START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001138 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION BRUNCH FOR DUMA MEMBER KOSACHEV, NOVEMBER 30, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-074. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009 Time: 11:30 a.m. - 1:15 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. RUSSIA A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov Ms. Purcell (notetaker) Mr. Kosachev Mr. Leontiev (notetaker) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A/S Gottemoeller hosted Duma International Affairs Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev to a brunch on November 30, 2009. Kosachev warned that ratification of the treaty would not be easy in Russia. He emphasized that the treaty would need to be balanced and equivalent in order to defuse the opposition's arguments. He noted that concerns about U.S. missile defense and ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration would be serious ratification issues in Russia. Kosachev was very interested in pursuing consultations with the U.S. Congress on treaty ratification. End Summary. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Duma Predictions for Treaty Ratification Process; Probing into Treaty Issues; Missile Defense Concerns and Prospects; Telemetry; More on Treaty Ratification. -------------- --- DUMA PREDICTIONS FOR TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS -------------- --- ¶5. (S) On November 30, 2009, Gottemoeller hosted a brunch for visiting State Duma Member and Chair of the Duma International Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev. Kosachev's first comment was that he had just spoken by phone with Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Prikhodko. Prikhodko had said he felt inspired by his visit to Washington the previous week. He had seen movement forward on the treaty. In Prikhodko's view, however, one or two serious issues still divided the Parties and there had been a hardening of the U.S. position on telemetry in the last few days. ¶6. (S) Kosachev asserted that interest in the new treaty was high and growing daily among the Russian public and the Duma. Very little information was available since the negotiations were going on behind closed doors, so there was much speculation. Ten days earlier the Duma had convened a closed hearing on the treaty negotiations. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov had briefed, along with experts from the Ministry of Defense and other agencies. ¶7. (S) Asked about his contacts with the Senate, Kosachev said he had frequent contacts with his U.S. counterpart, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Berman, but only rarely with Senators. He was scheduled to visit Berman in San Francisco around the end of January or early February. He thought he should visit Washington during the ratification process and consult with some key Senators about the new treaty, perhaps during the same visit. ¶8. (S) Kosachev predicted very harsh discussions on the treaty in the Duma during ratification. The opposition, especially the Communist Party, would oppose the treaty. International Affairs Committee Deputy Chair Yuliy Kvitsinsky was a member of the Communist Party faction and would be the main opponent of the treaty. He and other members of the opposition had decades of experience in military and national security matters, were highly respected and influential. The United Russia Party could not simply push the treaty through. Kosachev believed treaty supporters must prepare good arguments in support of the treaty. The treaty had to be defendable; it was not something to be signed at any cost. The Russian administration would have to prove to the Federal Assembly that no unequal concessions had been made, that the treaty was balanced and equally met the security requirements of both countries. He believed the Presidents had very little maneuvering room. If the treaty was not equivalent, President Medvedev would not be able to agree to it. ¶9. (S) Kosachev said he had received a good impression of the delegations' work from his discussions with the Russian delegation. He was pleased to learn that the atmosphere was one of partnership, not competitive or hostile. Gottemoeller reinforced that both sides had well-qualified teams and a good working relationship, a very different approach from the Cold War. In addition, the U.S. side was well aware of Russia's need for equivalency in the treaty. -------------- PROBING INTO TREATY ISSUES -------------- ¶10. (S) Kosachev praised the agreement on a three-tiered structure of treaty articles, a protocol, and annexes. He had some concerns about which portions of the package could be provisionally applied, claiming that Russian laws in this regard were different from U.S. laws. Gottemoeller and Antonov assured Kosachev that the delegation lawyers were working out which portions could be provisionally applied. ¶11. (S) Kosachev said he would support the central limits that the Presidents would decide, but explained Russia's view that deeper reductions in delivery vehicles were needed because of concerns about upload potential. Russian society was very concerned that the Moscow Treaty had exacerbated the inequality in upload potential. ¶12. (S) Kosachev said many Russian experts were expecting a large number of U.S. delivery vehicles to be deployed in a non-nuclear configuration, which would influence third states and affect the balance of forces for Russia over the longer term. It would be a serious ratification issue. A way needed to be found to regulate this type of weapon and prevent unforeseen consequences from such deployments. Kosachev had not yet heard about any Russian plans to develop non-nuclear ICBMs or SLBMs, but was certain that if the United States deployed them, the Russian military would seek to do so as well. This would instigate a new kind of arms race, possibly including third countries. ¶13. (S) To address non-nuclear strategic offensive arms (SOA),Gottemoeller expressed the view that it was time for serious bilateral talks on strategic stability. The commitment by both Presidents to the goal of nuclear disarmament, while not near-term, created different conditions for nuclear policy making. There was a need to think about the role of ICBMs in the future when there would be fewer and fewer deployed nuclear weapons. The United States had not yet made final decisions on non-nuclear strategic delivery vehicles, so it would be useful for the United States and Russia to analyze the question together. For the new treaty, however, a good solution had been found to count non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs the same as nuclear warheads. ¶14. (S) Kosachev said this approach was only an interim solution. Antonov added that Russia had initially proposed to ban ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration because of worries about a new arms race, noting that Ukraine had wanted to participate in the START Follow-on negotiations and had hinted about its capability to possess non-nuclear SOA. The United States could not accept a ban, however, so Russia had to compromise and count non-nuclear warheads the same way as under START. Antonov urged that further U.S.-Russia discussions on stopping missile proliferation be conducted at the expert level. ¶15. (S) Kosachev argued that the number of inspections should be lower than in START because the number of facilities was fewer and space-based monitoring systems had improved. He recalled that the Presidents had agreed that the verification regime would be made simpler and less costly in comparison to START. Gottemoeller responded that the United States had simplified its original START Follow-on proposal in response to Russian approach. At the same time, Russia, which had started with a greatly simplified proposal, had had to add measures back in. Thus, the two countries were creating a balance between their two original proposals. She stated that the United States still called for the same number of inspections, 20, while Kosachev noted that Russia called for only 16 inspections per year. Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. side had accepted Makarov's proposal to build a verification regime based on the principle of equivalence for both countries. The U.S. side was now discussing measures on this basis. -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE CONCERNS AND PROSPECTS -------------- ¶16. (S) Kosachev said missile defense was a sore topic for Russia and would be another serious ratification issue. He asked whether the treaty could include more than just declarations about the offense-defense interrelationship. Gottemoeller described the joint statement that was being developed by the negotiators. The United States had made a very important step in accepting it, since the initial U.S. view had been that there should be no mention of missile defense at all. Some U.S. Senators continued to take a very tough position opposing any mention of missile defense in the treaty. ¶17. (S) Gottemoeller raised U.S. interest in missile defense cooperation with Russia, and stated her view that there was now a good opportunity to begin joint missile defense programs, despite the fact that similar joint projects had been proposed by several previous Administrations but had not born fruit. Russia's previous proposal for missile defense cooperation using the Armavir and Gabala radars was very promising. Under Secretary Tauscher would be visiting Moscow in early December to begin talks on missile defense cooperation. ¶18. (S) Kosachev asserted that the previous Administration's plans for a third missile defense site in Europe had destroyed Russian trust in the United States, particularly since Poland and the Czech Republic had been involved in the planning but not Russia. He was pleased with the changed position of the current U.S. Administration and thought cooperation might be possible. This was a military problem as well as a political problem: the level of SOA was based on the extent of missile defense. Russian conservatives would oppose SOA reductions if the extent of U.S. missile defense development remained unknown. For that reason, the treaty needed to include more provisions on missile defense than just in the preamble. If the United States were willing to commit not to expand missile defense deployments, it would both save the United States money and pay big political dividends. -------------- TELEMETRY -------------- ¶19. (S) Admitting he was not a technical specialist, Kosachev expressed concern that telemetry measures in the treaty would appear to destroy its balance. The Russian press accused the U.S. of using telemetry from Russian missile launches to calibrate and improve U.S. missile defense systems. There would be a scandal if this concern was not resolved. Gottemoeller noted the highly technical nature of the subject, and the fact that some fresh new ideas were under discussion that could result in a solution. One option was to develop a set of agreements allowing telemetry cooperation, strengthening of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and enhancement of transparency regarding the development of each side's forces. Such exchanges would not be one-sided. The United States also would test new conventional systems and new missiles in the future, and it would be useful for Russia to have transparency into them. The goal was transparency and a simpler regime than under START, since there was no longer a need to verify throw-weight. It would be possible to discuss and agree on the technical details of the exchanges following treaty signature. ¶20. (S) Antonov commented that accusations about using telemetry for missile defense purposes were political, not technical. Russia was concerned about U.S. capabilities to circumvent the treaty, including by benefiting from United Kingdom Trident II tests. These tests were not subject to any treaty, but were controlled by U.S. facilities. This created great mistrust. Gottemoeller objected that the United States had no control over United Kingdom programs. ¶21. (S) Antonov continued that the mistrust could not be removed overnight. Russia needed guarantees. U.S. unwillingness to record missile defense commitments in the treaty created further suspicion. Antonov proclaimed he was not anti-American but was just passing on common Russian views. For its part, the United States was very suspicious regarding Russian mobile ICBMs, demanding they be monitored from birth to death, and stating that otherwise, as soon as the missiles exited Votkinsk they would hide in the woods. Kosachev concurred that the two countries were just at the beginning of restoring trust that had been seriously damaged for a generation. He remarked that his father had been born in Votkinsk and was buried there. Gottemoeller pointed out the United States had made a huge step by agreeing not to continue continuous monitoring at Votkinsk. -------------- MORE ON TREATY RATIFICATION -------------- ¶22. (S) Gottemoeller commented that the U.S. Senate was very interested in the negotiations; they asked her for briefings whenever she came back to Washington. Antonov interjected that it was important to work together on ratification and to maintain contacts between the Russian and U.S. legislatures, so as not to repeat the experience of START-II, which Russia ratified while the United States did not. Kosachev estimated that the ratification process in Russia would take 1-2 months after the Duma received the package. The Duma wanted to maintain the same pace as the U.S. Senate, however. He reiterated that ratification in Russia would not be automatic. There would be a great deal of public commentary and criticism, but he would try to find appropriate arguments in support of the treaty. ¶23. (S) Gottemoeller offered to go to Moscow to talk informally with experts and Duma members if desired, although she could not testify formally. Kosachev enthusiastically supported the idea. He promised to send an invitation to Gottemoeller as soon as the Duma received the treaty for ratification. He also wanted to invite some key Senators to visit Moscow and consult with the Duma. He would be willing to send some Duma members to Washington if it would be useful. Gottemoeller promised to report Kosachev's offers when she consulted with U.S. Senators. ¶24. (S) Antonov noted that the process of preparing the treaty package for submission to the Duma would be very difficult for him, requiring about 1 month's review by the Ministry of Justice, followed by the Prime Minister's office, and then the President's legal adviser. Kosachev concluded that ratification might then not be completed until close to summer 2010. Gottemoeller said her goal was for Senate advice and consent to treaty ratification by May 2010, when the NPT Review Conference would convene. Kosachev remarked it was a very compressed schedule, but had his support. ¶25. (S) Documents exchanged: none. ¶26. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS