START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001099

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
NOVEMEBER 19, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-040.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2009
Time: 3:30 p.m. - 5:15 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The U.S. delegation provided a revised version of the
U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) of Section VI of the
Inspection Protocol (IP). The key point of this new draft
text was the merging of the heavy bomber inspection
procedures contained in the U.S.-proposed text of Section VII
of the IP, Inspections of Heavy Bombers at Operational Bases,
as an approach to address the full set of "Type 1"
inspections. The Parties did a line-by-line review of the
revised JDT. The process moved slowly during which some text
was agreed where concepts were similar, but much remained as
bracketed text. By the end of the meeting the working group
had reviewed about one third of Section VI. End summary.


4. (S) Subject Summary: A Late and Missing Draft;
Inspection Protocol Section VI; and Wrapping Things Up.

--------------
A LATE AND MISSING DRAFT
--------------


5. (S) Col Ilin began the session by stating that the
Russian delegation had just received the revised
U.S.-proposed JDT of IP Section VI (Begin comment: The
translated U.S.-proposed JDT had been delivered to the
Russian Mission the previous day. End comment.) and asked
Dr. Warner if the U.S. delegation had received the Russian
version of the same. Warner said he had not, but since the
U.S.-proposed JDT was in both English and Russian he
suggested that the working group could work from that copy.
Ilin agreed, had copies made of the Russian version of the
JDT and handed a copy to Warner. The line-by-line review of
the U.S.-proposed text proceeded.

--------------
INSPECTION PROTOCOL SECTION VI
--------------


6. (S) Ilin asked if the title of Section VI would include
the purpose of the inspection. Warner stated it would not
but that it would be covered in paragraph 1. The naming of
the inspection remained in brackets but much of the text in
paragraph 1 was agreed.


7. (S) Paragraph 2 concerned the right of the Parties to
conduct inspections at a to-be-agreed-upon number of days
after entry-into-force (EIF) of the treaty. The text was
agreed, however the number of days after EIF remained to be
determined.


8. (S) Paragraph 3 concerned the number of inspections to be


conducted each year. At this point, Ilin reiterated Russia's
position that it would agree on the concept of combined
inspections, a U.S.-proposed hybrid of the Nuclear Warhead
Inspection and Data Update Inspection for operational bases,
only if the United States agreed to lower the number of
inspections from the proposed 14 per treaty year to some
lower quota. Ilin stated that if the United States would not
lower that number the Russian delegation would not support
combined inspections but would only negotiate for separate
inspections at the operational bases. Warner acknowledged
Ilin's statement. Aside from the number of inspections per
year, the text of paragraph 3 was agreed.


9. (S) Paragraph 4 provided for heavy bomber bases to be
temporarily exempt from inspection in infrequent cases and
for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. Ilin asked if
this was the same as force majeure to which Warner replied it
was not. Ilin then asked for an example. Warner cited the
B-2 strikes made on Al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan following
the September 11, 2001, attacks as a prime example for
exempting a heavy bomber base. Warner said that the
precedent for this provision was previously provided for
under START. Referring to the U.S. position on potential
uses of ICBMs or SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration, Ilin
asked if the United States had envisioned using this
provision for ICBM or SLBM bases. Warner responded that this
paragraph only covered heavy bombers. Ilin asked whether
this would include major strategic exercises. Warner stated
that it would not, and that the START provision for exempting
heavy bomber bases for major strategic exercises had been
intentionally not included in the START Follow-on treaty.
Ilin stated that the proposed provision would have to be
caveated with time limitations and could not apply to ICBM or
SLBM bases if the Russian side were to accept it. The
paragraph remained bracketed.


10. (S) Paragraph 5 addressed the time for the designation
of the inspection site. This paragraph was agreed with the
exception of the name of the location where pre-inspection re
strictions procedures would be located. (Begin comment: The
U.S. text uses "Part 6 to the Technical Annex," and the
Russian text uses "Annex 6 to this Protocol." End comment.)
The location reference remained bracketed.


11. (S) Paragraph 6 concerned the concentration of road
mobile launchers following site designation and was left
bracketed as U.S.-proposed text as the Russian delegation is
firm on their position that road mobile launchers should have
no special treatment in the new treaty.


12. (S) Paragraph 7 detailed what data would be confirmed at
ICBM, submarine, and heavy bomber bases. Although some text
was agreed, the substantive data remained bracketed pending
agreement on the special treatment of road mobile launchers
and the definition of non-deployed launchers. Additionally,
the inspection of the heavy bomber nuclear armament weapon
storage areas remained bracketed U.S.-proposed text. Russia
did not, at this time, envision inspections taking place
within these areas.


13. (S) Paragraph 8(a) outlined the items that the inspected
party would be briefed during the pre-inspection briefing at
an ICBM base. Significant agreement was reached on what data


would be briefed; however any data referring to road mobile
launchers, the definition of a "considered to contain"
launcher, or support equipment was left as bracketed text to
be worked out at a later date. Additionally, Col Petrov
stated that since the definition of site diagram was not yet
agreed by the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group, the
IP Working Group should leave any references to site diagrams
as bracketed text. Warner asked when the United States
should expect to receive the Russian proposal to Annex J.
Ilin and Petrov implied that it would not be discussed until
January.


14. (S) Paragraph 8(b) outlined the items that the inspected
party would be briefed during the pre-inspection briefing at
a submarine base. Again, agreement was reached on minor
aspects of verbiage; however, an impasse was reached when the
Russian delegation insisted on language which would include
the inspection of SSGN submarines. Warner stated that it was
the U.S. position that the SSGN would not be subject to
inspection under the START Follow-on treaty as it was not a
deployed SOA and could not launch an SLBM. Ilin asserted
that in the view of Russia it was SOA and therefore required
inspection. The text on deployed SLBM launchers remained
bracketed along with references to coastlines and waters
diagrams as that concept had not been worked out by the
Memorandum of Understanding Working Group.

--------------
WRAPPING THINGS UP
--------------


15. (S) Ilin stated that the working group had reached a
good place to stop for the day. The group could start with
heavy bomber briefing items at the next meeting.



16. (U) Documents exchanged:

- Russia:

-- Russian version of Inspection Protocol Section VI,
dated November 18, 2009.


17. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov


Col Petrov
Ms. Vodopolova
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS