START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001123 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-054. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 25, 2009 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 1:10 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, Warner discussed in greater detail the U.S. proposals made by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen to the Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, General Makarov during their meetings on November 22 and 23, 2009. Warner explained that by broadening the application of a range of provisions, the modified U.S. proposals responded to Russian concerns that mobile ICBMs not be subject to separate or unique verification measures. ¶4. (S) The Russians expressed interest in expanding the application of unique identifiers (UIDs) to all missiles. Gen Orlov suggested the possibility that Russia could provide notification of missile exits from the production plant within 48 hours of the exit. The Russian delegation also appeared interested in the U.S. proposal to observe the final elimination steps for all ICBMs, SLBMs, their launchers, and for heavy bombers. ¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Non-deployed Launchers; Votkinsk and Advance Notification; Issues with Advance Notification But Interest in UIDs; How Many Spares Do You Need To Fight a Nuclear War?; Cooperative Measures at Forty Below Zero?; Final Elimination of SOA; We're Still Not Sure About Mobile Concentration; and, The Purpose of Your Proposal is Ineluctable, Only the Format is Different. -------------- NON-DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶6. (S) Warner opened the meeting with a reminder to both sides of the tremendous amount of work still ahead to complete the treaty befor December 5th. Noting that only Ilin was presentduring all of the meetings between Mullen and Maarov, held on November 23, 2009, Warner recommende that the Ad Hoc Group discuss in greater detailthe proposals made by Mullen during his small grup session on the afternoon of November 23. ¶7. (S) Warner advised the Russian delegation that th United States was prepared to accept the Russia-proposed approach to distinguish between deployd and non-deploye ICBMs and their launchers, SLMs and their launchers, and heavy bombers, provided that the Russian side ccepted a separate limit on the total number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, on the order of 150, with the exact number to be negotiated. ¶8. (S) Ilin asked of the number of 150 non-deployed launchers (NDL) was it inside or outside the U.S.-proposed limit on deployed launchers, and if this was a proposal for 800 launchers plus another 150. Warner confirmed that the proposal was a separate limit on NDL and explained that it could apply to situations common to both sides which resulted in large numbers of launchers in long-term non-deployed status, such as SSBNs in overhaul or mobile ICBMs in storage awaiting elimination. ¶9. (S) Ilin then asked whether the United States would include its MX (Peacekeeper) and Minuteman III (MM-III) launchers in this 150 number and whether those launchers would be eliminated during the START Follow-on (SFO) reduction period. Warner stated that the United States had every intention of eliminating its MM-III launchers, and explained that the United States would need to meet its 800 deployed launcher limit as well as the separate limit of 150 NDL by the end of the SFO 7-year reduction period. Mr. Elliott highlighted the fact that the United States could have as many as 200-300 launchers considered to be non-deployed under SFO rules in 2010, and Warner noted that the United States would be obligated to eliminate a considerable number of these NDLs in order to meet the separate non-deployed limit. ¶10. (S) Warner commented that if the Russians believed a limit of 150 NDLs was too high, then the sides could discuss other numbers. The challenge was to find a number high enough to allow for routine maintenance without resulting in a treaty violation after the reduction period. Warner offered that the sides may also want to consider provisions for situations such as the discovery of a serious or systemic maintenance problem that could unexpectedly force one side to go above the limit on NDL. Elliott explained how Russian practices for SLBM launcher eliminations and concurrent deployment of new SSBNs could quickly bring Russia up to 100 NDLs and still have additional NDLs in routine maintenance. ¶11. (S) Mr. Kuznetsov dismissed the concept of a separate limit on NDLs entirely, and stated that only numbers of deployed launchers and deployed warheads mattered. He argued that the only reason for iQoducing this separate limit was to capture Russian mobile launchers, and wondered why Russia would agree to this. Gen Poznihir claimed that because Russia needed to eliminate many more strategic offensive arms (SOA) than the United States, creating a separate NDL limit that required elimination of old SSBNs that were no threat to anyone would cost Russia additional money. ¶12. (S) When Elliott pointed out that it was the Russian Federation that had initially proposed a separate limit on NDLs, Ilin claimed that the Russian concept was different, and Russia had subsequently "departed" from this concept. Referring to a previous U.S. proposal for a limit of 80/80 on non-deployed missiles and launchers, Ilin complained that once again, the United States wanted to impose another limit on Russia. ¶13. (S) Warner noted the 80/80 separate limit was derived from START verification provisions for mobile missiles and had been a U.S. proposal from the beginning of SFO negotiations. This latest proposal for a limit on NDLs was a serious move by the United States intended to address the oft-stated Russian complaint about unfair provisions on their mobile systems by broadening the application to all non-deployed launchers. -------------- VOTKINSK AND ADVANCE NOTIFICATION -------------- ¶14. (S) Warner then explained the U.S. proposal for both sides to provide advance notification of the exits of new ICBMs and SLBMs from their respective production facilities, with the time period for advance notice of the exit to be negotiated, and the U.S. proposal to apply a UID on each ICBM and SLBM and its launch canister, if applicable. ¶15. (S) Orlov questioned why the United States needed advance notification of exits of missiles from production facilities and claimed the idea made no sense from an operational perspective as notifications would be sent after missiles arrived at bases. Orlov also questioned how advance notification of exits would be implemented and verified. Ultimately, Orlov suggested that Russia might consider notifying the United States of a missile exiting a production plant within 48 hours of its actual exit. ¶16. (S) Orlov then stated his opinion that the United States had gotten so used to Votkinsk that it just couldn't drop it. Warner pointed out that for the United States it was the monitoring of mobile ICBMs that remained a concern, not Votkinsk itself. Warner explained that the U.S. proposals on UIDs and advance notification were being applied more generally in response to Russian concerns about separate restrictions on mobile systems. -------------- -------------- ISSUES WITH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, BUT INTEREST IN UIDS -------------- -------------- ¶17. (S) In response to Orlov's recommendation for notifications of new production items after their arrival at operational bases, Warner pointed out that under the Russian concept, such items become subject to the provisions of the treaty upon exit from the production facility, not after arrival at a base. ¶18. (S) Col Ryzhkov and Ilin both raised questions on the practical implementation of advance notifications. Citing the possibility that delays at the production facility could result in an exit not occurring at the time specified, Ryzhkov complained that this would increase the burden on the Russian notification system. (Begin comment: During the November 10, 2009, Ad Hoc Group, Ryzhkov claimed that multiple notifications associated with changes in status of missiles at bases would not be an issue for Russia. End comment.) ¶19. (S) Warner explained that factory delays or missed exits could be handled simply by cancellation of the notification and re-notification when the missile was ready to exit. Warner also confirmed that the United States was prepared to provide advance notification for all new production missiles exiting U.S. production facilities. ¶20. (S) Ilin asked whether the U.S. proposal to apply UIDs similar to those used on Russian mobile ICBMs would be applicable to all U.S. SLBMs, what UIDs for SLBMs would look like, and how a side would confirm a UID on an SLBM when conducting an inspection at a base. Warner explained that the U.S. concept for UIDs would apply to all existing ICBMs and SLBMs plus all newly produced ballistic missiles, and that the United States would probably base its UIDs on serial numbers for first stages. Warner acknowledged that confirming UIDs for SLBMs during inspections of operational bases would not be possible, but UIDs would be visible for SLBMs removed from launchers and placed in storage. These UIDs could be verified during a Type II inspection of such locations. ¶21. (S) Ilin asked whether the same confirmation procedures for UIDs on mobile ICBMs would apply for inspections of missiles in storage and during eliminations, and whether the UID was for the missile or the launcher. Warner stated the UID would be placed on the canister for those missiles with canisters, as the missile's first stage would not normally be visible. Elliott explained that differences for U.S. systems might require affixing UIDs to locations that would be visible when the missiles were in storage. Warner also explained that missiles could be moved from one launcher to another launcher, and that notifications with the missile's UID would provide the tracking mechanism. After confirming that the U.S. proposal would add UIDs to notifications and would be included on notifications throughout a missile's entire lifecycle, Ilin and Poznihir agreed to study the proposal. ¶22. (S) According to Ryzhkov, UIDs for Russian mobile ICBMs were not related to the missile's serial number. Serial numbers for missiles produced at the Votkinsk plant began every year with the number "1" and so the same serial number could be repeated. Therefore, Russia used a different procedure for developing UIDs. Warner noted that this was acceptable, provided there was a different number for each missile produced and that the number stayed the same throughout the missile's lifecycle. Ryzhkov then asked whether the United States intended to provide UIDs for all missile stages, or just for the first stage. Elliott indicated that the U.S. proposal was only for first stages of missiles. -------------- HOW MANY SPARES DO YOU NEED TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR? -------------- ¶23. (S) Warner then discussed the U.S. proposal to establish a limit of five on the number of non-deployed ICBMs at ICBM bases. He pointed out that the U.S. intention was to treat all ICBMs the same now that the United States had accepted the Russian definition of deployed and non-deployed. The issue would be to determine how many non-deployed missiles were actually needed at each base. ¶24. (S) Ilin said that this proposal was a return to a sub-limit that was not in accordance with the subject matter of the treaty--deployed launchers and delivery vehicles, and deployed warheads. Ilin suggested that confidence building measures could be applied to non-deployed items so that whatever numbers a side determined it needed, the non-deployed missiles could be placed in a declared facility. Ilin suggested that confidence building measures could be applied to non-deployed items so that whatever numbers a side determined it needed, the non-deployed missiles could be placed in a declared facility. In order to better understand the U.S. proposal, Ilin asked whether the number applied only to spare missiles or to those in maintenance. ¶25. (S) Warner said the limit on non-deployed missiles at ICBM bases applied to both spares and those in maintenance, but acknowledged that the number of five may be too small for Russian practices. In response to Poznihir's question whether this limit applied to SLBM bases, Warner replied that the limit was only for ICBMs. ¶26. (S) Kuznetsov asked why this limit was needed. After Warner replied that it was intended to avoid a large number of spare missiles at ICBM bases, Kuznetsov wondered if the United States was worried about a second strike capability or rapid reload. He went on to describe an experience from his days as a submariner in the Soviet Navy when military plans required each submarine base to have two complete sets of missiles (boevoy komplekt or "BK" in Russian) for each submarine, with the "crazy" idea that a submarine could return to base to reload during a nuclear war. Warner acknowledged that reloading missiles during a nuclear war was a strange concept, but Kuznetsov's story confirmed that this possibility had been anticipated, at least by some. -------------- COOPERATIVE MEASURES AT FORTY BELOW ZERO? -------------- ¶27. (S) Warner explained the U.S. proposal to extend cooperative measures to all mobile SDVs, including SLBMs, mobile ICBMs and heavy bombers. After Ilin asked about timelines and whether this entailed opening the hatches on submarines in port, Kuznetsov interrupted to question what one could see with the submarine hatches open in port. He then stated that no submarine commander in his right mind would ever open his hatches at an SSBN base in the winter at minus 40 degrees. Kuznetsov was adamant that cooperative measures for submarines could not be implemented. -------------- FINAL ELIMINATION OF SOA -------------- ¶28. (S) The Russian delegation appeared very interested in the U.S. proposal which included the right to observe the final elimination procedure for the first stage of any ICBM or SLBM and its associated launch canister and the right to observe the final elimination procedure for mobile systems, to include SLBMs and their launchers, mobile ICBMs and their launchers, and heavy bombers. (Begin comment: All Russian delegates were intent on writing this proposal down and did not interrupt during Warner's initial presentation. End comment.) ¶29. (S) Ryzhkov claimed that the U.S. proposal still amounted to confirming the process of elimination, not the results, and went into great detail on the burden for Russia to have inspectors observe the elimination process for 200 plus mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers. Ryzhkov said it would take an inspection team 10 days to observe the final cuts on 10 missiles and challenged the United States to have its missile experts tell legislators that a burned out solid-rocket motor case could be reused. He acknowledged that if propellant were to be washed out, it would need to be cut to eliminate it. ¶30. (S) Warner pointed out that the U.S. proposal didn't specify which final elimination procedure had to be used, only that each side had a right to observe it. Elliott explained that while this proposal might make it more difficult, the United States was prepared to treat all ICBMs and SLBMs equally for eliminations. ¶31. (S) In response to Ryzhkov's continued questioning of the U.S. logic and claims of unfairness, Warner said that the United States was looking for mutually acceptable and efficient ways to confirm the elimination of SOA, especially mobile ICBMs and launchers. Warner questioned the length of time Ryzhkov claimed was required to eliminate missiles, noting that it should be possible for a team to complete the inspection of a large number of missiles with only a few days on site. Warner offered that Russia might consider scheduling large-scale eliminations twice a year to minimize the burden or determine more efficient processes for elimination of first stages, whether that be a final cut of the motor case or explosion. -------------- WE'RE STILL NOT SURE ABOUT MOBILE CONCENTRATION -------------- ¶32. (S) Warner moved on to highlight a few provisions in the modified U.S. proposal that applied specifically to land-based mobile systems; a provision requiring that any mobile ICBMs that departed base 16 hours or less prior to the designation of that base for inspection return to the base for inspection; and a limit, yet to be negotiated, on the total number of non-deployed mobile ICBMs. ¶33. (S) Warner explained that the concentration rule was developed for START as a result of situations that occurred during implementation of the INF Treaty. Warner pointed out that under START all mobile launchers that had departed base 24 hours prior to designation had to return. This U.S. proposal was intended to accomplish similar objectives, but did not require all launchers to return. Those that had deployed more than 16 hours prior to designation could stay in the field, and the United States did not require that their positions be reported. ¶34. (S) Ryzhkov noted that while Russia understood the logic behind the concentration rule they did not understand the 16-hour requirement, or the proposal for a limit on the total number of non-deployed mobile ICBMs. The U.S. side agreed to discuss these points in greater detail during working group meetings. -------------- THE PURPOSE OF YOUR PROPOSAL IS INELUCTABLE, ONLY THE FORMAT IS DIFFERENT -------------- ¶35. (S) In the interest of time, Warner asked that the Russian side hold questions to allow Mr. Siemon to present the final U.S. proposals on telemetry. Siemon noted that the United States proposed to delete the exchange of tapes and interpretive data; retain the prohibition on encryption of telemetry data broadcasts; ban data denial techniques; provide advance notifications of ballistic missile launches with inclusion of frequencies and modulation of telemetry to be used; and to limit the number of exemptions for the use of encryption. He noted the United States allowed for up to seven test flights using encryption, but was open to discussion on that number. Ilin understood the U.S. proposal on telemetry, but had no other comments. ¶36. (S) Warner summarized the modified U.S. proposals made by Mullen, noting that the United States had tried to develop provisions that applied equally to SOA across the board. While these proposals might result in increased work, as in the case of UIDs across the whole range of missiles, the proposals affected both sides. Ilin thanked the United States for its attempt to meet Russian concerns over unequal treatment of its mobile missiles, and said the Russian delegation would study the proposals. Ilin noted that the key point of the U.S. proposal as he understood it, was intent to retain some special measures for mobiles--the substance was the same, only the format was different. ¶37. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶38. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Elliott Mr. McConnell Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Mr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Kuznetsov Gen Orlov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶39. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS