START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001132 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, DECEMBER 3, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-092. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 3, 2009 Times: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M., and 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met twice on December 3 to discuss U.S.-proposed joint draft texts (JDTs) for treaty Article XI and Sections V, VII, and VIII of the treaty Protocol Part 5 on Inspection Activities. Discussion during the morning session focused on Section VIII on Exhibitions and Article XI, while the afternoon focused on Section VII, U.S.-Proposed Agreed Statements, and Article XI. ¶4. (S) The Parties were able to come to agreement on additional portions of Article XI of the treaty, Section VII on Inspections of Non-Deployed Strategic Offensive Arms and Formerly Declared Facilities (Type 2 Inspections),and Section VIII on Exhibitions, though disagreement remained on several key issues, such as exhibitions for elimination of items of inspections, inspection parameters, and missile defense. ¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VII (Type 2 Inspections); Section VIII (Exhibitions); Summarizing Section VIII Progress; Article XI; Afternoon: Detailed Review of Section VII and Agreed Statements; and Afternoon: Comments on Article XI. -------------- SECTION VII (TYPE 2 INSPECTIONS) -------------- ¶6. (S) The sides first discussed paragraph 5 of Section VII to Part V of the Protocol. Warner stated that the right of inspectors to read unique identifiers (UIDs) should be retained at the Protocol level. Ilin disagreed. Warner agreed to move this provision to Tier III in the Annex on Inspection Activities. ¶7. (S) The sides then discussed at length paragraphs 6 and 7 of Section VII. Ilin argued for treating heavy bombers in the same way as ICBMs and SLBMs, and Warner and Maj Johnson endeavored to explain the rationale behind the distinction. The delegations agreed to modifications of the chapeau in paragraph 6 and based on these revisions, agreed to the U.S.-proposed language in sub-paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b). In paragraph 7, the sides confirmed agreement on the chapeau of paragraph 7 and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). For sub-paragraph (c),the Russian side made clear its consent was predicated on a unified regime for inspections of heavy bombers as well as ICBMs and SLBMs. The sides also agreed to drop references to storage facilities for heavy bombers throughout the section and confirmed agreement on paragraphs 8 and 9. Concluding discussion of this section, the delegations agreed to defer discussion of training models of missiles to a subsequent session. -------------- SECTION VIII (EXHIBITIONS) -------------- ¶8. (S) Working from the U.S.-proposed JDT, Warner directed the discussion to Section VIII on Exhibitions. He described the rationale behind the U.S. approach, noting in advance that disagreement remained regarding exhibitions for eliminated items in that they should not count against the Type 2 inspection quota. After discussion, Ilin made clear the Russian view that the language needed to emphasize that observation of the results of elimination should be conducted as a Type 2 inspection and count against the annual quota for such inspections. ¶9. (S) The U.S. side agreed to the Russian-proposed revision to Section VIII's title: Exhibitions to Demonstrate the Distinguishing Features and Technical Characteristics of New Types of Strategic Offensive Arms. The sides discussed the inclusion of variants in paragraph 1, and agreed to delete such references. The sides agreed to modify the language in the paragraph to reflect that each type of ICBM, SLBM, mobile launcher of ICBMs, and heavy bomber would be subject to an exhibition if it had not been so exhibited under START. ¶10. (S) Ilin commented that the U.S. side had floated several different approaches to exhibitions, which prompted a discussion of the appropriate formulation for timeframes for exhibitions. Ilin proposed language stating that exhibitions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions provided for upon the invitation of the conducting Party and within the timelines specified in notifications. Warner pointed out that such a formulation would need to include exhibitions for the Russian RS-24 mobile ICBM launcher. The sides agreed to use the phrase new types of strategic offensive arms instead of an ICBM and an SLBM in paragraph 1. They also agreed to differentiate in the text between exhibitions and inspections and that the sites of exhibitions would be determined by the exhibiting Party ¶11. (S) Warner tabled a new JDT version of paragraph B. Ilin noted that the wild card concept was missing and stated that eliminations were still bracketed. A discussion of timing ensued, and the sides agreed to a formulation specifying that timeframes would be stated in the annexes. ¶12. (S) Warner turned to Part C of Section VIII, Exhibitions to Confirm the Conversion or Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms, noting that the elimination element remained in brackets. Ilin queried how the Parties would confirm that converted heavy bombers could no longer perform nuclear missions. Warner responded that the veryQature of conversion was to render such systems incapable of performing their original nuclear missions. The sides then agreed on the Title of paragraph C, except for the reference to conversion. Warner and Ilin then agreed to defer resolution of the conversion and elimination issues raised in the paragraph to the Conversion or Elimination Working Group. Ilin also proposed inserting language stipulating that each Party would have the right to participate in exhibitions to confirm distinguishing features between ICBMs and SLBMs and how they differed from missile defense interceptors, with the time and place to be determined by the conducting Party. Warner emphasized that this position would not be accepted by the United States and quipped that he would place that in triple brackets. -------------- SUMMARIZING SECTION VIII PROGRESS -------------- ¶13. (S) Warner noted that the U.S. side would update Section VIII based upon the discussions and would propose a structure for a third type of exhibition. Both chairs agreed to speak with their Conversion or Elimination Working Group counterparts. If agreement could be reached on the conversion or elimination issues, then Part C of Section VIII could be agreed to accordingly. In Part B, the chairs noted that the main disagreement concerned inclusion of eliminations as exhibitions. -------------- ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶14. (S) Warner presented the revised U.S. proposal for Article XI of the treaty text, which Ilin stated he would consider. The sides agreed to remove several sets of brackets in the Article, but disagreements remained on the scope of inspections and their purposes. -------------- AFTERNOON: DETAILED REVIEW OF SECTION VII AND AGREED STATEMENTS -------------- ¶15. (S) Warner provided Ilin a copy of a U.S. draft of Section VII. After discussion of the title of Section VII, the working group agreed to delete the brackets around the text "Type Two Inspections," but keep the text within parentheses. A lengthy discussion was conducted on Paragraph 1 pertaining to the retention or elimination of references to mobile launchers of ICBMs. Ilin wanted to delete the word "mobile" but Warner stated this would make the term too general and this would change the agreement on which types of facilities undergo inspection. The working group suggested conferring with each side's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group to see whether it would be appropriate to change the related references in the MOU. (Begin comment: In a telephone call later that evening from the Russian Delegation, Buttrick reported that the Russian side would accept the inclusion of repair facilities and storage facilities for mobile ICBM launchers. End comment.) ¶16. (S) Warner provided Ilin with copies of the two U.S.-proposed Agreed Statements, one on B-1Bs and one on SSGNs. The sides agreed to retain the brackets around the numbers of permitted inspections per year at a single facility. The current numbers stood at two for the U.S. and one for Russia. Two issues were discussed in paragraph ¶4. The sides agreed to check within the Data Base on the usage of the terms "type," "category," "variant," and "version," and match the MOU usage with the usage in paragraph 4. Additionally, a lengthy discussion ensued about the use of the phrase "and the reason for the absence of each item." Ilin did not understand the reason for keeping this in paragraph 4 and the brackets were retained. (Begin comment: In a telephone call later that evening from the Russian Delegation, Buttrick reported that the Russian side would accept the U.S. position that would include providing a reason for absence of items of inspection from the inspection site. End comment.) Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on B-1Bs: PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS Agreed Statement: The Parties agree that in order to provide assurances that B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments continue to satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with Part III of the Protocol, The following provisions shall apply after the completion of the elimination or conversion, using conversion procedures employed previously under START, of the final B-1B heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments: ¶1. The United States of America will notify the Russian Federation that the Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas have been eliminated. Once eliminated, these facilities will not be subject to inspection. ¶2. B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments will no longer be subject to the provisions of the Treaty, other than those provisions contained herein. ¶3. The United States will offer an annual exhibition of B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The Russian Federation has the right to participate in this exhibition within the 30-day period following notification. ¶4. The procedures for conduct of such annual exhibitions will be identical to those for heavy bomber conversion confirmation exhibitions, contained in Section VIII to Part Five of the Protocol and Part Three of the Protocol, with the following additional procedures: (a) The point of entry will be Travis Air Force Base, California. (b) The United States will indicate in the notification the B-1B base where the exhibition will take place. (c) Upon arrival at the B-1B base, the in-country escort team lead shall provide an annotated site diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (d) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the inspection team leader may designate no more than one B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments for exhibition. (e) A member of the in-country escort shall permit inspectors to view the designated B-1B heavy bombers that were converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol and therefore are incapable of employing nuclear armaments. (f) The conduct of such an exhibition shall be recorded in the official report. End text. Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on SSGNs: PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in order to provide assurances that the four guided missile submarines (SSGN) of the United States of America are incapable of launching an SLBM, the following provisions shall apply to such submarines: (a) The United States of America shall conduct an initial one-time exhibition for each of the four SSGN guided missile submarines to confirm that its launchers are incapable of launching an SLBM. (b) The four SSGN guided missile submarines shall not be subject to any requirement to provide data or photographs. Other than the provisions contained herein, the SSGN guided missile submarine shall not be subject to the provisions of the Treaty. (c) Subsequent to the initial one-time exhibition, the United States of America shall offer a viewing of one SSGN guided missile submarine each year until all SSGNs have been viewed a second time during the duration of the Treaty. 1) The United States of America shall notify the Russian Federation of an SSGN's availability for viewing. The Russian Federation shall inform the United States of AmericaQithin 72 hours of receipt of notification on its intent to participate in the viewing. The Russian Federation shall have the right to participate in this viewing within 15 days following notification thereof. The notification shall include the point of entry and recommended date of arrival. 2) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine base, a member of the in-country escort shall provide a schedule of activities. 3) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for viewing one guided missile launcher located on the SSGN guided missile submarine. If a Dry Dock Shelter (DDS) is installed, tubes obstructed by the shelter shall not be made available for viewing. 4) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the inspectors that the guided missile launcher is incapable of launching an SLBM. 5) The conduct of such a viewing shall be recorded in the official inspection report. End text. ¶17. (S) Ilin provided a copy in Russian of the text of paragraph 6 in Section VII. A lengthy discussion was conducted concerning whether structures ought to be inspectable during a Type Two inspection and the parameters for the inspection of the entire inspection site within the site diagram boundary. The U.S. side suggested that a broader term than "structures" was needed in this paragraph to clarify that inspectors would be permitted to look for items of inspection in the open areas between structures within the inspection boundary. Warner proposed some text to clarify the intent and application of this provision and Ilin agreed to check on this proposed text to see if it was acceptable; the brackets would remain in paragraph 6 for the time being, however. Warner's-proposed text stated "...to inspect the area within the boundaries of the inspection site as shown on the site diagram to include structures which are large enough to contain an item of inspection..." ¶18. (S) During the review of paragraph 8, the sides decided to move the text concerning test ranges up to the portion of paragraph 6 concerning test ranges. However, it was agreed that the discussion of conversion or elimination facilities would remain in paragraph 8. -------------- AFTERNOON: COMMENTS ON ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶19. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed to language for the first sentence of paragraph 2 and added references to non-deployed launchers. In paragraph 3, the sides agreed to delete references to "mobile launchers of ICBMs" but to retain all other brackets. Ilin promised to call Warner later that evening to discuss this section. Ilin proposed different language for the portion of the paragraph on formerly declared facilities, but Warner disagreed. The sides concurred that paragraph 4 would remain bracketed. ¶20. (U) Documents exchanged: - U.S.: -- U.S.-Proposed JDT for Article XI; -- U.S. Proposed JDT for Section VIII and Revised JDT for Section VIII concerning Exhibitions; -- U.S. Proposed JDT for Part 5 of Section V; -- U.S. Proposed JDT for Section VII; -- Proposed Agreed Statement concerning B-1B Bombers; and -- Proposed Agreed Statement concerning SSGNs. ¶21. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Celusnak Mr. Colby Maj Johnson LTC Leyde Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Kamenskiy Ms. Voldopova Col Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS