START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001146 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 2, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-085. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 2, 2009 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At a meeting of the Counting Rules Subgroup of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group chaired by Mr. Taylor and ADM Kuznetsov, discussion focused on locational re strictions and sub-limits on non-deployed items in Article IV. The Russian delegation asked questions about the U.S.-proposed limit on non-deployed launchers and the difference between locating and basing items. The Russian delegation also sought to understand the U.S. position on non-deployed heavy bombers. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Locate Versus Base for Deployed Items; Overall Non-Deployed Limit is Key for Counting Rules; We Have to Have 150 by When?; Moving Through the Sub-Limit Paragraphs of Article IV; What's a Non-Deployed Heavy Bomber?; What's an Item? What's a Movement? -------------- LOCATE VERSUS BASE FOR DEPLOYED ITEMS -------------- ¶5. (S) Taylor began the discussion at the Treaty Text Working Group meeting by introducing revised text for Article IV on locational and numerical limitations on certain items under the treaty. Taylor noted the first paragraph was intended to capture the Russian idea for including a paragraph in this Article about deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA),instead of just focusing on non-deployed items. Kuznetsov inquired about the use of "locate" for some items versus "base" for others. Taylor explained that in English, "locate" meant where something could be versus where it was housed or supported. Kuznetsov asked about the legal distinction between the terms "locate" and "base." Taylor observed, as a way of describing the terminology, that submarines could be "located" anywhere in the ocean but only "based" at a submarine base. Taylor added that "base" also worked for mobile ICBMs which had bases at which they were housed. Kuznetsov disagreed that ballistic missile launchers could be based, insisting that they were located at bases. ¶6. (S) Taylor asked Kuznetsov to explain the Russian delegation's concept behind its use of the terms. Kuznetsov exclaimed that it was not just a "concept" but the whole basis of what was being discussed in the treaty: "What we are counting is what is at bases." In the Russian view, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would be non-deployed, for instance. He read the following proposed text for the first paragraph of Article IV: "Each Party should locate deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs only at ICBM bases and submarine bases. Deployed heavy bombers shall only be based at airbases, unless agreed otherwise." ¶7. (S) Mr. Highsmith distinguished between "locating" deployed launchers of ICBMs and "basing" deployed launchers of SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. He pointed out that the definitions of "airbase" and "submarine base" used basing as a concept while the definition of "ICBM base" used location. Kuznetsov said it sounded ridiculous to say one based SLBM launchers anywhere, as they were an integral part of a submarine, which was what was "based." Dr. Fraley retorted that, if one said the launchers were located only at the base, they would have to stay behind when the submarine went on patrol. Kuznetsov laughed that he, too, had never seen an SLBM launcher outside a submarine. Taylor and Kuznetsov agreed to move on to another topic in Article IV. ¶8. (S) Later in the meeting the sides returned to this subject and tried a few more formulations out loud before the U.S. delegation committed to think about revised language for a future meeting. (Begin comment: A revised version of this Article, including proposed text for paragraph 1 and showing brackets to reflect the sides' positions, was sent to the Russian delegation that evening. End comment.) Begin text of revised Article IV: SFO-VII U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text December 3, 2009 Article IV ¶1. Each Party shall locate: (a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases; (b) deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile submarines. ¶2. Each Party shall base deployed heavy bombers only at air bases. ((3. Each Party shall limit: (a) the total number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, to no more than 150. (b) the number of non-deployed ICBMs at each ICBM base to no more than 5.))1 ((4))1 ((3.))2 Each Party shall locate: (a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, production facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities,((and))2 test ranges((, and space launch facilities))1. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases. (b) non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs only at ICBM bases, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities of ICBM bases, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training facilities, test ranges, ((space launch facilities,))1 and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. ((5.))1 ((4.))2 Non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no more than 30 days. ((6. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges to no more than 15.))1 ((7.))1 ((5.))2 Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges. ((8.))1 ((6.))2 Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. ((9. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 10. ¶10. Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers.))1 (( ))1 Proposed by the United States (( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation End text. -------------- OVERALL NON-DEPLOYED LIMIT IS KEY FOR COUNTING RULES -------------- ¶9. (S) Taylor turned to the next paragraph which dealt with the two U.S.-proposed sub-limits: 150 non-deployed launchers and five non-deployed ICBMs per ICBM base. He stated clearly that the treaty had to have a limit on the overall number of non-deployed limit for the United States to agree to the Russian concept of counting deployed and non-deployed items. (Begin comment: The Russian concept was that a missile and launcher would become deployed when the missile was in/on the launcher, but both would be non-deployed when separated. End comment.) Taylor noted that the sub-limit did not single out mobile ICBMs, but treated all SOA equally. When Kuznetsov asked why the United States had proposed five non-deployed ICBMs per base, Taylor explained it was to allow for maintenance issues. Kuznetsov further asked why there was not a limit on non-deployed SLBMs and Taylor responded that, for submarines in overhaul, for example, there would be a whole boatload of SLBMs. -------------- WE HAVE TO HAVE 150 BY WHEN? -------------- ¶10. Col Kamenskiy asked about the timing of the limit of 150 non-deployed launchers. Was it a limit at entry-into-force or after 7 years? Did the limit kick in the day after ratification? Taylor answered that the sides would be limited to 150 non-deployed launchers at the time of entry-into-force (EIF) of the treaty. Kamenskiy shook his head, saying that the Russian Federation had months earlier proposed a limit on non-deployed launchers after 7 years, but that proposal had been rejected by the United States. Kuznetsov followed with a question about whether the United States had calculated how many non-deployed launchers it would have. The United States, he offered, had three submarines that had been converted for SLCMs, which counted under START as deployed launchers. Kuznetsov said he did not know how many non-deployed SLBM launchers the Russian Federation had, but there would be more than 150, based on the number of items awaiting elimination. ¶11. (S) Taylor clarified that under the U.S. proposal, the SSGNs would not count under the START Follow-on treaty and that the United States had offered transparency measures to assure the Russian Federation that those submarines could not launch SLBMs. Kuznetsov reiterated that the Russian Federation could not live with a limit of 150 non-deployed launchers, as there were too many that would count until they were eliminated. "The number is too small for us. The number should reflect today's reality." ¶12. (S) The sides moved to the next paragraph on locations. Taylor pointed out the differences between the U.S. proposal and the previous Russian proposal for paragraph 4(a). The United States proposed to permit the inclusion of space launch facilities as an allowed location for non-deployed launchers and a prohibition on prototype mobile launchers of ICBMs at maintenance facilities and in paragraph 4(b),the inclusion of maintenance facilities as a location permitted for non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Kuznetsov noted the deletion of the phrase "mobile launchers of ICBMs" as the descriptor for the item being restricted and requested brackets around space launch facility. Kuznetsov indicated that the Russian delegation could agree to the prototype sentences in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b). -------------- MOVING THROUGH THE SUB-LIMIT PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE IV -------------- ¶13. (S) Taylor explained that the U.S. proposal limiting non-deployed ballistic missiles at test ranges to 15, was previous text that had appeared as a subparagraph and now stood on its own. Kuznetsov rebuffed the proposal by saying that the Russian delegation did not limit non-deployed items. Taylor used the opportunity to repeat that the overall non-deployed limit was a key element for the United States to drop its position on "considered to contain" for the definition of deployed launchers. The whole approach, he said, had been to limit ICBM and SLBM launchers in a non-deployed status. ¶14. (S) On paragraph 6, regarding a limit on test launchers at test ranges, Kuznetsov questioned the need for such a limit. "There are no other test launchers than those at test ranges. This is redundant." Kamenskiy added that under START, the rail-mobile missile system had test launchers that sometimes went to the test range; that was why this provision had been needed. Under START, those test launchers could go to the test range for 45 days before they had to go into non-deployed status. Kuznetsov cut off Kamenskiy's comments. ¶15. (S) Taylor pointed to the definition that said a test launcher was located at a test range. He asked what happened if such a launcher left the range. Without the paragraph under discussion, such a launcher could not be a test launcher. So the treaty needed to specify that test launchers could only be at test ranges. ¶16. (S) On the locational re striction for training launchers to be only at ICBM bases and test ranges, Kuznetsov insisted that the Russian Federation would not have mobile training launchers, but would train with operational launchers. Taylor reassured him that the U.S. delegation had heard the message that Russia would not have mobile training launchers and had, therefore, broadened the term to include all training launchers. Kuznetsov said the Russian side would think about it. Kuznetsov argued about the limit on one silo training launcher per base, theorizing about having 2 or 3 such launchers at a base. Was the United States afraid they would be converted into operational launchers? In START, he proclaimed, "we were afraid of everything." -------------- WHAT'S A NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBER? -------------- ¶17. (S) On the U.S. proposal to limit the number and basing location for test heavy bombers, Kuznetsov said the Russian delegation would think about the provision. Kuznetsov noted there was no provision on non-deployed heavy bombers, as the Russian delegation had proposed. Where should they be based? Kuznetsov said the Russian delegation could not understand the U.S. position on non-deployed heavy bombers. What was a non-deployed heavy bomber? What was a deployed heavy bomber? He expressed frustration that the United States kept saying that a deployed heavy bomber was a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. Taylor added "other than a test heavy bomber." ¶18. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the Russian side wanted to associate the bomber with its base. If a heavy bomber was located at a flight test center or a training facility it would be non-deployed. Lt Col Comeau asked whether the Russian side believed a non-deployed bomber was one equipped for non-nuclear armaments or one located at a production facility. Kuznetsov said that, in the Russian position, both of those would be non-deployed heavy bombers. Comeau pressed to know how both a nuclear-equipped and a non-nuclear equipped heavy bomber could be considered non-deployed. Kuznetsov argued that a heavy bomber awaiting elimination for 1 to 2 years had to be considered non-deployed. Taylor noted that the U.S. delegation had heard the Russian concerns. -------------- WHAT'S AN ITEM? WHAT'S A MOVEMENT? -------------- ¶19. (S) On paragraph 10 of the paper, dealing with a 30-day limit on the movement of items between declared facilities, Kuznetsov interjected with the questions: "What's an item? What's a movement?" Taylor reminded him that this provision had originally been a Russian proposal in Article VIII on notifications. When the TTDWG had discussed that Article, the sides had agreed to move the provision to Article IV. If the provision was not needed, it could certainly be dropped. Kuznetsov agreed to drop it. ¶20. (U) Documents provided: - U.S.: -- U.S. Working Paper, Article IV, dated December 2, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian; and -- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Article IV, dated December 2, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian. ¶21. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Taylor Lt Col Comeau Dr. Dreicer Dr. Fraley Mr. Highsmith Mrs. Zdravecky Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA ADM Kuznetsov Col Kamenskiy Ms. Melikbekian Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS