START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001139 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 2009 REF: GENEVA 1125 (SFO-GVA-VII-059) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-073. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The eighth meeting of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group during Session VII was held at the Russian Mission on November 30, 2009. The two sides briefly reviewed the status of CorE documents currently in the conforming process in addition to specific sections that were returned by the Conforming Group. Mr. Elliott began the discussion of the mobile launcher of ICBM "tagging concept" presented by Colonel Ryzhkov during the previous meeting (Reftel). Requests for clarification from both sides pushed this discussion into the possible placement and use of UIDs on all launchers and missiles. The proper time allotment for use of national technical means (NTM) was also discussed. ¶4. (S) Elliott raised the issue of elimination procedures for mobile launchers of ICBMs. He noted some inconsistencies and changes in the Russian position and reiterated the need for detailed procedures for elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs. The Russian side argued there was no need for increased specificity in the procedures, but they did agree to propose new text to address the U.S. concern. The use of "wildcard procedures" was also briefly discussed. ¶5. (S) Ryzhkov stated the Russian side had not reviewed the latest U.S. proposal on the elimination of ICBMs. Elliott provided an overview of the U.S.-proposed text again and then attempted to illustrate the need for a meaningful right to inspect with respect to inspection quotas and batch elimination. The Russian side argued the difficulty of batch elimination and argued for the use of 'statistical sampling' for confidence building. End Summary. 
¶6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Sections in Conforming; Tagging and Unique Identifiers; Elimination Procedures for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs; Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs; and Right to Inspect. -------------- SECTIONS IN CONFORMING -------------- ¶7. (S) Ryzhkov began the discussion by stating that the U.S.-proposed language in Section 5 (Conversion and Elimination of Heavy Bombers) was acceptable. Elliott stated that Section 5, in addition to Section 6 (Other Means for Removal from Accountability) and Section 7 (Procedures for Elimination of Facilities),were agreed and either had been or would be sent to conforming. Mr. Smirnov indicated that Section 7 had been returned by conforming and that brackets remained. Elliott confirmed there were brackets but stated they were such that the United States was responsible for clearing them. He said the personnel required to provide clearance on those brackets would work on them soon. -------------- TAGGING AND UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS -------------- ¶8. (S) Elliott proposed the two sides discuss mobile launchers of ICBMs. He said the United States had studied the Russian proposal delivered to the U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD) on November 28, 2009, which focused on elimination procedures, in addition to information provided by Ryzhkov in the previous meeting (Reftel). Elliott asked for clarification on the Russian mobile launcher tagging concept. He stated that agreement on procedures for affixing the tags would likely allow the United States to move away from their requirement to observe the final elimination procedure. Elliott noted that there was no detail in the proposal regarding the tags, and he assumed that the working group would be responsible for determining specific implementation details acceptable to both sides. Elliott shifted the discussion to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs noting that such procedures would likely be used for all missiles and launchers in the future. He stated that a UID would be assigned to all new systems, and for existing systems a UID would be assigned to them as well. The UIDs would then serve as the verification mechanism for the life of the missile or launcher. Therefore, Elliott stated, the UIDs would be reported in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in addition to all notifications, from birth through death of a system. ¶9. (S) Ryzhkov asked whether Elliott was referring to missiles or launchers. Elliott replied that, in the latest Russian proposal, Russia agreed to place UIDs on all missiles. He opined that it would be logical to use the same concept for mobile launchers and heavy bombers. Ryzhkov stated he was not aware the United States had agreed to place UIDs on all missiles. Elliott confirmed the U.S. agreement. Ryzhkov explained that the Russian proposal for tagging eliminated launchers was quite different than the proposed use of UIDs on missiles and launchers. He stated that no metal tags were used on launch canisters or first stage motor cases under START; only paint was used. He then provided examples of a tag that could include the serial number of the chassis for mobile launchers of ICBMs. ¶10. (S) Elliott stated that the exact method for affixing the tag was of no concern at this time. He expressed the need for both sides to assign UIDs to all existing systems which would provide the starting point for creation of an accounting system both sides could understand and use. Elliott then illustrated the symmetry of the process by indicating silos had a location known to each side. Bombers had tail numbers (or names in Russian),and submarines had hull numbers that were large enough to be known. He stated ICBMs and SLBMs would soon have an UID and that mobile launchers would be the only item without an UID if this concept was not implemented. He then stated that the numbering system used would be determined by the possessing Party. The only requirements for the number were that the number be unique and that it be reported in the MOU and notifications. ¶11. (S) Ryzhkov stated that he understood the U.S. position but that the Russian side had not considered the concept of placing UIDs on missile launchers for the complete life cycle. They had only proffered the placing of UIDs on mobile launchers of ICBMs at time of elimination, and he did not have authority at that time to agree to anything further. He opined, however, that if the United States proposed this, UIDs should indeed be placed on all missiles. The Russian side did not have any interest in doing so because they felt the countries' relations were at a stage where a notification would suffice for accountability. ¶12. (S) Elliott indicated he was confused by Ryzhkov's comments as this concept was proposed by the Russian side. After receiving confirmation from Ryzhkov that the latest Russian proposal included such provisions, Elliott clarified that his intention was simply to account for the need for UIDs on both missiles and launchers. He stated that in addition to the right of inspection it was a necessity for the U.S. side to relax its requirement to view the final elimination procedure. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that verification procedures should be simple and not burdensome. He stated the right to inspect would provide confidence that the elimination was conducted properly. Information exchange, however, was to be the main method of verification through status notifications. Ryzhkov noted that the Russian side had been attempting to move closer to the U.S. position through the last few steps. He said he would report the U.S. proposal to the Russian delegation but stated the brackets should remain in the text at this time. ¶14. (S) Elliott agreed to provide a new proposed text which would incorporate changes from the latest Russian proposal and would use as much existing text as possible while retaining brackets where applicable. Ryzhkov reminded Elliott that the NTM windows should remain bracketed even though 60 days was used in the Russian package proposal as items could not be accepted a la carte. -------------- ELIMINATION PROCEDURES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS -------------- ¶15. (S) The two sides reviewed the procedures for elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs. Elliott stated that there were originally three steps required for elimination, all of which were very similar to START. He stated that the Russian side originally accepted the requirement to cut off the aft 0.78m of the launcher but Russia wanted to retain the leveling jacks. However, in the past few weeks they have reversed their position and agreed to cut off the leveling jacks. Now, the Russian side was proposing installing new jacks so the vehicle could be used for other purposes. Elliott stated that the eliminated launcher with leveling jacks was of concern to the United States. ¶16. (S) Ryzhkov replied that the Russian side had originally decided not to remove the leveling supports because the proper balance could not be maintained if the chassis was converted to be used as a crane. After consulting their engineers it was determined that, for stability reasons, they would need to replace the leveling supports to allow for increased width of the stance. Ryzhkov clarified that this was only the case when mobile launchers for ICBMs were converted to civilian use. The current Russian position was simply to remove the jacks. ¶17. (S) Elliott explained that a problem arose as the U.S. side attempted to provide latitude for future use of the chassis of the eliminated launcher. He referenced Section I (General Provisions) which stated elimination must preclude use of an item for its original purpose. He then indicated removal of the jacks, and installation of new ones, did not preclude the launcher from being used for its original purpose. He stated that removing the aft 0.78m would ensure the launcher could no longer launch a missile. ¶18. (S) Ryzhkov then asked whether a chassis exiting the Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant in Belarus differed from an eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs chassis without equipment boxes, erector-launcher mechanism, and jacks. He stated that even though a chassis with no equipment boxes, erector-launcher mechanism, and jacks would be similar to a new chassis leaving the Minsk plant, for the chassis to be returned for use as a mobile launcher required returning that chassis to the Barrikady Plant in Volgograd, Russia, for installation of equipment boxes and leveling jacks. ¶19. (S) Elliott recommended the Russian side provide more detail regarding what would be removed from the chassis during the elimination process. He specifically referenced environmental control equipment and said it would be beneficial if the elimination procedures for mobile launchers of ICBMs included removal of leveling jacks, erector-launcher mechanism, mounting bracket, and specific equipment boxes. In essence, Elliott recommended the Russian side add more specificity in the procedure to ensure verification could be accomplished but to allow the vehicle to be used for other purposes. Ryzhkov asked, frustratingly, whether Elliott believed the Russian side would cheat. Elliott responded that it was a matter of verification and not cheating. ¶20. (S) Elliott pointed out that the current issue involving the use of an eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs was very similar to conversion. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that the Russian side desired to have the right to inspect converted heavy bombers in the future. Elliott went on to say the U.S. side was not proposing follow-on inspections for eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs. ¶21. (S) Mr. Shevchenko then asked whether the United States believed vehicles received by the Russian side from Belarus were launchers, at which time Elliott responded "no." Shevchenko stated that the elimination procedure ensured the launcher was in the same configuration as when it left the Minsk plant and that the tag would ensure verification of elimination. ¶22. (S) Elliott clarified that he simply recommended adding more detail in the procedure. He said that doing so could allow the United States to back away from the current U.S. position that the aft 0.78m be removed. He recommended writing "cut strongback, remove bunkers, destroy mounting bracket, and cut the erector mechanism in half." (Begin comment: The Russian term "bunkers" refers to missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments. End comment.) Shevchenko asked if the erector could be cut in more than two pieces. Elliott replied that would be fine. ¶23. (S) Elliott raised a concern regarding inclusion of "wildcard procedures" for mobile launchers of ICBMs. He stated that while it was useful for some launchers, mainly silo launchers of ICBMs, the use here created uncertainty. He also asked the Russian side to provide new text to address that concern. ¶24. (S) Ryzhkov agreed to provide new language for elimination procedures that would add more detail about the process. Regarding the "wildcard procedures," he opined that it should be included for elimination of all items to provide flexibility. Elliott replied that doing so could bring arguments in the BCC lasting the full life of the treaty. Ryzhkov stated that in the case of disagreement the proposed procedure would not be used. Instead, the established procedure (i.e., remove erector-launcher mechanism, etc.) would be used. He believed that keeping the wildcard option for all items would be neutral and provide consistency. Elliott agreed they would be applied equally but expressed concern about the "wildcard procedures" in general. -------------- ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS -------------- ¶25. (S) The two sides moved to a discussion of Section II (Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs). Elliott referred to his proposal from the previous meeting regarding elimination of solid-fueled missiles that were burned out. He stated there was agreement that if a rocket motor was destroyed by explosion no other procedures were required. There was also agreement in the case of rocket motors where propellant was washed out. In that situation, the rocket motor case must be destroyed by crushing, cutting or other similar methods. He stated that the main point of contention regarded rocket motors where the propellant was burned. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov of the U.S. proposal to cut holes in the rocket motor cases after the burn process was complete. ¶26. (S) Ryzhkov stated the Russian side was still reviewing the proposal and he could not comment at this time. He opined, however, that this step would be redundant. Elliott replied that the U.S. side would create new proposed text and provide it to the Russian side prior to the next working group meeting. -------------- RIGHT TO INSPECT -------------- ¶27. (S) Elliott acknowledged that there was no agreement yet regarding inspections. However, he noted the Russian side wrote the right to inspect in its proposal. To ensure that right could be properly exercised, the text should be written to facilitate inspection of eliminations in batches. He stated some felt the current inspection quota was too re strictive. Batch elimination inspections could be one way to address the concerns of both sides and make the right to inspect truly meaningful. Elliott agreed to provide new text to address this issue. ¶28. (S) Ryzhkov argued that batch elimination did not necessarily suit Russian needs in all cases. In the event the Russian side needed to eliminate only one item, that item must remain in place until other eliminations and the corresponding U.S. inspection occurred. He stated that "sampling" was the proper way ahead in this case as it would provide confidence building. It would also remove the requirement for an inspection in the case only one item was eliminated. He opined that was why the Russian side was so strict on the inspection quota. ¶29. (S) Elliott countered that the sampling size would need to be significantly larger in the case of the Russian side since they were eliminating more items than the U.S. side. Furthermore, elimination in a batch would allow for sampling in groups, thus providing a more accurate and statistically valid sample. Elliott stated that a larger inspection quota would also be an option but that it would require more trips. He opined that the Inspection Protocol Working Group would debate this issue. ¶30. (S) Ryzhkov asserted that this issue must be resolved for progress to occur. He stated that the new treaty must embrace the concept of sampling. Inspecting elimination of all items, as under START, was not an option. He attempted to justify his point by commenting on the Russian side's right to verify conversions conducted by the U.S. side. He said that a small inspection quota ensured the inspections were chosen wisely. Since reconversion would require an item be at a plant or shipyard for a significant amount of time, he stated, inspections would not usually be used to verify that a reconversion had not occurred. ¶31. (S) The meeting closed with Elliott reiterating the concept of group sampling in response to a question by Shevchenko. Elliott again agreed to provide new text to further explain the U.S. position. Ryzhkov closed by asking Elliott to remember the current inspection quota of 16 as he wrote the new text. ¶32. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶33. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott Mr. Broshar Mr. Celusnak Mr. Coussa Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett LT Sicks Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Voloskov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶34. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS