START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001075 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 17, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-028. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Colonel Ilin, the Russian side presented comments on the U.S. concept for specific, separate treaty provisions for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and ICBMs for road-mobile launchers; the U.S. counterproposal for continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Missile Assembly Plant; and the Russian concept for counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary : Disadvantages Based on System Characteristics; START's One-Sided Obligations; Comments on Votkinsk; Why the Need for Focused Mobile Provisions; U.S. Has Addressed Russian Build-Up Concerns; Additional Russian Concerns; and, Russian Concept for Counting Rules for Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments. -------------- DISADVANTAGES BASED ON SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS -------------- ¶5. (S) Ilin began the meeting with a review of the agreed agenda items: ICBMs for road-mobile launchers; Russian comments on continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Missile Assembly Plant and the U.S. reciprocal offer for continuous monitoring; and, the Russian concept for counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments. Ilin stated the negotiations thus far demonstrated the most difficult and controversial issue that remained was ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and the road-mobile ICBM launchers themselves. The Russian Delegation presented its logic relating to the Russian position indicating there should be no special procedures specifically focused on mobile ICBMs. Ilin turned to General Poznihir for the presentation. ¶6. (S) Poznihir stated that the Russian Federation proceeded from an understanding of the U.S. concern regarding the possible covert creation of a Russian road-mobile ICBM force which would affect the strategic stability between the Russian Federation and the United States. Russia could not seriously consider separate procedures focused on these forces guided by an idea that was far from reality. Procedures in the new treaty should be based on the U.S.-Russian relationship, which significantly reduced the possibility of a nuclear conflict, by reducing strategic offensive arms (SOA),as well as, a realistic view of Russia's financial and defense production capabilities. Poznihir noted the nuclear force structure of the two Parties had changed significantly over the life of the START Treaty. Russia chose to emphasize a land-based road-mobile ICBM capability, whereas the United States chose to emphasize a mobile force based on the SSBN. Since the Russian treaty concept treated all mobile SOA equally, the same measures needed to apply to both road-mobile ICBMs and SSBNs. ¶7. (S) Poznihir noted the difference in force structure philosophy also placed Russia at a disadvantage on several levels. Since the SSBNs operated under the sea, Russia had a more difficult task of monitoring and tracking SSBNs than the United States had monitoring and tracking Russian land-based road-mobile ICBMs. Although both weapon systems reduced vulnerability through mobility and concealment, Russia's road-mobile force was confined to deployment areas, whereas the U.S. SSBN force was free to roam the seas. Russia was also placed at a disadvantage because the United States had fewer of these mobile systems to operate and also because this smaller SSBN force could be deployed with SLBMs that contained far more nuclear warheads than Russia's road-mobile ICBM force. Russia's road-mobile force was characterized by a unique operating regime that required specialized storage structures providing environmental and power needs, a specialized infrastructure of trained personnel, and pre-surveyed launch sites. These characteristics constrained operations of the road-mobile ICBM force; characteristics which the United States did not have to deal with regarding its SSBNs. ¶8. (S) To address the U.S. concern of an expanded road-mobile ICBM capability, Poznihir stated Russia had no interest in developing such a capability. This would involve an increased production capability and very significant costs. Russia sought rather to invest its monies to finance other projects. -------------- START'S ONE-SIDED OBLIGATIONS -------------- ¶9. (S) Poznihir remarked on the effect START's allegedly one-sided obligations had on Russia. Regarding cooperative measures (CM),Poznihir noted that the requirement to display road-mobile launchers in the open outside of their fixed structure groups was not only burdensome, but also affected the operational readiness of the road-mobile ICBM force. Moving the launcher out of its fixed structure degraded the operational readiness of the launcher-missile combination. As he stated previously, road-mobile launchers had unique requirements even for day-to-day operations. The open display requirements required road-mobile launchers to be taken off the fixed structure power system, necessitating the launcher generators to provide the power required to operate the launcher's electrical and environmental systems; which increased costs due to fuel consumption. On the other hand, Russia believed U.S. obligations for bomber cooperative measures actually increased the readiness of the U.S. heavy bomber. When a heavy bomber was removed from its hangar for the required display in the open, it was one step closer to launch. In closing, Poznihir stated that the sides also differed on the issue of elimination procedures for mobile ICBMs. Whereas the United States wanted unique detailed procedures for these eliminations, Russia believed the elimination procedures should be the same for all solid propellant ICBMs. -------------- COMMENTS ON VOTKINSK -------------- ¶10. (S) Poznihir next provided Russia's response to the U.S.-proposed streamlined procedures for continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Missile Assembly Plant. Russia believed the U.S. proposal to install specialized camera equipment, combined with the 60 hours in advance exit notification, to monitor the exit of road-mobile ICBMs from the Votkinsk Plant would be ineffective. Russia would not accept the proposal since the proposal was impractical. The installation of a specialized camera system would not provide useful information because the exit of ICBMs took place in special, covered railcars. Monitoring through the use of these cameras would only result in more ambiguities. ¶11. (S) Poznihir indicated Russia did not understand the value of the U.S. offer for reciprocal monitoring of nuclear weapons storage areas (NWSAs) at U.S. submarine bases; it was not an even trade for the information the United States gathered at Votkinsk. Nor did Russia accept that the U.S. offer to provide heavy bomber tail numbers would be equivalent to Russia's continued provision of unique identification numbers on all mobile ICBMs. Tail numbers had been on the bombers for many years and had been available to Russian inspectors. Russia would consider the offer if the United States would provide unique identification numbers for all of its strategic offensive arms. -------------- WHY THE NEED FOR FOCUSED MOBILE PROVISIONS? -------------- ¶12. (S) Dr. Warner explained why the United States believed there was a need for a focused set of provisions for monitoring mobile ICBMs. The mobile ICBM had been and would remain a significant component of Russian strategic nuclear forces. He noted that by the end of ten years the proportion of warheads assigned to mobile ICBMs would be much larger. There were two reasons for this proportional increase. First, the RS-24, which would be in service in a matter of months, would be the first mobile ICBM deployed with multiple warheads. Second, the overall number of deployed strategic warheads would be reduced by the treaty, which would increase the value of a MIRVed ICBM and increase its importance to Russian strategic capabilities. ¶13. (S) Warner stated that the issue for the United States, given the relatively small size of the mobile ICBM and its launcher compared to other strategic systems such as SSBNs and heavy bombers as well as its mobility, the mobile launcher/ICBM combination, was difficult to track and monitor the actual number of the mobile ICBMs and their launchers that were deployed. Various steps in both START and the START Follow-on (SFO) treaties were designed to provide confidence of the number of mobile ICBMs and their launchers available to the Russian side. Warner noted that several treaty provisions applicable to fixed ballistic missiles were also applicable to mobile ICBMs. An example of this was the requirement to provide data on the location of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs which were mobile and silo-based, and the right to conduct periodic inspections to confirm this data for both types of ICBMs. Nevertheless, specific procedures, focused solely on mobile ICBMs, were required because of the unique monitoring challenges presented by mobile ICBMs. ¶14. (S) Warner noted that, under START, specific procedures were in place throughout the life cycle of a mobile ICBM. Continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk final assembly facility and the assignment of unique identifiers provided confidence at the birth of the missile. Special requirements for inspection activities were in place in START and the United States had proposed these requirements be carried over in START Follow-on. One of these was the concentration or recall requirement for the inspection of bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Special requirements for the elimination of the mobile ICBMs mark the end of the life cycle. ¶15. (S) Warner indicated further that the United States understood Russian concerns with overly detailed and demanding mobile ICBM requirements in START and took this under consideration when developing the U.S.-proposed SFO provisions for mobile ICBMs. Because the Russian Delegation had objected to the U.S.-proposed requirements, the U.S. Delegation was working with colleagues in Washington to develop more streamlined procedures. These streamlined procedures will be concise and represent a more limited number of appropriate measures. Warner said the U.S. Delegation planned to provide the streamlined package of procedures relating to mobile ICBMs to the Russian side as early as Thursday. -------------- U.S. HAS ADDRESSED RUSSIAN BUILD-UP CONCERNS -------------- ¶16. (S) Mr. Elliott noted the Russian presentation referenced U.S. expressed concern about Russian capability to build up a covert mobile ICBM force, absent adequate verification measures. Elliott confirmed the U.S. side believed that due to the unique characteristics of the mobile launcher-ICBM combination it was possible, if not probable, that the Russian Federation could build up a covert mobile force. Elliott noted further that, while the Russian side characterized the U.S. concern as imaginary, it expressed similar concern over the U.S. capability to covertly reconvert previously converted SSGNs and B-1Bs back to a strategic nuclear delivery capability. The U.S. Delegation could have dismissed the Russian concerns as imaginary; however, instead it was considering periodic exhibitions of converted SSGNs and B-1Bs to assuage these Russian concerns. Elliott concluded by noting that U.S. concerns, over a possible Russian build-up potential, were no less than the Russian concerns and the U.S. request for various transparency measures applied to mobile ICBMs no more than the Russian request for transparency measures regarding the potential reconversion of converted U.S. systems. ¶17. (S) Mr. Trout noted that, for the last three years in post-START negotiations until the previous fall, Russia had expressed concern over U.S. SLBM upload capability. He stated the U.S.-proposed treaty text provided to Russia in October 2008 had not addressed these concerns. The U.S. proposal for reciprocal monitoring of the NWSAs at submarine bases in exchange for continued permanent portal monitoring at Votkinsk had attempted to address this Russian concern. The concept of having a permanent presence of Russian monitors on U.S. submarine bases was not being taken lightly by the U.S. military. The United States was trying to offer a proposal that would balance U.S. concerns with a possible mobile ICBM reload potential with the Russian concerns over a possible Trident SLBM uploading scenario. Trout said he was coming to the conclusion that it was more important to the Russian side to protect its operations from outside observation than to monitor U.S. Trident upload capability. Trout asked whether the Russian side could help the U.S. side understand Russian concerns. -------------- ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN CONCERNS -------------- ¶18. (S) Ilin reiterated that both sides had to be subject to the same treaty provisions. He believed the U.S. side was not ready to apply the same procedures and provisions to U.S. SSBNs as it was proposing to apply to Russian mobile ICBMs. For a long time the main concern for the Russian side was the SLBM upload capability. Russia had asked the United States many times to respond to its concerns and that request had been ignored. Therefore, Russia had changed its approach. For the new treaty, Russia proposed to reduce the number of SDVs and, therefore, the number of launchers, in order to reduce the upload potential of each side. ¶19. (S) Ambassador Ries commented that the U.S. side had listened carefully to Russian concerns about the need for streamlining and simplification of the treaty and for attention to the impact of verification measures on readiness and cost. The U.S. proposed a simplified approach to monitoring at Votkinsk. In the course of the negotiations, each side had noted that it was necessary to recognize the other side's legitimate concerns. Ilin responded that the situation brought to mind the image of having your hand in a vise. One side says they were willing to loosen it, but it was impossible to escape. He extrapolated from this example that if one side was subjected to limits, the other side should be similarly limited. He did not get the feeling, he said, that the U.S. side was willing to accept limits similar to those it proposed to apply to mobile ICBMs to SSBNs, which were treated like a sacred cow, even though it was extremely hard to verify their upload capability. The issues of most serious concern to the Russian side were the conversion of the Trident I SSBNs to a conventional role and the treatment of missile defense in the SFO treaty. The Russian concern with the Trident I SSBNs was not only the issue of reconversion. It also included the fact that U.S. precision conventional weapons essentially served the same purpose as nuclear weapons. Both missile defense and precision conventional weapons affected parity between the United States and the Russian Federation. ¶20. (S) Ilin remarked, in reference to the U.S. offer of reciprocal monitoring at the NWSAs at Kings Bay and Silverdale submarine base, that the Russian side after 20 years of U.S. monitoring at Votkinsk knew what information could be gained. He said he did not understand what information Russia would gain through monitoring at Kings Bay and Silverdale and how that information would equal the information gained by the United States at Votkinsk. Nonetheless, he requested additional details of the U.S. offer. ¶21. (S) General Orlov questioned what was more important, the number of ICBMs produced or the number of missiles deployed. For the SSBN, Russia was not concerned with the number of warheads that could be carried; it already knew the maximum number. Russia was more interested in the location of the SSBNs when they were deployed at sea. Orlov stated this information could be an equitable exchange for information gained through monitoring at Votkinsk. Warner stated the U.S. side had addressed Russia's concern over the number of warheads deployed on SLBMs and was certainly not prepared to provide locational information on SSBNs at sea. The U.S. side had told Russia that it was under the limit for operationally deployed nuclear warheads set by the SORT (Moscow) Treaty. The United States would be required to continue this reduction to get under the deployed warhead limit in SFO. He stated the United States was not willingly responsible for the one-sided application of specific procedures for mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers in START. The United States had seriously considered mobile systems of its own in the late 1980s; the rail-mobile system for the already existing Peacekeeper ICBM and the so-called Midgetman mobile system. The end of the Cold War and domestic politics helped the United States to decide not to deploy these systems. This decision helped lead to the very different strategic force structures of the two sides 20 years later. Warner reiterated the main point to be taken away from the discussion was that when the United States considered ratification of the treaty, it believed it was important to have a small separate set of treaty provisions focused on mobile ICBMs. -------------- RUSSIAN CONCEPT FOR COUNTING RULES FOR HEAVY BOMBER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS -------------- ¶22. (S) Ilin presented a new Russian concept for counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments. The concept was based on definitions, counting rules, and inspection activity. Airbases would be categorized by their association with heavy bomber weapons employment capabilities, those airbases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and those for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Heavy bombers would be categorized both by their association with a heavy bomber airbase (deployed or non-deployed),and by their association with the capability to employ or not employ nuclear armaments (heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments). Nuclear armaments would be defined only within the scope of this treaty. ¶23. (S) Ilin explained that. in the Russian concept, each airbase would have a declared number of warheads that would count against the limit on deployed warheads. The declared number would be determined by the number of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments located at the base. Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments would be declared to have one warhead that counted toward the declared number for the airbase. ¶24. (S) The concept included inspection activities to confirm the declared number of strategic delivery vehicles at each airbase. At airbases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armament, the inspecting Party would count the number of heavy bombers of this category and inspect a number of these bombers to view nuclear armaments deployed on the bomber. At airbases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the inspecting Party would view a sample of the non-nuclear heavy bombers to confirm reconversion had not taken place. During both inspections, the inspecting Party would not have access to the weapons storage area. Responding to a question from Warner, Ilin stated a sample of the non-nuclear heavy bombers would be inspected to confirm the absence of nuclear weapons and the fact that reconversion had not been accomplished. Ilin noted the Russian concept was just a preliminary suggestion. ¶25. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶26. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Elliott Mr. Hanchett Amb Ries Mr. Siemon Mr. Trout Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Gen Orlov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Col Zaytsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶27. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS