START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001106 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 2009 REF: GENEVA 01098 (SFO-GVA-VII-024) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-057. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 25, 2009 Time: 11:00 P.M. - 12:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov conducted a Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting on November 25. Gottemoeller discussed details of the meeting to occur that day in Washington between APNSA Jones with Russian NSA Prikhodko, and they compared notes on the results of the recent meeting between CJCS Mullen and Russian CSA Makarov. The HOD also conducted a frank exchange on missile defense and the offense-defense relationship, which Antonov deemed to be the key issue to be resolved before the treaty could be concluded. Gottemoeller reviewed the U.S. proposal for a legally binding arrangement to allay Russian concerns. The HOD also reviewed progress made on the treaty preamble, Article V (Prohibitions),and the treaty structure. End summary. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Mullen-Makarov and Jones-Prikhodko Meetings; Missile Defense and Offense-Defense; Preamble, Article V, and the Treaty Structure. -------------- MULLEN-MAKAROV AND JONES-PRIKHODKO MEETINGS -------------- ¶5. (S) Antonov opened by commenting that Moscow strongly believes the treaty can be done on time by December 5, and that the treaty will be in the interest of both countries. Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for that comment, and in answer to his question, outlined her understanding of the proposed meeting schedule for the Prikhodko visit. She noted Ambassador Ries and Mr. Koshelev would participate in the meetings, except for the one-on-one discussion between Prikhodko and APNSA Jones, which Antonov thought Ambassador Kislyak also would want to attend. Antonov asked if there would be new proposals on the table for the meetings, to which Gottemoeller replied there were already a number of proposals on the table related to various issues, including mobile missiles and telemetry. She stressed the need for the Russian side to be flexible in its approach to these proposals. She noted that Admiral Mullen had also expressed flexibility on the part of the Untied States when he discussed numerical limits on strategic delivery vehicles, if the Russian side would move on mobile ICBM verification and telemetry. ¶6. (S) Looking to what would follow after the meeting, Antonov stated both sides will be calling for an update on the Prikhodko visit. His personal take was that, after the visit of Mullen and Makarov, both sides were now proceeding on the basis that they now know what both sides really want. While both sides may have engaged in tactical sparring, Antonov assured Gottemoeller that for his own part he was being open and sincere and not playing at politics. He was happy for the Thanksgiving Day to give him time to think about the issues and come up with some new ideas for fixing them, and he hoped both sides were doing the same. ¶7. (S) Turning to ABM, Antonov stated missile defense was the key issue in the negotiations. He thought the documents he passed to Gottemoeller would play a key role in the upcoming discussions in Washington (Begin comment: Antonov was referring to Russian-proposed treaty text on the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, a joint statement, and Russian and U.S. unilateral statements on missile defense. See Reftel for reporting and text of the documents passed. End comment.) He wanted to ensure Gottemoeller had had the opportunity to convey these proposals to Washington to ensure they would not be unexpected when raised in discussions. ¶8. (S) Antonov reported he had requested Moscow not to spring any last minute surprises such as coming up with more new ideas to allow for focusing on the existing issues. He also thanked Gottemoeller for her support of the recent visit of Russian Federation Council representatives. He considered the visit to be an unqualified success, and wished such an event had taken place at the beginning of the negotiations process rather than at the end. Looking back on the recent visits of Senators Feinstein and Kyl, Antonov felt he now better understood both and appreciated the role they would play in upcoming treaty ratification, as well as in ties between the U.S. and Russia. ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller noted there were about 14 days left until the deadline for completing the writing of the treaty, and she pushed for the best effort possible to complete the work on time. Antonov joked there were really 28 days, as both sides could work day and night. He went on to assess the Mullen-Makarov and Jones-Prihodko meetings to be key events in the negotiations process, though he worried that they came very late in the game. ¶10. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether there had been any initial comments from Moscow concerning the proposal on mobile missiles advanced by Mullen during his visit. Gottemoeller reminded Antonov of the key items in the U.S. proposal: an offer to notify of exits of missiles from U.S. production facilities, a requirement for 60 hours advance notification of the exit of a missile, and willingness to add unique identifiers (UIDs) to all strategic delivery vehicles (SDV). For his part, Antonov saw the issue of mobile missiles linked to analogous treatment of submarines. Telemetry was also linked, as all of this went to a much broader question of "equivalence." Answering the question, he indicated Moscow will positively examine all U.S. proposals, but he surmised there would probably be no definitive word back from Moscow on either the Mullen-Makarov or Jones-Prikhodko visits until Tuesday at the earliest. Gottemoeller commented sharply that Tuesday would be too late, but Antonov said he would not move without written instructions from Moscow, and as they involved the highest level of the Russian Government, he judged that it would take that long to get them. ¶11. (S) Continuing on the subject of the recent Mullen-Makarov meeting, Antonov thought the visit was helpful for both sides, but he cautioned Gottemoeller that Makarov possessed little authority to make key decisions. He said if Mullen and Makarov had reached an agreement, it would have had to go back to President Medvedev for final decision. He wryly observed that Medevev would probably not be working on such issues this weekend. Antonov also noted the negotiation issues stemming from that visit or the ongoing Prikhodko visit were highly sensitive and could not be discussed over the phone. He said the representatives (i.e., Makarov and Prikhodko) would have to return to Moscow and file a written report, which meant Monday at the earliest. ¶12. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether Chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee Kozachev would be coming to Geneva on Sunday, November 29, as Antonov had previously mentioned. Antonov said he was quite reluctant to encourage visitors to come and "help." He said Russian Military Representative to NATO Army General Aleksey Maslov had also offered to come to Geneva to help where he could. However, such visits took Antonov away from his duties for an entire day, which he assessed to be counterproductive to the overall effort. ¶13. (S) Returning later in the conversation to discuss the Mullen-Makarov visit, Antonov was glad that Makarov was able to come here and see his generals and colonels in action. He left Geneva satisfied with the progress being made, but most important to Antonov was that Makarov left having been afforded an opportunity to think things through. Gottemoeller said she had spoken with Mullen prior to his departure, and Mullen expressed his willingness to return to Geneva or fly to Moscow if it would help to move the negotiations forward. Mullen had also reported to Gottemoeller how Makarov had touched on a proposal for resolving the telemetry issue involving selecting certain launches on which to exchange telemetry, and a provision for encryption with a data key to be provided. Makarov also mentioned, she reported, possible flexibility with regard to the Russian proposal on SDV limits, which had been raised to 650 at the Monday meeting in Geneva. Gottemoeller assessed Makarov's comments as useful developments. -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE AND OFFENSE-DEFENSE -------------- ¶14. (S) Gottemoeller returned to the subject of missile defense and its impact on the relationship between offense and defense. She related how she had conferred with State Department legal advisors and confirmed the proposed joint statement or an exchange of letters would be legally binding and part of the ratification package. Their status as legally binding documents was not only confirmed in U.S. law but by international law. She thought joint statements or an exchange of letters were the most appropriate way to address the offense-defense relationship, as the concept was related to the treaty but not the subject matter of the treaty itself. She emphasized that the document could not be an integral part of the treaty from the U.S. perspective. ¶15. (S) Antonov retorted the offense-defense relationship and telemetry issues were not technical or legal issues but political decisions. He wanted to ensure that the treaty would clearly indicate an ICBM or SLBM launcher could not be reconfigured into an ABM launcher or vice versa. Russia's position on the matter was unchanged, and at least one sentence on the offense-defense relationship must be in the treaty. Antonov articulated the Russian concern about the 3rd missile defense site. (Begin comment: Antonov was referring to the missile defense sites proposed for emplacement in Poland and the Czech Republic. End comment.) He was concerned that a site originally intended for missile defense could be reconfigured to be a forward-deployed ICBM site. He saw this having a direct impact on the correlation of forces. As a result, he pushed hard for language to be inserted into the treaty that banned any reconfiguration between ICBMs and missile defense launchers. ¶16. (S) Gottemoeller underscored that the U.S. proposal for addressing the offense-defense relationship was not to be simply a politically binding statement. She carefully reiterated how the U.S. proposal would be legally binding in the view of both the U.S. and international law. She reported how she had confirmed with Washington to be clear on how the U.S. proposal would be considered. In regards to Antonov's comment about missile defense being a political issue for the Russian Federation, Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that this was also the case for the United States. She pointed out to Antonov that the ultimate goal was not the signature of the document but its entry into force, with the middle step being the ratification process. ¶17. (S) Gottemoeller appreciated how Antonov had come a long way in helping to find a workable solution. She reminded him that the United States for its part had made considerable efforts to find a middle ground. The United States was willing to accept language on missile defense in the preamble. She noted the United States had developed a creative solution to allay Russian concerns, and that abundant precedents exist for the approach being proposed. She reminded him (again) that the proposal to use joint statements or an exchange of letters would be legally binding. She also pointed out the successful use of such a solution in resolving difficult issues related to the conclusion of the START Treaty, among which were treatment of ALCMs and the Backfire bomber. Antonov then concluded the discussion on missile defense by saying that the offense-defense issue would obviously be a top political issue during the endgame, and Russia would not sign the treaty unless it was resolved in its favor. He worried aloud about the potential fallout from the treaty not being signed because missile defense was the single sticking point. He wondered what would need to be done in the way of damage control if such occurred. Gottemoeller said that in that case, she would be reporting back to Washington to ensure her White House colleagues were aware of the issue for the Jones-Prikhodko meetings. Oddly, given his earlier comments, Antonov stated that he would have to try to get his deputy Sergei Koshelev on the phone in Washington, because Sergei Prikhodko would not have been prepared to discuss the issue. -------------- PREAMBLE, ARTICLE V, AND THE TREATY STRUCTURE -------------- ¶18. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov then reviewed the progress made on the preamble. Antonov said one of his assistants was responsible for finding language that would be better phrased in Russian. Antonov also agreed to review the language noting the implementation of the SORT Treaty and the appropriateness of the adjective "successful" in defining the implementation thereof. ¶19. (S) Gottemoeller then told Antonov that she would be preparing some new proposals on Article V in anticipation of the next meeting. Antonov complained that until Gottemoeller was ready to work his offense-defense language, he would not want to work Article V. She reminded him again that time was growing short. Gottemoeller also reported to him that the U.S. delegation leads were unanimous that it would not be possible to combine test ranges and space launch facilities into one all-encompassing term. She also asked for his assistance in getting both sides working off of a treaty structure that contained a single, agreed nomenclature for its subgroups. Antonov agreed to take both issues for action. ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS