START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001147 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 3, 2009 REF: GENEVA 1141 (SFO-GVA-VII-079) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-091. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 03, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The tenth meeting of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group during Session VII was held at the Russian Mission on December 03, 2009. The two sides discussed current text regarding general provisions, conversion or elimination (CorE) of heavy bombers, and elimination of facilities. Some brackets were cleared in the general provisions section. All brackets were cleared in the section regarding elimination of facilities, and the remaining brackets were reviewed, but not cleared, in the heavy bomber section. ¶4. (S) The sides discussed text regarding elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs along with CorE of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. Numerous brackets were cleared in the elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs section and the elimination of ICBM launchers section. Remaining issues for elimination of ICBM and SLBMs included: 1) the placing of a hole in the motor case when the solid-fuel was removed by burning; the timeframe eliminated items are visible to national technical means (NTM); and the elimination procedures for launch canisters. Remaining issues for elimination of ICBM launchers included specific elimination procedures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, including the possible use of "wildcard" procedures, and the allowable time period for NTM to verify CorE activities. Russia also noted a need to move inspection procedures to Part V of the Protocol. ¶5. (S) In reference to the elimination of SLBM launchers, the sides agreed in concept to a two-step elimination process, but significant differences in the desired wording for this section remained. The procedures to be used for elimination remained bracketed, and the Russian side raised concerns about the use of "limits" in one location. The two sides disagreed in the wording regarding conversion of SLBM launchers for use other than launchers of SLBMs. Lastly, the Russian side raised a concern that current text did not exist to reflect the actual date a converted item was removed from the limits of the treaty. End Summary. ¶6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: General Provisions, Facilities, and Heavy Bombers; Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs; Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers; and Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers. -------------- GENERAL PROVISIONS, FACILITIES, AND HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶7. (S) Mr. Elliott opened the meeting with discussion on Section VII (Procedures for Elimination of Facilities). He stated the U.S. side was removing its proposed text "ICBM Emplacement Equipment" and "support" in paragraph 1 of this Section. Removal of those items cleared the remaining brackets and resulted in agreed text ready for submission to the Conforming Group. ¶8. (S) Col Ryzhkov replied that he believed Section V (Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers) and Section VII were now agreed. Mr. Smirnov corrected Ryzhkov by noting Section V still had bracketed text regarding the time period for items to remain visible to NTM after CorE. (Begin comment: The U.S. side wants a 60-day window for NTM while Russia wants 30 days. End comment.) Elliott concurred that brackets remained. Ryzhkov stated that issue should be considered to be "in-progress." ¶9. (S) Elliott next addressed Section I (General Provisions). He stated the brackets existing in paragraph 3 were being addressed through agreed statements. (Begin comment: These agreed statements had not yet been provided to the Russian side. End comment.) These statements would allow for viewing of B-1Bs and SSGNs through the life of the treaty. Elliott opined that acceptance of those agreed statements would surely clear the brackets in this paragraph. Elliott stated the brackets in paragraph 6 regarding confirmation of CorE would remain until procedures for elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, in addition to elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs, were agreed. -------------- ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS -------------- ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov opened discussion of Section II (Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs) by stating the Russian side was accepting U.S. language in paragraph 1 and subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(c). Referencing the Russian proposal to place a large hole in the case (Reftel),Ryzhkov asked why the U.S. side did not incorporate the Russian concept in the joint draft text. ¶11. (S) Elliott replied that the U.S. side attempted to combine the U.S. and Russian texts whenever possible. Therefore, it utilized not less than 10 centimeters vice 1 meter. Additionally, he noted the United States preferred holes be drilled rather than using a sledge hammer as the Russian side had proposed; the U.S. side would not oppose that though. He also noted that while a one meter opening would be visible to NTM, the United States was not prepared to forfeit a right to inspect the eliminated first stage motor cases. He opined the procedures could easily be modified to account for a larger opening or for use of a sledge hammer if both sides agreed that was necessary. ¶12. (S) Ryzhkov asked that the two sides use a term other than "drilled" to allow for additional flexibility in the procedure. Lt Col Goodman recommended using the term "placed." Ryzhkov stated the Russian side would study this paragraph and provide a recommendation if "placed" was unacceptable. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side would remove its subparagraph 2(d) regarding "wildcard" procedures, and consequently, the corresponding U.S. bracketed text "2(d)" in paragraph 3 should be removed as well. He then indicated U.S. paragraph 5, which pertained to inspection team rights for elimination confirmation inspections, should be located elsewhere in the text. Elliott noted that Col Ilin and Dr. Warner should be consulted and he asked that Ryzhkov approach Ilin for assistance. Elliott agreed to discuss with Warner as well. ¶14. (S) Ryzhkov next discussed U.S. paragraph 4 which provided procedures for elimination of launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs. He said this paragraph was "not good" as it was not possible to use the procedures as set forth by the U.S. side, and therefore, it would remain bracketed. Mr. Ivanov then asked to review treaty Article VII (Conversion or Elimination). He raised a concern with the U.S. use of "procedures" in paragraph 1. The Russian side recommended use of "Part" to ensure all Sections of Part Three of the Protocol were captured on the basis that some means of removal from accountability did not contain procedures. Elliott replied the U.S. side would consider the Russian text. -------------- CORE OF ICBM LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶15. (S) Ryzhkov began discussion of Section III (Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers) with Russian paragraph 4 concerning elimination of mobile launchers stating there was agreement with the first three paragraphs. Ryzhkov noted a "fundamental" disagreement in this paragraph as the U.S.-proposed language required all procedures be accomplished while the Russian-proposed language allowed the use of any of the procedures. Therefore, he stated, those brackets should remain. He then opined that the Russian side would accept U.S. subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) if the two were combined as they would equate to the Russian subparagraph 4(a). U.S. subparagraph 4(c) requiring cutting of 0.78m from the launcher chassis would remain bracketed. ¶16. (S) Elliott indicated that the two subparagraphs could be combined, and he acknowledged the Russian desire to keep subparagraph 4(c) in brackets. He then asked Ryzhkov about the disposition of the Russian subparagraph allowing "wildcard" procedures. Ryzhkov replied the Russian preference was to provide the "wildcard" option in all sections of the CorE Protocol. Elliott responded that this text should remain in brackets since the U.S. side opposed use of "wildcard" procedures for any item other than silo launchers of ICBMs. ¶17. (S) Ryzhkov agreed to keep the brackets and he quickly moved to the time period allowed for inspection by NTM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. He stated both "30-day" and "60-day" should remain bracketed here and throughout the text as they would be addressed together. Ryzhkov then noted paragraph 6 was similar text pertaining to inspection team procedures and should also be located elsewhere. Referencing paragraphs 7 and 8, Ryzhkov stated the Russian side was removing its proposed text since it was covered in the General Provisions. Therefore, these two paragraphs were agreed. Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether the Russian side intended to oppose bracketed U.S.-proposed text in paragraph 1 of this section. Ryzhkov replied that the Russian side accepted the U.S. addition. -------------- CORE OF SLBM LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶18. (S) Ryzhkov opened discussion on Section IV (Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers) by stating the United States had proposed a new paragraph 1. He then asked whether the United States had incorporated the equivalent Russian text in its proposed paragraph 3 and why the Russian text was not fully accepted. He also noted that a submarine could be moved after its hatches were removed. He stated it could be moved to a different pier for scrapping. ¶19. (S) Elliott replied that the United States had attempted to write text to support actual Russian elimination plans. He said he understood Russia would eliminate SSBNs at a shipyard and that current text supported movement of the submarine as long as it remained at that facility. Ryzhkov replied the Russian translation stipulated the submarine must remain at the same pier where the hatches were removed. He also noted that the U.S.-proposed text utilized an indefinite time period for NTM while Russian-proposed text contained a 30-day time period. ¶20. (S) Elliott then asked to clarify several additional paragraphs. He stated, in paragraph 2, the United States chose "limits" instead of "provisions" since a two-step elimination process was to be used. With START, the SLBM launchers came out of the central limits when the hatch, fairings, and gas generators, when applicable, were removed. The submarine was still under the provisions of the treaty at that time. He then noted that the U.S.-proposed text provided inspection by NTM until the submarine was no longer subject to the provisions of the treaty. It would remain visible to NTM until it was scrapped. ¶21. (S) Ryzhkov explained the Russian concept of limits for deployed and non-deployed launchers. He stated non-deployed launchers, as the launchers in question would be categorized, would not be subject to the limitations of the treaty but would be subject to its provisions. He explained the use of "limitations" was broader and covered more. ¶22. (S) Elliott responded that he understood and subsequently noted the U.S. side was prepared to embrace the concept of deployed and non-deployed launchers as long as a limit was set on non-deployed launchers. He indicated SLBM launchers were neither deployed nor non-deployed once the hatch was removed. These launchers would still be subject to the provisions of the treaty even though they would not count against the numerical limits and would remain visible to NTM until the submarine was scrapped. ¶23. (S) Ryzhkov noted that a conceptual difference existed. He stated that according to the Russian concept, a launcher was non-deployed when a missile was removed. The missile would be non-deployed as well. In the case of elimination, the launcher would be removed from the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) once the hatch was removed. When the submarine was scrapped, it would also be removed from the MOU. Therefore, Ryzhkov concluded, the use of the term "provisions" was preferred. ¶24. (S) Elliott indicated that if we used "provisions" in this case, the submarine would no longer be subject to the treaty in any way once the hatches were removed. Elliott asked Ryzhkov to confirm that was what Russia intended. Ryzhkov noted that some confusion existed on this topic as the launchers would no longer be subject to the treaty while the submarine would be. ¶25. (S) Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that Article II uses the phrase "SLBM and associated launcher." Therefore, legal guidance was needed before the two sides could move forward. He proposed leaving both U.S.-proposed and Russian-proposed texts bracketed until the lawyers could respond. Elliott then asked whether the Russian proposed text at the end of the paragraph could be removed. Ryzhkov agreed. ¶26. (S) Elliott requested clarification regarding the 30-day period provided for in Russian paragraph 3. Ryzhkov answered that it would allow inspection by NTM of the removed hatches, fairings, and when applicable, gas generators and the submarine. Upon expiration of that window the submarine and the removed elements could be moved, as required. Elliott asked whether notification would be appropriate at which time Ryzhkov replied "yes." ¶27. (S) Elliott stated the U.S. side required the submarine be visible to NTM until it was no longer subject to the provisions of the treaty. Smirnov replied that was impossible in the case of a covered dock. Elliott asked whether it was possible to identify the submarine while in the covered dock or if it was possible to move the covering. Smirnov replied no to both questions. ¶28. (S) When asked whether the Russian Federation had any concerns about paragraph 1, Ryzhkov replied that conforming would address their linguistic issues. Elliott then stated the use of "any of" in paragraph 2 of the U.S.-proposed text was not popular to the U.S. side because it allowed for "wildcard" procedures. Ryzhkov responded that the Russian side reserved the right to develop other procedures. He stated that during the life of the treaty advances in technology would allow for new procedures. Such procedures would have to be agreed upon in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) though. ¶29. (S) Elliott noted that technology would provide changes in "how" but not "what" procedures were completed. In that case, the U.S. side would still expect the agreed procedure to be accomplished at a minimum. Ryzhkov replied that the issue was not about less scope in the existing procedures but that the "wildcard" allowed for new procedures. He noted again that new procedures must be agreed upon in the BCC otherwise, they could not be used. Goodman astutely recommended the "wildcard" option be renamed the "Elliott Option." Ryzhkov and Smirnov gleefully agreed. Elliott then suggested it should be called the Elliot/Ryzhkov option to which Ryzhkov laughingly responded that he wanted to be left out of it. ¶30. (S) Elliott inquired if the Russian side had any thoughts on the U.S.-proposed paragraph 4 regarding when an item ceased to be subject to the provisions of the treaty. Ryzhkov stated the U.S.-proposed text was acceptable and he noted Russia was removing their proposed text at the end of U.S. paragraph 2. He noted "any of" should remain since the Russian side preferred the "wildcard" option. He reiterated that it should be applicable to elimination of all items. He also indicated that the U.S.-proposed text in paragraph 5 was acceptable. ¶31. (S) Regarding paragraph 6, which states the procedures for conversion, Ryzhkov said the U.S.-proposed text would not work in the Russian language. He stated the language problem could be solved once the definition of strategic offensive arms was finalized. Elliott noted no definition existed and Ryzhkov replied one was being worked. Elliott then proposed different phraseology but Ryzhkov indicated that text would not be acceptable either. Elliott explained that the option to convert a launch tube for other than arms must be retained to which Ryzhkov indicated his understanding; he recommended the discussion be tabled for the time being. ¶32. (S) Ryzhkov stated specific conversion procedures, subparagraphs 6(a),6(b),and 6(c) were acceptable. He asked why the United States chose not to incorporate Russian-proposed paragraph 6, referencing when an item was considered converted, in the U.S.-proposed paragraph 7. Essentially, the U.S. text did not account for the completion of procedures in paragraphs 5 or 6. Elliott indicated this was simply an oversight and that the U.S. side would add the additional text. Ryzhkov agreed to study the U.S.-proposed paragraph 7 again and if the Russian Federation agreed to that text Russian-proposed paragraphs 7 and 8 could be removed. ¶33. (S) Ryzhkov asked when a SLBM launcher would be considered converted. Elliott responded after inspection or upon expiration of the 30-day inspection period. Ryzhkov replied that additional text would be required in U.S.-proposed paragraph 7 to stipulate the actual date of conversion. Elliott agreed and indicated this text may need to be added to the heavy bomber section as well. Ryzhkov closed by asking the U.S. side to review paragraphs 1 and 3 and to search for a compromise. ¶34. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶35. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott Mr. Broshar Mr. Celusnak Mr. Coussa Mr. Dwyer Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett Mr. Pfister LT Sicks Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Voloskov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶36. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS