Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1141
2009-12-13 11:04:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #1141/01 3471104 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 131104Z DEC 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0610 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5741 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2920 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1930 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7137
S E C R E T GENEVA 001141
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T GENEVA 001141
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-079.
2. (U) Meeting Date: December 1, 2009
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group
meeting chaired by Mr. Elliott and Colonel Ryzhkov, the
Russian side presented options involving cutting holes into
the first stage motor case after the solid propellant had
been removed by burning. One option involved cutting a 10
centimeter hole in the first stage motor case which would
require verification by inspection, and the other option
involved cutting a hole large enough to be visible by
national technical means (NTM). The Russian side preferred
the second option since it did not involve on-site
inspection. The Russian side accepted the 60-day period for
verifying elimination of silo launchers by NTM. End Summary.
4. (U) Subject Summary: NTM to Verify Elimination of ICBMs
and SLBMs; NTM Means No Inspection Rights; Another Use for
Empty Launch Canisters; A Move on Mobile Launcher Elimination
Procedures; 60-Days: An Act of Russian Diplomacy; and Review
of Previously Provided SLBM Launcher CorE Procedures.
--------------
NTM TO VERIFY ELIMINATION
OF ICBMS AND SLBMS
--------------
5. (S) Col Ryzhkov began the meeting reminding the U.S. side
that in a telephone call the previous day, President Obama
and President Medvedev reiterated their intent to have a
treaty signed by December 5, 2009, after which he turned to
the discussion of Section II, Procedures for Elimination of
ICBMs and SLBMs. He indicated that the Russian side had
developed two options to aid in the verification of solid
propellant removal from first stage motor cases. Option one
involved removing the solid propellant from the motor cases
of all stages of a missile by burning and cutting a hole at
least 10 centimeters in diameter in the first stage motor
case. Option two involved removing the solid propellant from
the motor cases of all stages of a missile by burning and
cutting a hole in the first stage motor case that could be
verified by national technical means (NTM). Ryzhkov stated
option two required a hole approximately one meter in
diameter so that it would be visible to NTM. The appeal of
option two was that it would negate the need for on-site
inspection.
6. (S) Mr. Elliott remarked that the U.S. side had drawn
from the discussion at the previous day's meeting to develop
U.S.-proposed text that included similar language. Elliott
proceeded to review this draft text. Paragraph 1 relating to
the elimination of liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs matched
Russian-proposed text with the exception of the phrase, "such
that the ICBMs and SLBMs are rendered inoperable, precluding
their use as a ballistic missile." The phrase had been
removed since it was captured in paragraph 2 of the General
Provisions Section. Elliott noted that although paragraph 2
focused only on the removal of the propellant from the first
stage of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, it was understood that
fuel would be removed from all stages as they were
eliminated. Elliott noted the U.S.-proposed text for launch
canister elimination included cutting at least a 5.3 meter
segment from the body of the launch canister. This language
was included for two reasons: 1) the 5.3 meter cut
demonstrated that no missile could be contained in the
remains of the launch canister, and 2) this left a segment
sufficient in length to permit its use in construction as the
Russian side had suggested it intended to do.
7. (S) Ryzhkov noted that paragraph 4, which addressed
inspection rights when burning or washing was used to remove
the propellant from the motor stages, could be more clearly
stated using the following formulation: Solid-fueled ICBMs
and SLBMs shall not be removed until elimination is confirmed
by inspection or upon the expiration of the 30-day period
identified for this process. Elliott took note of the
suggestion and stated this formulation would be taken back
for study. In addition, Elliott noted the U.S.-proposed text
did not include detailed procedures for the notification of
elimination and the subsequent inspection, and would not
include detailed procedures for these notifications until the
sides had decided whether the batching technique would be
used for verification.
--------------
NTM MEANS NO INSPECTION RIGHTS
--------------
8. (S) Ryzhkov asked what Elliott thought about the Russian
proposal for verifying the elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs by
NTM. Ryzhkov believed that both the Russian-proposed concept
of cutting a large hole in the first stage motor case and the
U.S.-proposed concept of cutting the first stage motor case
after the propellant had been removed could be verified by
NTM and on-site inspection was not required. The Russian
side proposed the use of NTM since the quota for inspections
would be small. Elliott replied that there was little doubt
that cutting a one meter hole in the motor case was fatal;
however, the issue, when using NTM for verification, was that
a side could not accurately verify which missiles were being
eliminated. This could only be accomplished through
inspection and verification of unique identifiers (UIDs).
9. (S) Ryzhkov reminded the U.S. side that Russia could not
accept any procedures that encompassed using UIDs until the
U.S. side had accepted the Russian package deal.
Specifically the Russian side could not accept the
U.S.-proposed text to read and verify the data from the UID
on the first stage rocket motor and associated launch
canister. Elliott remarked that when the U.S. side presented
its package deal, the Russian side selected items from the
package at will and maybe this presented the same type of
situation. With a smile, Ryzhkov said it was his duty to
make that statement.
10. (S) Ryzhkov noted that the U.S. side had neglected to
add loading tubes to the paragraph that addressed the
elimination of launch canisters. He suggested that loading
tubes either be added or the paragraph deleted since the
launch canister was not a weapon and posed no threat to the
United States.
11. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that whatever elimination
procedures were decided upon for ICBMs and SLBMs, the Russian
side wanted to be able to conduct the procedures at the site
where the ICBM or SLBM was located. For instance, when
conducting static firing at the Perm' or Krasnoarmeysk burn
stands, Russia did not want to be obligated to return the
spent stages to Votkinsk for elimination; they wanted to
complete the elimination at the site where the static firing
took place. Elliott responded that the U.S. proposal took
this into account. Ryzhkov stated this should also pertain
to the elimination of launch canisters. When Russia
conducted a flight test at a test range, it did not want to
be obligated to return the launch canister to Votkinsk for
elimination, Russia wanted to complete the elimination
process at the test range.
--------------
ANOTHER USE FOR EMPTY LAUNCH CANISTERS
--------------
12. (S) Mr. Shevchenko asked whether there was a particular
reason the U.S. side was demanding elimination procedures
that limited launch canister use after elimination. Elliott
explained the United States proposed elimination procedures
for the launch canisters because without them, the United
States could not discriminate a loaded from an unloaded
launch canister. This would raise additional questions if
launch canisters were located at other than test facilities
where they were permitted. Shevchenko responded that the
launch canister by itself posed no threat since once loaded
it needed the power source from the launcher to run the
environmental systems the ICBM required for proper operation.
It was important that realistic elimination procedures for
launch canisters were agreed upon since Russia wished to use
the eliminated launch canisters for agricultural use.
Elliott agreed to take this request back to the U.S.
delegation.
-------------- ---
A MOVE ON MOBILE LAUNCHER ELIMINATION PROCEDURES
-------------- ---
13. (S) Ryzhkov provided the U.S. side with Russian-proposed
text for paragraph 4(a) of Section III, Procedures for
Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers: Removal of the
bunkers (equipment boxes),removal of the erector-launcher
mechanism, and destruction of its mountings in combination
with the cutting of the launcher leveling supports off of the
chassis. It was the opinion of the Russian side that these
procedures placed the chassis in the same condition it was in
after it had first left the production facility in Minsk.
Seeing that the Russian-proposed text reflected discussion
from the previous meeting, Elliott said he would incorporate
the text in the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text that was being
prepared.
--------------
60-DAYS: AN ACT OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY
--------------
14. (S) Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether the Russian side had
reconsidered the U.S. proposal for the 60-day period in which
to verify elimination through NTM. He stated that U.S.
experts stated the Russian-proposed 30-day time period would
be insufficient for U.S. verification. Ryzhkov stated that
as an act of Russian diplomacy, the Russian side accepted the
60-day period for verification by NTM for silo launchers of
ICBMs. This was the only situation in which the Russian side
would accept a 60-day period since the ICBM silo was not able
to be removed from the site once eliminated.
--------------
REVIEW OF PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED
SLBM LAUNCHER CORE PROCEDURES
--------------
15. (S) The Russian delegation reviewed its proposed
procedures for the conversion or elimination of SLBM
launchers of November 25, 2009. After listening to Mr.
Smirnov's review, Elliott questioned the difference between
the time an eliminated SLBM launcher ceased to be subject to
the treaty and the time when the submarine ceased to be
subject to the treaty. He stated that the phrase, "upon the
completion of its entire elimination," when referring to the
elimination of the submarine, led to confusion on what was
actually conducted during the entire elimination. Ryzhkov
explained that the entire elimination process was the
complete scrapping of the submarine. Elliott suggested that
alternative language be drafted to better describe the
process.
16. (U) Documents provided:
- U.S.:
-- U.S.-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section II,
Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, dated November
30, 2009.
- Russia:
-- Russian-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section II,
Paragraph 2(a) Procedures for Elimination of ICBM and SLBMs,
undated; and
-- Russian-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section III,
Paragraph 4(a) Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of
ICBM Launchers, no date.
17. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Hanchett
LTC LaGraffe
Mr. Pfister
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Voloskov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-079.
2. (U) Meeting Date: December 1, 2009
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group
meeting chaired by Mr. Elliott and Colonel Ryzhkov, the
Russian side presented options involving cutting holes into
the first stage motor case after the solid propellant had
been removed by burning. One option involved cutting a 10
centimeter hole in the first stage motor case which would
require verification by inspection, and the other option
involved cutting a hole large enough to be visible by
national technical means (NTM). The Russian side preferred
the second option since it did not involve on-site
inspection. The Russian side accepted the 60-day period for
verifying elimination of silo launchers by NTM. End Summary.
4. (U) Subject Summary: NTM to Verify Elimination of ICBMs
and SLBMs; NTM Means No Inspection Rights; Another Use for
Empty Launch Canisters; A Move on Mobile Launcher Elimination
Procedures; 60-Days: An Act of Russian Diplomacy; and Review
of Previously Provided SLBM Launcher CorE Procedures.
--------------
NTM TO VERIFY ELIMINATION
OF ICBMS AND SLBMS
--------------
5. (S) Col Ryzhkov began the meeting reminding the U.S. side
that in a telephone call the previous day, President Obama
and President Medvedev reiterated their intent to have a
treaty signed by December 5, 2009, after which he turned to
the discussion of Section II, Procedures for Elimination of
ICBMs and SLBMs. He indicated that the Russian side had
developed two options to aid in the verification of solid
propellant removal from first stage motor cases. Option one
involved removing the solid propellant from the motor cases
of all stages of a missile by burning and cutting a hole at
least 10 centimeters in diameter in the first stage motor
case. Option two involved removing the solid propellant from
the motor cases of all stages of a missile by burning and
cutting a hole in the first stage motor case that could be
verified by national technical means (NTM). Ryzhkov stated
option two required a hole approximately one meter in
diameter so that it would be visible to NTM. The appeal of
option two was that it would negate the need for on-site
inspection.
6. (S) Mr. Elliott remarked that the U.S. side had drawn
from the discussion at the previous day's meeting to develop
U.S.-proposed text that included similar language. Elliott
proceeded to review this draft text. Paragraph 1 relating to
the elimination of liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs matched
Russian-proposed text with the exception of the phrase, "such
that the ICBMs and SLBMs are rendered inoperable, precluding
their use as a ballistic missile." The phrase had been
removed since it was captured in paragraph 2 of the General
Provisions Section. Elliott noted that although paragraph 2
focused only on the removal of the propellant from the first
stage of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, it was understood that
fuel would be removed from all stages as they were
eliminated. Elliott noted the U.S.-proposed text for launch
canister elimination included cutting at least a 5.3 meter
segment from the body of the launch canister. This language
was included for two reasons: 1) the 5.3 meter cut
demonstrated that no missile could be contained in the
remains of the launch canister, and 2) this left a segment
sufficient in length to permit its use in construction as the
Russian side had suggested it intended to do.
7. (S) Ryzhkov noted that paragraph 4, which addressed
inspection rights when burning or washing was used to remove
the propellant from the motor stages, could be more clearly
stated using the following formulation: Solid-fueled ICBMs
and SLBMs shall not be removed until elimination is confirmed
by inspection or upon the expiration of the 30-day period
identified for this process. Elliott took note of the
suggestion and stated this formulation would be taken back
for study. In addition, Elliott noted the U.S.-proposed text
did not include detailed procedures for the notification of
elimination and the subsequent inspection, and would not
include detailed procedures for these notifications until the
sides had decided whether the batching technique would be
used for verification.
--------------
NTM MEANS NO INSPECTION RIGHTS
--------------
8. (S) Ryzhkov asked what Elliott thought about the Russian
proposal for verifying the elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs by
NTM. Ryzhkov believed that both the Russian-proposed concept
of cutting a large hole in the first stage motor case and the
U.S.-proposed concept of cutting the first stage motor case
after the propellant had been removed could be verified by
NTM and on-site inspection was not required. The Russian
side proposed the use of NTM since the quota for inspections
would be small. Elliott replied that there was little doubt
that cutting a one meter hole in the motor case was fatal;
however, the issue, when using NTM for verification, was that
a side could not accurately verify which missiles were being
eliminated. This could only be accomplished through
inspection and verification of unique identifiers (UIDs).
9. (S) Ryzhkov reminded the U.S. side that Russia could not
accept any procedures that encompassed using UIDs until the
U.S. side had accepted the Russian package deal.
Specifically the Russian side could not accept the
U.S.-proposed text to read and verify the data from the UID
on the first stage rocket motor and associated launch
canister. Elliott remarked that when the U.S. side presented
its package deal, the Russian side selected items from the
package at will and maybe this presented the same type of
situation. With a smile, Ryzhkov said it was his duty to
make that statement.
10. (S) Ryzhkov noted that the U.S. side had neglected to
add loading tubes to the paragraph that addressed the
elimination of launch canisters. He suggested that loading
tubes either be added or the paragraph deleted since the
launch canister was not a weapon and posed no threat to the
United States.
11. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that whatever elimination
procedures were decided upon for ICBMs and SLBMs, the Russian
side wanted to be able to conduct the procedures at the site
where the ICBM or SLBM was located. For instance, when
conducting static firing at the Perm' or Krasnoarmeysk burn
stands, Russia did not want to be obligated to return the
spent stages to Votkinsk for elimination; they wanted to
complete the elimination at the site where the static firing
took place. Elliott responded that the U.S. proposal took
this into account. Ryzhkov stated this should also pertain
to the elimination of launch canisters. When Russia
conducted a flight test at a test range, it did not want to
be obligated to return the launch canister to Votkinsk for
elimination, Russia wanted to complete the elimination
process at the test range.
--------------
ANOTHER USE FOR EMPTY LAUNCH CANISTERS
--------------
12. (S) Mr. Shevchenko asked whether there was a particular
reason the U.S. side was demanding elimination procedures
that limited launch canister use after elimination. Elliott
explained the United States proposed elimination procedures
for the launch canisters because without them, the United
States could not discriminate a loaded from an unloaded
launch canister. This would raise additional questions if
launch canisters were located at other than test facilities
where they were permitted. Shevchenko responded that the
launch canister by itself posed no threat since once loaded
it needed the power source from the launcher to run the
environmental systems the ICBM required for proper operation.
It was important that realistic elimination procedures for
launch canisters were agreed upon since Russia wished to use
the eliminated launch canisters for agricultural use.
Elliott agreed to take this request back to the U.S.
delegation.
-------------- ---
A MOVE ON MOBILE LAUNCHER ELIMINATION PROCEDURES
-------------- ---
13. (S) Ryzhkov provided the U.S. side with Russian-proposed
text for paragraph 4(a) of Section III, Procedures for
Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers: Removal of the
bunkers (equipment boxes),removal of the erector-launcher
mechanism, and destruction of its mountings in combination
with the cutting of the launcher leveling supports off of the
chassis. It was the opinion of the Russian side that these
procedures placed the chassis in the same condition it was in
after it had first left the production facility in Minsk.
Seeing that the Russian-proposed text reflected discussion
from the previous meeting, Elliott said he would incorporate
the text in the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text that was being
prepared.
--------------
60-DAYS: AN ACT OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY
--------------
14. (S) Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether the Russian side had
reconsidered the U.S. proposal for the 60-day period in which
to verify elimination through NTM. He stated that U.S.
experts stated the Russian-proposed 30-day time period would
be insufficient for U.S. verification. Ryzhkov stated that
as an act of Russian diplomacy, the Russian side accepted the
60-day period for verification by NTM for silo launchers of
ICBMs. This was the only situation in which the Russian side
would accept a 60-day period since the ICBM silo was not able
to be removed from the site once eliminated.
--------------
REVIEW OF PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED
SLBM LAUNCHER CORE PROCEDURES
--------------
15. (S) The Russian delegation reviewed its proposed
procedures for the conversion or elimination of SLBM
launchers of November 25, 2009. After listening to Mr.
Smirnov's review, Elliott questioned the difference between
the time an eliminated SLBM launcher ceased to be subject to
the treaty and the time when the submarine ceased to be
subject to the treaty. He stated that the phrase, "upon the
completion of its entire elimination," when referring to the
elimination of the submarine, led to confusion on what was
actually conducted during the entire elimination. Ryzhkov
explained that the entire elimination process was the
complete scrapping of the submarine. Elliott suggested that
alternative language be drafted to better describe the
process.
16. (U) Documents provided:
- U.S.:
-- U.S.-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section II,
Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, dated November
30, 2009.
- Russia:
-- Russian-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section II,
Paragraph 2(a) Procedures for Elimination of ICBM and SLBMs,
undated; and
-- Russian-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section III,
Paragraph 4(a) Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of
ICBM Launchers, no date.
17. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Hanchett
LTC LaGraffe
Mr. Pfister
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Voloskov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS