Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1140
2009-12-13 10:51:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1140/01 3471051
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131051Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0605
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5736
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2915
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1925
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7132
S E C R E T GENEVA 001140 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001140 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-078. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 1, 2009 Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The thirteenth meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group was held at the Russian Mission on December 1, ¶2009. The working group agreed that Type 1 and Type 2 inspections would be formally identified as such in Article XI of the treaty. The sides agreed that three sections within the Inspection Activities Protocol (now designated as Part Five of the Protocol) should be sent to the Conforming Group. Also, following a productive discussion, the sides reached near full agreement on Section V addressing general rules for inspection activities. Though items addressing some issues regarding heavy bombers, mobile ICBM recall and the number of inspectors on the inspection teams were left bracketed, the sides agreed that this section was ready for conforming. One issue left unresolved was the Russian position that none of the material in the third level (technical annexes) would be reviewed and agreed to prior to treaty signature. Dr. Warner urged the Russian delegation to have their leadership reconsider this position. End Summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article XI; Agreement on Part Five, Sections I, IX and X; General Rules For Inspection Activities; and Will Any Technical Annexes Be Agreed to by Treaty Signature. -------------- ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶5. (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting with a brief discussion on Article XI of the treaty, which described the types of inspections to be conducted. Col Petrov stated that his legal advisors had advocated that the article be written such that the subject of the inspection activities be clearly stated and include detailed descriptions of the items being inspe
cted. Warner replied that the U.S. legal team was leaning in the opposite direction in that the article should state only the inspection activities, their locations and their purposes. Additional details on what items were to be inspected would be provided in the protocol and annexes. However, Warner noted that both sides had agreed that "Type 1" and "Type 2" inspections would be formally identified as inspections of strategic offensive arms (SOA) at ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber bases and, inspections of SOA at other facilities, respectively. Petrov provided a new Russian-proposed JDT of Article XI. Warner stated that the U.S. side would submit a revised JDT of Article XI to the Russian side for consideration. -------------- AGREEMENT ON PART FIVE, SECTIONS I, IX AND X -------------- ¶6. (S) Warner turned the discussion to the U.S.-proposed JDT for Part Five, Section X, "Inspection Activity Reports." The delegations agreed on paragraphs 1, 3 and 4. In paragraph 2, the Russian side preferred that the language state that the inspection report include the "SOA subject to the Treaty" that was inspected. Warner replied that the United States advocated listing the specific items inspected because "SOA" was an undefined term. However, as Petrov had pointed out, he recognized that such a list would make the paragraph lengthy and cumbersome. Warner agreed to consult with the U.S. lawyers regarding the term "SOA." Once this was resolved, the section would be sent to the Conforming Group. ¶7. (S) Both sides agreed that Part Five, Section IX, "Cancellation of Inspection Activities," was ready for the Conforming Group. Minor changes were made in paragraphs 1 and 2; and the Russian side accepted U.S.-proposed paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. ¶8. (S) In Section I, "General Obligations," the sides agreed on paragraphs 1, 2 and 4. Regarding paragraph 3, on the non-disclosure of information gained at inspections, the sides agreed that this topic would be addressed in the treaty text itself and so could be deleted here. The sides agreed to leave paragraph 5, the Russian proposal to allow only one inspection at a time, bracketed. Lastly, the sides agreed that the title of Section I should be "General Provisions" rather than "General Obligations" and that this section would also go to conforming. -------------- GENERAL RULES FOR INSPECTION ACTIVITIES -------------- ¶9. (S) The discussion turned to Part 5, Section V, "General Rules for the Conduct of Inspection Activities." The sides agreed to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 19. The remaining paragraphs were addressed as discussed below. ¶10. (S) Paragraph 4 addressed the boundaries of the inspected facility and stated it shall be per Annex J. Warner stated that the U.S. proposal was that Annex J be broken apart and the information on site diagrams be placed into a separate annex, later identified as Section 4 of the Inspection Activities Annex. The remaining text would be placed into currently existing annexes. Ms. Kotkova noted that, at this time, neither side knew the context nor the organization of the annex the U.S. side was preparing. Therefore, referring to it was not meaningful. Warner replied that the U.S. side intended to have a few selected annexes completed prior to treaty signature and was focusing on those annexes. One of the annexes would address site diagrams. Kotkova stated that because the organization and sections of this proposed JDT were not yet agreed upon, referencing specific sections or subsections was unwise. Kotkova suggested this paragraph instead refer to the "Inspection Activities Annex to this Protocol." Warner agreed, subject to the concurrence of both sides' lawyers. ¶11. (S) In paragraph 6, Petrov requested adding a sentence at the end to read, "The in-country escort shall provide to the inspectors at the inspection site sufficient lighting necessary to carry out the procedures provided for in this Part." Warner noted that this text had previously been moved down to the third tier but agreed to relocate it here. ¶12. (S) In paragraph 7, the sides agreed on the unbracketed text. Warner noted that the bracketed text should remain so because it addressed mobile ICBMs in relation to the 24-hour recall provision. Petrov concurred. Paragraph 8 addressing the inspectors' right to use specified equipment was fully agreed upon after Petrov concurred with removing the brackets around the phrase that allowed for cameras to be used by only the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. ¶13. (S) With the exception of one subparagraph, agreement was reached on paragraph 10 (items of inspection) after the U.S. side agreed to delete the reference to support equipment. Warner stated that subparagraph 10(a)(ii) addressed heavy bombers and consequently should be deferred pending progress on some of the heavy bomber issues. ¶14. (S) Warner declared that the U.S. side had completely revised paragraph 11. It stated that the size criteria for inspections shall be an "imaginary cylinder" that was 97 percent of the diameter and length of the Party's smallest first stage of an ICBM or SLBM listed in the database. Petrov disagreed with this approach and proposed two alternative options for size criteria: (1) 97 percent of the diameter and length of the smallest of the ICBM or SLBM type or mobile launcher declared at the facility; or (2) 97 percent of the diameter and length of the smallest first stage of an ICBM or SLBM which was maintained, stored, or transported in stages of the smallest ICBM or SLBM which is maintained, stored and transported in launch canisters declared for that facility. Warner requested the Russian side submit this proposal in writing and Petrov agreed. Likewise, subparagraph (b),addressing heavy bomber nuclear weapon storage areas, remained bracketed for the reason stated by Warner in paragraph 13 above. ¶15. (S) Paragraph 13 addressed the size of the inspection teams. Warner stated that he appreciated that the Russian side had agreed to no more that ten inspectors for Type 1 inspections and exhibitions. The U.S. side had seriously considered the Russian explanation that the inspectable area of Plesetsk would be reduced and had taken the anticipated changes at that site into account for Type 2 inspections. However, Warner pointed out another issue of concern. Specifically, when a notification was sent regarding the intention of a Party to conduct an inspection, the inspection type was not given until the inspection team arrived at the point of entry. If the notice stated a number of inspectors less than 10, the Party essentially "telegraphed" the inspection type that was to be declared several hours later. Therefore, unless the Russian side agreed to 10 inspectors for all types of inspection activities, the phrase would remain bracketed. After some discussion within the Russian delegation, Petrov stated that the proposed Russian maximum of seven inspectors should remain in "soft" brackets indicating that the Russian side was seriously considering changing its position on this matter. ¶16. (S) The sides agreed to Paragraph 16 after "deployed warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs" was changed to "warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs" and the last sentence of subparagraph (a) was clarified to state that the inspection of non-deployed items will be completed within 24 hours after the completion of the associated warhead inspection. The U.S.-proposed paragraph 18 on sequential inspections remained bracketed. ¶17. (S) Warner concluded the discussion on Section V by stating that it was ready for the Conforming Group. He noted regarding paragraph 11, the U.S. side would provide revised text stating that size criteria would be used but that the specific technical information on these criteria would be provided in the Inspection Activities Annex. -------------- WILL ANY TECHNICAL ANNEXES BE AGREED TO BY TREATY SIGNATURE -------------- ¶18. (S) For the next meeting, Warner suggested the sides review Annex 7 which addressed the procedures for the inspection of covered objects, containers and launch canisters. Petrov stated that the Russian position was that no technical annexes would be considered prior to treaty signature. Warner replied that selected portions of the third level needed to be completed prior to this event and that Ambassador Antonov had agreed explicitly with Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller to do so. He stated that the United States proposed completing only a select few annexes which were very important and must be agreed upon before treaty signature. Warner pointed out that the sides had made tremendous progress in the last few days and he believed that the Inspection Activities Part of the Protocol may be finished by the end of this week. That would still leave time for the delegations to achieve agreement on those important annexes. He stated that the policy of not discussing any of the technical annexes before treaty signature was unacceptable to the U.S. side. Warner suggested that Petrov consult with Antonov and Petrov indicated he would. ¶19. (U) Documents provided: - Russia: -- Russian-Proposed JDT of Article XI, dated December 1, 2009 (Russian and unofficial English). ¶20. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Buttrick Maj Johnson LTC Leyde Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. Shkeyrov (Int.) RUSSIA Col Petrov Mr. Izrazov Ms. Kotkova Ms. Vodopolova Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶21. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS

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