START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001110 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 24, 2009 REF: GENEVA 01102 (SFO-GVA-VII-044) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-050. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 24, 2009 Time: 15:30 - 18:00. Place: Russian Federation Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The seventh Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group (WG) meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov, began with a discussion of Section VII of the Protocol (Elimination of Facilities) during which the Russian delegation provided a joint draft text (JDT) accepting the U.S. proposal for this section. The chairmen further decided to send this section to the conforming group. The Russian side then provided a revised Russian-proposed JDT for Section III (ICBM Launcher Elimination). After a short discussion, it was clear that neither side would move from its current position with respect to mobile launcher CorE. The Russian delegation provided an updated JDT of Section V (CorE of Heavy Bombers) correcting administrative errors detected in both sides' previous proposals. The U.S. delegation agreed to study the Russian text and send to conforming if no issues arose after review. ¶4. (S) Elliot explained the U.S. requirement for two time limits for verification in the CorE sections (based on a 30-day window for inspections and a 60-day window for national technical means (NTM)). The sides then discussed Section I (General Provisions) in an effort to resolve the issues in the section. Elliott explained that many of these brackets were tied to treaty Articles VII, XI and IX and would fall out once the articles were agreed. Finally, Section IV (Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers) was discussed. The Russian side presented alternate elimination procedures for elimination of SLBM launchers. The U.S. Qe asked the Russian side to produce a revised JDT containing those procedures to allow the U.S. side to study and better understand the Russian proposal. End Summary. ¶5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VII to Conforming; Section III: No Movement; Section V to Conforming; Time for Verification; Section I: Removing Brackets; and Section IV: Who needs CTR. -------------- SECTION VII TO CONFORMING -------------- ¶6. (S) The meeting began with a discussion of Section VII (Elimination of Facilities) of the Protocol. The Russian delegation provided a revised joint draft text (JDT) that fully accepted the U.S. proposal for this section and removed all brackets. Specifically, the Russian delegation agreed to paragraph 2 in the U.S.-proposed text which requires the dismantlement and removal of the superstructures for fixed structures for mobile ICBMs, as part of elimination. Also in that paragraph is a ban on placing any structure or covering, permanent or temporary, over the remaining foundation of the fixed structure. Both chairmen agreed to send Section VII to conforming. Later in the meeting, when discussing elimination of SLBM launchers, Ryzhkov stated that there was a large fight within the Russian delegation on accepting the U.S. proposal on elimination of fixed structures. Intense discussion developed within the Russian delegation to the ban on not placing a cover over the remaining foundation of the fixed structure for mobile launchers. The other intense discussion within the Russian delegation centered on the U.S. list of support equipment and that if they accepted or acknowledged this listing then the U.S. side would later force Russia into listing all the equipment in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Elliott assured Ryzhkov it was not the intention of the U.S. delegation to list support equipment in the MOU. Both chairmen agreed to send Section VII to conforming. -------------- SECTION III: NO MOVEMENT -------------- ¶7. (S) The discussion next turned to Section III (Elimination of Launchers of ICBMs). Despite the agreement of both sides on paragraph 3 (Reftel),Ryzhkov presented a revised paragraph 3 which broadened the right of inspection to include all three options for elimination of silo launchers. (Begin comment: The initial agreement only provided for inspection if the Party used the "other procedures" option in subparagraph c. The specified procedures in subparagraphs a and b would be verified by NTM only. End comment.) Ryzhkov surmised that this was a broader interpretation and was also consistent throughout the document. (Begin comment: The originally agreed paragraph was bracketed in the Russian side's document. End comment.) Elliott sought comment from Ryzhkov on mobile launcher elimination. Ryzhkov reiterated that the requirement for U.S. inspections of the final cut was not acceptable. Elliott responded that this is a very firm U.S. position. A discussion ensued between Ryzhkov and Elliott on the procedures each side had proposed for mobile launcher elimination. Ryzhkov confirmed that Russia now proposed to remove both the erector-launcher mechanism and the stabilizing jacks (leveling supports),but did not want to cut off the aft 0.78 meters of the vehicle chassis. Elliott questioned Ryzhkov on why the Russian delegation had included a new subparagraph on "other procedures." Ryzhkov responded that it was consistent with the rest of the document which had similar paragraphs. Elliott informed Ryzhkov that if there was any hope of the United States accepting "other elimination procedures" for mobile launchers, the Russian delegation should consider carefully the elimination requirements and ensure they are verifiable. Ryzhkov stated that if he accepted the U.S. proposal in this area he would greatly exceed his authority. ¶8. (S) Elliott concluded the discussions on this section by asking Ryzhkov whether, in accordance with paragraph 7 on conversion of ICBM launchers, the Russian delegation intended this to apply to silo launchers as well as mobile launchers. Ryzhkov responded that it applied to both silo and mobile launchers. Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether the Russian Federation ever conducted such a conversion of a mobile launcher to launch another type of missile. Ryzhkov responded they had for the RS-24. Elliott asked whether the Russian Federation conducted an exhibition of the converted launcher. Ryzhkov responded they did not because the converted launcher was only for testing. -------------- SECTION V TO CONFORMING -------------- ¶9. (S) The Russian side provided an updated JDT of Section V (CorE of Heavy Bombers) to correct some administrative errors detected in both sides' proposals. Ryzhkov explained that in the new JDT, paragraph 5 was rewritten to incorporate the U.S.-proposed text and to remove provisions now covered in the General Provisions section. Ryzhkov further recommended sending this section to conforming. The U.S. side agreed to study the Russian document and, if after review, there were no substantive differences, to send this section to the Conforming Group. -------------- TIME FOR VERIFICATION -------------- ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov began the discussion on the two time limit requirements for verification in the CorE sections (based a 30-day window for inspections and a 60-day window for NTM). He stated that the Russian delegation's position was that only one standardized timeline should be used for verification. Elliott responded by saying that the United States could not accept a single time due to the vast differences in the two types of verification. Elliott then provided hard data on the amount of cloud cover over representative areas of the Russian Federation's silo fields showing that for over 70 percent of the time there was 100 percent cloud cover. This showed that any time short of 60 days for verification by NTM was too short. Elliott also stated the U.S. side had already moved from the 90-day timeline in START to the proposed 60 days. Conversely, using a 60-day window for verification by inspection would cause undue restrictions on both sides by requiring the converted item to remain at the conversion facility for up to 60 days while awaiting inspection. Elliott concluded, saying given these facts, two time frames were required for verification; one for inspection (30 days) and the other for NTM (60 days). Ryzhkov said he understood the data and needed to study the U.S. proposal. -------------- SECTION I: REMOVING BRACKETS -------------- ¶11. (S) Elliott began the discussion on Section I (General Provisions) by stating that paragraph 6 should be deleted for two reasons. One, that the right to verification was already covered in Treaty Article VII and two, that the timeframe for verification was already covered in each section of the CorE part of the Protocol. Ryzhkov said he understood the logic and agreed; however, he wished to keep the first portion of paragraph 6 bracketed just to be 100 percent sure that the right to verification was included for CorE. Elliott agreed, with the stipulation that if such language existed in treaty Article VII, duplicate language would be deleted in the General Provision Section. Elliott then moved to the brackets in paragraph 4 dealing with exhibitions. He asked Ryzhkov to explain why the Russian side used the term "demonstration." Ryzhkov responded that demonstration, in the Russian language, was a broader term than exhibition and it includes all possibilities. For example, the presentation of photographs or slides in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),a combination of photographs, slides or demonstrations at a operational site, or the presentation of photographs, slides or demonstrations to explain the results of CorE. Elliott explained that in the English language the word exhibition meant the same and that in principle we agreed. Elliott concluded by saying that the U.S. delegation would consult with our lawyers and linguists to help with the wording and that the brackets can be cleared in this paragraph. -------------- SECTION IV: WHO NEEDS CTR -------------- ¶12. (S) Finally Ryzhkov began a discussion of Section IV (Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers) by explaining a new proposal for the elimination of SLBM launchers. He explained that the Russian delegation had accepted the U.S. proposal on removing the launcher hatches and superstructure fairings but added the requirement to remove the gas generator, if equipped. The Russian delegation, however, did not accept the U.S. second procedure to remove the entire missile section. Ryzhkov also stated that, for consistency, the Russian delegation had added a subparagraph "other procedures developed by the party conducting the elimination." During subsequent discussions, Ryzhkov stated he liked the U.S. proposal for when the SLBM launcher was removed from accountability; however, the requirement to remove the entire missile section was excessive. Elliott asked whether the Russian Federation was intending to remove the missile section during final disposition of the submarine. Ryzhkov responded that they did intend to remove the missile section. Elliott then stated his delegation did not understand why the Russian delegation was objecting to procedures they were going to accomplish anyway. Elliott further stated that the United States had made it clear that CTR program funds would be available for these eliminations. Both Ryzhkov and Smirnov reacted negatively to the mention of CTR funds. ¶13. (S) Elliott then asked whether the main issue of contention was the U.S.-proposed time frame for completing the elimination (365 days). Ryzhkov responded that it was not a timing issue (although 5 years was a good time) but rather a technical issue. He stated that SLBM launchers could no longer be used when the hatches and superstructure fairing were removed and that any Navy expert would confirm this fact. With the superstructure fairings removed, any attempt to install an SLBM would result in the missile protruding from the launcher and this could easily be verified by NTM. He further offered that the eliminated launchers would remain visible to NTM and that an inspection team could verify the elimination directly at the ship yard (within the inspection quota.) Elliott stated he well understood the technical aspects of the system and further stressed that some on the U.S. delegation required the complete elimination of the submarine by removal of the missile section. He requested Ryzhkov provide the Russian delegation proposal in a JDT so the United States could study the proposal. Ryzhkov agreed. ¶14. (S) Documents provided: - U.S: -- Joint Draft Text for Section VII of Part III in the Protocol dated November 24, 2009, in the original English with unofficial Russian translation Russian Federation: -- Joint Draft Text for Section III and VII of Part III in the Protocol dated November 24, 2009, in the original Russian with unofficial English translation. -- Joint Draft Text for Section V of Part III in the Protocol dated November 24, 2009, in the original Russian. ¶15. (S) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hopkins (Int) Russia Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS