START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001174 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 28, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-063. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 28, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:50 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met on November ¶28. The U.S. and Russian delegations exchanged revised versions of the joint draft text (JDT) of treaty Article XI. The sides conducted a line-by-line review of the JDT of Article XI and Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. The process moved rapidly through Article XI, but slowed significantly when the group transitioned to Section VI. Much text was agreed in Article XI with the exception of the section regarding the provisions for exhibitions which required further discussion. In contrast, much of the text of Section VI remained as bracketed text. The United States also offered a preliminary outline of its proposed agreed statements on SSGNs and B-1Bs. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Treaty Article XI; More on General Obligations; and Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. -------------- TREATY ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner began the session by stating that he intended to review the revised JDT of treaty Article XI and to continue the review of Section VI of Part Five to the Protocol. Petrov agreed but noted that the Russian delegation intended to keep Article XI as short as possible and to move any non-essential paragraphs to the second tier. Warner then began the line-by-line review of the proposed JDT of Article XI. ¶6. (S) The sides agreed that Paragraph 1 of Article XI, on the purpose of inspections, was agreed. ¶7. (S) The sides also on agreed on Paragraph 2, on facilities where inspections of deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA) would take place, with the exception of the U.S.-proposed adjective "nuclear" in front of warheads and the U.S. stipulation that non-deployed SOA at heavy bomber bases would also be inspectable. ¶8. (S) For paragraph three, listing the facilities where non-deployed inspections would take place, the sides agreed to use a general listing of the types of facilities that would be inspected, with the specific facilities subject to this type of inspection listed in the tier two section for non-deployed inspections. In addition, Warner proposed that the formerly declared facility (FDF) inspection be listed in paragraph three. Petrov replied that the Russian Federation agreed with the FDF concept but that he needed to confer with colleagues before agreeing to remove the brackets to include the FDF reference. ¶9. (S) Warner then inquired what the Russian-proposed formulation "confirm technical characteristics" during a non-deployed inspection meant. Petrov responded that it referred to such activities as the measurement of the 20 centimeter red dot on converted B-1B heavy bombers during inspections. Warner asked for further clarification as the U.S. position was that converted B-1Bs would not be subject to non-deployed type inspections. No resolution of the issue was reached. ¶10. (S) Warner then took the opportunity to reiterate the U.S. position that the converted B-1B and SSGNs would not be subject to non-deployed inspections. He explained, however, that the United States would present proposed agreed statements outlining a once-per-year inspection regime for the B-1Bs and SSGNs in order to provide the Russians with an opportunity to verify that these systems were not reconverted for nuclear use. ¶11. (S) For paragraph four on exhibitions, although both delegations had re-worked the text, the sides could not reach complete agreement and so deferred further discussion to the next meeting. The sides did agree, as with previous inspection descriptions, to move supporting information to the second tier of the treaty. Warner also agreed to accept the Russian proposal for new types of exhibitions. Warner clarified that the Russian proposal to extend the applicability of the phrase "demonstrate distinguishing features" to all new types of SOA would require a change from START, under which the phrase applied only to heavy bombers. Warner also stated that the U.S. position was to include heavy bomber nuclear armaments among the types of exhibitions of new SOA. ¶12. (S) After closing the discussion of Article XI, Warner informed the Russian delegation that the Untied States had agreed to drop any reference to continuous monitoring at Votkinsk in the new treaty. The Russian delegation was visibly impressed by this statement. -------------- MORE ON GENERAL OBLIGATIONS -------------- ¶13. (S) Petrov presented Warner with additional items that Russia proposed including in Section I of Part Five of the Protocol on General Obligations. Warner stated that the United States would review the proposal and would be prepared to discuss it at the next meeting, but did note that the General Obligations section had already been sent to conforming and any revisions would require a re-submittal to the Conforming Group. -------------- SECTION VI OF PART FIVE OF THE PROTOCOL -------------- ¶14. (S) Warner then turned the discussion to Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol and asked Petrov to clarify a statement in paragraph 9(a) concerning inspection of a fixed structure during an inspection of deployed SOA. Petrov stated that the Russian proposal offered to substitute for an empty fixed structure for inspection during the nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) portion of a combined inspection if that empty fixed structure did not contain a deployed mobile launcher. Warner acknowledged and stated that the paragraph also outlined that mobile launchers at the maintenance facility would not be subject to the NWI portion of an inspection. Petrov stated that the provision should remain in brackets. Warner agreed. ¶15. (S) Warner then pointed out that the selection of a re stricted area (RA) for the data update portion of an inspection was essential to the United States for verification of data presented in the periodic notifications. Petrov stated that inspection of a re stricted area was inconsistent with the inspections of ICBM and SLBM bases. Under those inspections, only the maintenance facility would be inspected during the data update portion of the inspection. Warner agreed to leave the paragraph on re stricted areas in brackets. ¶16. (S) For paragraph 9(b),outlining launcher selection for SLBMs, Warner explained that the U.S. text directed two deployed launchers to be subject to the NWI portion of the inspection, while the Russian text subjected only one deployed launcher to selection. Warner agreed to leave the numbers bracketed until an agreement could be reached. Warner stated that, in regards to the selection of a non-deployed launcher, the United States did not agree to the Russian proposal to select an SSGN launcher since the United States did not consider it capable of launching an SLBM. Warner reiterated that the United States would present a draft agreed statement which would address the SSGNs and that these systems would not be subject to inspections of deployed SOA. Warner stated that the agreed statement would offer the inspection of one SSGN per year in order to ensure that the Russians would see each of the four SSGNs within a 4-year period. Warner noted this would be in line with the obligations outlined by the package offered to Russia by General Jones. ¶17. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: -- U.S. version of Treaty Article XI, dated November 28, 2009. - RUSSIA: -- Russian version of Treaty Article XI, dated November 28, 2009; and -- Additions to General Obligations Section, undated. ¶18. (S) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Celusnak Mr. Couch Maj Johnson Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Petrov Mr. Ivanov Ms. Vodopolova Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶19. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS