START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING
GROUP, NOVEMBER 17, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-031.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group
(IPWG) was held at the U.S. Mission on November 17, 2009.
The meeting focused on taking a second look at the opening
sections of the joint draft text of the Inspection Protocol
(IP). The two Parties brought the results of internal
technical and legal reviews to the discussion and were
prepared to agree on some issues and provide more detailed
rationale on others. The IPWG members discussed the title,
introductory chapeau, Section I - General Obligations,
Section II - Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of
Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members, Section III -
Arrangements for Transportation, and Section IV - Activities
Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry. At the
conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed that the four
sections discussed could be sent to the Conforming Group,
with references to monitoring left in brackets. All
remaining questions either concerned legal issues or were
associated with provisions for continuous monitoring.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Throwing Down the Conforming
Gauntlet; The Legalities of Inspector Lists; Privileged
Inspectors; Getting the Inspectors There; Getting Through the
Point of Entry; and, Starting the Inspection - Choices,
Choices.

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THROWING DOWN THE
CONFORMING GAUNTLET
--------------


5. (S) Colonel Ilin opened the neeting noting that he had
recently read the document describing the conforming process,
which had been provided by the U.S. side during an earlier
Conforming Group meeting and that today we were to challenge
our colleagues performing the conforming work. Dr. Warner
stated that the working group would be reviewing the material
in the first four sections of the Inspection Protocol. The
co-chairs agreed that their respective reviews had revealed
much common ground. Ilin commented that the primary
outstanding issue was continuous monitoring.


6. (S) Discussion of the text began with the title of the
Protocol. Alternatives included "Procedures for Inspection
Activities" and "Inspections, Visits, and Exhibitions" before
the co-chairs agreed upon "Inspection Activities" while the
phrase "and Continuous Monitoring Activities" remained in
brackets. The introductory chapeau was agreed, other than a
reference to continuous monitoring. Paragraph 1 of Section I
on the conduct of inspection activities was accepted as
agreed language, with both sides having accepted the term


"inspection activities." Both Parties agreed that the
collective term would be used throughout the Protocol, where
it was appropriate. After some discussion, it was agreed
that paragraph 2, whereby each Party committed in a blanket
statement to provide the notifications called for in the
Notifications Section of the Protocol, was also accepted.

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THE LEGALITIES OF INSPECTOR LISTS
--------------


7. (S) The discussion moved to the legal status provisions
of Section II. In paragraph 1, on transportation of the
inspectors, all of the language (with the exception of
"monitors") was accepted, including the Russian proposal to
include Open Skies aircraft as an acceptable transportation
means for the delivery of inspectors into and out of points
of entry (POEs). In paragraph 2, there was a compromise on
the size of the inspector list at 300 inspectors. A second
provision within the paragraph stated that the inspectors
were to be citizens of the inspecting Party (as under START);
the Russian text also included aircrew members under that
provision. After some discussion of the U.S. practice of
using, in some cases, aircrew who were legal residents but
not citizens of the United States, and the legal status of
these individuals when they traveled as inspection airplane
crew members, it was agreed that the U.S. and Russian legal
advisors would resolve the issue and provide appropriate
language.


8. (S) The U.S.-proposed paragraph 3 provided for agreement
or objection to inspectors and aircrew members by means of a
notification. Warner agreed to delete the provision based on
the previous reference to the Notifications Protocol in
paragraph 2 of Section I, agreement on the notification by
both Parties, and the reference to agreement or objection in
the following paragraph. The co-chairs came to agreement on
paragraph 4, on the updating of inspector lists, after Warner
agreed to remove references to the notification section, on
the grounds that the notification section of the protocol
would contain the obligation to notify, and the sides
compromised on a 45-day maximum update period for the list of
inspectors. Paragraph 5, on the identification information
included in the inspector list, was agreed other than the
reference to monitors.


9. (S) Paragraph 6 was intended to cover initial exchange of
inspector lists, notifications for amendments, and the
provision of visas for the individuals on them. After some
discussion and an agreed re-write to more clearly address
these elements, the text for this paragraph was agreed. The
U.S. version of paragraph 7 included the provision that
proposed inspectors could be denied only based on a criminal
indictment or conviction. After some discussion, Ilin and
Warner agreed to refer the question to the legal advisors for
discussion and resolution. Paragraphs 7 through 9 of the
Russian version specified the numbers of inspectors for
exhibitions and two types of inspections. Warner stated that
if the Parties could agree on one number for the size of the
inspection team for all three types of inspection activities,
the provision could be moved up to the treaty level; if not,
it would more appropriately be covered in Section V - General
Rules, where the U.S. version included it. Ilin responded


that the Russian numbers had not changed, but that the
provisions could be moved to Section V and recast into a
single paragraph.

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PRIVILEGED INSPECTORS
--------------


10. (S) Paragraph 8 addressed the privileges and immunities
to be accorded inspectors and aircrew as they carried out
their duties. After some discussion about whether the
chapeau and/or extended paragraph belonged in Tier 1 or Tier
2 of the treaty, it was agreed to keep the provisions at Tier
2 and in this location. The end of the chapeau, addressing
extension of immunity for "acts previously performed" after
the end of an inspector's assignment, was left bracketed for
review by the legal advisors. Subparagraphs (a) through (h)
addressed cases of privileges or immunities specific to the
exercise of inspection functions. Subparagraph (a) was
agreed language other than the waiving of immunity from
jurisdiction if a Party chose to do so. Warner agreed to
delete this provision because it was adequately covered by
existing diplomatic practice and customary international law.
In the remainder of this paragraph, subparagraphs (c) and
(d) were agreed completely, while subparagraphs (b),(e),
(f),(g),and (h) were agreed other than references to
continuous monitoring.

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GETTING THE INSPECTORS THERE
--------------


11. (S) Discussion of Section III began with the title; the
Russian version was "Air Transportation" while the U.S.
version was "Transportation" because of the separate
subsections for air and ground transportation included
therein. Paragraph 1, on establishing points of entry, was
agreed except for a reference, included in the U.S. version,
to where POEs were to be listed. Ilin agreed that the MOU
was the appropriate location. The context of the first
paragraph 2 was continuous monitoring. The second paragraph
was a Russian provision that was intended to identify the
airports at the POEs that could be used by inspection
aircraft, Open Skies, and commercial aircraft in transporting
inspectors and equipment to and from the POEs. After some
discussion, it was decided that these ideas could be
incorporated into paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 was deleted.


12. (S) Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 were agreed other than their
references to continuous monitoring. Paragraph 6, the
Russian-proposed provision for use of Open Skies aircraft,
was accepted by the U.S. delegation. Paragraph 7 provided
for flight routes to be listed in the MOU and flight plans to
be filed in accordance with notifications. After a brief
discussion, Ilin agreed to accept this provision. Paragraph
8, listing the payment for services required in handling
inspection aircraft on the territory of the inspected Party,
was a subject of genuine disagreement. The Russian version
showed airplane parking and security costs to be borne by the
inspecting Party rather than inspected Party, as had been the
accepted practice under both the START and INF Treaties.
Warner stated that the United States could not agree to this
and, after Ilin reiterated the rationale for the Russian


approach, it was agreed this issue would have to be addressed
at higher levels. The Ground Transportation subsection
focused entirely on continuous monitoring activities was left
bracketed.

--------------
GETTING THROUGH THE POINT OF ENTRY
--------------


13. (S) The discussion moved to Section IV - Activities
Beginning at the Point of Entry. Paragraph 1 focused on the
arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and the
in-country escort meeting them and expediting their entry.
The U.S. Delegation accepted the Russian text that called for
the baggage and equipment of the inspecting team to be exempt
from taxes, which left only provisions on continuous
monitoring bracketed in the text. Both paragraphs 2 and 3
were agreed other than continuous monitoring provisions.
Paragraphs 4 (examination of equipment to ensure it cannot
perform unintended functions) and 5 (examination of equipment
at the POE) were combined and re-written to incorporate
common language. After some discussion to ascertain from
where the various parts of the text had been extracted, Ilin
agreed to the inclusion of examination procedures in Annex 5
and the new paragraph was fully agreed other than continuous
monitoring provisions.

--------------
STARTING THE INSPECTION
- CHOICES, CHOICES
--------------


14. (S) The original paragraph 6 from this section, on
storage of equipment at the POE, was incorporated into
paragraph 1. The second portion of 6, on designating the
site and type of inspection to be performed, was the subject
of a limited discussion because of a difference between the
U.S. and Russian versions in specifying the timing of the
designation. The U.S. version of the text made the timing
clear by tying it to the time of site designation listed in
the notification (START Format 116, in the case of START
inspections) provided approximately 24 hours in advance of
the inspection team's arrival at the POE. Ilin agreed to
this approach and the paragraph became fully-agreed text.


15. (S) Paragraph 7 was introduced as a rewritten version of
what had been paragraphs 9 and 10, on the options available
to the inspection team leader if there are no ICBMs or SLBMs
or a reduced number of heavy bombers at the base chosen for
inspection. With the appropriate name of the inspection to
be filled in, Ilin agreed to the text in subsections (a) and
(b),but stated that subparagraph (c) on sequential
inspections would need to remain bracketed. Warner made the
case that, as the delegations discussed increasing numbers of
inspections over the original Russian proposal of five
inspections of each kind, sequential inspections would become
increasingly attractive to both sides. Ilin made no comment.
Paragraph 8, on the procedures to be followed in dealing
with mass media, was discussed from the perspectives of both
Parties. The U.S. version referenced procedures defined in
Annex 3, while the Russian version stated that procedures
would be specified by the inspected Party. It was agreed
that the provision would be discussed by U.S. and Russian


legal advisors.


16. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed that all four sections were
ready to be sent to the Conforming Group. Warner and Ilin's
next meeting was to be a one-on-one discussion of Treaty
Article XI.


17. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


18. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
LCDR Feliciano
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Ms. Pura
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Col Petrov
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS