START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001099 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, NOVEMEBER 19, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-040. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2009 Time: 3:30 p.m. - 5:15 p.m. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The U.S. delegation provided a revised version of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol (IP). The key point of this new draft text was the merging of the heavy bomber inspection procedures contained in the U.S.-proposed text of Section VII of the IP, Inspections of Heavy Bombers at Operational Bases, as an approach to address the full set of "Type 1" inspections. The Parties did a line-by-line review of the revised JDT. The process moved slowly during which some text was agreed where concepts were similar, but much remained as bracketed text. By the end of the meeting the working group had reviewed about one third of Section VI. End summary. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: A Late and Missing Draft; Inspection Protocol Section VI; and Wrapping Things Up. -------------- A LATE AND MISSING DRAFT -------------- ¶5. (S) Col Ilin began the session by stating that the Russian delegation had just received the revised U.S.-proposed JDT of IP Section VI (Begin comment: The translated U.S.-proposed JDT had been delivered to the Russian Mission the previous day. End comment.) and asked Dr. Warner if the U.S. delegation had received the Russian version of the same. Warner said he had not, but since the U.S.-proposed JDT was in both English and Russian he suggested that the working group could work from that copy. Ilin agreed, had copies made of the Russian version of the JDT and handed a copy to Warner. The line-by-line review of the U.S.-proposed text proceeded. -------------- INSPECTION PROTOCOL SECTION VI -------------- ¶6. (S) Ilin asked if the title of Section VI would include the purpose of the inspection. Warner stated it would not but that it would be covered in paragraph 1. The naming of the inspection remained in brackets but much of the text in paragraph 1 was agreed. ¶7. (S) Paragraph 2 concerned the right of the Parties to conduct inspections at a to-be-agreed-upon number of days after entry-into-force (EIF) of the treaty. The text was agreed, however the number of days after EIF remained to be determined. ¶8. (S) Paragraph 3 concerned the number of inspections to be conducted each year. At this point, Ilin reiterated Russia's position that it would agree on the concept of combined inspections, a U.S.-proposed hybrid of the Nuclear Warhead Inspection and Data Update Inspection for operational bases, only if the United States agreed to lower the number of inspections from the proposed 14 per treaty year to some lower quota. Ilin stated that if the United States would not lower that number the Russian delegation would not support combined inspections but would only negotiate for separate inspections at the operational bases. Warner acknowledged Ilin's statement. Aside from the number of inspections per year, the text of paragraph 3 was agreed. ¶9. (S) Paragraph 4 provided for heavy bomber bases to be temporarily exempt from inspection in infrequent cases and for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. Ilin asked if this was the same as force majeure to which Warner replied it was not. Ilin then asked for an example. Warner cited the B-2 strikes made on Al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attacks as a prime example for exempting a heavy bomber base. Warner said that the precedent for this provision was previously provided for under START. Referring to the U.S. position on potential uses of ICBMs or SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration, Ilin asked if the United States had envisioned using this provision for ICBM or SLBM bases. Warner responded that this paragraph only covered heavy bombers. Ilin asked whether this would include major strategic exercises. Warner stated that it would not, and that the START provision for exempting heavy bomber bases for major strategic exercises had been intentionally not included in the START Follow-on treaty. Ilin stated that the proposed provision would have to be caveated with time limitations and could not apply to ICBM or SLBM bases if the Russian side were to accept it. The paragraph remained bracketed. ¶10. (S) Paragraph 5 addressed the time for the designation of the inspection site. This paragraph was agreed with the exception of the name of the location where pre-inspection re strictions procedures would be located. (Begin comment: The U.S. text uses "Part 6 to the Technical Annex," and the Russian text uses "Annex 6 to this Protocol." End comment.) The location reference remained bracketed. ¶11. (S) Paragraph 6 concerned the concentration of road mobile launchers following site designation and was left bracketed as U.S.-proposed text as the Russian delegation is firm on their position that road mobile launchers should have no special treatment in the new treaty. ¶12. (S) Paragraph 7 detailed what data would be confirmed at ICBM, submarine, and heavy bomber bases. Although some text was agreed, the substantive data remained bracketed pending agreement on the special treatment of road mobile launchers and the definition of non-deployed launchers. Additionally, the inspection of the heavy bomber nuclear armament weapon storage areas remained bracketed U.S.-proposed text. Russia did not, at this time, envision inspections taking place within these areas. ¶13. (S) Paragraph 8(a) outlined the items that the inspected party would be briefed during the pre-inspection briefing at an ICBM base. Significant agreement was reached on what data would be briefed; however any data referring to road mobile launchers, the definition of a "considered to contain" launcher, or support equipment was left as bracketed text to be worked out at a later date. Additionally, Col Petrov stated that since the definition of site diagram was not yet agreed by the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group, the IP Working Group should leave any references to site diagrams as bracketed text. Warner asked when the United States should expect to receive the Russian proposal to Annex J. Ilin and Petrov implied that it would not be discussed until January. ¶14. (S) Paragraph 8(b) outlined the items that the inspected party would be briefed during the pre-inspection briefing at a submarine base. Again, agreement was reached on minor aspects of verbiage; however, an impasse was reached when the Russian delegation insisted on language which would include the inspection of SSGN submarines. Warner stated that it was the U.S. position that the SSGN would not be subject to inspection under the START Follow-on treaty as it was not a deployed SOA and could not launch an SLBM. Ilin asserted that in the view of Russia it was SOA and therefore required inspection. The text on deployed SLBM launchers remained bracketed along with references to coastlines and waters diagrams as that concept had not been worked out by the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group. -------------- WRAPPING THINGS UP -------------- ¶15. (S) Ilin stated that the working group had reached a good place to stop for the day. The group could start with heavy bomber briefing items at the next meeting. ¶16. (U) Documents exchanged: - Russia: -- Russian version of Inspection Protocol Section VI, dated November 18, 2009. ¶17. (S) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Mr. DeNinno Maj Johnson LTC Leyde Ms. Pura Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Ivanov Col Petrov Ms. Vodopolova Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS