START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001105 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 2009 REF: GENEVA 01083 (SFO-GVA-VII-030) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-055. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 25, 2009 Time: 3:40 P.M. - 6:15 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On November 25, 2009, the U.S. and Russian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group chairs met at the Russian Mission. The sides discussed potential dates of the data exchange for the treaty and took the opportunity to address outstanding bracketed issues. Some changes were made to documents that had already been sent for pre-conforming. The Russian side also asked questions regarding the U.S. list of intended declared facilities. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Database Data Exchange; Discussions of Bracketed Text Part I; Sections to Conforming; Discussions of Bracketed Text Part II; Discussion of U.S. Facilities List; and Closing Comments. -------------- DATABASE DATA EXCHANGE -------------- ¶5. (S) Mr. Trout began the discussions by asking Gen Orlov for clarification on when the actual numerical data would be exchanged. Col Petrov replied that data exchange would occur 45 days after the treaty was signed. Trout then hypothesized that if the treaty was signed on December 10, 2009, the data exchange would occur on or about January 25, 2010, and that the sides would probably have to meet in Geneva around January 11, 2010. Additionally, if 45 days is agreed, the opening chapeau should be changed to reflect this. Orlov agreed, and Trout confirmed that he would deliver revised text incorporating these details as soon as possible. -------------- DISCUSSIONS OF BRACKETED TEXT PART I -------------- ¶6. (S) Trout began the discussion of bracketed text by providing the U.S. position on inclusion of data on warheads on individual missiles, explaining that the data helps the inspection team prepare for the inspection. Orlov repeated the Russian position that only aggregate warhead data by base would be included in the MOU and that the inspection team would be provided detailed warhead data during pre-inspection briefings. He asked whether specific warhead data was provided under START. Trout replied that START used warhead attribution rules and did not require specific warhead data for each missile, as it was implied by the attribution rule. Orlov assured Trout that the history and lessons of START showed that both sides could be trusted, and that this extra information did not serve a purpose. Trout recapitulated the U.S. approach, clarifying that the United States was trying to increase the amount of data exchanged in order to increase confidence and transparency and would provide information on those bases that were not inspected. He explained that exchanging this data should improve Russian insight into U.S. forces and assuage over U.S. upload capacity. Orlov repeated that missile warhead loadout data would be provided during inspection briefings and that there was no need to list it in the MOU. No changes were made to the bracketed text. ¶7. (S) Trout asked for an explanation of the Russian concept of "Basing Areas" for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Orlov stated that in this new treaty, Russia drops the idea of "Deployment Areas" and "Restricted Areas" and has replaced it with the concept of an ICBM Base for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs which will include several "Basing Areas." He explained that the geographic coordinates for the area will not change, but noted that inspection procedures will probably change due to new site diagrams. The requirements for those site diagrams will not be the same as in START. Trout asked for clarification--specifically whether the new Russian site diagrams would only include fixed structures. Petrov replied that only the fixed structures would be annotated--all other structures would not be subject to the limitations of the treaty. Trout stated that the U.S. side will accept the Russian language for Basing Areas, but added that he remained concerned about site diagrams and would review this matter with the U.S. delegation. ¶8. (S) Trout returned to previous discussions on how the fixed structures would be handled in the MOU. Referencing the U.S. proposal tabled during the last meeting, Trout again asked whether the Russian side had accepted the proposal that no measurement data for fixed structures would be listed in the MOU annexes in exchange for two photographs of fixed structures, one of the front and one of the side. Orlov stated that the Russian delegation had not yet decided and asked why the photos were necessary. Trout replied that since that is where the mobile launchers would be located and the fixed structures will be eliminated according to procedures agreed upon in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the photos would help inspectors identify them. Petrov asked whether the United States wanted photographs for every single fixed structure, to which Trout replied that since fixed structures are the same at all bases, one set of photographs of the standard fixed structure would be acceptable. Petrov reminded Trout that under START there were two instances where mobile launchers were not housed in fixed structures; however, the Russians would guarantee the launchers will be in the fixed structures during inspection. Trout stated that Petrov's use of Drovyanaya as an example of a place where mobile launchers of ICBMs were not kept in the fixed structures indicated that in the future Russia may again use other buildings to house mobile launchers. Petrov tried to make the argument that the fixed structures are support equipment, but Trout reminded him that they are surveyed launch positions and not support equipment. Orlov stated that the Russian delegation would think about it, but for himself, he would provide the photographs. Pischulov added, in connection to fixed structures, that Russia had accepted the U.S. position to list the number of fixed structures at Basing Areas. ¶9. (S) Trout returned to a discussion continued from the last MOU Working Group meeting regarding the use of the term "returned" with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs at production facilities to differentiate between new and reworked/repaired missiles. He again stated that the term was acceptable if Russia intended to continue the practice of identifying missiles as "returned." Petrov said Russia would continue the practice. Trout stated he would let the Notification Working Group know and that we would drop the brackets at the next meeting. ¶10. (S) Petrov asked to discuss Annex J, starting with identifying which working group should have negotiation responsibility. LT Lobner demurred stating that the U.S. side had not had time to review the recent Russian-proposed text. He stated that Petrov was correct in that there was discussion to move it to the Inspection Protocol Working Group, but that at this time there was no final decision on this matter. Petrov reiterated that it did not matter who deals with Annex J, and stated that the Russian-proposed text modified and simplified the approach from START but not the intent. Lobner replied that the United States was interested in studying the text to see their approach. ¶11. (S) Trout turned to the topic of training models of missiles (TMOMs) and argued that declaring the number of TMOMs at facilities in the MOU would mitigate possible questions that could arise in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) about the number of non-deployed missiles at a facility. For example, if the United States observed seven non-deployed missiles via national technical means (NTM) at a facility that only had five declared missiles in the MOU, the additional MOU data regarding those TMOMs would quickly answer the question why two additional missiles were observed. Petrov stated that the United States would never see a TMOM via NTM and that the numbers of TMOMs at a facility would be provided during inspection pre-briefings. Pischulov added that Russia had dropped its brackets regarding distinguishing features for TMOMs in Annex A, but again reiterated the Russian position regarding the utility of declaring the numbers at facilities. ¶12. (S) A discussion of the U.S. intended declared facilities for space launch facilities (SLF) ensued with Trout reiterating that the United States will not combine test ranges with SLFs. Lobner reiterated the current U.S. position that only Minuteman (MM) III and Trident II will be declared as existing types and consequently, only SLF that launched space launch vehicles utilizing a first stage of one of these existing types would be declared. Trout added that Peacekeeper (PK) missiles would be addressed in an associated letter or similar document which would state the U.S. commitment to eliminate all such launchers. Orlov replied that he was of the opinion that it was decided not to have those types of documents, but after some consultation with his colleagues, agreed that these types of documents probably should exist. He then turned back to the PK issue, stating that there was no misunderstanding regarding the condition of these launchers, but rather that it was interesting that we will not include these systems even though they still exist. Petrov said that besides the 50 Peacekeeper launchers at Warren, there were 65 Peacekeeper missiles at Hill Air Force Base. Petrov then asked, given existence of the Peacekeepers, how could the Peacekeeper not be declared as existing type? Petrov then asked about the U.S. intentions for the Trident I missiles and the MM-II launchers and missiles, specifically two MM-II test launchers at Vandenberg Test Range. Trout reminded the Russians that as they are fond of saying, this is a new Treaty and PK, MM-II, and Trident I are not existing types. Regarding the Russian proposal to merge SLF with test ranges, Trout bluntly stated that the U.S. position to not merge these facilities would not change. -------------- SECTIONS TO CONFORMING -------------- ¶13. (S) After a short break, Mr. Pischulov brought up the status of Annexes A and C, which were in the process of pre-conforming, stating that Russia was suggesting adding a paragraph to Annex C. He then handed a document to Lobner adding that the language for the proposed texts are now similar and ready for conforming. Lobner stated that he would have the text added to the document, but inquired about the title of the section. He argued that the Russian-proposed title did not adequately reflect the data that would be contained in the Annex. After some discussion, Pischulov agreed, and Orlov proposed the title be changed to "Heavy Bomber Armaments Technical Data." Lobner agreed, with the caveat that "nuclear" be added as U.S. bracketed text prior to the word "armaments." -------------- DISCUSSIONS OF BRACKETED TEXT PART II -------------- ¶14. (S) Moving to Annex D, Pischulov stated that the Russian side had identified two categories of facilities that were missing from the paragraph concerning facilities subject to inspection: ICBM repair facilities and repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Lobner accepted the proposed text and stated that the U.S. side had also noted the inadvertent omission and had already added them to the U.S.-proposed text. ¶15. (S) Trout said that the Russian delegation had proposed definitions for deployed heavy bomber, non-deployed heavy bomber, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, and heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments at a Definitions Subgroup Meeting on November 17 (Refel). Trout asked why we could not use the same structure for the heavy bomber section of the MOU. Pischulov said they were provided as a way to capture counting rules, specifically the one warhead attribution counting rules that had recently been proposed. ¶16. (S) Lobner countered that the nomenclature of the bombers, specifically the Russian use of the START categories, was no longer applicable in the new treaty. More importantly, he argued, agreement on the U.S. proposal, which was very similar to the new definitions recently provided by the Russian Federation, could be made independently of the final decisions on counting rules, with some small exceptions, specifically deployed and non-deployed heavy bomber status. Lobner stated that this issue was one that this working group could settle separately from the counting rules. Orlov engaged his colleagues for a few minutes, but stated that the Russian proposal at this time was still connected to resolution of the counting rules. He added, however, that he would study the concept some more. ¶17. (S) Trout moved on to Annex A, pointing out that without measurements for the length of first stages, there was nothing with which to compare a new type. Petrov said that when a new type was developed, the developing party would provide the new data and identify which system to compare it to. Trout asked for clarification: would the other party then measure the existing type and the new type or would the party just rely on data in the MOU. Petrov replied that they proposed taking the MOU data as the basis and then measure the new type. A short discussion followed with Petrov finishing the conversation by stating we will have all the technical data for each ICBM and SLBM in the MOU to declare a new type based on a change in length. The new type will be declared against one of the existing types and distinguishing features will be provided. Trout then quickly addressed the listing of the weight of the fully loaded first stage. Petrov stated that the Russian text had deleted that provision. ¶18. (S) Trout then provided a new Joint Draft Text for Annex D: Other Data Required by the Treaty, which highlighted some of the many changes proposed during the past 6 days. He then offered to quickly go through the changes, but Petrov stated that the Russian side needed time to study it. Trout reminded Petrov that many of the changes were Russian-proposed changes, but agreed to move on to a discussion of the U.S. facilities list, which the Russian side was eager to discuss. -------------- DISCUSSION OF U.S. FACILITIES LIST -------------- ¶19. (S) Pischulov pointed out a couple of translation errors in the U.S. facilities list and then questioned why a number of facilities listed in START were not on the new list (see paragraph 21). Lobner explained that most deletions could be explained by the U.S. position on what constitutes existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Some specific facilities were mentioned that followed this logic. Petrov asked about the Trident training facilities, noting that they were not listed. Lobner replied that a training facility was a "specified" facility, and as such there were no items of inspection located at the two Trident training facilities. The United States had decided that it was not necessary to declare these facilities any longer. Moving back to the issue of types of missiles the United States did not intend to declare as existing types, Pischulov asked how the United States would react if Russia decided not to declare the SS-N-20/Typhoon since it had not been used in a long time. Trout replied that it was an interesting question and that he would think about it. Pischulov suggested that facilities containing deployed and non-deployed SOA should be included. After some more discussion regarding SLBM related facilities, Lobner stated that two types of facilities specifically related to SLBM launchers would require further study. Additionally, after questions regarding the U.S. position on training models of silos at Hill AFB, Lobner replied that the United States would look at the issue. -------------- CLOSING COMMENTS -------------- ¶20. (S) Orlov and Trout agreed to forward Annexes A and C to conforming with the agreed changes but that Annex A would continue to have fixed structures dimensional data bracketed until resolution of the photograph issue. Trout promised to provide the text for the new chapeau including the proposed 45-day reporting window. Trout also stated that he was not sure the working group would have much to discuss on Friday and would call Orlov to discuss whether or not a meeting would be productive. ¶21. (S) Begin text: ¶I. ICBM Related Facilities ICBM Base For Silo Launchers Of ICBMs: Name/Location: F.E. Warren Missile Complex, Wyoming 41-08n, 104-50w Maintenance Facility: Name/Location: F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming 41-08n, 104-50w Name/Location: Malmstrom Missile Complex, Montana 47-30n, 111-10w Maintenance Facility: Name/Location: Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana 47-30n, 111-10w Name/Location: Minot Missile Complex, North Dakota 48-25n, 101-20w Maintenance Facility: Name/Location: Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota 48-25n, 101-20w ICBM Base For Mobile Launchers Of ICBMs: None ICBM Loading Facilities: None Production Facilities For ICBMs: Name/Location: ATK Launch Systems, Inc Promontory, Utah 41-40n, 112-26w Production Facilities For Mobile Launchers Of ICBMs: None Storage Facilities For ICBMs: Name/Location: Camp Navajo, Arizona 35-13n, 111-51w Storage Facilities For Mobile Launchers Of ICBMs: None Repair Facilities For ICBMs: Name/Location: Hill Air Force Base, Utah 41-08n, 112-00w Test Ranges: Name/Location: Vandenberg Air Force Base, California 34-48n, 120-34w Training Facilities: None Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For ICBMs: Name/Location: Oasis Complex, Utah 41-04n, 112-57w Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For Mobile Launchers Of ICBMs: None II. SLBM Related Facilities Submarine Base: Name/Location: Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic Kings Bay, Georgia 30-48n, 081-32w Name/Location: Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific Silverdale, Washington 47-43n, 122-43w SLBM Loading Facilities: None Production Facilities For SLBMs: Name/Location: Alliant Techsystems Inc. Magna-Promontory, Utah 40-40n, 112-06w Production Facilities For Ballistic Missile Submarines: Name/Location: General Dynamics Corporation Electric Boat Division Groton, Connecticut 41-21n, 072-06w Storage Facilities For SLBMs: Name/Location: Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake, California 35-40n, 117-34w Repair Facilities For SLBMs: None Test Ranges: None Training Facilities: None Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For SLBMs: Name/Location: Oasis Complex, Utah 41-04n, 112-57w Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For SLBM Launchers: None III. Heavy Bomber Related Facilities Air Base For Deployed Heavy Bombers: Name/Location: Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana 32-30n, 093-40w Name/Location: Dyess Air Force Base, Texas 32-26n, 099-51w Name/Location: Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota 44-09n, 103-06w Name/Location: Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota 48-25n, 101-21w Name/Location: Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri 38-43n, 093-32w Air Base For Heavy Bombers Equipped For Non-Nuclear Armaments: None Production Facilities For Heavy Bombers: Name/Location: Northrop Plant Palmdale, California 34-39n, 118-05w Storage Facilities For Heavy Bombers: None Repair Facilities For Heavy Bombers: Name/Location: Boeing Plant Wichita, Kansas 37-37n, 097-16w Name/Location: Rockwell Plant Palmdale, California 34-37n, 118-04w Name/Location: Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma 35-25n, 097-23w Heavy Bomber Flight Test Centers: Name/Location: Edwards Air Force Base, California 34-55n, 117-53w Training Facilities: None Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For Heavy Bombers: Name/Location: Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona 32-09n, 110-49w IV. Space Launch Facilities None ¶22. (U) Documents Exchanged: - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed text for Annex D - R.F. -- Russian-proposed text for new paragraph for Annex C ¶23. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Trout Mr. Broshar LT Lobner Mr. Sobchenko (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Col Petrov Col Pischulov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS