START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001129 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-075. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009 Time: 4:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group met with their Russian counterparts at the U.S. Mission on November 30. This was the sixth meeting of this session and the thirteenth meeting overall. Gen Poznikhir began the meeting by requesting a review of positions on initial MOU data exchange and ended by taking the subject of data exchange and provisional application as homework to discuss with the Russian Delegation. Poznikhir then began a review of bracketed text in various areas of the MOU. Mr. Trout pointed out that if we get agreement on counting rules, unique identifiers (UIDs),and a limit on non-deployed launchers, most of the bracketed text will be resolved. Until then, little can be accomplished. End Summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: MOU Data Exchange and Timeline, Brackets Held Hostage, and Discussion of Next Steps. -------------- MOU DATA EXCHANGE AND TIMELINE -------------- ¶5. (S) Poznikhir started the discussions by asking for clarification of what the U.S. delegation's proposal to exchange MOU data 45 days after treaty signature meant and proposed a "logical" alternative of exchanging Section I aggregate data at signature and the remaining MOU data 45 days after entry-into-force (EIF) of the Treaty. Trout reminded Poznikhir that under START, data was available at signature but was a year out of date. He then suggested that for this treaty both sides use the July 1, 2009, START MOU data to fill appropriate categories at signing. Poznikhir demurred, stating that Russia would not have all the UIDs available, and errors that would be hard to rectify would be introduced. Trout reminded Poznikhir that under START, UIDs were not exchanged until EIF and that the United States had proposed that warhead data not be exchanged until EIF. Poznikhir agreed that using July 1, 2009, START data could be done, but the Russian delegation did not have access to that data in Geneva. Therefore Russia could not have it ready until 45-60 days after signature. Trout again reminded him that with START as a precedent, the U.S. Senate will expect real data. Poznikhir reiterated his claim that exchanging anything beyond the aggregate numbers required in Section I would not be possible and asked what would be the effect if we exchanged data, but never reached EIF. Trout asked how Poznikhir's concept would support provisional application of the treaty. Poznikhir stated that, while provisional application had not yet been agreed to, he would discuss both data exchange and provisional application with his delegation as homework. -------------- BRACKETS HELD HOSTAGE -------------- ¶6. (S) Re-engaging on bracketed text, Poznihir suggested that the last sentence in the revised U.S.-proposed chapeau, "Each Party acknowledges that it is responsible for the accuracy of its own data," was redundant as the Russian lawyers had determined that by signing and ratifying the treaty, each Party had the implicit responsibility to provide accurate and complete data. Trout promised to have the U.S. lawyers take another look. Poznikhir then turned to the bracketed text for "items subject to the provisions of the Treaty" and the Russian-proposed text "strategic offensive arms (SOA)." Trout said the United States was staying with "items" because data on more than just SOA will be exchanged. Poznikhir then pointed out that the word "herein" had been mis-translated into Russian on the U.S.-provided Russian language text. ¶7. (S) Poznihir next asked whether the bracketed text "and their associated launchers" could now be removed. Trout stated that if Russia agreed to a limit on non-deployed launchers, the brackets could be removed. Poznihir reminded Trout that in their November 28, 2009, package proposal Russia had refused to accept a limit on non-deployed launchers. Trout explained that without a limit on non-deployed launchers there would be no reason to eliminate launchers, that non-deployed missiles could be held on site and loaded whenever needed. He suggested that this idea is similar to the Clinton era idea of de-alerting. He went on to opine that without a limit, the treaty will not be decreasing forces, just de-alerting those forces. Poznikhir explained that he had never seen additional missiles at operational bases under START, and Russia had no plans to have additional missiles at operational bases; moreover, we need to forget the Cold War. Trout reminded Poznikhir that naval forces have SSBNs and storage areas for missiles at the same base and that this treaty will be in effect for 10 years--how each Party stores missiles can change over that time. ¶8. (S) Poznikhir then asked whether deployed launchers will be in the central limits. Trout explained that a deployed missile implies a deployed launcher. Furthermore, if we get agreement on a limit for non-deployed launchers, this non-deployed limit would be placed in paragraph 1 of Section I of the database. Poznikhir stated regardless of this agreement, both Parties will still have non-deployed launchers. Therefore, since we both know that these non-deployed launchers exist, the United States should either unbracket the Russian text in paragraph 2 or provide text as a U.S. position in paragraph 1. Trout agreed to think about th issue. ¶9. (S) Poznikhir stated that Russia wil not have variants of ICBMs, only types, so we ould remove "or variant of a type" from the heade in Section II. Trout then led a discussion of hat constituted a type and variant of a type reslting in Poznikhir conceding that, if the U.S sidefelt it necessary, the words could remain. ¶10. (S) Poznikhir then brought up a number of other brackets including the U.S. term "nuclear" warheads, the use of the term "returned" for missiles at production facilities, MOU requirements for reporting warheads on each missile and the requirement for including greatest throw weight under Annex A, Section (I),ICBMs. Trout explained that most of the bracketed text would be resolved if we get agreement on counting rules, UIDs, and a limit on non-deployed launchers. A short discussion ensued on how individual submarines would be identified with Poznikhir stating that they have names for classes of submarines and he understood that the United States has names for each submarine. Trout stated that the Russians could use any convention they wished--numbers, alphabetic designators, names, etc., and that the United States would understand that once assigned, they would not change. Poznikhir offered to study the idea. ¶11. (S) A discussion concerning heavy bombers began with Poznikhir suggesting that the Russian proposal to have deployed heavy bombers, non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments be accepted. He further explained that all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would be considered non-deployed, with deployed heavy bombers being only those equipped for nuclear armaments located at heavy bomber bases. Trout responded that the United States could accept the categories of deployed heavy bombers and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments but non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would have to be bracketed since the U.S. proposal was to have a separate arrangement on converted heavy bombers. Poznikhir stated that he disagreed with the U.S. position that airbases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would not be in the MOU. ¶12. (S) Poznikhir then suggested removing the text concerning training models of missiles at the end of Section (I) of Annex A. Trout agreed and suggested that under missile stages in the same section, the length used for confirming a new type could also be removed and asked whether Russia had agreed to photographs of fixed structures in lieu of measurements. Poznikhir agreed to Trout's suggested deletion and said Moscow is still considering the fixed structure issue. -------------- DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶13. (S) Trout suggested that the MOU Working Group still had to address Annex J and stated that the U.S. delegation would have something for the Russian delegation soon. Attempts to move the Annex to another working group had failed. Col Pischulov asked about the decision to remove heavy bomber training facilities. LT Lobner reminded him that since neither side has training heavy bombers, the category had been removed completely from the treaty. Poznikhir asked when the working group would meet next. Trout replied that it would not be on December 1, and that it would help negotiations if Russia would agree to a limit on non-deployed launchers. Poznikhir responded that the U.S. concern about non-deployed launchers was unfounded and reminded the working group that we are running out to time to complete our negotiations. ¶14. (U) Documents provided: None ¶15. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Trout Mr. Broshar Mr. Celusnak Mr. Colby Mr. Coussa LT Lobner Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Gen Poznihir Mr. Shevchenko Col Pischulov Col Voloskov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS