START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001091 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-067. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 28, 2009 Time: 3:00 P.M. - 4:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller led the U.S. delegation in a Plenary session with the Russian delegation, led by Ambassador Antonov. The Russian side had called the meeting on short notice in order to deliver a new proposal for resolution of outstanding issues that had been approved by Moscow earlier in the day. Antonov described the proposal as a "package" offer and Russia's "final" offer "for the negotiations." ¶4. (S) The Russian proposal included some movement towards U.S. positions on counting rules and overall treaty limits, but presented significant problems on missile defense and the offense-defense relationship, telemetry, verification of mobile launchers and their ICBMs, and the verification regime more broadly. Gottemoeller and other members of the U.S. delegation expressed concern with elements of the proposal, but deferred a fuller response until after further review. End summary. ¶5. (S) Subject Summary: Antonov Previews and Comments on the Russian Package Proposal; Antonov Delivers the Russian Package Proposal; Involvement of Capitals; U.S. Reaction; and Exchange on Offense-Defense and Missile Defense. -------------- -------------- ANTONOV PREVIEWS AND COMMENTS ON THE RUSSIAN PACKAGE PROPOSAL -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Ambassador Antonov opened the meeting by emphasizing the Russian delegation's intention to complete the treaty by December 5 or "the beginning of December." Noting the meetings between Admiral Mullen and General Makarov and between APSNA Jones and NSA Prikhodko, Antonov said he was pleased that high-ranking decision makers in Washington and 
Moscow understood the issues at hand. He explained that the Russian delegation had followed these meetings by preparing a package proposal for review by Moscow, and earlier that day had received Moscow's approval to table the offer. Antonov underlined that the proposal was a package and that he had been specifically instructed to convey that it was the "final" proposal "for the negotiations." He commented that the proposal was based on the principles of equality and mutual respect and that the Russian delegation had striven to accommodate U.S. positions. ¶7. (S) Before delving into the substance, Antonov highlighted several key elements of the package proposal. On the verification of mobile launchers and their ICBMs, he stated that the Russians could agree to additional verification measures, provided that such measures were applied to the same extent to all strategic offensive arms (SOA). Despite this shift in their position, he affirmed that their "fundamental approach" was "intact." ¶8. (S) On telemetry, Antonov described the Russian revised proposal as a "good will gesture" and an opportunity to bridge the disagreements on the matter. He referred to Russian acceptance of the "hybrid" approach to counting rules, specifically with respect to the concept of "deployed" SOA. He asserted that the Russian delegation had "drastically" changed its proposed ceilings on warheads and strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). On missile defense, he claimed that Russia had "accommodated" the U.S. position on the interrelationship between offense and defense and had agreed with the U.S. approach to dealing with the quandary. He also stated that Russia had agreed with the U.S. approach regarding ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration. ¶9. (S) He once again affirmed that the Russian position, despite the revisions contained in the proposal, remained intact. He warned that, if the problems were not resolved, the package solution would make no sense. He closed the preview by asserting that the proposal was "constructive." -------------- ANTONOV DELIVERS THE RUSSIAN PACKAGE PROPOSAL -------------- ¶10. (S) Antonov then presented the Russian proposal. Begin text of official translation of Russian counterproposal: OFFICIAL TRANSLATION Releasable to the U.S. side Document of the Russian side November 28, 2009 Proposal of the Russian Federation on Fundamental Issues of the New START ¶1. Numerical limits on strategic offensive arms and counting rules: - Warhead limit: 1600 - Strategic delivery vehicle limit: 650-700 One warhead shall be counted for each heavy bomber. ¶2. Non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs References to nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads shall be removed from the text of the Treaty. Non-nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms shall be counted against the overall limit on deployed warheads. All non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs shall be counted against the overall limit for strategic delivery vehicles. The U.S. side shall confirm that it is not possible for heavy bombers, converted for non-nuclear armaments, to use nuclear armaments. ¶3. The relationship between strategic offensive arms and missile defense: The relationship between strategic offensive arms and missile defense shall be recorded in a package of documents, which will form future agreements (treaty, joint statement/understanding and unilateral statements of the Russian Federation and the United States). In addition, all elements of the package shall be legally binding. The following obligations shall be included in the text of the Treaty itself: Not to convert or use ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein and not to convert or use missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. Not to give missile defense interceptors the capabilities of ICBMs and SLBMs. The following provisions shall be recorded in a joint statement/understanding: Regarding signature of the Treaty under the circumstances that the sides have strategic missile defense systems; Regarding the intention of the sides to discuss unique distinguishing features of newly developed types of missile defense interceptors from existing ICBMs and SLBMs; Regarding agreement in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (to be established under the terms of the Treaty) on procedures for confirming the presence of such differences. The statements of the Russian Federation and the United States regarding the viability of the treaty shall include the possibility to withdraw from it in the event of a quantitative or qualitative buildup of missile defense systems by one of the Parties. ¶4. Verification regime for mobile ICBMs By mutual agreement of the Parties, additional verification measures for strategic offensive arms may be established. Such measures shall be applied equally to SLBMs, ICBMs, and ICBMs for mobile launchers. The Russian Federation shall provide data on the boundaries of deployment areas for ICBMs for mobile launchers. In order to confirm data on mobile launchers of ICBMs located on an ICBM base, US inspectors shall be given the opportunity to view one of the fixed structures within the basing area for which the mobile launcher of ICBMs is absent at that time. In order to confirm elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs, a special mark, which can be verified during an inspection at a strategic offensive arms elimination site, will be placed on the chassis of eliminated launchers and the eliminated launchers of ICBMs shall be made available to NTMV for 60 days. Eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. The U.S. side shall, for its part, withdraw all other demands related to ICBMs for mobile launchers, including the requirement for inspectors to be present during the elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs and ICBMs for mobile launchers. ¶5. Telemetry: An agreed quantity of telemetry information (TI) on test launches of ICBMs and SLBMs may be exchanged by mutual agreement of the sides on the basis of parity. Information shall be provided on recording media of an agreed type prepared by the transmitting side. The sides shall have the right to encrypt information in a specific number of instances - up to four launches per year for each type of missile. The U.S. side shall undertake the obligation to provide TI on ICBM and SLBM launches, including launches of Trident-II SLBMs from SSBNs of the United Kingdom, and shall make a unilateral statement on the non-use of TI provided by the Russian Federation in the interest of missile defense. ¶6. Verification mechanism: All types of strategic offensive arms, regardless of their basing modes, and launch canisters of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be marked with unique identifiers (UIDs) reflected in the database and subject to inspection during inspections of all types. The Russian side shall provide, 48 hours in advance, notification of the exit of an ICBM from the Votkinsk production facility. The U.S. side shall provide, 48 hours in advance, analogous notifications of the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from production facilities for solid fuel missiles. An appropriate notification of the arrival of a missile at an ICBM base, SLBM base or at a location for non-deployed missiles shall be provided. There shall be no verification of armaments for HBs at air base storage facilities. The number of mandatory inspections per year shall not exceed 16. Within the framework of inspections conducted to confirm the core limitations of the Treaty (the number of deployed delivery vehicles and warheads),non-deployed missiles located at maintenance facilities of the ICBM base or SSBN base will also be verified. Up to two inspection events per year may be conducted at one SOA facility. There shall be no more than two such facilities. The U.S. side shall afford Russian inspection teams the opportunity to conduct mandatory periodic inspections of SLBM launchers converted to use SLCMs and of heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments and to verify significant differences of ICBMs and SLBMs from missile defense interceptors as well as ICBM and SLBM launchers from missile defense interceptor launchers. An obligation of the Parties to provide notification of the movement of HBs equipped for non-nuclear armaments beyond the national territory shall be recorded in the Treaty. Additional limitations on non-deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers as well as on non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be established. End text. -------------- INVOLVEMENT OF CAPITALS -------------- ¶11. (S) Antonov then handed over copies of the proposal, commenting that the U.S. side would find familiar positions incorporated therein. He claimed that the proposal reflected the first time the Russian delegation had: accepted a reference to Votkinsk, moved on telemetry, given ground on the verification of mobile launchers and their ICBMs, and conceded on the verification regime. He emphasized that agreeing to the package offer was very hard for the Russian delegation, and hoped that the "constructive" proposals would be received and entertained well in Washington. He specifically urged that Washington take into account the Russian position on the interrelationship between SOA and strategic defensive arms (SDA). He also reaffirmed that the proposal constituted a package and emphasized that it was a final offer. ¶12. (S) Antonov further explained that Moscow had given him and the delegation the authority to clear up the text in order to prepare a treaty for signature by December 5. He continued that he did not expect any high-ranking officials to travel to Geneva from Moscow to aid the delegation, commenting that the capabilities and effectiveness of the delegation had been confirmed by President Medvedev, who had given them the authority to finalize issues remaining in light of the package proposal. Antonov suggested that the working groups would be the right venues to work out such technical aspects. He closed by stating that Moscow expected only a simple answer from Geneva regarding the proposal, not further deliberation. ¶13. (S) Gottemoeller thanked the Russian side for its proposal, noting that it reflected the high-level meetings of the preceding week. She commented that high-ranking officials from both sides could well be expected to play a role in the upcoming negotiations, and judged that this would be a beneficial influence. -------------- U.S. REACTION -------------- ¶14. (S) Turning to the proposal, Gottemoeller stated that the offer would receive immediate attention in Washington. She began by stating that she understood well the role of packages in negotiations, and noted that the Russian proposal was comprehensive. She also welcomed that the Russian side had taken note of key U.S. issues, especially telemetry and the verification of mobile systems. She also took note of the "steady development" of the Russian position on the treaty central limits, assessing it as "very welcome." She also acknowledged the Russian mention of Votkinsk, and likewise expressed appreciation for that. ¶15. (S) That said, Gottemoeller said that it was apparent that the two sides still had "clashing" views on some issues. She pledged that the U.S. side would undertake a careful assessment of the Russian proposal before any full response, but invited members of the U.S. delegation to comment or ask questions. She reserved, however, the first question for herself, which was a request for an explanation regarding how the Russian side reconciled its proposal regarding sharing telemetry data from British Trident II D-5 tests with the "long-agreed" approach regarding existing patterns of cooperation. ¶16. (S) Antonov responded that their proposal did not damage the common understanding that cooperation with third parties was not the subject of the treaty. He emphasized that they did not seek to interfere with the U.S. pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom. But, he described, the Russian side had repeatedly expressed its concern that this pattern of cooperation could be used to circumvent key elements of the treaty. If, he argued, the Parties agreed on telemetry exchanges on a basis of parity then the Parties could not have the opportunity to violate the principles of the treaty, especially equivalency. He added that the Russian delegation wanted a guarantee that exchanges of telemetric information could not be used to undermine treaty provisions, clarifying that the Russian delegation was particularly concerned that the United States could unfairly profit from the results of British tests of the Trident II. He noted also that the Russian legal advisors had analyzed this proposal in light of the Presidents' Joint Statement of July 6 and ruled that it would not impinge upon the protections of existing patterns of cooperation provided for in sub-paragraph 9 of that Statement. Separately, Antonov stated that the Russians would also want guarantees that information derived from telemetric exchanges would not be used for strategic missile defenses. Such usage would damage Russia's strategic deterrent capabilities. ¶17. (S) Gottemoeller commented that such proposals seemed to contradict the protections afforded to patterns of cooperation, especially given that the United States did not exercise control over British flight testing. She emphasized that such requirements would violate Antonov's rule of equivalency by imposing a unilateral burden on the United States with respect to its relationship with the United Kingdom. ¶18. (S) Dr. Warner then sought the justification behind the Russian proposal that the United States provide advance notification of the exit of both ICBMs and SLBMs from a production facility while the proposal only required that Russia provide notification of the exit of ICBMs in such circumstances. After an exchange in which General Poznikhir explained that the Russian objectives was to include all solid-fueled ballistic missiles in the requirement, he and Warner engaged in an exchange regarding the implications of equality in this instance. ¶19. (S) Mr. Trout then asked for clarification regarding the Russian proposal to allow for four encrypted launches for each "type" of ballistic missile. Poznikhir responded that each type of ballistic missile, such as an SS-25, RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) and RS-24 would each be permitted four encrypted launches per year. ¶20. (S) Trout then asked whether the proposed SDV ceiling included non-deployed as well as deployed systems. Antonov answered that the limit only included deployed SDVs. ¶21. (S) Warner pointed out that the Russian proposal needed to clarify that references to counting non-nuclear warheads under overall limits. Poznikhir agreed. ¶22. (S) Antonov then interjected that such technical issues could be addressed in the working groups. -------------- -- EXCHANGE ON OFFENSE-DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- -- ¶23. (S) Gottemoeller then raised the issue of the package of documents that had been proposed to address the issues related to the offense-defense relationship. She noted that the sides had discussed providing for the Parties to explain the distinguishing features of missile defense interceptors in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). In this light, she stated that it surprised the U.S. side to see the Russian delegation proposing inspections of missile defense interceptors, a proposal which was "new" and "surprising," and represented a new way of treating the issue. It did not, she made clear, seem a step towards resolving the issue. ¶24. (S) Antonov retorted that he was disappointed in the initial U.S. reaction because missile defense constituted one of the "fundamental, key" interests for Russia. He described the U.S. side as routinely calling attention to its interests, such as on Votkinsk, telemetry, and the inspections of mobile systems, but, when the Russian side raised its key issue of the offense-defense relationship and missile defense, the U.S. side, he contended, was not willing to consider any steps towards the Russian position. He emphasized that the resolution of this matter would have a major impact onQussia, and so he felt bound to Qress this, stating that he was ready to discuss the issue further. ¶25. (S) He then proclaimed that he wanted to note then that the U.S. side had rejected all Russian proposals to insert SOA-SDA language into the treaty text. He recounted that this proposal was the second such package the Russian side had offered since APNSA Jones' presentation of the U.S. proposal in Moscow. He exclaimed that the words he had heard the U.S. side use could not be employed in diplomacy. Underscoring that the Russian side had made many concessions, he once again urged the U.S. side to react in a "constructive" fashion. ¶26. (S) Gottemoeller pushed back by clarifying that, from the outset of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation had made an important compromise in principle by agreeing, as recorded in the Presidents' Joint Statement of July 6, to include language on the interrelationship between SOA and SDA in the preamble of the treaty on the interrelationship between SOA and SDA, a step which constituted a break from past U.S. practice and positions. Antonov replied that the Joint Statement did not quarantine such language to the preamble. He jested that the Russian side could pursue a comparable line of logic from President Medvedev's statement in Singapore that Russia trusted the United States and therefore did not need verification to imply that verification should be restricted to the preamble. He followed this by repeating his request that the U.S. side make clear to Washington the substance and importance of the problem. He stated that he was ready to continue discussions on the missile defense issue or other issues as needed. ¶27. (S) The meeting closed with the heads of delegation noting each other's consistency in their positions on the matter. ¶28. (U) Documents exchanged: - Russia: -- Proposal of the Russian Federation on Fundamental Issues of the New START, dated November 28, 2009. ¶29. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby Lt Col Comeau Mr. Connell Ms. Dreicer Mr. Elliott Dr. Fraley Lt Col Goodman Mr. Johnston Ms. Kirchgasser LTC LaGraffe Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Ms. Zdravecky Dr. Hopkins (Int) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Mr. Artem'yev Ms. Fuzhenkova Mr. Ivanov Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Adm Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Lobach Ms. Melikbekian Col Petrov Gen Poznikhir Col Pischulov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Trifonov Ms. Vodopolova Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) MISSING ONE PERSON ¶30. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS