START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001085 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING, NOVEMBER 19, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037) ¶B. GENEVA 1082 (SFO-GVA-VII-035) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-038. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2009 Time: 11:20 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. RUSSIA A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov Ms. Purcell (Notetaker) Mr. Vorontsov (Notetaker) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the November 19, 2009, one-on-one meeting with Amb Antonov, A/S Gottemoeller previewed current Washington thinking about reducing strategic delivery vehicles below ¶800. In such a case, Washington believed compensation for conventionally-armed launchers would be needed. Washington also believed the warhead limit should go down to 1500 if the delivery vehicle limit went below 800. Antonov considered it impossible for Russia to explicitly recognize conventionally-armed launchers in the treaty. Antonov also said the Presidents had discussed delivery vehicle numbers between 600 and 700. ¶4. (S) Antonov was adamant that it was critical for the joint statement on missile defense to be legally-binding and ratified in the United States as well as in Russia. Gottemoeller identified offense-defense as a key issue that needed to be resolved, along with numerical ceilings, telemetry, and measures for mobile ICBM systems. The U.S. side hoped to resolve these issues during CJCS Mullen's meetings with General Makarov and National Security Advisor Jones' meetings with Mr. Prikhodko. Those meetings would determine whether there would be a treaty to sign by December ¶10. ¶5. (U) Subject Summary: Negotiating Lower Numbers; Planning Mullen-Makarov and Jones-Prikhodko Talks; Missile Defense Commitments Must Be Legally-Binding; Releasability of Treaty Data, May I?; and, And On Top of That, The Duma Is Coming. -------------- NEGOTIATING LOWER NUMBERS -------------- ¶6. (S) Gottemoeller conveyed to Antonov that she had just received confirmation that Presidents Obama and Medvedev had discussed limits on strategic delivery vehicles below 800 during their November 15 meeting in Singapore. Washington was now considering numerical limits lower than 800. In such a case, the United States would need compensation, an allowance for launchers carrying conventional warheads. The limit of 800 delivery vehicles proposed by Jones in October (REF A) was high enough so that conventionally-armed strategic delivery vehicles could be counted as if they were nuclear-armed. If the limit were lower, for example 750, the United States probably would need a separate allowance of 50 conventionally-armed delivery vehicles that would not count as nuclear-armed. This was an on-going discussion in Washington, not yet decided. ¶7. (S) Antonov considered such an allowance completely unacceptable. Russia had agreed to close its eyes to U.S. conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs by counting them as nuclear. Russia could never agree, however, to recognize conventionally-armed strategic delivery vehicles explicitly in the START Follow-on treaty. Instead, the word nuclear would be removed from in front of warheads in the treaty text. Russia did not object to research and development on conventional warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs, but its goal was for them not to be deployed. ¶8. (S) Gottemoeller acknowledged U.S. understanding of Russia's position, and that the treaty would reflect constructive ambiguity regarding conventional warheads. But, the question had just arisen of how to reduce below 800 delivery vehicles. It would be very difficult to break that barrier, so the U.S. side was considering compensation. Antonov insisted that the Presidents, or at least President Medvedev, had discussed reductions to 600 to 700 delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller acknowledged that President Obama had expressed willingness to explore a limit below 800. ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller also conveyed Washington's consideration that, if the delivery vehicle limit was reduced below 800, the deployed warhead limit should be lowered as well, to ¶1500. Antonov asked why that had to be so. Gottemoeller explained that reducing deployed warheads down to 1500 would make the reductions more significant in comparison with the Moscow Treaty and, therefore, be viewed more positively by the international community. If the United States had a separate allowance for conventional warheads, it would not need a warhead limit as high as 1600. Another, potentially important, reason was that Russia would soon deploy a new MIRVed ICBM. The United States did not yet know how many warheads Russia planned to deploy on it. Antonov argued that the United States could use warhead inspections to count the number of warheads on Russian ICBMs. Gottemoeller clarified that the concern was over the total number of warheads deployed on the new mobile ICBM. The United States needed some certainty as to the limits of Russian MIRVing. -------------- PLANNING MULLEN-MAKAROV AND JONES-PRIKHODKO TALKS -------------- ¶10. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed plans for the arrival of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen and Russian Chief of the General Staff General Makarov on November 22. Gottemoeller planned to host the visitors for dinner at her apartment the evening of November 22, and Antonov planned to hold a reception at the Russian Mission the evening of November 23. Gottemoeller provided Antonov a list of the delegation accompanying Mullen and the schedule she had proposed. Antonov conveyed that Makarov would be accompanied by a number of three- and four-star generals, including the commanders of the Russian Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Forces. ¶11. (S) Antonov asked what should be covered during the opening plenary meeting. Gottemoeller suggested that she and Antonov first provide their views on the status of the negotiations, and then the visiting military leaders could each give a presentation. Antonov demurred, saying that he did not represent the military and could only speak at their meeting if they requested. Antonov was supportive of the visitors convening small group meetings in any composition, but he saw no reason for a closing plenary meeting. His view was that the Russian visitors' role was to help the negotiators, but not interfere in the negotiating process. They would convey the results of the meetings to President Medvedev, who would make decisions that would form the basis for Russian foreign policy adviser Prikhodko's subsequent visit to Washington. ¶12. (S) Antonov asked whether Mullen would discuss limits on numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller thought so, but said she would have more details later. Antonov doubted that Makarov would say anything about numerical limits that would differ from President Medvedev's statements. Medvedev had first stated a delivery vehicle limit of 500-550, then had changed his position to 600-700. The President determined the limits of Russia's ability to compromise, and neither Makarov nor Prikhodko would contradict the President. There would be no surprises from the Russian side on this point. Moscow was wondering why White House officials were included on Mullen's delegation, since the discussion would be on military-technical issues. ¶13. (S) Gottemoeller reviewed the key U.S. goals for Prikhodko's visit to Washington November 25-26. The United States hoped that at least the main parameters of the treaty would be decided in order to give guidelines to the negotiators on the direction of the treaty regarding: - numerical ceilings; - measures relating to mobile ICBM systems; - telemetry; and - the offense-defense relationship. The U.S. considered these meetings critical for determining whether or not there would be a treaty to sign by December 10. ¶14. (S) Antonov asked about press availability during Mullen's visit. Gottemoeller advised against it, being certain that Mullen would not want publicity and would not give any interviews. Antonov agreed, saying he would also advise Makarov not to give any interviews. However, if asked, the Russians would tell the press that the visit was taking place as directed by President Medvedev, that military-technical issues were being discussed, that the goal was to help move the negotiations forward, and that they would report back to President Medvedev. Perhaps there would also be some warm words about what a great job the negotiators were doing. The Heads of Delegation both noted that the press was very interested in the negotiations. Gottemoeller warned that a U.S. journalist would shortly publish an article about U.S. portal monitoring activities at Votkinsk. -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE COMMITMENTS MUST BE LEGALLY BINDING -------------- ¶15. (S) Gottemoeller requested confirmation that Russia wanted the associated documents on missile defense to be equivalent to the Treaty Protocol because Russia would ratify them. They did not need to be ratified under U.S. law, but the Administration would provide them to the Senate on a voluntary basis. Antonov became very serious and said that the missile defense documents must be legally-binding and ratified by both sides as an integral part of the treaty package. He had understood that the United States had agreed to do so and had reported that to Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Medvedev. If the United States was not going to ratify the missile defense documents, that changed everything. Russia's concerns about U.S. missile defense would return and the Parties would be back to square one on this issue. Antonov explained that the reason why he had earlier said that the missile defense documents must be considered second tier documents was because Gottemoeller had said that the United States would ratify at least the first and second tier documents. ¶16. (S) Gottemoeller clarified that all three tiers would be subject to ratification in the United States, although she understood Russia would not ratify the third tier documents. Associated documents had been concluded successfully under START, even though they had not been subject to ratification in the United States. Antonov emphasized the importance of obtaining a legally binding-guarantee that, for the duration of the START Follow-on treaty, the United States would not build up missile defenses to a level that would threaten Russia's deterrent forces. ¶17. (S) Antonov clarified that he was not referring to the draft unilateral statements. He knew they were not legally-binding. His concern was with the joint statement; if it were not legally-binding, the value of the treaty would be negated for Russia. Russia insisted that obligations regarding both offenses and defenses must be law for both the United States and Russia. Gottemoeller assured him the United States was working hard to address Russia's concerns, reminding him that the U.S. position always was that the START Follow-on treaty would address only strategic offensive arms, and not defensive systems. START provided a very good precedent, in that missile defense concerns were resolved through statements associated with the treaty and, therefore, the withdrawal clause in START did not specify any examples of extraordinary events. ¶18. (S) Antonov promised to prepare Makarov and Prikhodko for discussions of the offense-defense issue and requested that Gottemoeller prepare Washington officials. Russia did not want to begin offense-defense discussions from the beginning all over again. Russia wanted to resolve the issue. Russia was not asking for limitations on missile defense, but only for a binding Presidential level commitment that ICBMs, SLBMs, and their launchers would not be used for missile interception, so that Russia would not face technological surprise. This would significantly enhance trust between the sides. ¶19. (S) Gottemoeller expressed concerns about treaty ratification. Antonov countered that Russia had a similar difficulty in obtaining treaty ratification. The treaty must be seen in Russia as providing parity in order to be ratified. -------------- RELEASABILITY OF TREATY DATA, MAY I? -------------- ¶20. (S) Gottemoeller provided the U.S. Delegation's reaction to Russian-proposed treaty text on releasability of treaty data, which Antonov had provided on November 18 (REF B). The U.S. side believed it was a step in the right direction, but not yet acceptable. In Gottemoeller's view, the United States would agree that data would be released as mutually agreed, but a routinized procedure for releasing data was needed. Russia's proposed text would require requesting approval for each release of data, with potentially long delays. Under START, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data was automatically releasable after three months. Antonov asked for details on releasability procedures under START, taking careful notes. He promised to check further with his delegation. Gottemoeller noted that the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group was discussing this provision, and would continue to work on it. ¶21. (S) Begin text: Russian Proposal for paragraph 6 of Article VIII (in place of paragraphs 6 and 7 of U.S. draft text) Each Party shall have the right to release to the public or a third Party the data acquired in the implementation of this Treaty subject to the consent by the other Party. End text. ¶22. (S) Gottemoeller then raised the proposed outline structure for the treaty documents. Russia had proposed an outline that was not consistent with the U.S. approach in terms of which headings used Roman numerals and which used letters. Using Russia's outline structure would require too many changes in the various texts being developed. Antonov said he would check with his legal advisor, recognizing it was not a substantive issue. ¶23. (S) Antonov recommended against listing specific examples of when the Parties should not use concealment measures in Article IX of the treaty. The U.S.-proposed text of Article IX included such a list. He argued that such illustrative examples should be discussed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The overall commitment not to use concealment measures that impede verification covered it all--a total ban. Gottemoeller argued that the provision came from paragraph 3 of Article IX of START. Antonov recommended that the experts work further on that paragraph. -------------- AND ON TOP OF THAT, THE DUMA IS COMING -------------- ¶24. (S) Antonov had just received confirmation by phone that a group of Duma members planned to arrive in Geneva the evening of November 22 to meet with the Russian Delegation. It was not a request, but a fait accompli. He was at a loss as to what to do with them, especially on November 23, when his delegation would be fully occupied with the Mullen-Makarov meetings. He was concerned, however, not to offend them or let them feel neglected. One of the visitors was named Ozerov, who was very important and influential. Kosachev was not coming. They would be invited to the reception at the Russian Mission the evening of November 23. Gottemoeller agreed to arrange a lunch for the Duma members on November 24, after Mullen's departure. ¶25. (S) Antonov hoped for good results from all these visits. He commented that many additional officials in Moscow were now seeking to participate in the negotiating process, and cited two relevant Russian proverbs: Victory has many fathers, but defeat is an orphan; and Generals take cities, while privates surrender cities. ¶26. (S) Documents exchanged. None. ¶27. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS