START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001077

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 18, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-033.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 18, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The fifth meeting of the U.S. and Russian Conversion
or Elimination (CorE) Working Group for this session was held
at the U.S. Mission on November 18, 2009. The two sides
reviewed remaining points of difference in the General
Provisions section of the CorE part of the Protocol (Second
Tier Documents). The Russian side also presented monetary
and safety-related reasons for limiting the time window for
verification by national technical means (NTM) following
elimination.


4. (S) The two sides also discussed the minimum requirements
for facility elimination, focusing on the fixed structures
for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The Russian side proposed
simply dismantling the above-ground structure and removing
those materials from the facility, leaving an uncovered
concrete pad in place.


5. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov expressed continuing skepticism
regarding the adequacy of U.S. procedures used to convert the
B-1B heavy bomber to a strictly non-nuclear role. Mr.
Elliott maintained that the procedures were wholly adequate.
He cautioned that any U.S. flexibility on the Strategic
Delivery Vehicle limit below the original level of 1100 was
contingent on excluding those converted B-1Bs from the
aggregate limits of Treaty Article II.


6. (U) Subject Summary: General Provisions, Revisited; Silo
Elimination; Heavy Bomber Elimination; Facility Elimination-
Concrete Pads; and, B-1B Conversion--RF Still Skeptical.

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GENERAL PROVISIONS, REVISITED
--------------


7. (S) After handing over an updated Russian-proposed Joint
Draft Text for portions of the CorE part of the Protocol,
Ryzhkov led the working group through a review of the CorE
"General Provisions." In the third paragraph, which
describes the concepts of CorE, the only disputed text
related to the Russian concept of authorizing periodic
verification of converted items. The current U.S. position
is that such items will no longer be "subject to the
provisions of the Treaty" once conversion is completed.


8. (S) Ryzhkov pointed out that the Russian-proposed wording
in the third paragraph was consistent with the U.S. offer to
allow annual inspections of converted B-1B heavy bombers
(REFTEL). This offer would keep the converted B-1B heavy


bombers within the scope of the SFO treaty, and the Russian
language merely reflected this reality. Elliott responded
that, while periodic viewings of converted heavy bombers
could be an important transparency measure, the U.S. side
believed that transparency was a two-way street and he was
still waiting for the Russian side to provide sufficient
transparency for mobile ICBMs and their launchers under the
SFO treaty.


9. (S) Ultimately, the two sides agreed that this difference
on post-conversion verification would be resolved at a later
date. (Begin comment: The U.S. SSGNs were not mentioned by
either side during this exchange. End comment.) Elliott
expressed his hope that the U.S. side would clarify its
position vis-a-vis mobile ICBMs and their launchers during
the Ad Hoc Group meeting scheduled for November 19th.


10. (S) Ryzhkov moved to paragraph 4 of the General
Provisions, which contains the process for adjudicating
questions regarding procedures for CorE developed by the
possessing Party. He stated that the Russian side had
deleted its own paragraph describing this process and had
accepted the U.S. proposal with only two minor changes for
clarification. After a brief discussion, the U.S. side
promised to further evaluate the wording changes proposed by
the Russian side.


11. (S) Ryzhkov drew the working group's attention to
paragraph 6 of the General Provisions, which discusses the
verification of CorE. The Russian side had added some
general language to capture the time windows for NTM means of
verification and asset availability for inspection, which
vary depending on the specific procedure in the CorE
Protocol. After some discussion, Elliott promised to
evaluate the proposed language further. Elliott also
reminded Ryzhkov that the other Russian-proposed bracketed
text in paragraph 6, which specifies verification of "the
result" of CorE, would have to remain bracketed. (Begin
comment: This text is unacceptable to the U.S. side since it
would prohibit direct observation of the final elimination
steps for mobile ICBMs. End comment.) Ryzhkov indicated his
understanding.

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SILO ELIMINATION
--------------


12. (S) The working group turned to the portion of Section
III covering silo elimination. Elliott reported that, after
careful assessment, the U.S. side insisted on a 60-day window
to ensure an adequate "look" by NTM at Russian facilities,
given the frequent lack of cooperative weather in Russia.
However, the window for on-site inspection could certainly be
shorter.


13. (S) Ryzhkov responded that a verification window of 60
days imposed an undue financial burden on the Russian
Federation. He acknowledged the legitimacy of the U.S.
argument for multiple verification windows, but then
illogically recommended that a single compromise window of 45
days be used. In response to a query from Elliott regarding
the reason for the financial burden, Mr. Smirnov explained
that elimination processes, such as digging, re-filling


holes, and grading the area surrounding an eliminated silo,
could only occur between March and October. If the 60-day
window extended into the winter, Russia was forced to choose
between paying excessive sums of money to complete the job
during the winter or leaving holes unfilled until spring.
The latter option, he opined, would pose a definite hazard to
livestock.


14. (S) Elliott noted that the Russian side had fully
bracketed the U.S. paragraph 4 in this section, and asked why
this had been done. (Begin comment: Paragraph 4 describes
procedures for an optional post-elimination inspection for
ICBM silos. End comment.) Ryzhkov answered that the Russian
side believed all provisions in this paragraph were now
addressed by the General Provisions. Therefore, the Russian
side proposed deleting the paragraph. Elliott agreed to
evaluate the proposal.

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HEAVY BOMBER ELIMINATION
--------------


15. (S) The two sides then began a review of procedures for
CorE of heavy bombers. Ryzhkov asked the U.S. side to remove
the last brackets in the sub-paragraph describing the
so-called "wild card" procedure for conversion, asserting
that the material was now adequately addressed by paragraph 4
in the General Provisions. Elliott agreed to evaluate his
proposal.


16. (S) Elliott then handed over new U.S.-proposed language
covering the heavy bomber elimination.

Begin text:

The elimination process for a heavy bomber shall be to
cut a wing or tail section from the fuselage, or cut the
fuselage into two pieces, at a location obviously not an
assembly joint, thereby rendering the heavy bomber inoperable.

End text.


17. (S) Elliott explained that previous versions of this
provision had directed "removal" of a wing, and the U.S. side
was concerned that the Russian word for removal could simply
mean unbolting the wing--which was not the intent of either
side. The new language was clearer because it utilized only
the verb for "cut." Ryzhkov agreed with Elliott's
presentation and choice of words, noting ruefully that the
two sides had spent an enormous amount of time discussing
this simple paragraph even though they had agreed on its
content since September.

--------------
FACILITY ELIMINATION
- CONCRETE PADS
--------------


18. (S) Leading a discussion of facility elimination
requirements, Elliott asserted that the only major issue
still requiring agreement was what constituted the
elimination of a fixed structure. Ryzhkov answered that this
would be achieved by dismantling the building and removing


the pieces from the facility. Elliott commented that those
measures might be sufficient, but that the U.S. side would
insist that no structure be rebuilt on top of the remaining
concrete pad that had served as the foundation.


19. (S) Ryzhkov pointed out that the concrete pads did not
play the same role they had for the old Russian Pioneer and
early Topol systems, which were re stricted such that they
could launch only from very specific locations. (Begin
comment: These systems are known in the United States as the
SS-20/SABER and the SS-25/SICKLE. End comment.) The Russian
Federation's modern mobile ICBM systems were just like a
submarine, capable of launching from any location. He
reminded his American colleagues that current Russian
doctrine required mobile ICBMs to disperse from their fixed
structures in an environment of escalating international
tension. In other words, the residual concrete pad had no
remaining military value to the Russian Federation once the
shelter of the fixed structure would be destroyed.
Therefore, there was no reason for a treaty requirement to
destroy the pad. (Begin comment: In response to a later
request for clarification by Mr. Dwyer, Ryzhkov reiterated
that the Russian side did not consider the concrete pad part
of the fixed structure. End comment.)


20. (S) Elliott acknowledged Ryzhkov's explanation, but
stressed that the United States required treaty language
stipulating that buildings could not be rebuilt over the
fixed structure foundations and support equipment could not
be returned to the eliminated facility. Ryzhkov replied that
the Russian side had no intention of using eliminated
facilities for purposes inconsistent with the treaty. He
opined that the U.S. position would be inconsistent if it
permitted heavy bombers to even visit an airbase designated
for use by bombers converted to non-nuclear roles. He said
the Russian-proposed Treaty Article V had such a prohibition,
preventing the Parties from using an eliminated facility for
purposes inconsistent with the treaty. (Begin comment:
Actually, Ryzhkov was mistaken. Only the U.S.-proposed text
for Article V has such a prohibition, which is carried over
from START. End comment.) Col Zaitsev then clarified that
transient passage of strategic offensive arms through
eliminated facilities would be permitted under the Russian
proposal.


21. (S) Elliott asked whether this prohibition would also
prevent the return of support equipment to the eliminated
facility. Zaitsev answered that the Russian ide did not
have a definition for "support equipmnt," and for that
reason had taken care to list ach item required to be
removed during facility limination.

--------------
CONVERTED B-B:
R.F. STILL SKEPTICAL
--------------

22. (S) Elliott then expressed a concern that, uner the
Russian concept, once the United States had converted its
last B-1B heavy bomber it would remain a strategic offensive
arm equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This meant that the
B-1B bases would not be considered eliminated facilities.



23. (S) In response, Ryzhkov asserted that the United States
had failed to explain how the B-1B had been adequately
modified during the so-called conversion process. Referring
to the SSGNs, he noted that the U.S. side had proposed an
actual demonstration of converted SLBM launchers, but that
the U.S. side needed to provide more convincing reasons to
confirm that the B-1B heavy bombers had been converted. He
stated that if the scope of the conversion was limited to a
swapped connector in the bomb bay, the Russian Federation
considered that problematic.


24. (S) Elliott responded by recalling that, during the
presentation made by National Security Advisor General Jones
in Moscow (REFTELl),the U.S. position had been that all B-1B
bombers would either be converted using existing procedures
or eliminated per the provisions being developed under START
Follow-on. He noted that the Russian counterproposal had
been silent on this aspect of the U.S. offer. For that
reason, the United States insisted on retaining the brackets
in paragraph 3 of the General Provisions for CorE. Elliott
noted that, at the time of START Treaty implementation, both
Parties had relied upon Agreed Statements to address unique
issues requiring solutions as the treaty entered into force.
He suggested that the two sides consider a similar strategy
to address similar issues that would bridge START-to-START
Follow-on. However, he re-emphasized that the United States
intended to finish converting the B-1B bomber fleet using
existing procedures, and he did not think the U.S. side would
get any
better at explaining the process.


25. (S) In response, Ryzhkov warned that, if the Russian
side remained unconvinced about the adequacy of B-1B
conversion, the Russian Delegation would engage its political
masters to solve the problem. (Begin comment: This apparent
resentment of the U.S. tactic to elevate the negotiations to
the level of the National Security Advisor during his Moscow
visit is a recurring theme in working group sessions. End
comment.) Then, relenting slightly, he repeated that the
Russian side still had official concerns about converted U.S.
heavy bombers, which it considered an outstanding legacy
issue from the START era. He urged his U.S. colleagues to
keep this in mind.


26. (S) Elliott soberly asserted that he wanted to make sure
the Russian side understood all his thoughts on this matter.
He was sure that U.S. military commanders would be unable to
agree to new limits on strategic delivery vehicles if the two
sides had not reached closure on the issue of the B-1B heavy
bomber. He knew that the United States did not want to go
back and spend additional money on bombers that had already
been converted.


27. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- Revised Procedures for Heavy Bomber Elimination from
Section V of Part III in the Protocol (in the original
English),dated November 18, 2009,

- Russia:


-- Joint Draft Text for Sections I, III, and V of Part
III in the Protocol (in the original Russian with unofficial
English translation),dated November 18, 2009.


28. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
LCDR Brons
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Voloskov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


29. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS