START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1125 (SFO-GVA-VII-059)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-073.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The eighth meeting of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group during Session VII was held at the
Russian Mission on November 30, 2009. The two sides briefly
reviewed the status of CorE documents currently in the
conforming process in addition to specific sections that were
returned by the Conforming Group. Mr. Elliott began the
discussion of the mobile launcher of ICBM "tagging concept"
presented by Colonel Ryzhkov during the previous meeting
(Reftel). Requests for clarification from both sides pushed
this discussion into the possible placement and use of UIDs
on all launchers and missiles. The proper time allotment for
use of national technical means (NTM) was also discussed.


4. (S) Elliott raised the issue of elimination procedures
for mobile launchers of ICBMs. He noted some inconsistencies
and changes in the Russian position and reiterated the need
for detailed procedures for elimination of mobile launchers
of ICBMs. The Russian side argued there was no need for
increased specificity in the procedures, but they did agree
to propose new text to address the U.S. concern. The use of
"wildcard procedures" was also briefly discussed.


5. (S) Ryzhkov stated the Russian side had not reviewed the
latest U.S. proposal on the elimination of ICBMs. Elliott
provided an overview of the U.S.-proposed text again and then
attempted to illustrate the need for a meaningful right to
inspect with respect to inspection quotas and batch
elimination. The Russian side argued the difficulty of batch
elimination and argued for the use of 'statistical sampling'
for confidence building. End Summary.


6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Sections in Conforming; Tagging and
Unique Identifiers; Elimination Procedures for Mobile
Launchers of ICBMs; Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs; and Right
to Inspect.

--------------
SECTIONS IN CONFORMING
--------------


7. (S) Ryzhkov began the discussion by stating that the
U.S.-proposed language in Section 5 (Conversion and
Elimination of Heavy Bombers) was acceptable. Elliott stated
that Section 5, in addition to Section 6 (Other Means for
Removal from Accountability) and Section 7 (Procedures for
Elimination of Facilities),were agreed and either had been
or would be sent to conforming. Mr. Smirnov indicated that
Section 7 had been returned by conforming and that brackets


remained. Elliott confirmed there were brackets but stated
they were such that the United States was responsible for
clearing them. He said the personnel required to provide
clearance on those brackets would work on them soon.

--------------
TAGGING AND UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS
--------------


8. (S) Elliott proposed the two sides discuss mobile
launchers of ICBMs. He said the United States had studied
the Russian proposal delivered to the U.S. Head of Delegation
(HOD) on November 28, 2009, which focused on elimination
procedures, in addition to information provided by Ryzhkov in
the previous meeting (Reftel). Elliott asked for
clarification on the Russian mobile launcher tagging concept.
He stated that agreement on procedures for affixing the tags
would likely allow the United States to move away from their
requirement to observe the final elimination procedure.
Elliott noted that there was no detail in the proposal
regarding the tags, and he assumed that the working group
would be responsible for determining specific implementation
details acceptable to both sides. Elliott shifted the
discussion to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs noting that
such procedures would likely be used for all missiles and
launchers in the future. He stated that a UID would be
assigned to all new systems, and for existing systems a UID
would be assigned to them as well. The UIDs would then serve
as the verification mechanism for the life of the missile or
launcher. Therefore, Elliott stated, the UIDs would be
reported in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in addition
to all notifications, from birth through death of a system.


9. (S) Ryzhkov asked whether Elliott was referring to
missiles or launchers. Elliott replied that, in the latest
Russian proposal, Russia agreed to place UIDs on all
missiles. He opined that it would be logical to use the same
concept for mobile launchers and heavy bombers. Ryzhkov
stated he was not aware the United States had agreed to place
UIDs on all missiles. Elliott confirmed the U.S. agreement.
Ryzhkov explained that the Russian proposal for tagging
eliminated launchers was quite different than the proposed
use of UIDs on missiles and launchers. He stated that no
metal tags were used on launch canisters or first stage motor
cases under START; only paint was used. He then provided
examples of a tag that could include the serial number of the
chassis for mobile launchers of ICBMs.


10. (S) Elliott stated that the exact method for affixing
the tag was of no concern at this time. He expressed the
need for both sides to assign UIDs to all existing systems
which would provide the starting point for creation of an
accounting system both sides could understand and use.
Elliott then illustrated the symmetry of the process by
indicating silos had a location known to each side. Bombers
had tail numbers (or names in Russian),and submarines had
hull numbers that were large enough to be known. He stated
ICBMs and SLBMs would soon have an UID and that mobile
launchers would be the only item without an UID if this
concept was not implemented. He then stated that the
numbering system used would be determined by the possessing
Party. The only requirements for the number were that the
number be unique and that it be reported in the MOU and



notifications.


11. (S) Ryzhkov stated that he understood the U.S. position
but that the Russian side had not considered the concept of
placing UIDs on missile launchers for the complete life
cycle. They had only proffered the placing of UIDs on mobile
launchers of ICBMs at time of elimination, and he did not
have authority at that time to agree to anything further. He
opined, however, that if the United States proposed this,
UIDs should indeed be placed on all missiles. The Russian
side did not have any interest in doing so because they felt
the countries' relations were at a stage where a notification
would suffice for accountability.


12. (S) Elliott indicated he was confused by Ryzhkov's
comments as this concept was proposed by the Russian side.
After receiving confirmation from Ryzhkov that the latest
Russian proposal included such provisions, Elliott clarified
that his intention was simply to account for the need for
UIDs on both missiles and launchers. He stated that in
addition to the right of inspection it was a necessity for
the U.S. side to relax its requirement to view the final
elimination procedure.


13. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that verification procedures
should be simple and not burdensome. He stated the right to
inspect would provide confidence that the elimination was
conducted properly. Information exchange, however, was to be
the main method of verification through status notifications.
Ryzhkov noted that the Russian side had been attempting to
move closer to the U.S. position through the last few steps.
He said he would report the U.S. proposal to the Russian
delegation but stated the brackets should remain in the text
at this time.


14. (S) Elliott agreed to provide a new proposed text which
would incorporate changes from the latest Russian proposal
and would use as much existing text as possible while
retaining brackets where applicable. Ryzhkov reminded
Elliott that the NTM windows should remain bracketed even
though 60 days was used in the Russian package proposal as
items could not be accepted a la carte.

--------------
ELIMINATION PROCEDURES FOR
MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
--------------


15. (S) The two sides reviewed the procedures for
elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs. Elliott stated
that there were originally three steps required for
elimination, all of which were very similar to START. He
stated that the Russian side originally accepted the
requirement to cut off the aft 0.78m of the launcher but
Russia wanted to retain the leveling jacks. However, in the
past few weeks they have reversed their position and agreed
to cut off the leveling jacks. Now, the Russian side was
proposing installing new jacks so the vehicle could be used
for other purposes. Elliott stated that the eliminated
launcher with leveling jacks was of concern to the United
States.


16. (S) Ryzhkov replied that the Russian side had originally



decided not to remove the leveling supports because the
proper balance could not be maintained if the chassis was
converted to be used as a crane. After consulting their
engineers it was determined that, for stability reasons, they
would need to replace the leveling supports to allow for
increased width of the stance. Ryzhkov clarified that this
was only the case when mobile launchers for ICBMs were
converted to civilian use. The current Russian position was
simply to remove the jacks.


17. (S) Elliott explained that a problem arose as the U.S.
side attempted to provide latitude for future use of the
chassis of the eliminated launcher. He referenced Section I
(General Provisions) which stated elimination must preclude
use of an item for its original purpose. He then indicated
removal of the jacks, and installation of new ones, did not
preclude the launcher from being used for its original
purpose. He stated that removing the aft 0.78m would ensure
the launcher could no longer launch a missile.


18. (S) Ryzhkov then asked whether a chassis exiting the
Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant in Belarus differed from an
eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs chassis without equipment
boxes, erector-launcher mechanism, and jacks. He stated that
even though a chassis with no equipment boxes,
erector-launcher mechanism, and jacks would be similar to a
new chassis leaving the Minsk plant, for the chassis to be
returned for use as a mobile launcher required returning that
chassis to the Barrikady Plant in Volgograd, Russia, for
installation of equipment boxes and leveling jacks.


19. (S) Elliott recommended the Russian side provide more
detail regarding what would be removed from the chassis
during the elimination process. He specifically referenced
environmental control equipment and said it would be
beneficial if the elimination procedures for mobile launchers
of ICBMs included removal of leveling jacks, erector-launcher
mechanism, mounting bracket, and specific equipment boxes.
In essence, Elliott recommended the Russian side add more
specificity in the procedure to ensure verification could be
accomplished but to allow the vehicle to be used for other
purposes. Ryzhkov asked, frustratingly, whether Elliott
believed the Russian side would cheat. Elliott responded
that it was a matter of verification and not cheating.


20. (S) Elliott pointed out that the current issue involving
the use of an eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs was very
similar to conversion. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that the
Russian side desired to have the right to inspect converted
heavy bombers in the future. Elliott went on to say the U.S.
side was not proposing follow-on inspections for eliminated
mobile launchers of ICBMs.


21. (S) Mr. Shevchenko then asked whether the United States
believed vehicles received by the Russian side from Belarus
were launchers, at which time Elliott responded "no."
Shevchenko stated that the elimination procedure ensured the
launcher was in the same configuration as when it left the
Minsk plant and that the tag would ensure verification of
elimination.


22. (S) Elliott clarified that he simply recommended adding
more detail in the procedure. He said that doing so could


allow the United States to back away from the current U.S.
position that the aft 0.78m be removed. He recommended
writing "cut strongback, remove bunkers, destroy mounting
bracket, and cut the erector mechanism in half." (Begin
comment: The Russian term "bunkers" refers to missile launch
support equipment, including external instrumentation
compartments. End comment.) Shevchenko asked if the erector
could be cut in more than two pieces. Elliott replied that
would be fine.


23. (S) Elliott raised a concern regarding inclusion of
"wildcard procedures" for mobile launchers of ICBMs. He
stated that while it was useful for some launchers, mainly
silo launchers of ICBMs, the use here created uncertainty.
He also asked the Russian side to provide new text to address
that concern.


24. (S) Ryzhkov agreed to provide new language for
elimination procedures that would add more detail about the
process. Regarding the "wildcard procedures," he opined that
it should be included for elimination of all items to provide
flexibility. Elliott replied that doing so could bring
arguments in the BCC lasting the full life of the treaty.
Ryzhkov stated that in the case of disagreement the proposed
procedure would not be used. Instead, the established
procedure (i.e., remove erector-launcher mechanism, etc.)
would be used. He believed that keeping the wildcard option
for all items would be neutral and provide consistency.
Elliott agreed they would be applied equally but expressed
concern about the "wildcard procedures" in general.

--------------
ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS
--------------


25. (S) The two sides moved to a discussion of Section II
(Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs). Elliott referred to his
proposal from the previous meeting regarding elimination of
solid-fueled missiles that were burned out. He stated there
was agreement that if a rocket motor was destroyed by
explosion no other procedures were required. There was also
agreement in the case of rocket motors where propellant was
washed out. In that situation, the rocket motor case must be
destroyed by crushing, cutting or other similar methods. He
stated that the main point of contention regarded rocket
motors where the propellant was burned. Elliott reminded
Ryzhkov of the U.S. proposal to cut holes in the rocket motor
cases after the burn process was complete.


26. (S) Ryzhkov stated the Russian side was still reviewing
the proposal and he could not comment at this time. He
opined, however, that this step would be redundant. Elliott
replied that the U.S. side would create new proposed text and
provide it to the Russian side prior to the next working
group meeting.

--------------
RIGHT TO INSPECT
--------------


27. (S) Elliott acknowledged that there was no agreement yet
regarding inspections. However, he noted the Russian side
wrote the right to inspect in its proposal. To ensure that



right could be properly exercised, the text should be written
to facilitate inspection of eliminations in batches. He
stated some felt the current inspection quota was too re
strictive. Batch elimination inspections could be one way to
address the concerns of both sides and make the right to
inspect truly meaningful. Elliott agreed to provide new text
to address this issue.


28. (S) Ryzhkov argued that batch elimination did not
necessarily suit Russian needs in all cases. In the event
the Russian side needed to eliminate only one item, that item
must remain in place until other eliminations and the
corresponding U.S. inspection occurred. He stated that
"sampling" was the proper way ahead in this case as it would
provide confidence building. It would also remove the
requirement for an inspection in the case only one item was
eliminated. He opined that was why the Russian side was so
strict on the inspection quota.


29. (S) Elliott countered that the sampling size would need
to be significantly larger in the case of the Russian side
since they were eliminating more items than the U.S. side.
Furthermore, elimination in a batch would allow for sampling
in groups, thus providing a more accurate and statistically
valid sample. Elliott stated that a larger inspection quota
would also be an option but that it would require more trips.
He opined that the Inspection Protocol Working Group would
debate this issue.


30. (S) Ryzhkov asserted that this issue must be resolved
for progress to occur. He stated that the new treaty must
embrace the concept of sampling. Inspecting elimination of
all items, as under START, was not an option. He attempted
to justify his point by commenting on the Russian side's
right to verify conversions conducted by the U.S. side. He
said that a small inspection quota ensured the inspections
were chosen wisely. Since reconversion would require an item
be at a plant or shipyard for a significant amount of time,
he stated, inspections would not usually be used to verify
that a reconversion had not occurred.


31. (S) The meeting closed with Elliott reiterating the
concept of group sampling in response to a question by
Shevchenko. Elliott again agreed to provide new text to
further explain the U.S. position. Ryzhkov closed by asking
Elliott to remember the current inspection quota of 16 as he
wrote the new text.


32. (U) Documents provided: None.


33. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Coussa
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)



RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Voloskov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


34. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS