START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001088 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 20, 2009 REF: A. A) GENEVA 00856 (SFO-GVA-V-044) ¶B. B) GENEVA 01012 (SFO-GVA-VI-052) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-043. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 20, 2009 Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On November 20, 2009, the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) met at the U.S. Mission. The TTDWG discussed the provisions in Article VIII on disclosure of information. Though agreeing in principle for the need to release information, the sides were not able to agree on language allowing for release to the public of initial data submitted after signature and prior to entry into force (EIF). The TTDWG also began initial discussion on Article IV, and agreed to consider convening a sub-working group to work through locational restrictions found in this article. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Article VIII - Disclosure Issues; and Article IV - Initial Work Begins. -------------- ARTICLE VIII - DISCLOSURE ISSUES -------------- ¶5. (S) Ries began discussion on Article VIII by proposing a new formulation to the language concerning release of data acquired through implementation of the treaty. The new language would allow for release of data at EIF, and would contain provisions for subsequent releases of information within certain parameters. The language also recognized the need for agreement with the two Parties on data release, and it noted the sensitivity of certain types of data that would not be released unless the Parties agreed otherwise. Koshelev, for his part, noted the extensive experience both sides had acquired in the area of data release during the life of the START Treaty. However, taking into consideration Russian legislation on security of information, the best course of action to his mind would be to postpone discussions of data release until the first session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). ¶6. (S) Koshelev also pointed out there would be a final submission of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data at the end of the START period, and that information would look very similar to the information submitted at EIF. Admiral Kuznetsov added that, for the MOU, all of the data fields had yet to be decided let alone populated with data. Taking into consideration all fields would have to be completed prior to signature, he felt it premature to begin discussions on what to release and not release until it was known what information would be available for such consideration. He also argued for pushing any discussion of data release to the BCC, which would convene after all matters had been decided and treaty EIF. ¶7. (S) Ries agreed with Kuznetsov on the need to complete all database fields and affirmed the intention of the United States to provide such data. She added there were in fact three separate releases of data that would need to be considered: the final START data, which the BCC would address; an initial release of START Follow-on (SFO) data to take place during the provisional application phase; and subsequent releases of data taking place on a recurring basis throughout the life of the treaty. However, she felt it important for Article VIII to address the initial release of information and also address what would happen subsequently. She reminded the Russian side this treaty possessed an added dimension over START in that it would also address nuclear warheads. As this aspect of the treaty involved highly sensitive information, it was important to craft language limiting releases to the aggregate numbers of nuclear warheads. Regardless, it was important to be clear all other data would not be released unless otherwise agreed. ¶8. (S) Koshelev thought any activities related to provisional application should take place at a separate discussion and not be framed in the treaty text. He argued for more concise language and avoidance of listed inclusions and exceptions. He also thought the BCC would be the best venue for determining release of information. With that in mind, he noted how the Russian-proposed language provided the broad context for determining future releases of information via the BCC. ¶9. (S) Mr. Dean observed the key difference in positions was that the United States wanted the right to release information vice a release being subject to consent. He thought the BCC would then be able to address further details concerning such release. Ms. Zdravecky stressed the importance of Article VIII language in establishing expectations for outside observers about what would be released, as well as what was too sensitive and therefore not likely to be considered for release. ¶10. (S) Koshelev said the only hard and fast requirement in the treaty involving information release was the requirement for both sides to meet the limits set forth in Article II within 7 years. He stipulated to the obligation for both sides to report that information. Mr. Taylor pointed out how both the START Treaty and Moscow Treaty also had goals of lower limits and both sides reported on a recurring basis the progress they were making towards those goals. The language the United States sought to insert in Article VIII would assure treaty implementation would occur with maximum openness and transparency. Koshelev said he would think over the matter and consider what practices (i.e., release of information) would be desirable to carry over from the START Treaty. At the same time, he lobbied for a shorter formulation to the language. Ries agreed, but noted it equally important to fence certain areas of data from any release. -------------- ARTICLE IV - INITIAL WORK BEGINS -------------- ¶11. (S) Dr. Fraley began a discussion of U.S.-proposed locational restrictions in Article IV. He noted the Russian proposal contained several restrictions in Article V that could also be discussed at the same time and might be more appropriately located in Article IV. Regardless of the location in the text, he urged the Russian side to begin discussion soonest. Fraley also pointed out that the Russian text did not contain all locations where strategic offensive arms (SOA) might be located under this treaty, and he asked whether the Russians had thought about this omission. Finally, he noted the concepts of prototypes and transit rules for SOA should also be discussed. ¶12. (S) Kuznetsov opined the MOU Working Group should decide first what data will be placed in the MOU, then the Definitions Subgroup should build definitions for deployed and non-deployed SLBM, ICBM, and heavy bombers, and only then should the TTDWG examine Article IV. Koshelev wondered whether the matter should not be referred to another working group prior to discussion by the TTDWG. Ries suggested both sides consider including experts from other working groups. After the meeting ended, Koshelev and Ries agreed to consider forming a subgroup to examine location re strictions in Article IV. ¶13. (S) Documents exchanged: None ¶14. (S) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Dr. Fraley Mr. Sims Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky Mr. Sobchenko (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev ADM Kuznetsov Ms. Fuzhenkova Col Kamenskiy Mr. Luchaninov Ms. Melikbekian Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS