START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001081 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 17, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 1075 (SFO-GVA-VII-028) ¶B. GENEVA 0963 (SFO-GVA-VI-030) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-032. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group met with their Russian counterparts at the Russian Mission on November 17, 2009. This was the second meeting of this session and the ninth meeting overall. The U.S. side handed over a revised version of joint draft text (JDT) of the MOU and the two sides discussed issues stemming from the JDT. The United States also handed over its planned facilities declaration for the MOU. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Discussion of JDT and U.S. Facilities Declaration; "Returned" ICBMs and Notifications and JDT Clarifications; and, Discussion of Mobiles and Next Steps. -------------- DISCUSSION OF JDT AND U.S. FACILITIES DECLARATION -------------- ¶5. (S) Following a brief discussion regarding proposed START Follow-on (SFO) related meetings in Washington and the impending visit of three Duma members the following week, General Orlov and Mr. Trout turned to the opening section of the MOU. Trout agreed to consider Orlov's proposal to title the MOU "Protocol to the Treaty, Section 2." ¶6. (S) Trout handed over the latest version of the U.S.-proposed JDT of the MOU, which incorporated the last round of Russian and U.S. changes. Trout and Orlov agreed not to proceed line-by-line through the most recent iteration, as both sides were aware of the outstanding issues. Orlov asked, in light of the earlier discussion of the Ad Hoc Group (REF A),what Trout thought of the Russian proposal on heavy bomber counting rules. Trout responded that the U.S. side was looking at the whole issue of counting rules, but that no decision had yet been reached. ¶7. (S) Colonel Pischulov stated that the Russian Delegation had not introduced any new changes into MOU subsections 1, 2, or 3, but had not accepted any U.S.-proposed text. He then briefly surveyed the Russian Delegation's positions on Sections 4 and 5 and the Annexes to the MOU. Trout queried for the rationale behind the Russian inclusion of so much technical data pertaining to heavy bombers, as the U.S. position was that only data required to distinguish between heavy bomber types was needed. Orlov stressed that the additional data, which was the same as in START, was necessary for inspectors. Pischulov stated that the Parties needed technical data to determine how many missiles can be located on the aircraft. LT Lobner pointed out that technical data was included in START for purposes of attributing warhead numbers. In light of the dropping of such an attribution system, the technical data no longer served a purpose, while distinguishing data was still salient. Orlov replied that, if the United States accepted the Russian proposal on heavy bomber counting rules proffered that day at the Ad Hoc Group, Russia would agree to drop the technical data requirements. Under the Russian proposal, each heavy bomber would be attributed with a single warhead. Trout replied that the United States was looking at a construct of deployed heavy bombers, non-deployed heavy bombers, and deployed heavy bombers with non-nuclear armaments, and would respond to the Russian proposal soon. ¶8. (S) Trout proposed that the sides drop the categories for measurements of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs in Annex A and instead exchange photographs that show the front and side of such fixed structures. Orlov stated that the Russian Delegation would consider the proposal. Mr. Shevchenko questioned what the Russian Federation derived from such an exchange. Trout responded that the Parties achieved a means to resolve brackets. ¶9. (S) Both Trout and Orlov noted that they had been tasked by their Heads of Delegation with referring text to the Conforming Group as quickly as possible. The two chairs agreed to consider specific texts for referral at the next MOU Working Group meeting. ¶10. (S) The Parties then discussed the category of "other airplanes" in Annex D and agreed that the heading and associated data would be included under a revised title of "inspection airplanes." ¶11. (S) Trout handed over a Facilities Declaration for the United States. Orlov said that the Russian Delegation would consider the document and be prepared to discuss it at the following session. He also stated that he had the same data with him but it was not ready to be turned over to the U.S. side at that time. -------------- "RETURNED" ICBMS AND NOTIFICATIONS AND JDT CLARIFICATIONS -------------- ¶12. (S) Pischulov raised the issue of "returned" ICBMs at production facilities for ICBMs, stating that the Russian side believed that this was an agreed issue. (Begin comment: "Returned" ICBMs are those treaty-accountable missiles that have returned to a production facility, usually for maintenance. ICBMs that have never left a production facility are not treaty-accountable. End comment.) Trout queried whether the Russian side would continue the START practice of including in notifications whether an ICBM leaving a production facility is a newly-produced or a "returned" missile. Trout stated that, if the Russians agreed to continue such notifications, the U.S. would accept the inclusion of the word "returned" in the MOU. Orlov initially responded that the Russian side would continue doing so, but then subsequently stated that they would consider the issue. ¶13. (S) Orlov noted that Mr. Elliott had agreed to delete all references in the treaty to "items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty" and queried why the text remained in the MOU heading. Trout replied that he would look into the matter, but noted that the MOU covered more than only strategic offensive arms, as the Russian heading suggested. ¶14. (S) Lobner raised a number of detailed issues. He first confirmed with Pischulov that the Russians agreed to remove "training heavy bombers." He noted that the United States was moving toward the deletion of references to training heavy bombers, their related items, and deployment areas, but that completing such deletions would take some time. ¶15. (S) Orlov agreed to include the phrase "variant of a type" in Section III. He also agreed to add the category of "repair facilities for ICBMs," as the United States would have to declare a facility under this heading. Lobner noted that the United States would also place brackets around "training models of missiles" to reflect Russian opposition to including the category. Lobner also pointed out that the U.S. position on the title for Annex B, as well as various opening paragraphs for sections in Annex B, were changed to reflect the U.S. view that the section should emphasize heavy bomber distinguishing features. Lobner noted that the United States had not seen any data under Annex C, Section 4, on non-nuclear ALCMs. ¶16. (S) Lobner stated that the United States agreed with the Russian reorganization of facilities in Annex D. In light of the reorganization, the United States had added sub-headings for ease of following the data. He also noted that some differences remained regarding which facilities to include in this section. Trout added that production facilities for SSBNs, a category the Russians proposed including, were not typically subject to inspection. Pischulov replied that the Russian Delegation had included this category because such facilities could be used for conversions or eliminations and therefore needed to be listed, but understood that they were not normally subject to inspection. Orlov affirmed this point and suggested moving those facilities not inspectable elsewhere. Pischulov noted that the Russian Delegation had included the category of "flight test centers" for the same reasons. Trout floated the idea of creating a category of bases not subject to inspection, and Orlov agreed to consider the proposal. Mr. Luchaninov queried whether definitions would need to be provided for the U.S.-added sub-headings; Lobner replied that, because they were purely organizational, the U.S. side did not envision creating such definitions. -------------- DISCUSSION OF MOBILES AND NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶17. (S) Colonel Voloskov asked why the U.S. side had included a category on ICBM and SLBM production facilities. Trout responded that this reflected the U.S. position that the Votkinsk Final Assembly Plant was still subject to inspection. This prompted a discussion on the issue of Votkinsk and the wider matter of the verification of mobile ICBMs and their launchers. The Russian Delegation expressed their opposition to special verification provisions for mobile ICBMs and their launchers. Trout asked the Russian Delegation for suggestions for a verification regime that would provide adequate confidence to the United States. Sidestepping the question, Orlov dismissed the idea of installing cameras at Votkinsk, noting that such a system could be easily cheated by the Russians, and the U.S. proposal to allow the Russians to enjoy comparable rights at what Orlov referred to as "two provisional storage facilities." (Begin comment: Orlov was referring to the U.S. offer to permit Russian monitors outside the U.S. Strategic Weapons Facilities in exchange for extending continuous monitoring at Votkinsk (REF B). End comment.) ¶18. (S) Mr. Shevchenko, pointing out that Votkinsk produced ICBMs for fixed launchers as well as for mobile launchers, challenged Trout that the United States would not be able to differentiate types among the ICBMs produced. Trout responded that the United States would use multiple means, including notifications and national technical means, to confirm types. Shevchenko pressed Trout that relying on notifications implied that the United States would have to trust the Russian side because there would be no way to see inside identical railcars used to transport different kinds of ICBMs. Trout agreed that the U.S. side would have to trust the Russian side to some degree, and that such trust would lessen the strain on national technical means. Shevchenko then queried whether, if Russia began producing liquid-fueled ICBMs at another facility, the United States would demand equivalent rights there. Trout replied that the United States would not, because the United States' concern was with ICBMs for mobile launchers, which would only be of the solid-fueled kind. ¶19. (S) The chairs concluded the meeting by agreeing that at the next meeting they would look to determine text that could be sent to the Conforming Group. Queried by Trout, Orlov admitted that he had not yet studied Annex J, but would do so in the near future. Again, questioned by Trout, Orlov also said that the Russian Delegation would consider providing, at the next meeting, a list of Russian facilities that would be declared. ¶20. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed JDT of the MOU, dated November 12, 2009; and -- U.S. Facilities to be Declared Under START Follow-on, dated November 17, 2009. ¶21. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Trout Lt Col Blevins LCDR Brons Mr. Colby Mr. Coussa LTC LaGraffe LT Lobner Mr. Sobchenko (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Pischulov Mr. Shevchenko Col Voloskov Ms. Vodopolova Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS