START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001074 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 13, 2009 REF: STATE 116297 (SFO-VII-GUIDANCE-001) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-021. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 13, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:15 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The third Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Colonel Ryzhkov, continued the review of the U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) of the CorE part of the treaty protocol. The sides addressed procedures for the elimination of silo ICBM launchers, CorE procedures for heavy bombers and SLBM launchers, and the elimination of facilities and fixed structures, with some discussion on the General Provisions Section. Several paragraphs of text were agreed upon during the meeting. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Your Text or Mine--Where do we Begin?; Section III: Procedures for CorE of ICBM Launchers; Section V: Procedures for CorE of Heavy Bombers; Section IV: Procedures for CorE of SLBM Launchers; and, SectiQ VII: Procedures for Elimination of Facilities and Fixed Structures. -------------- YOUR TEXT OR MINE-- WHERE DO WE BEGIN? -------------- ¶5. (S) Ryzhkov opened by stressing his desire to review the latest Russian-proposed text for the General Provisions Section of the CorE Protocol, which he said had been provided at the previous evening to the U.S. Delegation. Elliott demurred, citing a lack of time to translate the document into English and review it. Ryzhkov cited several new items in the Russian proposal which he believed were important to discuss before discussing the other sections. Elliott finally agreed, with the proviso that the General Provision Section discussion could be held at the end of the meeting or at the next discussion on Treaty Article VII, the CorE Article of the treaty. Ryzhkov reviewed paragraphs one through three of the Russian proposal and asked whether Elliott would agree. Elliott again demurred and reminded Ryzhkov that the General Provision Section would be discussed in detail later in the day, during a short meeting of the two working group chairs. Ryzhkov stressed the need to define the term "other items" that the U.S. side had proposed in the General Provision Section. Elliott explained that the term was considered useful to add because the term "Strategic Offensive Arms" was not defined. The next phrase, "subject to the limitations of the Treaty," was key. Elliott emphasized, however, that the text was not yet agreed. -------------- SECTION III: PROCEDURES FOR CorE OF ICBM LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶6. (S) Elliott and Ryzhkov returned to the U.S.-proposed JDT of Section III: Procedures for CorE of ICBM Launchers. Elliott proposed increasing the allowable time period for displays from 30 to 60 days to permit adequate time for the use of national technical means (NTM). Ryzhkov replied that Russia would prefer a single time period for all CorE verification activities--NTM, inspections, and exhibitions. Elliott responded that the U.S. side would study the idea, but stressed, in most cases, where NTM would be used, it would be necessary to have a longer time window. Hence, it would be difficult to have one time period for all CorE verification activities. ¶7. (S) Ryzhkov agreed with the U.S.-proposed text concerning the material to be placed into silos to carry out their elimination. However, instead of the U.S. phrase "filled with debris resulting from demolition and earth," the Russian side proposed the phrase "...filled with debris resulting from demolition of infrastructure, soil, or gravel." Elliott agreed to study the proposal. Ryzhkov indicated Russia had moved most of the language from paragraph four of Section III to the General Provisions Section and the chapeau of the CorE part of the Protocol. Elliott responded that he was not against moving this particular language to wherever it made the most sense--either the General Provisions Section or the chapeau of the CorE part of the Protocol, but noted further study was necessary so items such as specific notifications and verification activities would not be deleted inadvertently. ¶8. (S) The sides discussed paragraph nine of Section III and agreed the text, as written, should stand (on conversion of an ICBM launcher from one type of ICBM to another). Russia supported not specifying "silo" in this paragraph. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov when the outstanding mobile launcher CorE issues were decided, the text of this paragraph might be affected. Ryzhkov agreed, noting that the Russian delegation did not know what the United States would propose on mobile launchers. -------------- SECTION V: PROCEDURES FOR CorE OF HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶9. (S) Turning to Procedures for CorE of heavy bombers, Ryzhkov explained that Russia had removed the term "sever" in regard to the fuselage, as it had medical, not technical, connotations and, as such, did not fit in the text. He stated that all of the issues with paragraph one were all linguistic and the overall elimination concepts of both sides were similar. ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov proposed moving the text in paragraph two on remaining visible to NTM to the General Provisions Section, but then immediately withdrew his request after Elliott reiterated his earlier concerns that some inspection or notification activities might be inadvertently deleted from the individual sections if care was not taken when moving them to the General Provisions Section. There remained a disagreement over whether the time period would be 30 or 60 days. Both sides agreed to the draft text for paragraphs three and four--procedures for conversion of heavy bombers--with the exception of part of subparagraph "c" of paragraph four, "that render the heavy bomber incapable of employing nuclear armaments in a manner that the other Party can confirm, which shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC." Again, Ryzhkov proposed moving this text to the General Provisions Section. Again, Elliott responded he had yet to read the revised Russian-proposed text and as such could not comment until later. ¶11. (S) Ryzhkov noted the remaining paragraphs of Section V, paragraphs five, six, and seven, were compressed into one paragraph which, for the Russian side, was its paragraph five. He added that the newly-proposed paragraph five is an abbreviated version of the U.S.-proposed paragraphs six and seven. The Russian-proposed paragraph five contained new language about the right to view a heavy bomber after it had been converted. Begin Text: Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the converted heavy bomber shall not be flown, but shall be moved directly to the viewing site at the conversion facility. Notification thereof shall be provided and the heavy bomber shall remain on the viewing site for a 30-day period. End Text ¶12. (S) Ryzhkov proposed providing a right to view any item after the completion of either CorE procedures. The right might not be exercised often, but it would enhance confidence for both sides. Elliott responded that the U.S. side would review the Russian proposal. -------------- SECTION IV: PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION OF ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶13. (S) Elliott acknowledged the differences between the sides concerning SLBM launcher elimination procedures. One Russian proposal in particular stated SLBM eliminations could take place at either existing CorE facilities or "other facilities." Ryzhkov replied "other facilities" were declared facilities where CorE activities took place, but were not uniquely associated with SLBM eliminations. He continued, stating that Russia wanted flexibility built into the elimination process. Elliott agreed to review the Russian proposal further. Elliott read through U.S.-proposed JDT paragraphs two, three, and four (implementing the new guidance in REFTEL paras 1 and 2). Ryzhkov asked some questions for clarification, but had little negative feedback. Elliott noted the U.S. position requiring eliminated SLBM launchers to remain in the open for verification by NTM. He added that U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding would remain available to Russia for SLBM launcher elimination. ¶14. (S) Ryzhkov queried the U.S. side about the lack of a "wild card" procedure in the U.S.-proposed text for elimination of SLBM launchers. Elliott rejoined that the U.S. position was to have a wild card option for conversion of SLBM launchers, but not for SLBM launcher elimination. Ryzhkov opined this was due in large part to the United States not intending to eliminate any of its SLBM launchers over the next ten years. He further noted that the lack of a "wild card" option for SLBM launcher elimination did not give Russia flexibility and the elimination procedures were one-sided in nature, since the United States would not eliminate any of its SLBM launchers. He reminded the U.S. side that Russia did not intend to convert its SLBM launchers during the life of the new treaty and asked the U.S. side to reconsider its position: "Perhaps we can have additional elimination procedures listed, such as placing the submarine hatches and gas generators in an open area where NTM could view them. This would be a confidence-building measure. Why do we need all these additional procedures and strict timelines?" ¶15. (S) Elliott responded that the core issue was to gain and build confidence aQthat the United States was willing to address alternate proposals, especially with respect to use of NTM for verifying eliminations. Ryzhkov emphasized that the Russian side believed the scope of the U.S.-proposed verification and inspection measures was too great. Russia had compromised by agreeing to allow SLBM launcher conversions in order to save the U.S. money. The United States should be responsive to Russia's needs in this regard. Russia did not want to depend on the largesse of Senator Lugar, who could always withdraw his funding offer. He concluded by stating that, "'Trust but verify' was an adage under START. Perhaps the philosophy in the new treaty should be 'Verify but trust'." ¶16. (S) The Russian side agreed to the procedures outlined in paragraphs five and six of the U.S.-proposed JDT regarding SLBM launcher conversion. (Begin comment: These paragraphs cover compulsory conversion procedures. End comment.) Elliott offered to review the current JDT to see if any language in paragraphs seven through nine could be moved to the General Provisions Section. (Begin comment: These paragraphs cover the "before and after" notifications and exhibitions. End comment.) Ryzhkov replied he had to review the text further before agreeing. -------------- SECTION VII: PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF FACILITIES AND FIXED STRUCTURES -------------- ¶17. (S) Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that text in Section II, Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, still required high-leQl guidance from the respective sides before moving forward. Therefore, he proposed to discuss some of the paragraphs in Section VII, Procedures for Elimination of Facilities and Fixed Structures. Ryzhkov immediately commented that Russia bracketed the term "Fixed Structures" in the section heading. ¶18. (S) The two sides agreed to remove the requirement to eliminate facilities and fixed structures "in situ," since there was no possibility to do otherwise. Elliott opined that, once the definition of "support equipment" was agreed, many brackets in the section could be removed. Ryzhkov agreed, and replied that, as it stood, the term "support equipment" was too broad for the Russian side to agree to--it could mean anything from heavy bomber support equipment and submarine docks, to common trucks and specific tools. ¶19. (S) Ryzhkov felt the Russian-proposed text was clear on what support equipment would be eliminated: training launchers of ICBMs; driver training vehicles; training models of missiles; launch-associated support vehicles; and fixed structures. There was no need to detail any other items. He asserted that Russia did not have such a thing as a "transporter-loader of mobile ICBMs"; it was an item only used with INF forces. Elliott noted that the main concern of the United States was that eliminated facilities related to SOA could not be used again in the future. As long as the SOA and all items associated with the SOA were removed or eliminated, both sides should be satisfied. ¶20. (S) Both sides agreed the remaining contentious issue with respect to "fixed structures" was the reinforced concrete pad the mobile launcher rested on while in its garage. Ryzhkov confirmed that Russia intended to eliminate fixed structures when eliminating a facility where they were located. The procedure would be to take down the superstructure and remove it. It did not make sense to Russia to destroy the foundation as well. As an analogy, Russia was not asking the United States to eliminate the heavy bomber hangars when eliminating an airbase. ¶21. (U) Documents exchanged, None. ¶22. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott LCDR Brons Mr. Broshar Mr. Dwyer Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett Ms. Purcell LT Sicks Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Trifonov Ms. Vodopolova Mr. Voloskov Col Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶23. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS