START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001096 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S. RECEPTION FOR CODEL, NOVEMBER 12, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-018. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2009 Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The U.S. delegation to the START Follow-on (SFO) negotiations hosted a reception on November 12, 2009, in honor of the visit to U.S. Mission Geneva of Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and John Kyl (R-AZ). Also present were the Senators' two staffers, U.S. delegation members and experts, and Russian delegation members and experts. Discussions at the reception covered the U.S.- and Russian-proposed limits on delivery vehicles, Russian reaction to Jones' visit to Moscow in October, the mechanics of bridging the period between the expiration of START and the entry-into-force of the new treaty, the significance of verification in the new treaty, whether the sides would benefit from START experience in applying certain technical procedures in SFO, and the status of agreeing on a closeout exchange of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data under START. End Summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: SFO Treaty Limits; U.S. Tactics Upset Russian Delegation; Seeking Forward Movement, Not Backward; Legal and Legislative Perspectives on Bridging; Purpose of Verification; Tridents in Loading Tubes - What to Expect?; Trident II NWI - A Hardcover Dilemma; No Time for Final JCIC - Status of START Closeout MOU; Arms Control Beyond START Follow-On. -------------- SFO TREATY LIMITS -------------- ¶5. (S) LT Sicks asked General Poznihir for the Russian rationale for such a low proposed strategic delivery vehicle (SDV) limit, since it would encourage MIRVing. Poznihir responded that SDVs actually were the destabilizing item in the nuclear realm. Mr. Colby countered that MIRVing missiles was traditionally considered more destabilizing. Col Zaitsev then stated warheads meant nothing if they did not have a missile to fly on, and he said that the United States seemed to only care about warheads. Russia, he claimed, chose an SDV limit that forced true reductions while the United States chose a SDV limit that suited the current U.S. force structure. (Begin comment: Broadly, the Russian participants did not appear willing to engage on this level. It seemed that they did not accept even in principle the notion that land-based MIRVed ICBMs were destabilizing.) -------------- U.S. TACTICS UPSET RUSSIAN DELEGATION -------------- ¶6. (S) Mr. Koshelev told Mr. Taylor that APNSA General Jones' trip to Moscow had created a great deal of discomfort on the Russian delegation. Koshelev was very uncomfortable with the response the delegation had to give to the proposal Jones had made. The number of 550 strategic delivery vehicles was not what had been recommended by the delegation. Furthermore, with the U.S. response characterizing disappointment with Russia's response to the offer, all decisions were now being made in Moscow. Hopefully, the delegations would be able to get back to work resolving issues the following week after the two Presidents met in Singapore on November 15. (Begin comment: The meeting between the two Presidents was on the margins of the APEC conference. End comment.) ¶7. (S) Mr. Shevchenko stated a number of times to Colby the United States had made a serious mistake by taking the package proposal to Moscow. He believed this U.S. action had taken discretion out of the Russian delegation's hands by pushing negotiations to a political level. He further said that there was little the delegation could do now other than follow the specific direction of the Russian President. -------------- SEEKING FORWARD MOVEMENT, NOT BACKWARD -------------- ¶8. (S) Taylor told Koshelev that he was disappointed at the results of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group meeting on November 11, 2009, where it appeared that agreed text was being questioned by the Russian lawyer because she did not like the text as it had been conformed in the START Treaty. Taylor cautioned that the Parties did not have time for this kind of discussion. The Parties should make better use of their time discussing and agreeing on substance rather than trying to find pretty words. Taylor was very concerned that the ratification process would prove very difficult if concepts taken from the START Treaty would use different text to explain the provisions. The U.S. Senate would question the change, wanting to know what was different. Koshelev said he agreed. He observed there were individuals who wanted to make such changes in the text, but he was working hard to prevent such diversions. -------------- - LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON BRIDGING -------------- - ¶9. (S) Mr. Brown and Mr. Lobach noted they had just finished a discussion of Russian law concerning the requirement for Duma approval of certain types of international agreements, including those dealing with military forces, disarmament and verification. Kyl asked whether the issue of granting privileges and immunities was within the purview of the Duma under this law; Lobach responded in the affirmative, adding that, if the Russian Government wanted the legislature to approve an agreement on this subject, he had no doubt the legislature would do it; it could be done relatively quickly, but would ultimately be a legislative action. Kyl noted there was a bill before the Senate specifically addressing privileges and immunities of Russian inspectors who might come to the United States, and he stressed the importance of not having a gap in the rights and obligations of both sides with respect to their strategic relationship, for political reasons. (Begin comment: Kyl was referring to the bill "S.2727, the START I Treaty Inspections and Monitoring Protocol Continuation Act of 2009," submitted by Senator Lugar on November 5, 2009. End comment.) -------------- PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION -------------- ¶10. (S) In discussion with legal advisers Brown and Lobach, Senator Kyl cited his legal career prior to his election to Congress as providing a framework for his approach to international agreements: that the rules should be clear as to what was expected. He explained his view that detailed verification provisions were not just for adversaries who did not trust each other but were also to ensure that neighbors remained friendly, quoting Robert Frost that "good fences make good neighbors." Brown, noting that he was from the same state as Frost, commented to Lobach that fences in New Hampshire were actually quite low but were desirable to provide predictability and thus avoid disputes and ambiguity, thereby keeping the neighbors friendly. Lobach responded that fences in Russia were not normally low but were used specifically to keep people out of areas where they did not belong. -------------- TRIDENTS IN LOADING TUBES - WHAT TO EXPECT? -------------- ¶11. (S) LCDR Feliciano opened the discussion with Col Petrov regarding inspection expectations for the new treaty. Feliciano asked whether the Navy should expect the same inspection issue surrounding Tridents in loading tubes as had occurred under START. Petrov acknowledged the issue was complex under START, but went on to explain how the current delegation had the benefit of 15 years of START inspections in moving forward with the new treaty. Petrov stated he understood the hardship placed on the sailors and others who must go through the long process of removing a Trident II from a loading tube. He said the process would not only put a strain on the people, but on the base as well. Petrov went on to say the proposed combined inspection would further put a strain on the people, base and submarine. ¶12. (S) Feliciano stated that not having to remove a Trident from a loading tube would help with the combined inspection timeline. Petrov agreed and stated the combined inspection concept was even more burdensome on the escorts than on the inspectors. Removing a Trident from its loading tube would put additional stress on the base because since it would prolong the inspection. Under the Russian concept, the non-deployed Tridents would be located in storage bunkers. Inspectors would only inspect them during an inspection of non-deployed SOA; it would put less stress on the base, since SLBMs on submarines would not be inspected. Feliciano asked whether Russia would plan to carry out the same Trident II inspection procedures or whether there was a better way. Petrov stated he was confident the inspection team could continue to confirm missile type using the combination of the technical data in the MOU and the photos already provided by the Navy. ¶13. (S) Feliciano asked whether 15 years of inspecting Tridents in loading tubes under START could substitute for a technical exhibition under the new treaty. Petrov nodded in agreement while stating the missile type removed from the loading tube was confirmed as a Trident II almost every time when compared to the reference aid pictures. Mr. DeNinno asked Petrov what he meant by "almost" and for specifics on times Petrov thought the Trident II had not matched the photos. Petrov admitted there was only one inspection when the inspected Trident II had not matched the photos and only because the TRIDENT II was rotated on the stand in comparison with the photo. Feliciano stated he would provide feedback to Navy to ensure it did not occur again. -------------- TRIDENT II NWI - A HARDCOVER DILEMMA -------------- ¶14. (S) Feliciano stated the Navy was already thinking about how to implement the new procedures associated with nuclear warhead inspections (NWIs),and explained it was possible inspection teams would see the same reentry vehicle hardcover as under START or a modified version of the hardcover. Petrov stated the aim of the NWI was to confirm the number of warheads actually deployed on a particular missile, including whether a missile had no deployed warheads. Petrov informed Feliciano and DeNinno he had personally done the calculations to determine whether the number of U.S. deployed warheads was under 2200 as the United States had briefed at the last Moscow Treaty Bilateral Implementation Commission. According to his calculation, the number of U.S. warheads was not below ¶2200. He went on to explain the Trident II hardcover made it difficult to calculate the actual numbers of warheads on a Trident II. DeNinno mentioned START was based on attribution and the United States had similar concerns about the large covers used on the SS-25 and SS-27 ICBMs. Petrov acknowledged the point and explained Russia had used a conformal soft cover during the recent reentry vehicle inspection in Teykovo which had allowed inspectors to confirm and resolve a long-standing issue (Petrov and DeNinno had been present for that inspection). He explained a conformal soft cover made it easier to confirm actual warheads deployed. Petrov said the method the sides used to cover warheads under SFO would be an important issue. He went on to explain that the current Trident hardcover posed some doubt about how many warheads were actually deployed. Feliciano said he would take that feedback to the people implementing the inspections on the U.S. side. -------------- -------------- NO TIME FOR FINAL JCIC - STATUS OF START CLOSEOUT MOU -------------- -------------- ¶15. (S) Koshelev asked Taylor whether the United States had heard anything from the other JCIC Parties about the U.S. proposal to have a close-out MOU for the START Treaty. Taylor said he was not aware of any responses, and that he had just received a copy of the proposal from Washington. Koshelev said the Ambassador from Belarus had asked him that day what Belarus should do with regard to the proposal, and thus Koshelev was seeking Taylor's view of whether or not there would be a JCIC. ¶16. (S) Taylor said he did not believe there would be time for a full JCIC session given the anticipated pace of work that would be necessary on the SFO Treaty. Taylor asked Koshelev whether it would be possible for Brown and Kotkova to conform the document, get it ready for signature, and then ask representatives in Geneva from the Missions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to sign the document on instructions from their Governments. Koshelev said he did not believe Belarus or Kazakhstan would be willing to take on such a task. Nikonenko would likely want to come to Geneva instead of relying on the Ukrainian Mission. Taylor asked Koshelev whether the document could be signed in capitals, that is, once the United States and Russia had agreed on the text, whether it would be possible to send the document through diplomatic channels for signature. Koshelev said he felt that would the best way short of a JCIC session to get the document signed. Taylor asked Koshelev whether he had any concerns with the document. He said that Col Ryzkov would have some comments, but he was not certain the extent of those comments. -------------- ARMS CONTROL BEYOND START FOLLOW-ON -------------- ¶17. (S) Colby discussed arms control policy and European security matters with ADM Kuznetsov (Ret). Kuznetsov offered a different take on arms control between the United States and Russia, arguing for greater flexibility and noting the United States had not sought formal arms control agreements with Great Britain or France. The two Parties, he argued, should design their forces as they saw fit while seeking to cooperate on broader security matters. Kuznetsov also dismissed recent calls (presumably including by President Medvedev) for broader European security architecture to replace CFE, NATO, et. al., and argued the current security architecture worked quite well for all concerned. He noted he would have no wish for Russia to enter into NATO and therefore have to deal with all the committees in Brussels. ¶18. (S) Kuznetsov offered Colby his assessment of Russia's view on nuclear abolition. Speaking apparently for himself, Kuznetsov described the idea with a common colorful epithet. Konstantin Vorontsov noted there were differences on this point between the MOD and the MFA. Kuznetsov pointed out abolition would be complicated by the fact that there were many nuclear powers, not just the United States and Russia, and reminded his interlocutors of the cold but effective peace that nuclear weapons had secured since World War II. ¶19. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS