START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001090 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-061. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 27, 2009 Time: 15:00 P.M. - 17:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov conducted a Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting on November 27, 2009. Antonov assessed the recent visit of NSA Prikhodko as positive, though he qualified it stating Prikhodko's role was to deliver a message and not work substantive treaty details. Chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee Kozachev is due to visit November 29-30, and Gottemoeller offered to meet with him and host a lunch. Gottemoeller tabled a non-paper on Article V, which evoked a spirited discussion on provisions related to the treatment of heavy bombers and missile defense. Finally, Gottemoeller requested Antonov's cooperation in setting guidelines for Conforming Group activities to ensure more productive and speedier results. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Prikhodko Visit Backbrief and Kozachev to Visit Geneva; Article V - U.S. Non-Paper Reviewed; Article V - Heavy Bombers; Article V - Missile Defense; Getting the Conforming Group on the Right Track. -------------- PRIKHODKO VISIT BACKBRIEF AND KOZACHEV TO VISIT GENEVA -------------- ¶5. (S) Antonov reported he had spoken to Prikhodko after his meetings in Washington. Antonov, who confided he and Prikhodko were close friends, was pleased to note Prikhodko had called him first prior to calling the foreign minister. Prikhodko related that U.S. officials had told him they were not satisfied with the outcome of the visit of CJCS Mullen and Russian CSA Makarov. Prikhodko apparently qualified by saying it was not a reflection on the efforts of the delegations. Their conversation then turned to the question of how to get to an agreement. Antonov said the work could be done by the delegation, and it did not have to be a "tsar's concern." He reported Prikhodko had traveled to Washington with authorization to discuss only the treaty. Prikhodko closed his conversation with Antonov assessing the outcome of his visit to be positive, and the most important thing was both sides had been given food for thought. ¶6. (S) Gottemoeller told Antonov that the reports she had received from Washington matched the reports Antonov had received. She alluded to recent U.S. proposals for resolving the mobile missile and telemetry issues. She conveyed how Washington was very interested in reaching an agreement, and she alluded to an important meeting that was taking place November 27th in Washington, on a day following a holiday where minimal activity was normally performed. She offered to Antonov her impression that Washington, while working hard to reach agreement on the treaty, might be growing pessimistic of the chances for a treaty signature by the desired date. ¶7. (S) In response to Antonov's question on the window for a signature in the December timeframe, Gottemoeller confided the President was scheduled to be in Europe December 8-11. Antonov quickly shifted from the potential date of the signing to the potential location. He reported he had cabled Moscow and lobbied hard for the signing ceremony to be in Geneva. He had argued for Geneva as that was where both delegations were located. He also noted the significance of Geneva in the broader context of arms control and disarmament. However, his impression from Moscow was that Moscow would like another venue. He wondered out loud if Prague might get the nod, considering Prikhodko had once worked there and spoke fluent Czech. ¶8. (S) Gottemoeller reminded Antonov the most important consideration was not the location of the signing but having in fact something that could be signed. Antonov was nonplussed. Referring back to Prikhodko's visit, Antonov hinted that Prikhodko had been sent to Washington just to convey a message, and that all of the technical issues could and would be resolved at Antonov's level. He assessed the treaty document itself to be approximately 40 percent complete, and in an effort to show more progress promised definitive answers to preamble questions on Monday. Gottemoeller suggested that she and Antonov meet every day from here on--including Saturday, to which Antonov readily agreed. ¶9. (S) Later in the meeting, Gottemoeller returned to the subject of Prikhodko's trip to Washington and wondered how long before the results were briefed to the Russian senior leadership and new guidance issued. Antonov thought it could come as soon as Saturday, November 28, but he was not sanguine about the prospects of such a speedy action. He reported President Medvedev, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and Prikhodko were all in Belarus November 27 for an event. It was possible that the results of the visit might be discussed, but he figured the more likely scenario would be no new guidance would be forthcoming until Monday or Tuesday. ¶10. (S) Antonov advised Gottemoeller that Chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee Kozachev was due to visit Geneva on November 29 and 30. Gottemoeller offered to host a luncheon for him, which Antonov gratefully accepted. -------------- ARTICLE V - U.S. NON-PAPER REVIEWED -------------- ¶11. (S) Gottemoeller passed to Antonov a copy of a U.S. Non-Paper on Article V (Prohibitions). Begin text of U.S. Proposal on a Treaty Article on Prohibitions: U.S. Non Paper November 27, 2009 Article ((((V))))1 ((((VI))))2 ¶1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. ¶2. The Parties agree that the modernization and replacement of their strategic offensive arms shall not involve the production, testing or deployment of nuclear weapon delivery systems other than ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. ¶3. In the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the Bilateral Consultative Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article ((XIII))1 ((XIV))2 of the Treaty. ((4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs or SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration.))2 ((4. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties.))1 ((5. In fulfilling obligations under this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing a payload, other than any kind of weapon, into space or the upper atmosphere.))2 ((5. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.))1 ((6. Each Party undertakes not to convert heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Nuclear armaments shall not be stored at air bases of heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments. The crews of such bombers shall not undergo training to carry out missions involving nuclear weapons.))2 ((6.))1 ((7.))2 Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory. ((7. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph x of Section x of Part Four of the Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph x of Section x of Part Four of the Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.))1 ((8. Each Party undertakes not to locate heavy bombers with nuclear armaments outside the continental portion of national territory.))2 ((9. In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber outside the national territory in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of Article VIII, notification shall be provided.))2 ((10. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.))2 ((11. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein.))2 ((12. Each Party undertakes not to jointly base heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at an air base.))2 End text. ¶12. (S) Gottemoeller proceeded to point out the differences with a previous draft version of Article V. She recalled Antonov had expressed concerns over how paragraph 2 had been worded to ban new forms of strategic offensive arms (SOA). She pointed out the paragraph had been rewritten to reflect what was going to be permitted in the form of modernization of SOA, namely ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. She pointed out the text was juxtaposed between ensuring no prohibitions on modernization while at the same time prohibiting the development of new, exotic forms of SOA. ¶13. (S) Taking paragraphs 1-3 as a whole, Gottemoeller stressed them to be the key to framing the prohibitions that should be included in Article V: modernization was permitted, exotic weapons prohibited, and any questions thereof could be raised for discussion in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). ¶14. (S) For U.S. paragraph 4 (Russian paragraph 5), Gottemoeller agreed to the need for language limiting the uses of ICBMs and SLBMs for the launching of objects into space. However, she encouraged Antonov to consider staying with text formulation that had been used in the START Treaty. ¶15. (S) Russian and U.S. versions of paragraph 7 were both deemed to be acceptable. The HOD discussed the most logical location for them in the treaty. The HOD also agreed to consider moving paragraph 9, which contained language on the need for notifications of heavy bomber movements, to the notifications part of the protocol. -------------- Article V - Heavy Bombers -------------- ¶16. (S) For Russian paragraph 6, Gottemoeller asked Antonov whether he had any concerns about the lack of verification provisions associated with ensuring crews of converted heavy bombers were not being trained to carry out missions using nuclear ordinance. Antonov said his experts had not expressed any reservations. He and Gottemoeller then discussed the final location of this paragraph and the possibility of listing like paragraphs together. ¶17. (S) Paragraph 8 (a Russian-proposed prohibition on locating heavy bombers with nuclear armaments outside the continental portion of national territory) evoked a spirited discussion. Gottemoeller began by commenting how this paragraph went against one of the basic tenets of the treaty, namely the ability for a Party to decide the size, composition, and by extension, the operation of its SOA. Antonov agreed that Article II permitted the determination of size and structure. However, for operations, he reminded Gottemoeller how the heavy bombers in question in this paragraph would actually be carrying live nuclear weapons. As such, it was logical that their movement be constrained. He assumed this provision would not be a huge question, as he didn't see the need for either side to have nuclear weapons on board heavy bombers during peace time in the first place. He wondered where the United States might want to fly its nuclear laden bombers, Guam, or some other location. ¶18. (S) Comparing treatment of one type of SOA restrictions to another, Gottemoeller pointed out how the Russian side chafed at any proposals to curb the movements of mobile launchers of ICBMs. Antonov replied mobile launchers were confined to deployment areas, which he likened to small islands in the sea that was the national territory. However, under the Russian proposal, the heavy bombers would get to fly over the entire national territory with no restrictions. Antonov wondered (what the Russian Federation should think) whether the United States had any plans to deploy heavy bombers over the skies of Cuba or Venezuela. Gottemoeller wryly observed that if that was an issue, the United States would have complained every time a Russian Bear bomber flew down the U.S. coast on its way to a landing in Venezuela or Cuba. With that, the HOD determined to set the question aside for the time being. ¶19. (S) For paragraph 12, the final paragraph of the article which contained a provision prohibiting basing nuclear and non-nuclear bombers together, Gottemoeller wondered if there was a real need for such a provision. Attempting to soften the impact of the language, Antonov noted the language said "based," which meant lesser collocations might be acceptable. He also offered to move the text to a less prominent part of the treaty documents so long as the United States would agree to the language therein. -------------- ARTICLE V - MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶20. (S) Russian-proposed paragraphs 10 and 11 (conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to ABM launchers and the reverse), evinced another animated response from Antonov. Antonov pointed out how the United States had converted ICBM launchers at Vandenberg AFB into missile defense launchers. He wanted language inserted into Article V that would clearly prohibit them from being reconverted back into ICBM launchers. Gottemoeller underscored the purpose of the treaty was to cover SOA and not missile defense systems. ¶21. (S) Antonov replied there were many things covered in the treaty. For example, ICBM launches of objects into space are covered with a provision; however, if only SOA were to be addressed, the treaty could not carry this provision either. Gottemoeller observed that this issue had political linkage that made it unacceptable to the United States. Antonov noted the treatment of silos was covered under the treaty, and this aspect of their usage should likewise be addressed. Gottemoeller noted there was a proposal for another visit to Moscow by Under Secretary Tauscher to continue discussion on missile defense cooperation. Antonov was skeptical it would take place, and he was less convinced anything new would be discussed. -------------- GETTING THE CONFORMING GROUP ON THE RIGHT TRACK -------------- ¶22. (S) Gottemoeller expressed concerns over the operation of the Conforming Group. She observed the Conforming Group activities were being counterproductive in that they were redrafting sections of agreed language that necessitated a return to the originating working group for discussion and approval. ¶23. (S) Antonov offered for a joint meeting of HOD with the representatives of both side to the Conforming Group to ensure they heard one set of directions articulated. As an aside, Antonov took advantage of the moment to chide the United States for its constant reliance on START Treaty text and phrasing. ¶24. (S) Gottemoeller expressed her appreciation of Antonov's offer, and closed by reminding him how the smooth operation of the Conforming Group would be key to achieving the goal of an acceptable treaty by the desired date. ¶25. (S) Documents exchanged: - U.S. -- Non-Paper on Article V (Prohibitions),dated November 27, 2009. ¶26. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS