START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001148 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 02, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-086. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 2, 2009 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A small group of members of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG),met on December 2, 2009. The U.S. and Russian sides discussed the right to release data to the public. The Russian delegation proposed a new treaty article that addressed only this subject and the U.S. side provided a revised version of Article VIII on notifications that contained two paragraphs on data releasability. The discussion focused on the differences in interpretation of the word "data" and the Russian military's unwillingness to release the START Follow-on (SFO) database information. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: No Progress on Release of Public Information; and The Major Disconnect. -------------- NO PROGRESS ON RELEASE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION -------------- ¶5. (S) A small group of members of the TTDWG met to further clarify the Russian position on release of database information to the public, with the intention of moving towards completion of Article VIII. Amb Ries expressed surprise that the provided Russian working paper on Article VIII did not include existing agreed joint draft text (JDT) and contained no mention of public release of data. Ms. Kotkova explained that she drafted the Russian proposal for Article VIII based on information from the Notifications Working Group and was proposing a new article on public release of information because it covered more than database information. (Begin comment: U.S. TTDWG and Notification Working Group chairs were unaware that any such agreement had been reached. End comment.) ¶6. (S) The Russian-proposed Article VIII included several elements including: the set up a database; an obligation to notify; additional voluntary notification; and the use of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC). They proposed, in Part Two of the Protocol, to allow the Parties to publicly release information upon the date of signature but specifically restricted the release of geographic coordinates, unique identifiers, site diagrams, and coastlines and waters diagrams, unless otherwise agreed in the Bilateral Consultation Commisssion (BCC). A final re striction was included on public release of data and other information acquired in the implementation of the treaty subject to consent by the other Party, via consultations of the BCC. ¶7. (S) Despite the unorthodox process, the U.S.-proposed text in an attempt to move toward the new Russian language. However, the U.S. side insisted that each Party maintained the right to release the intial MOU data upon signature of the treaty. (Begin comment: All of the July 2009 START data that the United States proposed would be included in Part Two of the Protocol. End comment.) -------------- THE MAJOR DISCONNECT -------------- ¶8. (S) The Russian delegation explained that although the proposed treaty article allowed Parties to publicly release information in Part Two of the Protocol upon the date of signature, the Russian side interpreted "data" as only the list of categories of data in the database part of the protocol plus the initial aggregate numbers (for strategic delivery vehicles and warheads) determined in Article II. It did not include each of the numbers associated with the categories of data. Mr. Dean explained that this was a major disconnect with the U.S. interpretation of data, which definitely included the numbers that populated the categories of data in the database. A long discussion of the meaning of "data" and "information" did not result in any resolution. ¶9. (S) Ries explained that the Russian concept was completely at odds with U.S. requirements, including the need to provide this information to the U.S. Senate as part of the ratification process. The American public and world community would expect to know what the new treaty was going to accomplish and how it would support the Non-Proliferation Article VI. According to Kotkova, the Russian military believed that the release of data was a national security threat and was unwilling to change its position. Kotkova said the Russian ratification package for START included the initial database information but it was not made available to the Russian public. Kotkova anticipated that the July 2009 START data would be provided to the Duma as part of the Russian ratification process. ¶10. (S) When pressed for further explanation of the difference between START ratification and SFO ratification, Kotkova implied that the difference hinged on the superior quality of today's data compared to 15 years ago. Additionally, under SFO, the release of aggregate numbers at signature would not likely continue during implementation. Kotkova speculated that the Russian military would not want to release the aggregate data because "it will not look too impressive to the rest of the world." ¶11. (S) The meeting concluded with no resolution. Kotkova committed to continue her attempts to explain the U.S. position to the military members of her delegation. ¶12. (U) Documents provided: - United States: -- U.S. Working Paper, Article VIII, December 2, 2009. - Russia: -- Russian Unofficial Translation for Article VIII, November 30, 2009. ¶13. (U) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Dr. Dreicer Mr. Dean Mr. Bennett (Int) RUSSIA Ms. Kotkova ¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS