despite the differing attribution numbers. Trout stated that both sides had orders from their Presidents and that Orlov was correct and that issue would be difficult to solve. Orlov countered that this problem is not up to the Presidents to solve and that it should be solved by the delegations. -------------- MOU DATA EXCHANGE AND TIMELINE - AGAIN -------------- ¶11. (S) Trout reviewed the Russian proposal for MOU data exchange. Poznikhir restated the Russian concept that at signature, all that will be available will be aggregate numbers and categories of data. Then, 45 days after signature, the Parties will exchange data for all categories available from the July 1, 2009, START data. Finally, at EIF, this data will be made current and include all remaining required data. Trout reminded the working group that the Notification Protocol had the requirement that within 30 days after EIF, the Parties will exchange data current as of the date of EIF. Trout then presented the U.S. position: All data, using the July 1, 2009, START data, will be listed at signature. Then, 45 days after signature, the Parties will exchange data current as of the date of signature. Finally, within 30 days after EIF the Parties would exchange data current as of the date of EIF. Trout also reminded the Russian side that confidential data would not be exchanged until the EIF exchange, which includes warhead data, unique identifier (UID) data and geographic coordinates. Orlov agreed to take the U.S. proposal to his delegation. -------------- BRACKETS STILL HELD HOSTAGE -------------- ¶12. (S) After Trout requested a return to reviewing bracketed text, Poznikhir suggested looking at the chapeau and reiterated the Russian proposal to delete the last sentence: "Each Party acknowledges that it is responsible for the accuracy of its own data," as Russian lawyers believed it redundant with the intent of the treaty. Lobner responded he had discussed this with U.S. lawyers and they wanted to handle it in a lawyers' meeting. Poznikhir asked the status of the joint proposal to replace "limitations" with "provisions" at appropriate places within the text. Mr. Ivanov stated that the Conforming Group had agreed to replace: "subject to the limitations of the Treaty" with "subject to the provisions of the Treaty" throughout the text. Trout said he would confirm this with the U.S. members of the Conforming Group. ¶13. (S) Trout then asked whether the Russians were ready to drop the term "strategic offensive arms." Col Pischulov stated that it had already been deleted from the Russian text but that the U.S. delegation did not have the new text. Orlov stated his dislike for the document as there were even brackets in the title. After a short discussion, Trout agreed to "Database of Strategic Offensive Arms," as long as the other items captured in the MOU were addressed in the chapeau. Ivanov pointed out that there was not a Russian term that could cover all the categories of data in the MOU. Orlov asked whether SOA was agreed for the title. Upon Trout's affirmative reply, he suggested it could be repeated in the chapeau and then jokingly offered to arm wrestle Trout to settle the problem. After politely refusing the offer, Trout agreed to bring the U.S. delegation's position to the next meeting. ¶14. (S) Poznikhir then moved to the opening sentences for both paragraphs in Section I, entering into another discussion on the use of "provisions" and "limitations." After some linguistic clarifications and discussions, Trout responded that the United States would take a closer look at these sections but that the Russian proposal to edit these sentences was appropriate. Poznikhir returned to the issue of the use of "version" in the MOU stating that Russia had no versions of ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers. Lobner said that the Definitions Subgroup and the lawyers would work the issue. -------------- MOU PHOTO EXCHANGE -------------- ¶15. (S) Trout reminded Orlov that at the previous meeting (Reftel) Poznikhir had agreed to provide photographs of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs and, in exchange, the United States had agreed to drop the requirement to list measurements for fixed structures in Annex A. He acknowledged that the photographs from the START Treaty would be sufficient for those items being declared in the new treaty, but we had to have provisions for additional photographs, as necessary, and that a list of all accepted START Treaty photographs and those needed should be added to the MOU. Poznikhir asked whether all references to fixed structures would be removed if photographs were provided. Trout responded that only the measurement requirements would be deleted; the number of fixed structures at each base would still be required. Poznikhir reminded Trout that he had agreed that fixed structures were not SOA and therefore they should be deleted. Trout reminded Poznikhir that the U.S. position was to have fixed structures reported at the bases to which Poznikhir stated the text would remain bracketed. -------------- LENINSK AND TEST HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶16. (S) Trout returned to the discussion on the Leninsk Test Range. Orlov repeated that the Leninsk facility belonged to Kazakhstan and therefore would not be declared in the MOU. Poznikhir asked whether a space launch facility (SLF) was inspectable, to which Trout replied an SLF was not, but a test range was inspectable and Leninsk was a test range. Trout further stated that if Russia only flew missiles without re-entry vehicles at Leninsk, then the facility would be consistent with an SLF. Poznikhir stated that Russia had wanted to combine SLFs and test ranges so as not to hide anything, but the United States refused because the United States does not want inspectors at U.S. space launch facilities and that this was a limit on transparency. Trout restated the U.S. position that such a combination of SLFs and test ranges was unacceptable. Poznikhir went on to repeat the Russian position that notification of missile movements to the facility would be provided. Trout received an affirmative response to a question asking whether launch notifications would be provided for launches from the facility, as well as telemetry information, if an agreement on telemetry was reached. Trout suggested that perhaps an agreement could be drafted to record this information, such as an agreed statement. Orlov agreed to review the issue with the Russian lawyers. ¶17. (S) Trout addressed a concern with test heavy bombers stating that it was a treaty Article IV issue, but one that also affected the MOU. Trout first pointed out that test heavy bombers are not inspectable no matter where they are located. Therefore, unless a limit on test heavy bombers is established, either Party could have a significant force of non-inspectable heavy bombers. Poznikhir asked the basis for the U.S. suspicion. Trout replied that both Parties have test heavy bombers and should have as many as they needed. They provide a valuable service but each Party should limit the number. He added that the suggested limit was not meant to force Russia to eliminate required test heavy bombers, it was meant to assure each Party that no more heavy bombers than necessary were included in this non-inspectable subgroup. Orlov and Poznikhir admitted to having limited knowledge of Russian test heavy bomber numbers and took the issue as homework to find out more information. ¶18. (S) Poznikhir said that under the reasoning of sub-limits, Russia was thinking of including a limit for SLBMS of 200 with a sub-limit of 150 deployed SLBMs. -------------- TELEMETRY IS A FOUR LETTER WORD -------------- ¶19. (S) Orlov began a philosophical oration suggesting that to include limits on test heavy bombers opened the door to the concept of limits on all other categories--deployed and non-deployed launchers for example. Warming to this subject, he claimed that when Russia offers a finger the United States eats the whole arm. He stated that Russia felt cheated by accepting the request from Mr. McFaul for the word "telemetry" to appear somewhere in the treaty. He stated that the Russian President had made a major concession and included telemetry in the treaty. Despite the Russian concession, the United States was now proposing to include the START Treaty telemetry provisions in the treaty. -------------- DUPLICATE LANGUAGE -------------- ¶20. (S) After a brief review of the test heavy bomber issue, Orlov asked to return to Section II to address an Article IV issue. He and Poznikhir pointed out three instances of the same language from the chapeau. Lobner replied that he understood the Russian logic concerning duplication of categories, and that once Article IV and the central limits were finalized, the U.S. delegation would perform a thorough review of the text and eliminate redundancy. Poznikhir welcomed the effort. -------------- A BAD IDEA -------------- ¶21. (S) Pischulov reminded Trout that at the last meeting, the United States had again argued its position that only distinguishing features for heavy bombers were required and not technical data. He asked whether it was possible to remove all requirements for technical data for ICBMs and SLBMs and to provide distinguishing features and/or photographs similar to the heavy bomber proposal. Trout said the technical data for ICBMs and SLBMs were there for two purposes: 1) to help in identifying new types and 2) as size criteria to assist inspectors identify which buildings could contain SOA. -------------- CLOSING COMMENTS -------------- ¶22. (S) Orlov requested clarification of a comment Trout made about moving annexes into the protocol. Trout replied that Annexes A, B, C, and D would become Protocol paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 so that the document signed by the Presidents would include the categories of data to be listed in the MOU. Orlov claimed the Russian side had more questions but would save them for a future meeting. ¶23. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶24. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES: Mr. Trout Mr. Broshar Mr. Celusnak Mr. Colby Mr. Coussa LTC LaGraffe LT Lobner Mr. Hanchett Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA: Gen Orlov Mr. Ivanov Col Pischulov Gen Poznikhir Col Voloskov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 25.(U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS