START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001148

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 02, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-086.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 2, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) A small group of members of the Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group (TTDWG),met on December 2, 2009.
The U.S. and Russian sides discussed the right to release
data to the public. The Russian delegation proposed a new
treaty article that addressed only this subject and the U.S.
side provided a revised version of Article VIII on
notifications that contained two paragraphs on data
releasability. The discussion focused on the differences in
interpretation of the word "data" and the Russian military's
unwillingness to release the START Follow-on (SFO) database
information. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: No Progress on Release of Public
Information; and The Major Disconnect.

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NO PROGRESS ON RELEASE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
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5. (S) A small group of members of the TTDWG met to further
clarify the Russian position on release of database
information to the public, with the intention of moving
towards completion of Article VIII. Amb Ries expressed
surprise that the provided Russian working paper on Article
VIII did not include existing agreed joint draft text (JDT)
and contained no mention of public release of data. Ms.
Kotkova explained that she drafted the Russian proposal for
Article VIII based on information from the Notifications
Working Group and was proposing a new article on public
release of information because it covered more than database
information. (Begin comment: U.S. TTDWG and Notification
Working Group chairs were unaware that any such agreement had
been reached. End comment.)


6. (S) The Russian-proposed Article VIII included several
elements including: the set up a database; an obligation to
notify; additional voluntary notification; and the use of the
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC). They proposed, in Part
Two of the Protocol, to allow the Parties to publicly release
information upon the date of signature but specifically
restricted the release of geographic coordinates, unique
identifiers, site diagrams, and coastlines and waters
diagrams, unless otherwise agreed in the Bilateral
Consultation Commisssion (BCC). A final re striction was
included on public release of data and other information
acquired in the implementation of the treaty subject to
consent by the other Party, via consultations of the BCC.


7. (S) Despite the unorthodox process, the U.S.-proposed
text in an attempt to move toward the new Russian language.


However, the U.S. side insisted that each Party maintained
the right to release the intial MOU data upon signature of
the treaty. (Begin comment: All of the July 2009 START data
that the United States proposed would be included in Part Two
of the Protocol. End comment.)

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THE MAJOR DISCONNECT
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8. (S) The Russian delegation explained that although the
proposed treaty article allowed Parties to publicly release
information in Part Two of the Protocol upon the date of
signature, the Russian side interpreted "data" as only the
list of categories of data in the database part of the
protocol plus the initial aggregate numbers (for strategic
delivery vehicles and warheads) determined in Article II. It
did not include each of the numbers associated with the
categories of data. Mr. Dean explained that this was a major
disconnect with the U.S. interpretation of data, which
definitely included the numbers that populated the categories
of data in the database. A long discussion of the meaning of
"data" and "information" did not result in any resolution.


9. (S) Ries explained that the Russian concept was
completely at odds with U.S. requirements, including the need
to provide this information to the U.S. Senate as part of the
ratification process. The American public and world
community would expect to know what the new treaty was going
to accomplish and how it would support the Non-Proliferation
Article VI. According to Kotkova, the Russian military
believed that the release of data was a national security
threat and was unwilling to change its position. Kotkova
said the Russian ratification package for START included the
initial database information but it was not made available to
the Russian public. Kotkova anticipated that the July 2009
START data would be provided to the Duma as part of the
Russian ratification process.


10. (S) When pressed for further explanation of the
difference between START ratification and SFO ratification,
Kotkova implied that the difference hinged on the superior
quality of today's data compared to 15 years ago.
Additionally, under SFO, the release of aggregate numbers at
signature would not likely continue during implementation.
Kotkova speculated that the Russian military would not want
to release the aggregate data because "it will not look too
impressive to the rest of the world."


11. (S) The meeting concluded with no resolution. Kotkova
committed to continue her attempts to explain the U.S.
position to the military members of her delegation.


12. (U) Documents provided:

- United States:

-- U.S. Working Paper, Article VIII, December 2, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Russian Unofficial Translation for Article VIII,
November 30, 2009.





13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Dr. Dreicer
Mr. Dean
Mr. Bennett (Int)

RUSSIA

Ms. Kotkova


14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS